IJNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
PAVIS 


^tlltam  38. 


WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE,  IN 
MASSACHUSETTS,  NEW  YORK,  PENNSYLVANIA 
AND  INDIANA.  1861-1865.  Large  crown  8vo,  $2.50, 
net.  Postage  extra. 

THE  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  HISTORY  OF  NEW 
ENGLAND,  1620-1787.  In  two  volumes.  Crown  8vo, 

$4.50. 

HOUGHTON,   MIFFLIN  &  COMPANY, 
BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK. 


WAR  GOVERNMENT 

FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

1861-1865 


WAR  GOVERNMENT 

FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

.  IN 

MASSACHUSETTS,  NEW  YORK 

PENNSYLVANIA  AND 

INDIANA 

1861-1865 

BY 

WILLIAM  B.   WEEDED 

Author  of  Economic  and  Social 
History  of  New  England 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON,   MIFFLIN  AND   COMPANY 

$re&£,  Cambriboe 
1906 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

T»  A"V7TC 


COPYRIGHT    1906  BY  WILLIAM    B.   WEEDEN 
ALL   RIGHTS   RESERVED 

Published  April  7906 


PREFACE 

THE  Civil  War  will  afford  ample  ground  for  historical 
research  and  study  for  generations  to  come.  Massa 
chusetts  is  far  ahead  of  other  States  in  the  preservation 
and  arrangement  of  all  records,  especially  those  in  man 
uscript.  Her  "  shoestring  files "  contain  the  original 
story  of  the  stalwart  doings  in  those  days,  comprising 
several  hundred  volumes  of  manuscript,  well  arranged 
and  kept  under  lock  and  key.  Careful  search  was  made 
here ;  and  I  was  indebted  to  Governor  Crane,  Mr.  Ham- 
lin,  and  the  other  officials,  for  constant  courtesy.  The 
archives  at  Albany  and  at  Harrisburg  were  examined. 
The  excellent  biography  by  Foulke  sufficiently  lighted 
up  and  colored  the  extensive  correspondence  of  Morton 
as  it  was  set  forth  in  the  "  Official  Records  of  the  Re 
bellion."  This  enormous  collection  of  printed  matter  is 
a  mine  of  crude  ore,  and  from  it  will  be  drawn  the 
maturing  history  of  our  pregnant  Civil  War. 

James  Ford  Rhodes's  account  is  exhaustive,  absolutely 
impartial,  and  very  graphic.  I  have  used  freely  his  wide 
spread  authorities.  I  differ  in  construing  the  facts  at 
some  important  points,  as  will  appear  in  the  following 
pages.  Very  likely  the  difference  was  in  that  I  could 
not  rise -to  the  heights  of  his  sedate  charitableness. 

W.  B.  W. 

PROVIDENCE,  R.  I.,  March  1,  1906. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ix 

I.  THE  GENESIS  OF  THE  UNION 1 

II.  THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS 34 

III.  ADMINISTRATION 64 

IV.  STATE  SUPPORT 125 

V.  FEDERAL  AND  STATE  INTERFERENCE 177 

VI.   PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT 224 

VII.   THE  PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION 263 

VIII.   GOVERNMENT 319 

IX.  THE  UNION  VINDICATED  AND  DEVELOPED          .  .  359 


INTRODUCTION 

IT  was  my  lot  to  lap  two  generations  of  historians. 
George  Bancroft,  Francis  Parkman,  and  others  gave 
ine  advice  and  encouragement ;  Justin  Winsor  constant 
direction  and  suggestion  ;  Herbert  B.  Adams  much 
sympathy.  Perhaps  I  should  not  have  written  had  not 
Winsor  warmly  encouraged  it.  Sometimes  I  thought 
there  was  enough  matter  already  printed ;  but  he  showed 
that  sincere  and  serious  effort  to  "  enlarge  the  bounds 
of  knowledge "  would  never  be  unwelcome  or  useless. 
Latterly,  I  often  urged  on  the  students  of  this  genera 
tion  that  there  was  a  great  field  for  the  study  of  gov 
ernment  in  the  interplay  of  the  National  Union  and 
the  State  commonwealths,  which  were  principalities  in 
the  Civil  War,  especially  in  its  early  stages.  Likewise 
the  personality  of  the  governors  was  romantic  and  in 
teresting.  All  said  "  Good  " — but  no  one  wrote.  When 
I  first  suggested  my  own  undertaking  to  a  Nestor  in 
our  circles,  and  told  him  of  these  results,  or  lack  of  a 
resultant,  he  said,  "  Ah  !  those  who  write  about  it  must 
have  lived  it."  And  the  number  who  lived  it  is  narrow 
ing  fast.  I  realized  the  force  of  his  saying  when  I  came 
to  lay  out  subject-matter  and  narrative  in  the  begin 
ning.  Facts  which  were  simple  enough  alone  became 
complex  questions  when  their  relation  to  other  doings 
entangled  the  incidents  and  enforced  a  new  form  or 
frame  of  suggestion.  As  Mr.  Rhodes  well  says  in  his 
fourth  volume,  a  continuous  narrative  of  the  Civil  War 


x  INTRODUCTION 

does  not  admit  consideration  of  some  important  issues, 
which  often  end  in  grave  constitutional  problems. 

When  President  Lincoln  assumed  control,  Union, 
"the  bond  of  all  things,"  existed;  though  despoiled 
and  damaged,  it  was  not  broken  or  dissolved.  Even 
James  Buchanan  had  been  able  to  comprehend  that; 
weak  and  undetermined  as  he  was,  he  could  not  betray 
a  trust.  On  the  other  hand,  he  could  not  maintain  gov 
ernment  in  its  natural  prerogatives ;  could  not  perceive 
that  secession  involved  immediate  coercion,  else  there 
could  be  no  Union.  This  entity,  represented  by  the 
administration  at  Washington,  was  a  necessary  whole, 
but  not  absolute  in  all  its  functions. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  States  were  not  mere  aggre 
gations  of  people,  though  their  several  populations  con 
stituted  the  people  whom  Lincoln  led  and  constantly 
had  in  mind.  In  this  consciousness  he  was  their  work 
ing  servant  as  well  as  director  and  leader  by  right. 
Ultimately  he  reached  the  powers  of  a  dictator,  but  he 
was  no  Sulla  or  Caesar ;  he  used  only  the  abounding 
prerogatives  of  the  greatest  servant  of  the  people. 

Meanwhile,  the  States  —  what  were  they  ?  Minor 
principalities,  not  complete  in  sovereignty,  any  more 
than  the  people  are  completely  sovereign ;  but  powers 
with  many  attributes  of  sovereignty.  They  could  not 
coin  money  or  levy  war  for  themselves ;  but  they  could 
levy  war  for  the  Union,  on  the  largest  scale  conceived 
at  that  time  by  any  people,  whether  governed  impe-1 
rially  or  democratically.  The  true  functions  of  these 
partial  powers  and  petty  kingdoms  were  hardly  per 
ceived  in  1861.  Good  people  were  so  busy  in  putting 
down  rebellious  States  seeking  a  new  confederacy  that 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

they  forgot  the  importance  of  these  mediatory  prin 
cipalities,  powerful  in  their  local  representation,  and 
instantly  ready  to  support  the  loyal  North.  Because  it 
was  convenient  for  a  bureau  at  Washington  to  stretch 
forth  the  national  power  and  levy  on  the  whole  people, 
the  bureaucrats  were  constantly  forgetting  that  this 
process  was  in  a  state  of  necessary  gestation.  The  cen 
tral  power  of  the  Union,  destined  ultimately  to  reach 
its  imperial  hand  over  every  citizen,  was  being  slowly 
developed..  As  long  as  all  citizens  were  in  substantial 
agreement,  it  made  little  practical  difference  how  these 
powers  were  exercised  technically.  But  when  Repub 
licans  and  Democrats  resumed  their  old  party  lines, 
the  materials  for  difference  of  opinion  rapidly  became 
national  issues  of  vital  importance.  The  misunder 
standing  of  citizens  might  become  half  treasonable 
opposition  in  conducting  local  parties,  and  might  make 
state  legislatures  practically  hostile  to  the  national  gov 
ernment. 

As  the  contest  advanced  and  thickened,  the  func 
tions  of  the  leaders  of  these  local  communities  were 
extended  and  amplified.  The  term  "War  Governor" 
grew  naturally  out  of  the  occasion,  and  such  men  were 
Paladins  of  more  than  chivalrous  devotion  to  the  cause 
of  one  common  country.  The  name  indicates  that  some 
thing  had  been  added  to  the  office  as  it  had  been 
known  in  the  ordinary  civic  routine  of  the  States.  They 
were  indeed  detached  but  assimilated  War  Ministers, 
wielding  the  resources  of  their  governments,  not  only 
in  execution  of  the  law,  but  by  mustering  all  the  powers 
of  the  States  according  to  the  need,  and  under  the 
requisitions,  of  the  national  government.  Their  ener- 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

gies  in  most  instances  were  unbounded,  while  their 
executive  resource  and  tact  were  unfailing.  Their  inter 
course  with  the  President  and  departments,  varying 
according  to  the  traits  and  characteristics  of  each  indi 
vidual,  affords  most  interesting  ground  for  investi 
gation.  A  vast  amount  of  humanness  —  of  the  nature 
and  condition  of  man  —  shows  itself  in  the  interplay 
of  these  powerful,  practical  men  of  affairs  with  the 
authorities  at  Washington.  The  officials  of  the  bureaus 
were  more  constrained,  limited  by  politics  an/1  routine, 
oppressed  by  a  conserving  sense  of  responsibility,  than 
were  these  captains  who  worked  in  the  midst  of  the 
people.  They  had  a  certain  sovereign  quality  as  direct 
representatives  of  the  people ;  but  their  dominions  and 
principalities  were  portions  of  the  Union,  —  parts  of 
its  whole,  —  combined  in  its  structure,  and  constantly 
affected  by  the  national  movement  of  all  the  parts. 

There  were  great  personalities  developed  then;  and 
none  greater  than  the  three  men  treated  herein,  —  Mor 
ton,  Andrew,  Curtin,  —  whose  service  was  continuous 
throughout  the  war.  The  personages  differed  as  much, 
essentially,  as  the  circumstances  and  conditions  of  their 
respective  communities.  Moreover,  the  prescribed  con 
ditions  of  the  occasion  in  some  degree  forecast  the 
resultant  action  of  those  personages,  which  action  in 
turn  varied  its  color  as  personal  characteristics  came 
into  play. 

The  main  motive  of  my  thesis  lies  just  here.  War 
government,  federal  and  state,  did  the  work  most  potent 
and  far-reaching  in  its  results,  in  the  business  we  are 
now  indicating.  The  rebellion  made  itself  and  created 
its  necessary  issues;  the  immensity  of  the  war>  the 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

hecatombs  of  slaughter,  the  wasting  of  myriad  homes, 
were  due  to  occasional  incapacities  of  the  adminis 
tration. 

The  administration  —  president  and  cabinet  —  could 
not  grasp  the  whole  national  issue  resting  in  its  hands. 
It  was  so  fearful  of  doing  too  much  that  it  tried  to 
even  the  national  balance  by  striking  from  the  recruiting 
measures  the  heaped-up  resources  which  the  governors 
and  loyal  legislators  were  constantly  offering  from  the 
very  heart  of  the  people.  This  puttering  economy  of 
the  national  rulers  turned  awry  the  magnificent  stream 
of  early  recruits  —  not  raw  clodhoppers,  but  soldiers 
amply  supplied  and  equipped  by  state  energy  out  of 
state  treasuries.  This  mustering  force,  which  ought  to 
have  marched  out  in  regular  tread  toward  Washington, 
was  either  checked  and  hindered  like  an  uncertain  desert 
stream,  or  it  was  driven  like  a  fitful  torrent  when  the 
recurring  panics  called  hastily  for  more  and  more  troops. 
The  mismanagement  of  these  proffered  thousands  and 
abounding  resources  finally  exhausted  the  voluntary 
spirit  which  prevailed  so  vigorously  in  the  early  days. 
The  exhaustion  of  the  volunteers  naturally  compelled 
the  administration  to  put  forth  its  central  authority 
and  to  bring  every  citizen  of  the  United  States  — 
exemptions  excepted  —  under  its  military  control:  in 
short,  it  made  a  draft. 

But  this  process,  clear  in  statement,  was  by  no  means 
easy  and  simple  as  the  facts  occurred.  If  the  loyal 
communities  had  been  kept  at  work  mustering  and 
equipping  out  of  the  abundant  local  resources  of  the 
States,  there  could  not  have  arisen  those  differing  issues 
which  did  arise  concerning  the  powers  of  the  States 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

and  the  main  functions  of  the  national  government. 
These  disturbing  matters  became  burning  questions. 
They  were  adopted  by  the  old  Democratic  party,  now 
cast  adrift  and  needing  as  a  party  a  respectable  shib 
boleth.  The  Republican  partisans,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  by  no  means  self-effacing  or  modest  in  their 
assertions.  The  most  intense  partisan  is  a  narrow  and 
over-virtuous  one.  But  deeper  in  political  consequence 
than  these  personal  or  partisan  predilections  was  the 
larger  ground  of  legitimate  constitutional  evolution. 
There  were  no  actual  constitutional  means  for  placing 
States  in  loyal  opposition  to  the  fair  course  of  the 
national  government.  The  well-practiced  American 
methods  of  installing  opposition  through  discussion 
and  party  debate,  failed  in  times  of  revolution,  when 
the  matter  touched  vital  national  issues.  The  practical 
outcome  of  agitating  a  Northern  State  and  throwing  it 
across  the  line  of  action  taken  by  the  national  govern 
ment  was  a  veiled  support  of  the  seceded  and  rebellious 
States.  There  was  no  essential  difference  between  the 
position  advocated  by  Horatio  Seymour  in  1863  1  and 
that  of  Robert  E.  Lee  when  he  resigned  his  commission 
in  the  army  of  the  Union.2  These  innate  constitutional 
limitations  were  not  fully  recognized  and  comprehended 
at  the  time ;  but  the  people  felt  them,  endured  immense 

1  Cf.  infra  p.  293. 

2  Lee  resigned  April  20,  1861,  and  wrote  his  sister  on  the  same  day : 
"  The  whole  South  is  in  a  state  of  revolution,  into  which  Virginia,  after  a 
long  struggle,  has  been  drawn  ;  and  though  I  recognize  no  necessity  for 
this  state  of  things,  and  would  have  forborne  and  pleaded  to  the  end  for 
redress  of  grievances,  real  or  supposed,  yet  in  my  own  person  I  had  to 
meet  the  question  whether  I  should  take  part  against  my  native  State." 
—  Recollections  of  General  Lee,  p.  26. 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

anxiety  accordingly,  and  cherished  bitter  hatred  of  the 
Copperhead. 

The  practical  outcome  and  effect  of  all  this  agitation 
was  not  the  repression  of  the  States  politically,  but  their 
disuse  as  the  greatest  volunteering  agencies  ever  known. 
The  national  government,  absorbing  the  strength  of  the 
Union,  reaching  forth  its  natural  prerogatives,  seized 
every  citizen  —  not  exempt  from  military  service - 
through  the  draft.  This  did  not  change  the  nature  of 
the  contest,  though  forms  changed.  Methods  of  organ 
ization  were  altered  greatly ;  and  to  half-developed 
statesmen  like  Horatio  Seymour  these  methods  seemed 
unrepublican  and  despotic.  The  people  knew  better, 
and  acted  accordingly. 

There  was  an  immense  loss  of  immediate  vigor  in  a 
people  bred  to  local  government,  when  the  large  state 
organisms  were  curtailed  of  their  largest  and  most  far- 
reaching  local  functions.  Morton,  Curtin,  and  Andrew 
were  no  less  loyal  patriots  when  they  were  striving  to 
administer  the  draft.  The  contrast  between  them  and 
Seymour's  half-way  counselors  was  like  Milton's  vision 
of  Gabriel  and  Michael  arrayed  against  Satan  and 
Moloch,  though  the  amiable  Copperhead  lacked  the 
force  of  these  rebellious  angels.  But  the  governors 
could  not  be  the  mighty  agents  they  had  been,  in 
jecting  the  national  ascendency  into  every  hamlet, 
and  stimulating  every  citizen,  through  his  local  func 
tions  and  civic  pride,  to  offer  himself  on  the  altar  of 
his  country.  It  is  pathetic  to  read  the  anxious  expres 
sions  of  these  governors,  and  to  enter  into  their  strug 
gles,  when  trying  to  ward  off  the  draft.  They  became 
mere  implements  and  utensils  —  very  serviceable,  it  is 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

true,  in  carrying  through  the  national  power  and  in 
distributing  its  action,  but  occupying,  nevertheless,  a 
difficult  and  unpleasant  office. 

Perhaps  nothing  in  the  early  days  of  the  Rebellion 
impressed  observers  and  critics,  at  home  or  abroad, 
more  forcibly  than  the  immediate  use  of  the  kingly 
power  which  survived  in  the  office  of  President.  The 
Southern  Confederacy  differed  in  character  from  the 
United  States,  though  its  form  was  much  the  same. 
The  seceding  States  formed  their  government  in  the 
strictest  method  of  representative  institutions,  such  as 
had  been  followed  in  the  old  republic,  but  adapting  the 
new  form  to  the  maintenance  of  slavery.  Their  orderly 
conduct  in  these  respects  justly  commended  itself.  But 
the  office  of  President,  though  it  finally  assumed  dicta 
torial  powers  under  the  inevitable  pressure  of  war,  was 
new  and  untried  in  the  beginning.  On  the  other  hand, 
President  Lincoln,  instead  of  surrendering  to  anarchy 
at  Washington,  as  the  rebels  hoped  and  even  expected, 
found  plenty  of  prerogatives  awaiting  his  hand.  These 
were  inevitable  powers,  emanating  directly  from  the 
people  and  concentrating  in  a  crisis  only  in  one  hand, 
if  there  is  to  be  any  effective  government  enforced  by 
such  people  or  nation.  These  kingly,  though  not  or 
ganized,  powers,  carefully  exercised  by  Lincoln,  gradu 
ally  widened  into  the  effective  control  of  a  dictator. 
The  form  was  republican  and  limited,  but  the  substance 
was  of  the  old  attributes  of  sovereignty. 

Nothing  more  bewildered  the  average  congressman, 
in  his  Philistine  consciousness,  than  this  potent  and 
elusive  force  in  the  President.  The  people  trusted  Lin 
coln,  and,  knowing  their  nature  as  he  did,  he  never 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

abused  their  confidence  and  never  doubted  their  sup 
port.  This  serene  authority  maddened  the  half  intelli 
gent  congressman,  who  fancied  himself  the  essence  of 
a  town-meeting,  backed  at  any  moment  by  overwhelm 
ing  popular  vote.  Seward,  with  characteristic  sagacity, 
noted  that  Congress  frequently  represented  the  Press, 
which  they  then  mistook  for  the  People.1  Certainly, 
important  issues  were  generally  initiated  by  the  legisla 
tive  branch  of  government,  and  must  be  always  con 
firmed,  as  soon  as  circumstance  would  admit.  But  in 
an  extraordinary  crisis,  legislation  was  so  carved  out  by 
circumstance  and  enforced  by  patriotic  necessity  that 
the  congressional  representative  felt  himself  under 
duress,  as  it  were.  However,  if  he  could  not  wholly 
initiate  the  necessary  bill,  he  could  scold;  and  there 
was  much  talk  against  acting  in  accord  with  the  "  royal 
pleasure,"  in  the  words  of  Ben  Wade.2 

This  disappointed  energy  of  congressmen  and  of 
party  leaders  generally  culminated  in  the  serious  revolt 
against  Lincoln  in  the  early  canvass  for  his  reelection 
in  1864.  Though  the  people  had  nominated  him,  these 
petty  politicians  fancied  he  could  not  be  elected  with 
out  their  own  instant  help.  They  wanted  something 
else,  they  did  not  know  what,  until  the  great  ground 
swell  of  the  people  lifted  the  politicians  on  the  wave, 
and  swept  away  the  McClellans  and  Seymours. 

We  must  separate  the  dictatorial  powers  in  the  pre 
sidential  hand  —  and  so  sparingly  used  by  him  —  from 
the  great  act  of  emancipation,  which  produced  the  most 
far-reaching  changes.  The  President  herein  acted  from 
a  line  of  prerogatives  differing  totally  from  those  of  a 

1  Seward  at  Washington,  1861-72,  p.  23.  2  Infra,  p.  253. 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

dictator.  If  they  had  not  differed,  the  influence  of 
learned  critics  like  Benjamin  R.  Curtis,1  shouting  "  Usur 
pation!"  would  have  created  something  more  than  a 
bubble  on  the  surface  of  the  foaming  agitation  of  the 
time.  The  President,  burdened  with  unsought  respon 
sibility  in  supervising  incompetent  generals,  had  come 
to  be  literally  Commander-in-Chief  as  the  war  moved 
on.  As  -soon  as  possible,  the  same  conscientious  ruler 
gladly  yielded  his  baton  to  General  Grant.  His  great 
est  military  act  was  when  his  bloodless  sword  bent  into 
a  pen  and  struck  the  shackles  from  four  million  human 
beings.  Tremendous  powers  were  given  by  the  Ameri 
can  people  to  their  Dictator  and  to  their  Commander- 
in-Chief  ;  but  there  was  no  mingling  and  confusion  of 
the  two  entities.  The  capacity  to  recognize  and  dis 
criminate  these  great  governmental  agencies,  latent  in 
the  people,  always  put  forth  at  the  right  moment,  is  a 
wonder. 

A  salient  point  of  my  study  consists  in  the  contention 
that,  if  the  powers  of  the  people,  voluntarily  thrust  upon 
the  administration  in  the  year  following  the  autumn  of 
1861,  had  been  energized  and  fully  employed,  the  tre 
mendous  changes  in  the  Constitution  and  government 
of  the  United  States  would  not  have  occurred.  These 
events  and  their  issues  are  matter  of  history.  But  if 
slavery  had  not  been  destroyed  as  it  was,  speculation  can 
hardly  conceive  of  its  abolition.  Plainly,  legislative 
power  could  not  have  been  moved  to  so  great  a  change 
in  the  Constitution  as  matters  stood.  The  border  States 
were  sluggish  and  indifferent  to  every  kind  of  compen 
sation  offered ;  the  Northern  Copperheads  opposed  every 
1  Infra,  p.  233. 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

and  any  interference  with  the  wonted  enthrallment  of 
the  blacks.  How  can  we  conceive  of  the  successful  pas 
sage  of  constitutional  amendments  capable  of  solving 
the  difficulty  ?  These  speculations,  however,  go  beyond 
our  province.  Our  business  is  to  inquire  into  the  rela 
tions  of  the  Union  and  the  States,  and  we  would  ascer 
tain  why  such  vast  popular  intelligence,  backed  by 
enormous  resources,  did  not  instantly  smash  the  Rebel 
lion  before  arbitrary  power  could  muster  every  man 
and  some  children,  by  desperate  conscription,  into  open 
revolt. 

Pursuing  one  particular  theme,  I  am  forced  into  some 
unwelcome  criticism  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  But  it  is 
particular  and  not  general  criticism,  intended  only  for 
the  cases  cited,  and  for  the  question  of  the  moment. 
The  record  for  the  first  eighteen  months  compels  strict 
examination  and  considerable  criticism.  Lincoln's  great 
ness  grew  with  the  occasion  ;  though  his  magnanimous 
spirit  was  innate  and  not  installed  by  any  election  or 
inauguration.  In  managing  affairs  the  President  showed 
at  times  great  facility  ;  but  there  were  certain  limitations 
inborn  which  affected  his  conduct  of  office,  especially 
in  the  early  period.  Great  in  every  contact  with  the 
whole  people,  he  was  often  little  toward  his  fellow-men. 
The  sense  of  beauty,  the  quality  of  taste  in  truth  and 
nobleness,  had  no  place  in  his  rugged  nature.1  Conse 
quently  the  jester  or  the  shrewd  politician  generally 
was  manifest  in  his  presidential  intercourse.  Neither 
the  man  nor  the  statesman  predominated  at  the  White 
House  or  in  the  intercourse  of  bureaus.  The  great  man 
was  a  poor  executive.  Sagacious  and  sincere  within,  he 

1  Cf.  infra,  p.  46. 


xx  INTRODUCTION 

often  affected  those  around  him,  as  if  he  were  a  trifling 
clown.  Average  citizens,  good  patriots,  could  not  com 
prehend  how  pearls  could  irradiate  so  rough  a  shell. 
Nor  was  this  action  mere  modest  merit  languishing 
within  the  man.  As  John  Hay  shows,1  he  was  ambi 
tious  to  the  core ;  conscious  of  large  ability,  and  seeking 
its  exercise  within  such  limits  as  his  own  lack  of  taste 
and  breeding  prescribed.  Meanwhile,  such  self-seeking 
competitors  as  Chase  —  strong  in  conscious  power  and 
culture  —  were  disgruntled  and  affronted  by  enforced 
contact  with  the  Rail-splitter.  Seward  got  his  lesson 
early  and  learned  the  power  of  his  master.  Stanton,  a 
disparaging  critic  at  first,  had  no  presidential  ambition,2 
and  was  educated  into  loyal  confidence  by  Lincoln's 
magnanimous  treatment.  These  mighty  men  cooperated 
sincerely,  though  the  restless  ambition  of  Chase  never 
could  submit  to  Lincoln's  dominating  personality,  while 
his  intriguing  spirit  finally  went  to  the  verge  of  personal 
treachery.3 

All  history  loses  when  cast  into  topical  form,  but  that 
form  was  inevitable  here.  Narrative  proper  would  have 
included  all  events  of  the  struggle,  and  in  its  mass  must 
have  obscured  the  main  principles  of  this  treatise.  While 
the  topics  cannot  follow  a  strict  chronology,  and  more 
or  less  entangle  necessary  narrative,  I  trust  that  the  main 
purposes  of  the  work  will  become  apparent. 

There  would  have  been  advantages,  if  I  could  have 
included  all  the  States  in  this  study.  But  so  much 
detail  would  have  incumbered  the  main  topic,  which 
consists  in  the  actual  relations  of  a  State  —  as  such  — 

1  Cf.  infra,  p.  46.  2  Boutwell,  Sixty  Years,  vol.  ii,  89. 

3  Cf.  infra,  p.  331. 


INTRODUCTION  xxi 

to  the  central  organ  of  all  the  States.  In  the  communi 
ties  chosen,  Morton,  Andrew,  and  Curtin  held  con 
tinuous  service  throughout  the  war.  Perhaps  Morton 
had  the  most  difficult  post  among  all  the  Union  patriots. 
His  legislature  sometimes  was  absolutely  hostile  and 
violent ;  to  keep  the  State  not  only  in  line,  but  actually 
moving  forward,  participating  in  all  important  move 
ments,  was  a  triumph  in  executive  experience. 

New  York,  the  Empire  State,  likewise  affords  instruc 
tive  lessons.  The  city  has  been  always  a  disturbing 
factor  in  national  politics.  Great  commercial  centres  pro 
duce  much  socially ;  but  they  do  not  comprehend  and 
cheerfully  embrace  the  largest  political  issues.  Com 
merce  is  an  immense  factor  in  civilization,  but  it  is  not 
superior  or  even  coequal  to  civilization.  Commerce  was 
made  for  man.  As  we  may  not  consider  the  Church  in 
this  connection,  the  development  of  the  State  is  the 
greatest  mundane  interest  of  man.  The  great  city,  with 
its  benumbing  influence,  brought  the  overwhelming 
numbers  to  Seymour  which  effected  his  election.  Its 
backward  tendencies  confirmed  him  in  his  silly  wander 
ing  after  State-independence,  and  in  his  quasi-opposition 
to  the  national  administration. 

Although  this  study  is  limited  to  four  States,  and 
those  Northern,  my  purpose  is  national  in  making  it. 
The  individual  unionists  and  secessionists  of  1861  are 
fast  passing  away.  AU  of  us  should  try  to  record  and 
interpret  the  large  and  controlling  principles  of  the 
tremendous  struggle,  as  they  worked  out  in  the  actual 
operations  of  the  time.  The  secessionists  of  1861  be 
came  after  bloody  trial  and  sacrifice  renewed  American 
citizens.  By  thorough  patriotism  and  heroic  effort  they 


xxii  INTRODUCTION 

and  their  descendants  have  shown  in  these  latter  years 
that  the  United  States  has  no  better  citizens  than  those 
dwelling  in  the  Southern  States.  The  dogmas  of  State- 
Rights  and  Secession  have  passed  into  the  constitutional 
museum,  which  preserves  all  the  wondrous  structures 
now  developed  into  the  modern  organism  of  liberty  and 
law.  However  these  dogmas  were  born  and  bred, — 
whatever  their  basis  in  legal  evolution,  —  they  were 
maintained  by  brave  men  and  true  women.  No  people 
ever  fought  more  faithfully,  or  spent  their  substance 
more  fully,  than  the  people  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 

North  and  South  must  preserve  the  record  and  study 
the  issues  developed.  The  essential  point,  as  well  as  the 
difficulty  in  historic  treatment,  is  to  view  and  estimate 
the  facts  in  just  proportion  for  all  time.  Now,  the 
imperial  Union  is  established  in  all  minds,  North  and 
South ;  then,  when  the  facts  occurred,  they  were  passing 
through  minds  not  judicially  bent,  but  struggling  for 
life  or  death. 

In  summing  up  my  own  impressions,  I  see,  first,  the 
personality  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  towering  high  above 
his  time.  The  man  was  cast  in  heroic  mould,  and  the 
circumstances  shaping  him  to  his  work  were  the  largest 
in  history  since  Napoleon :  perhaps  larger  than  Napo 
leon's,  for  the  soldier-emperor  worked  upon  institutions 
which  had  been  gradually  losing  their  popular  birth 
mark  and  character ;  while  Lincoln  came  with  his  en 
vironment  directly  from  the  people.  Out  of  the  very 
bosom  and  heart  of  humanity  came  this  man,  a  daily 
offering  to  the  caprices  ?nd  humors  of  popular  govern 
ment,  a  final  sacrifice  to  an  assassin  —  the  fruit  of 
treason  and  rebellion. 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

Secondly,  I  recognize  that  the  leaders  and  generals 
of  the  Confederacy  played  a  great  part  in  this  failure 
of  disunion  and  the  victorious  ascendency  of  the  Union. 
There  has  been  much  criticism  of  Jefferson  Davis ;  and 
doubtless  his  prejudices  and  pedantry  were  liable  to 
censure.  Yet  it  is  pretty  certain  that  no  one  could  have 
accomplished  more.  The  fall  of  the  Southern  idea  as 
embodied  in  the  Confederacy  was  fated ;  its  descent  to 
the  nadir  of  defeat  and  dissolution  could  not  have  been 
affected  much  by  any  individual  living  within  its  bor 
ders.  Da  vis's  necessary  policy  was  inevitably  aggressive 
as  well  as  creative.  He  could  not  wait,  as  Lincoln  could 
and  did,  for  governmental  powers  latent  in  the  people 
to  spring  forth  and  reestablish  the  Union.  Davis  had 
to  make  and  break. 

Lee  was  a  great  moral  force  at  all  times.  As  a  soldier 
he  was  masterly  in  defense,  provided  his  opponent  did 
not  exceed  the  scholastic  traditions  of  decorous  offense. 
He  created  opportunity  out  of  the  calculated  weakness 
of  his  antagonists.  Yet  this  master  of  defensive  strategy 
fell  short  whenever  attempting  a  serious  offensive  to 
crush  his  enemy.  The  gallant  sons  of  the  South  could 
assault  vigorously  and  win  battles.  They  could  not 
overcome  their  opponent  intrenched  in  all  the  powers 
of  representation,  inclosed  by  all  the  works  of  civiliza 
tion.  To  attain  success,  they  must  not  only  attack  but 
destroy,  demolish  not  only  the  men  in  arms,  but  the 
solid  institutions  which  encompassed  the  Union  soldier, 
protecting  him  whether  in  victory  or  defeat. 

There  is  a  third  division,  once  citizens  then  state 
participants  in  the  turmoil  of  the  Civil  War.  It  is  not 
a  class,  for  the  individuals  composing  it  cannot  be  clas- 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

sified.  It  is  composed  of  disunionists  at  the  North.  It 
is  significant  that,  while  Copperheads  sought  office  per 
sistently,  the  whole  country  never  accepted  a  disunion- 
ist.  It  was  not  until  Grover  Cleveland  brought  new 
issues  to  the  front  that  the  Union  gave  control  to  the 
Democracy.  Now  we  are  coming  into  the  third  genera 
tion,  which  is  disposed  to  forgive  and  even  to  forget. 
The  Union  is  restored  both  North  and  South,  and  pa 
triots  everywhere  prevail.  No  one  cares  to  remember 
when  he  meets  a  patriot  that  his  father  struck  against 
the  flag.  Those  differences  were  adjusted.  But  what  of 
secret  betrayers,  traitors  at  heart,  who  did  not  breast  the 
battle  openly? 

The  great  historic  facts  cannot  be  traversed  or  ob 
scured.  The  outlines  of  the  struggle  for  the  Union 
must  deepen,  must  become  more  manifest,  as  history 
records  salient  events  and  brings  into  relief  the  true 
meaning  of  men's  acts  in  those  days.  If  we  depict  Lin 
coln  in  massive  form  and  drape  him  in  heroic  lines ;  if 
we  grant  to  Davis  and  Lee  the  epical  grandeur  belong 
ing  to  a  great  cause  sincerely  lost  —  what  next?  How 
shall  we  define  those  abortive  and  mischievous  'creatures, 
who  belonged  neither  to  the  Union  nor  to  the  Confed 
eracy  ? 

"  Men  like  these  on  earth  he  shall  not  find 
In  all  the  miscreant  race  of  human  kind." 

It  is  not  agreeable  to  portray  these  individuals.  It  mat 
ters  not  that  they  might  have  been  good  fathers  or 
neighbors  —  worshiping  in  due  form  and  living  pro 
perly.  The  State  is  over  all  and  in  all.  Domestic  life  is 
important ;  but  in  the  great  revolutionary  crucibles  the 
State  must  renovate  or  throw  off  every  kind  of  matter 


INTRODUCTION  xxv 

hostile  to  itself.  Or,  changing  our  view,  the  body  poli 
tic  must  nourish  itself,  rejecting  all  waste-product, 
which,  being  rejected,  becomes  offal,  hardly  to  be  dis 
tinguished  from  treason  and  disloyalty.  Verily,  the  lot 
of  the  Northern  disunionist  was  hard.  It  will  become 
harder,  as  time  reveals  more  fully  the  discordant  ele 
ments  of  that  time  in  the  clear  white  light  of  a  restored 
and  greater  Union. 


WAR  GOVERNMENT 
FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

CHAPTER  I 

THE    GENESIS    OF   THE    UNION 

IN  the  winter  of  1860-61,  the  United  States  was 
vexed  by  one  of  the  greatest  problems  in  civil  gov 
ernment  ever  set  forth  in  the  history  of  the  world.  A 
great  commonwealth  comprising  many  differing  commu 
nities  had  subdued  the  earth  from  ocean  to  ocean.  These 
communities  during  some  forty  years  had  struggled  for 
or  against  the  system  of  labor  that  enslaved  the  Afri 
can  negro.  All  the  powers  of  a  brilliant  branch  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race,  apt  in  political  life,  had  been  devoted 
to  the  pursuit  and  the  extension  of  domestic  slavery. 
According  with  this  masterful  passion  and  contingent  to 
it,  local  self-government  had  developed  vigorously  in 
these  slaveholding  communities,  devoting  and  attaching 
their  citizens  to  a  solid  governing  force  known  as  State- 
Rights.1  The  inevitable  principle  that  the  whole  must 
control  the  parts,2  —  in  event  of  political  difference, — 

1  W.  H.  Russell,  cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  433.    "  State  rights  meant 
protection  to  Slavery,  extension  of  slave  territory,  and  free  trade  in  slave 
produce  with  the  outer  world." 

2  Webster  held,  according  to  Merriam,  American  Political  Theories, 
p.  284,  that  the  Union  was  established  by  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
and  not  by  the  people  of  the  several  States.   It  was  as  all  the  people  that 
they  established  the  Constitution. 


2   WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

though  embodied  in  the  framework  of  the  Constitution, 
had  never  worked  itself  out  in  our  American  experience. 

The  idea  of  Union  —  one  out  of  many,  not  essentially 
acting  against  a  part,  but  including  the  whole  l  even  to 
the  suppression  of  an  offending  part  —  worked  itself 
slowly  into  the  convictions  of  the  American  people,  and 
through  severe  agony  became  the  controlling  purpose 
of  their  lives.  Yet,  a  nebulous  consciousness  of  this 
hovering  force  inhered  in  the  political  sentiment  of  the 
United  States ;  it  strove  for  expression  in  the  Northern 
States,  and  finally  overcame  the  resisting  forces,  active 
in  the  Southern  communities,  latent  in  Europe. 

To  sketch  the  progress  and  to  trace  the  interplay  of 
these  great  governing  principles  —  the  overwhelming 
power  of  the  Union,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  quicken 
ing  force  of  home-communities,  on  the  other  —  will  be 
the  purpose  of  this  study. 

A  prevailing  Union  was  a  magnificent  creation  out 
of  the  progress  of  government.  Perhaps  the  feeblest 
conception  of  this  transcending  idea  that  ever  animated 
a  practical  Executive  existed  in  the  person  and  office  of 
James  Buchanan ;  yet,  such  as  it  was,  it  prevailed.  In 
that  dark  and  trying  winter,  when  the  President,  halting 
between  many  opinions,  sustained  the  government  after 
his  fashion,  there  was  only  one  positive  idea  that  ani 
mated  his  muddled  consciousness.  It  was  true  that  he 

1  Mr.  Merriam  shows,  American  Political  Theories,  p.  281,  that  the 
Union  was  not  a  treaty  between  sovereign  States,  as  Calhoun  argued,  nor 
a  contract  between  States  by  which  their  sovereignty  was  diminished,  as 
Madison  argued  ;  but  it  was  based  on  law.  This  is  obvious  from  the  fact 
that  after  the  tremendous  issues  of  the  Civil  War,  no  changes  were  made 
in  the  fundamental  law  of  the  Union.  The  Union  now  exists  by  virtue 
of  the  original  law. 


THE  GENESIS  OF  THE  UNION  3 

drifted  into  some  countervailing  action  —  when  im 
pelled  by  Black,  Holt,  and  Stanton  —  toward  the  sal 
vation  of  his  threatened  administration.  But  his  one 
controlling  idea  was  the  non-secession  of  a  member  of 
the  Union.  Conscientious,  timid,  credulous,  employing 
precious  time  and  exhausting  his  strength  in  feeble 
prayers  or  maudlin  tears,  he  did  see  the  tremendous 
fact  that  a  State  could  not  go.  Weak  as  he  was,  he 
was  more  powerful  than  the  passionate  Greeley  crying 
out,  u  We  shall  resist  all  coercive  measures." 1  For  he 
did  hold  in  a  certain  way  that  the  whole  was  greater 
than  any  part,  or  than  all  the  parts  operating  through 
their  separate  functions ;  though  he  might  fail  when 
attempting  to  put  this  conception  into  executive  prac 
tice.  With  absurd  inconsistency,  he  could  not  coerce 
a  State  to  stay  in  the  Union,  while  he  could  find  no 
prerogative  or  authority  for  her  outgoing.  Yet  his 
tory  should  give  him  his  due,  in  that  he  did  hold  to 
gether  —  though  feebly  and  in  the  worst  manner  —  the 
functions  of  his  office,  and  did  deliver  over  his  trun 
cheon  to  a  wiser  and  firmer  hand  on  the  4th  of  March, 
1861. 

This  idea,  painfully  elaborated  in  1861-65,  does  not 
appear  to  be  simple  and  absolute  in  comprehension 
to-day.  We  should  hardly  expect  that  historical  writers 
of  the  ability  and  varied  experience  of  Goldwin  Smith 
and  H.  C.  Lodge  would  maintain  now  that  the  Union  of 
1789  was  according  to  the  former  "a  compact  dissoluble 
at  will,"  or  as  the  latter  says,  involved  "the  right  of 
practicable  withdrawal  from  a  mere  experiment.3 


99     2 


1  Tribune,  November  9,  1860. 

2  Cited  by  D.  H.  C.,  Proc.  M.  H.  S.,  Series  II,  vol.  xvi,  151-164. 


4   WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

This  modern  heresy  has  been  sufficiently  exploded  in 
a  long  and  thorough  argument  by  D.  H.  Chamberlain.1 
One  or  two  sentences  kill  the  vagary. 

No  new  fundamental  theory  of  the  relation  of  the  States 
to  the  Union,  or  of  the  nature  of  the  Union  itself  —  whether 
a  compact,  or  league,  or  confederacy  on  the  one  hand,  or  a 
perpetual,  indefeasible  nation  or  union  on  the  other  —  has 
been  enacted  by  law  or  constitution  since  1789.  In  this  re 
spect  the  rights  of  the  States,  the  rights  and  powers  of  the 
Union,  are  in  law  the  same  as  they  were  one  hundred  and 
thirteen  years  ago.2 

Mr.  Chamberlain  directly  refutes  the  views  attributed 
by  Mr.  Lodge  to  Webster,  when  he  makes  the  latter 
appeal  to  the  popular  conception  of  the  Union  pre 
vailing  at  the  time  of  the  Webster-Hayne  controversy. 
Webster  argued  that  "  the  Constitution  originally  cre 
ated  and  was  intended  to  create  a  perpetual  and  indissol 
uble  Union."  Webster  further  said,  "a  constitution 
is  a  fundamental  law,"  3  not  a  compact. 

1  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  replies  courteously  to  Chamberlain  in  The  Sun, 
August  9,  1903.   He  cites  Madison,  The  Federalist,  No.  43  :  "  Should  it 
unhappily  be  necessary  to  appeal  to  these  delicate  truths  for  a  justifica 
tion  for  dispensing  with  the  consent  of  particular  States  to  a  dissolution 
of  the  Federal  pact,  will  not  the  complaining  parties  find  it  a  difficult 
task  to  answer  the  multiplied  and  important  infractions  with  which  they 
may  be  confronted  ?    The  time  has  been  when  it  was  incumbent  on  us 
all  to  veil  the  ideas  which  this  paragraph  exhibits.   The  scene  is  now 
changed,  and  with  it  the  part  which  the  same  motives  dictate."    Mr. 
Smith  says  :    "  It  is  difficult  to  construe  this.   What  I  make  of  it  is  that 
the  writer  would  fain  have  treated  the  Union  as  indissoluble,  but  feared 
to  do  it.  ...  However,  the  difference  between  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  me 
is  historical,  not  practical.   The  practical  question  was  settled  by  the  war. 
The  rupture  was  not  at  bottom  either  secession  or  rebellion.   It  was  the 
natural  breach  between  the  free  and  the  slave  States." 

2  Proc.  M.  H.  S.,  Series  II,  vol.  xvi,  153. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  155. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  5 

Mr.  Chamberlain  proves  also  that  the  same  theory  in 
substance  was  held  by  the  Virginians  in  1789.1 

To  reach  the  origins  of  a  theory  of  government 
which  could  so  penetrate  and  saturate  the  powerful 
intellect  of  Daniel  Webster,  we  must  go  back  to  the 
springs  of  colonial  history.  The  most  important  political 
action,  developing  public  spirit  and  communal  feeling  in 
early  New  England,  manifested  itself  in  the  attack  upon 
Louisburg,  and  in  the  victory  wrested  from  the  power 
of  France.  When  the  Grand  Battery  was  evacuated, 
General  William  Pepperell  reported  to  Governor  Shir 
ley,  May  17,  1745,  "I  immediately  ordered  a  Regiment 
there,  the  Union  Flag  to  be  hoisted."  2 

Another  phase  of  this  communal  feeling  declared  in 
the  word  Union  appears  in  a  report  from  General  Wins- 
low,  near  Albany,  to  Governor  Hopkins,  July  27,  1756. 
"No  junction  Can  be  Admitted  off,  Unless  the  Provincial 
Officers  hold  their  Proper  Rank  (according  with  British 
regulars)  as  we  look  upon  our  Selves  only  as  Executors 
in  Trust  for  the  Provinces  have  sent  you  the  Result  and 
Protest."  3  Not  the  tea  or  sugar  taxes,  not  the  Stamp 
Act  or  taxation  without  representation,  so  affronted  the 
colonies,  as  this  insular  arrogance  of  British  officers, 
generally  incompetent  for  their  duties.  Winslow  and 
his  companions,  holding  this  deep  feeling  in  trust  for 
their  brethren,  are  a  significant  proof  of  union  sentiment. 
Similar  instances  might  be  cited  from  other  parts  of  the 
colonial  domain. 

A   "  brief  plan  and  scheme "  for  union  was  pub- 

1  Proc.  M.  H.  S.,  vol.  xvi,  164. 

2  Correspondence  of  the  Colonial  Governors  of  Rhode  Island,  vol.  i,  337. 

3  Ibid.,  ii,  227. 


6   WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

lished  in  Pennsylvania  in  1698. *  Franklin's  congress 
at  Albany  resolved  unanimously  "  that  a  union  of  the 
colonies  is  absolutely  necessary  for  their  preserva 
tion."  2 

This  immanent  perception  was  a  continental  force 
possessing  the  nascent  American  consciousness,  and  it 
was  simply  revealed  in  the  action  of  Pepperell,  when  he 
planted  not  a  British  or  Massachusetts,  but  a  Union 
symbol  of  conquest.  It  became  a  governmental  function 
after  Concord,  Bunker  Hill,  and  Yorktown.  Washing 
ton,  probably,  did  not  forecast  the  Union  of  Marshall, 
but  the  familiar  idiom  became  an  urgent  call  for  patri 
otism,  as  in  his  farewell  words,  "  Your  Union  ought 
to  be  considered  as  a  main  prop  of  your  Liberty."  3 
Whether  the  fathers  of  the  republic  builded  better 
than  they  knew,  or  whether  they  only  set  up  the  Union 
planks  existing  and  falling  ready  to  their  hand,  the 
result  was  the  same  as  it  worked  itself  out  in  the  for 
mation  of  the  commonwealth,  and  in  the  growth  of 
empire.  Theories  of  state-building  yielded  to  the  gla 
cial  pressure  of  events;  and  differing  political  desires 
became  one  purpose  in  the  inevitable  prerogatives  of  a 
government,  as  it  concentrated  itself  in  the  congress  of 
representatives  and  in  the  delegated  hand  of  the  Execu 
tive,  who  finally  held  all  the  powers  emanating  from 
the  people. 

John  Marshall  did  not  create,  he  formulated4  this 
magnificent  idea,  and,  through  judicial  interpretation, 

1  Frothingham,  Rise  of  the  Republic,  p.  110. 

2  Franklin's  Works,  Sparks'  ed.,  vol.  iii,  26. 

8  Memorial  Tablet  in  Independence  Hall,  Philadelphia. 
4  Cf.  infra,  35  n. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE   UNION  7 

put  into  the  common  operation  of  constitutional  law 
powers  hardly  apprehended  by  the  deliberative  Jeffer 
son.  This  profound  Union  sentiment  pervaded  the  North 
in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  strug 
gled  in  the  Southern  mind  against  the  encroaching 
spirit  of  slavery.  Very  slowly,  the  disciples  of  Marshall 
and  Jefferson  yielded  to  the  dominating  logic  of  Cal- 
houn l  and  the  "  fire-eating  "  constituency  bred  out  of 
his  loins.  Though  Jackson  was  not  an  ideal  ruler,  ac 
cording  to  the  canons  of  Aristotle  or  of  Montesquieu, 
he  was  a  sovereign  out  of  the  people,  comprehending 
their  aspirations  and  executing  their  will  with  rare 
integrity.  Along  with  this  old-fashioned  kingly  func 
tion  went  the  persuasive  energy  of  Henry  Clay,  sin 
cerely  amiable,  ready  to  compromise  all  the  coercive 
elements  of  government  into  any  scheme  for  quieting 
the  passion  of  the  hour  and  for  preservation  of  the 
Union.  Patriotism,  then,  meant  any  concession,  any 
sacrifice  of  a  part,  out  of  love  for  the  Union  or  the 
whole ;  forgetting  that  this  whole  was  gradually  being 
invaded  by  that  alien  despot  Slavery. 

Beyond  and  above  all  these  men,  the  Jovian  intellect 
of  Daniel  Webster  was  lifted  into  the  clearer  atmos 
phere  where  John  C.  Calhoun  sought  to  subject  the 
Union  to  revolving  States,  attracted  by  the  federal 

1  Calhoun  swept  away  some  prevalent  notions  of  social  contract  as 
applied  by  the  Virginian  Tucker  (Commentaries  on  Blackstone,  1803,  vol.  i, 
187),  holding  that  state  sovereignty  was  indivisible  ;  but  he  would  pro 
tect  the  individual  States  from  a  threatened  tyranny  of  the  majority,  by 
a  curious  analogy  wrought  out  from  the  rights  of  property  under  the 
common  law.  "  The  federal  government  may  have  possession  ;  the  states 
have  ownership ;  and  they  may  at  any  time  evict  their  tenant,  or  any  one 
of  the  states  may  claim  its  share  of  the  estate."  Cf.  Merriain,  American 
Political  Theories,  pp.  266,  268,  283. 


8   WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

mass,  but  possessed  and  directed  by  slavery.1  In  his 
prime,  Webster  comprehended  the  inevitable  destruc 
tive  tendencies  of  the  political  philosophy  of  Calhoun. 
In  his  declining  days,  when  love  of  the  Union  drove 
him  toward  compromise,  and  the  anaemic  influence  of 
presidential  ambition  enfeebled  his  reason,  that  Olym 
pian  man  wavered  and  finally  died,  overcome  by  the 
demons  of  the  hour.  But  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that 
he  most  of  all  maintained  the  Union  spirit  in  the  sec 
ond  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Even  the  half- 
developed  endogenous  statesmen  of  the  type  of  James 
Buchanan  were  formed  on  the  models  which  the 
mighty  hand  of  Webster  shaped  to  their  political  con 
sciousness.  The  Constitution  interpreted  by  Marshall 2 
was  carried  into  the  working  process  of  government  by 
the  genius  of  Webster ; 3  and  his  eloquent  voice  pro 
claimed  the  music  of  the  Union  to  the  farmer  and  the 
schoolboy. 

If  we  would  comprehend  the  political  forces  domi 
nating  the  United  States,  —  whether  before  or  during 
the  Civil  War,  —  we  must  study  the  principles  and  prac 
tice  of  party  organization  with  its  functions,  as  repre- 

1  W.  H.  Russell,  cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  431,  thus  stated  the  Southern 
idea,  when  he  was  at  Montgomery,  May  6, 1861:  "  We  hold  that  slavery 
is  essential  to  our  existence  as  producers  of  what  Europe  requires;  nay, 
more,  we  maintain  it  is  in  the  abstract  right  in  principle;  and  some  of  us 
go  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  the  only  proper  form  of  society,  according 
to  the  law  of  God  and  the  exigencies  of  man,  is  that  which  has  slavery  as 
its  basis." 

2  Cf.  infra,  p.  34  n. 

8  Webster  sought  out  and  in  the  clearest  terms  placed  the  final  power 
of  the  federal  government;  not  in  the  mosaic  of  States,  but  in  the  com 
mingling  elements  of  union.  Not  "by  the  people  of  the  several  states; 
it  is  as  all  the  people  of  the  United  States,  that  they  establish  the  consti 
tution." 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  9 

sentative  government  was  developed.  Much  could  be 
learned  from  the  course  of  parties  in  the  South,  while 
slavery  was  subduing  and  moulding  them  into  the  uni 
fied  body  which  seceded  and  warred  upon  the  Union. 
But  our  inquiry  lies  mainly  in  the  North,  and  we  must 
trace  there  the  whole  scheme  of  party  organization  — 
in  principle  and  practice  —  as  it  gradually  acquired 
control  of  political  action  in  the  early  nineteenth  cen 
tury. 

Burke  defined  party  to  be  "  a  body  of  men  united, 
for  promoting  by  their  joint  endeavors  the  national 
interest  upon  some  particular  principle  on  which  they 
are  all  agreed."  Perhaps  this  dictum  was  never  more 
fully  manifested  than  in  the  political  action  of  slavery 
in  the  Southern  States.  It  finally  possessed  itself  of 
the  whole  community,  politically,  economically,  and 
socially. 

While  party  organization  is  inevitable,  and  is  most 
active  in  democratic  politics,  it  prevails  more  or  less  in 
every  form  of  political  society.  As  Bryce1  indicates, 
the  individual  man  puts  himself  forth,  gets  his  will,  and 
satisfies  his  political  desires  most  completely  in  that  asso 
ciation  with  his  fellows  known  as  a  party.  While  gov 
ernment  and  even  administration  of  any  sort  —  despotic 
or  representative  —  unifies  and  enforces  the  common  will, 
party  divides,  and  gives  its  individual  members  the  only 
practicable  means  of  setting  forth  the  ideas  of  each  one 

1  Ostrogorski,  Democracy  and  Political  Parties,  vol.  i,  xl.  Introduction 
by  Bryce  :  "  How  did  democracies  get  on  without  party  ?  Popular  gov 
ernments  have  within  the  last  hundred  years  entered  on  a  new  phase 
marked  by  two  remarkable  facts.  The  number  of  participants  in  the 
business  of  government  is  immensely  greater,  and  the  method  of  partici 
pation  is  much  more  pacific." 


10  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

in  some  form  of  action.1  More  elastic  than  any  possible 
law  or  statute,  the  organization  of  party  has  been  com 
pared  2  to  a  tissue  bringing  the  various  powers  of  gov 
ernment  into  articulation  with  the  action  of  popular 
sovereignty.  It  matters  not  that  the  new  divisible  spirit 
coalesces  rapidly  and  gravitates  toward  a  pressure  only 
less  compulsory  than  that  of  the  State  itself ;  yet  there 
inheres  the  divisibility  of  the  many,  which  differs  essen 
tially  from  the  unity  of  all. 

In  this  new  development  of  the  citizen  the  old  methods 
of  edifying  and  developing  the  individual  man  all  had 
to  be  made  available.  State  and  Church,  either  or  both, 
had  struggled  for  the  control  of  the  individual,  while 
rulers  were  striving  always  to  get  both  sources  of  power 
into  their  own  hands.  There  were  some  lines  of  religious 
and  political  division  in  the  times  when  the  English 
colonies  were  growing  into  future  states.  The  doctrine 
of  Roger  Williams,  entirely  releasing  religious  opinion 
from  state  control,  had  made  little  headway  before  the 
American  Revolution.  But  the  most  ardent  Catholic 
in  Europe,  the  sternest  Puritan  or  fiercest  Calvinist  in 
America,  would  have  claimed  that  the  dogmas  of  his 
faith  were  his  own  within  his  church  relation,  and  were 
not  to  be  prescribed  by  any  prerogative  of  the  State. 
Parish  and  congregational  meetings  were  crude  methods 
of  representation,  but  they  were  potentially  democratic, 

1  "  The  autonomous  individual  is  finally  proclaimed  (by  universal  suf 
frage)  sovereign  in  the  State.    Left  to  himself  in  the  political  sphere  by 
the  emancipating  process  of  individualism,  and  powerless  in  his  atomis 
tic  isolation,  he  fastens  on  the  old  party  groove.  ...  A  prejudice  grew 
which  attributed  a  sort  of  mystic  virtue  to  the  elective  principle."  —  Ostro- 
gorski,  Democracy  and  Political  Parties,  vol.  ii,  607. 

2  Ford,  American  Politics,  p.  215. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  11 

and  more  effective  than  feudal  survivals  or  burgher  func 
tions.  Hence  it  was  natural  that  the  new  privileges  of 
the  citizen  should  take  on  the  forms  of  a  higher  law. 
There  is  reason  for  calling  the  party  system  in  the 
United  States  especially  an  extra-constitutional  function. 
Modern  students l  agree  that  the  old  obligations  of  creed 
and  dogma,  as  enforced  by  ecclesiastical  systems,  were 
very  like  the  new  political  faith,  prescribed  by  the  firm 
lines  of  party  control. 

Like  all  profound  and  gradual  social  movements,  this 
greatest  manifestation  of  popular  force  did  not  show 
itself  immediately  to  the  keenest  observers  in  the  United 
States.  After  the  skirmishing  between  the  Federal  and 
Republican  parties,  the  principle  of  organization  mar 
shaled  its  hosts  in  the  discussions  on  slavery  in  1820. 
Yet  the  sagacious  Tocqueville  was  hardly  conscious  of 
this  potential  force  in  1834.  The  highest  form  of  party 
efficiency  appeared  in  the  presidential  convention. 
American  statesmen  readily  perceived  the  latent  forces 
quickening  this  palpitating  organism,  fresh  from  the 
heart  of  the  people.  John  Quincy  Adams  said,2  "  Here 
is  a  revolution  in  the  habits  and  manners  of  the  people. 
These  meetings  cannot  be  multiplied  in  number  and 
frequency  without  resulting  in  deep  tragedies.  Their 
manifest  tendency  is  to  civil  war." 

Nothing  could  demonstrate  more  clearly  the  potential 
influence  of  these  novel  expressions  of  popular  opinion. 
Calhoun  thought  the  corruption  of  parties  would  drive 
people  to  force,  i.  e.  war.  But  Mr.  Ford 3  shows  very  well 

1  Von  Hoist,  Constitutional  Hist.  U.  S.,  1828-46,  p.  691,  and  Ostrogor- 
ski,  Democracy  and  Political  Parties,  vol.  ii,  615. 

2  Memoirs,  vol.  x,  352. 

8  American  Politics,  p.  303. 


12  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

that  the  organization  of  parties  became  a  conserving 
force,  and  long  repressed  the  tendency  of  slavery  toward 
its  logical  ultimate  in  civil  war. 

In  1831  and  1832  the  caucus  had  grown  into  the 
convention,  and  before  1840  all  elections  were  virtually 
initiated  by  party  action.  The  South  adhered  longer  to 
the  English  system  of  self-nomination  by  candidates, 
but  it  gradually  fell  into  the  American  way  of  conven 
ing  and  representing  the  people  through  parties. 

It  is  necessary  to  recognize  the  basis  and  the  organic 
principles  of  American  parties,  to  get  at  the  true  history 
of  the  Civil  War.  At  intervals  of  patriotic  enthusiasm 
citizens  knew  only  one  political  motive,  and  parties  dele 
gated  their  individual  members  to  a  resumption  of  their 
higher  and  more  direct  allegiance  to  state  and  federal 
governments.  These  acts  were  momentary.  As  soon  as 
the  pressing  occasion  passed,  individuals  went  back  to 
their  old  political  functions,  as  when  they  supported 
or  opposed  the  administration  of  Lincoln  through  the 
customary  efforts  of  organized  parties. 

Whether  slavery  produced  abolition,  or  whether  the 
hostility  induced  by  the  ethical  nature  of  the  institu 
tion  begat  a  more  positive  and  creative  desire  for  its 
encouragement  and  extension,  is  hardly  a  political  ques 
tion.  In  fact,  abolition  never  became  a  political  issue. 
The  abolitionists  of  1830-40  did  a  great  work  in 
inciting  the  conscience  of  the  nation  to  look  within  and 
set  its  political  house  in  order.  But  Isaiah  or  Jeremiah 
never  founded  and  maintained  a  kingdom.  Garrison 
struggled  as  fiercely  against  the  impregnation  of  Amer 
ica  through  the  Union  noted  herein,  as  Yancey  and  his 
fellows.  If  there  was  no  potent  Union  in  those  days,  — 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  13 

as  Southern  apologists  assert,  —  why  did  he  rebel  against 
the  Constitution  as  "  a  compact  with  Hell "  ? 

The  process  of  development  was  a  breeding  and  an 
education  on  both  sides.  The  economic  and  social 
growths  were  coming  constantly  into  the  political  atmos 
phere,  when  fierce  germs  planted  themselves  in  politi 
cians,  or  sought  larger  and  higher  life  in  the  great 
work  of  statesmen.  Gradually  the  moral  conviction  of 
the  North  broke  into  political  action,  which  was  then 
repelled  by  the  South  as  an  unpardonable  innovation. 
The  South  held  the  fortified  positions  —  whether  Whig 
or  Democratic  —  and  hence  embodied  the  conservative 
spirit  in  politics. 

Joshua  R.  Giddings,  born  in  Pennsylvania  in  1795, 
in  1842  offered  a  resolution  in  Congress  that  the  Con 
stitution  did  not  authorize  the  recovery  of  slaves.  The 
House  of  Representatives  not  only  rejected  this,  but 
censured  the  mover  by  a  vote  of  135  to  69.  The  act 
was  repudiated,  and  the  motive  of  the  actor  was  con 
demned;  practical  politics  were  beginning.  His  con 
stituents  reflected  and  returned  him  triumphant.  David 
Wilmot,  born  also  in  Pennsylvania  nineteen  years  later, 
in  1846  carried  through  the  House  his  famous  Proviso, 
though  it  failed  in  the  Senate.  This  bill  for  purchasing 
Mexican  territory  would  have  prohibited  slavery  therein. 
The  would-be  compromises  of  1850  tended  to  bring 
slavery  into  immediate  political  action  controlled  by  the 
individual  voter.  In  like  direction  were  the  movements 
of  Stephen  A.  Douglas  for  "  squatter  sovereignty,"  in 
1854,  culminating  in  the  Lecompton  constitution  of 
Kansas.  When  actual  control  was  usurped  by  "  border 
ruffians,"  Douglas  finally  remonstrated  against  this  form 


14  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

of  a  plebiscite,  saying,  "  All  men  must  vote  for  the  con 
stitution,  whether  they  like  it  or  not,  in  order  to  be 
permitted  to  vote  for  or  against  slavery."  In  theory, 
this  superficial  dogma  of  popular  sovereignty  appealed 
strongly  to  the  people  of  the  middle  and  northwest, 
accustomed  as  they  were  to  frontier  occupation  and  the 
ready  formation  of  institutions  at  the  will  of  the  settler. 
It  would  have  determined  and  disposed  anew  the  func 
tions  of  the  United  States  government  by  giving  the 
territorial  citizens  a  prerogative  not  yet  agreed  upon 
either  by  the  Union  or  the  States.  In  practice,  whether 
manipulated  by  the  men  of  the  Missouri  border  or  by 
the  followers  of  John  Brown,  it  became  a  mere  eddy  in 
the  great  current  of  Slavery  Extension. 

Early  in  I860,2  representative  men  defined  their  posi 
tions  in  terms  which  the  whole  country  could  not  fail 
to  understand.3  Douglas  was  especially  significant,  and 
parted  company  with  his  Southern  friends,  whom  he 
had  served  so  well  by  his  great  ability  and  his  popular 
arts.  "In  the  event  of  your  making  a  platform  that 
I  could  not  conscientiously  execute  in  good  faith  if  I 
were  elected,  I  will  not  stand  upon  it  and  be  a  can 
didate.  ...  I  have  no  grievances,  but  I  have  no  con 
cessions." 

1  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  ii,  283. 

2  Woodrow  Wilson,  American  People,  vol.  iv,  200.     In  forming  the 
Confederacy,  Southern  men  "assumed  that  since  each  of  their  States 
had  entered  the  Union  of  its  own  accord,  as  into  a  free  partnership,  and 
might  have  decided  not  to  enter  it,  it  was  clearly  within  its  privilege  to 
withdraw  when  just  cause  for  withdrawal  seemed  to  exist." 

Mr.  Wilson's  hereditary  opportunity  gives  additional  interest  to  his 
statements.  The  Southern  case  —  as  it  then  stood  —  is  urged  forcibly  by 
him.  Ibid.,  pp.  188-198. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  429-433. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE   UNION  15 

Abraham  Lincoln,  in  a  great  speech  in  the  Cooper 
Institute  at  New  York,  proved  that  Congress  had  power 
to  prohibit  slavery  in  the  Territories.  Confronting  the 
open  threats  of  disunion,  he  said :  "  Your  purpose,  then, 
plainly  stated,  is  that  you  will  destroy  the  government 
unless  you  be  allowed  to  construe  and  enforce  the  Con 
stitution  as  you  please,  on  all  points  in  dispute  between 
you  and  us.  You  will  rule  or  ruin  in  all  events." 

William  H.  Seward  made  a  firm  but  conserving  and 
conciliatory1  speech  in  the  Senate,  declaring:  "Did 
ever  the  annals  of  any  government  show  a  more  rapid 
or  more  complete  departure  from  the  wisdom  and  vir 
tue  of  its  founders  ?  .  .  .  I  remain  now  in  the  opinion 
that  these  hasty  threats  of  disunion  are  so  unnatural 
that  they  will  find  no  hand  to  execute  them." 

Lincoln  and  Seward  spoke  to  a  definite  point.  Jef 
ferson  Davis,  February  2,  had  introduced  resolutions  in 
Congress  to  define  the  ground  of  the  Southern  Demo 
crats.  They  contained  the  bald  statement  that  "nei 
ther  Congress  nor  a  territorial  legislature,  by  direct  or 
indirect  and  unfriendly  legislation,  had  the  power  to 
annul  the  constitutional  right  of  citizens  to  take  slaves 
into  the  common  territories."  Davis  indicated  also  in 
guarded  language  that  the  Union  would  be  dissolved 
in  event  of  the  election  of  a  straight  Republican  to  the 
presidency.2 

1  The  abolitionists  severely  condemned  this  attitude  of  the  leader  of 
the  Republican  party.   See  in  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  ii,  434,  435,  a  good 
account  of  the  actual  political  performance  of  the  abolitionists  at  this 
juncture. 

2  Southern  men  of  advanced  views  had  moved  far  away  from  the  doc 
trines  of  Clay,  or  of  Calhoun  even.   Gaulden  of  Georgia,  a  delegate  in  the 
Charleston  convention,  speaking  there,  was  approved  as  a  representative 


16  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Issues  were  becoming  plain.  Conventions  put  into 
effective  form  the  various  opinions  North  and  South  by 
nominating  John  C.  Breckinridge,  grandson  of  an  au 
thor  of  the  Kentucky  resolutions  of  1798 ;  Stephen  A. 
Douglas,  a  Democrat  advocating  popular  sovereignty ; 
Abraham  Lincoln,  a  Republican  out  of  the  loins  of  the 
Western  people.  Finally,  John  Bell  and  Edward  Everett, 
of  Tennessee  and  Massachusetts,  brought  in  the  con 
serving  Whig  element  and  the  fag-end  of  the  Know- 
Nothing  party,  toward  avoiding  the  danger  of  disunion. 
Lincoln  was  elected  in  November  by  a  minority  of 
the  votes  cast.  As  registered,1  there  were  for  Lincoln 
1,857,610  ;  for  Douglas,  1,291,574  ;  for  Breckinridge, 
850,082  5  for  Bell,  646,124.  The  opponents  combined 
had  a  majority  of  930,170  over  Lincoln.  But  these 
terms  majority  and  minority  were  merely  technical  and 
formal.  Under  the  constitutional  system  of  electors, 
never  lawfully  disputed,  he  was  chosen  to  the  office 
of  President,  and  was  subject  only  to  impeachment 
in  event  that  he  exceeded  the  prerogatives  of  that 
office. 

The  States  we  are  considering  particularly  gave  a 

planter.  "  I  am  a  Southern  States-rights  man  ;  I  am  an  African  slave- 
trader.  I  am  one  of  those  Southern  men  who  believe  that  slavery  is  right, 
morally,  religiously,  socially,  and  politically.  I  believe  that  the  institution 
of  slavery  has  done  more  for  this  country,  more  for  civilization,  than  all 
other  interests  put  together.  I  believe  that  this  doctrine  of  protection  to 
slavery  in  the  territories  is  a  mere  theory,  a  mere  abstraction.  We  have 
no  slaves  to  carry  to  these  territories.  ...  I  will  show  some  darkies  that 
I  bought  in  Virginia  [etc.],  .  .  .  and  I  will  also  show  you  the  pure  African, 
the  noblest  Roman  of  them  all."  This  speech  was  circulated  freely  at  the 
North,  and  convinced  many  —  whom  the  abolitionists  never  had  been  able 
to  touch  —  that  there  was  a  literal  impending  conflict.  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol. 
ii,  481. 

i  Ibid.,  p.  500. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION     .  17 

majority  to  Lincoln,  but  the  opposition  was  heavy,  as 
the  following  figures  show : l 


Lincoln 

Douglas 

Breckinridge 

Bell 

Massachusetts, 

106,533 

34,372 

5,939 

22,331 

New  York, 

362,646 

312,310* 

Pennsylvania, 

268,030 

16,765 

178,871 

12,776 

Indiana, 

139,033 

115,509 

12,295 

5,306 

*  By  fusion  of  the  opposition. 

There  was  no  lack  of  vigilance  or  prompt  action  on 
the  part  of  South  Carolina.  Her  Governor  Gist  on  the 
12th  of  October,  immediately  after  Pennsylvania  and 
Indiana  had  indicated  the  probable  outcome  of  the 
presidential  contest,  called  the  customary  session  of  her 
legislature  to  appoint  presidential  electors.  But  he  gave 
new  exegesis  to  this  function  of  a  state  government, 
conveyed  in  the  unusual  intimation  that  some  action 
might  be  necessary  "for  the  safety  and  protection  of 
the  State."  2  The  legislature  met  November  5,  the  day 
before  the  national  election,  and  Governor  Gist  recom 
mended  that  if  Lincoln  be  elected,  provision  should  be 
made  for  an  immediate  convention  to  sever  the  connec 
tion  of  South  Carolina  with  the  federal  Union. 

We  cite  these  passionate  acts,  not  to  condemn  the 
actors,  but  to  show  the  inevitable  doom  hanging  over 
the  American  States.  If  ever  fates  of  the  Grecian 
type  dominated  mankind,  it  was  in  these  crucial  days 
of  1860-61.  The  long,  deep  and  subtile  process  of 
educating  an  imperial  Union  —  we  have  tried  to  set 
forth  —  did  not  affect  the  political  consciousness  of 
generations  bred  in  the  torrid  airs  of  cotton  increase 
and  slavery  extension.  The  judicial  Marshalls,  the 

1  McClure,  Our  Presidents,  p.  175. 

2  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  115  et  seq. 


18  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

executive  Jacksons,  the  constitutional  Webster  s,  had 
passed  away ;  the  political  exemplars  of  the  South  had 
come  to  be  another  sort  of  guides  and  chieftains,  whom 
Calhoun's  spirit  led  along  paths  unknown  historically, 
and  even  more  uncertain  in  their  political  tendencies. 
The  dogma  of  State-Rights  was  meeting  the  growing 
conviction  of  the  opponents  of  the  extension  of  slavery. 
The  fatal  transit  of  these  political  bodies  bent  the  stars 
of  destiny  to  new  courses,  which  were  to  immolate 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives,  and  to  carry  destitution 
and  misery  to  almost  all  the  homes  of  the  Southern 
States. 

This  atmosphere  of  opinion  and  feeling  was  essential 
to  the  time.  If  Northern-bred  Americans  like  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge  do  not  know  now  that  there  has  been  a 
Union  for  more  than  a  century,  it  was  not  strange  that 
Davis  or  Stephens,  Yancey  or  Pickens,  ignored  the  fact 
in  1860-61.  Brave  to  a  fault,  patriotic  according  to 
their  inherited  tendencies,  they  had  come  into  one  idea 
possessing  all  and  overshadowing  all  the  ordinary  life 
of  a  citizen.  As  they  viewed  it,  all  the  economic  with 
the  prevailing  social  forces  of  the  time  united  to  induce 
one  political  motive  in  the  citizen,  and  it  was  directed 
by  slavery.  If  their  social  and  political  institutions 
could  not  rule  a  federal  Union,  then  the  seceding  and 
confederated  States  would  make  and  mould  not  only  a 
new  government,  but  a  new  country,  where  master  and 
slave  should  develop  a  civilization  all  their  own.  The 
occasional  talk  about  tariffs  or  free  trade  was  unsub 
stantial,  for  the  Confederacy  enacted  the  tariff  of  1857 
at  once. 

The    terms    conspiracy,   treason,    traitor,    which   so 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE   UNION  19 

affected  the  North  in  these  days,  have  been  gradually 
discarded  by  sober  historians,  in  setting  forth  the  idea 
of  secession.  Mr.  Rhodes  l  shows  clearly  that  the  move 
ment  was  too  large  and  organic  to  be  embraced  in  the 
functions  of  an  ordinary  conspiracy.  Though  the  honor 
of  each  individual  officer  of  the  United  States  may  be 
fairly  questioned  while  he  was  virtually  playing  into 
the  hands  of  the  incipient  Confederacy,  there  was  not  a 
mere  conspiracy  for  revolt  in  the  ordinary  sense.  There 
was  a  great  upheaval  of  the  foundations  of  society,  po 
litical  and  social ;  individuals  were  agitated  and  hurried 
along  by  it,  until  each  became  another  citizen,  with  a 
new  impulse  to  loyalty. 

Like  all  idealists,  the  men  of  the  Confederacy  con 
ceived  their  own  position  to  be  superior  in  elevation, 
and  their  principles  to  be  absolute  and  not  assailable. 
The  abolitionists  and  "  fanatics  "  of  the  North  might  err 
and  pervert  a  political  opportunity,  but  the  South  must 
be  single-minded  in  pursuing  its  rights,  and  it  alone 
could  suffer  grievance  under  the  pressure  of  a  consoli 
dated  government.  This  absolute  passion  revealed  itself 
during  the  manosuvres  for  compromise  in  the  winter. 
The  South  was  entirely  sincere  in  this  increasing  isola 
tion  of  political  conviction.2  It  mattered  not  what  the 
outside  world  wanted ;  it  wanted  this,  and  asked  only  to 
be  let  alone.3  South  Carolina  led  but  did  not  create 
this  controlling  passion.  It  spread,  devouring  as  it 
went,  until  it  touched  the  boundaries  of  Maryland  and 

1  See  the  arguments  of  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  cited  by  Khodes,  U.  S., 
vol.  iii,  210. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  278. 

3  Cf.  Burgess,  Civil  War  and  the  Constitution,  vol.  i,  76,  77,  on  Rights 
of  Sovereignty  and  of  Revolution. 


20  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Kentucky ;  nor  did  the  border  States  escape  the  political 
effects  of  the  contagion.1 

A  book  might  be  devoted  to  the  strange,  misdirected, 
and  contrary  love  of  union  2  which  was  manifest  in  the 
Northern  cities  during  the  winter  of  1860—61.  The 
party  of  secession,  with  deadly  purpose,  wasting  neither 
time  nor  effort,  went  straight  to  the  heart  of  the  matter.3 
The  conduct  of  the  leaders  of  opinion  in  the  North 
was  quite  different.  I  have  described  the  positive  over 
whelming  force  of  Union  sentiment  prevailing  in  the 
second  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  it  affected 
men  like  Andrew  Jackson  and  the  early,  self-possessed 
Daniel  Webster.  This  latent  force,  as  it  showed  itself 
after  the  election  of  Lincoln,  worked  in  a  different  way. 
The  savers  of  the  Union  then  seemed  to  believe  that  it 
could  be  preserved  only  by  allowing  its  destroyers  any 
license  possible  in  a  modern  government.  It  will  be 
interesting  to  discuss  several  types  of  these  men,  both 
for  the  effects  of  their  immediate  action  and  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  most  of  them  afterward  became  ardent 
supporters  of  the  administration  when  war  actually 
broke  out. 


1  If  Bell  and  his  followers  in  Tennessee  and  North  Carolina  could  have 
imitated  the  loyal  men  in  Kentucky,  and  could  have  remained  firm  in  the 
cause  of  the  Union,  which  they  fancied  they  held  preeminent,  the  results 
would  have  been  great  and  far  reaching.    Whatever  the  outcome  of 
secession,  the  peculiar  power  of  a  united  Confederacy  would  have  pre 
vailed  only  in  the  "  Cotton  States." 

2  Even  in  the  cool  afterthought,  when  he  wrote  his  American  Conflict, 
Greeley  said  the  Southern  Confederacy  had  no  alternative  to  an  attack 
on  Fort  Sumter  "  except  its  own  dissolution."    Fortunately,  the  intuition 
of  the  Northern  people  as  a  whole  proved  to  be  a  better  interpreter  of 
constitutional  law  than  was  the  disputatious  pen  of  Greeley. 

3  Burgess,  Civil  War  and  the  Constitution,  vol.  i,  135. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE   UNION  21 

Daniel  E.  Sickles  was  a  good  example  of  a  politician 
and  soldier  of  fortune.  He  said  on  the  floor  of  Con 
gress,  December  10,  1860 :  "  In  the  event  of  secession 
in  the  South,  New  York  city  would  free  herself  from 
the  hated  Kepublican  Government  of  New  York  and 
throw  open  her  ports  to  free  commerce."  * 

Perhaps  no  man  better  represented  the  Democracy 
of  the  North  in  intellect  and  character  than  Charles 
O'Conor,  who  was  beloved  by  all  his  fellow-citizens. 
He  said  at  a  great  Union  meeting  in  New  York,  De 
cember  19,  1859 :  "  Involving  the  fate  of  our  Union, 
is  negro  slavery  unjust  ?  .  .  .  I  insist  that  negro  slavery 
is  not  only  not  unjust,  but  it  is  wise  and  beneficent."  2 

James  S.  Thayer,  a  most  respected  Old  Line  Whig, 
at  a  meeting  for  peace  at  New  York  in  the  winter  we 
are  discussing,  said :  "  If  the  National  Administration 
shall  attempt  the  line  of  policy  that  has  been  fore 
shadowed  [i.  e.  enforcing  laws  in  the  seceded  '  States '], 
we  will  reverse  the  order  of  the  French  Revolution, 
...  by  making  those  who  would  inaugurate  a  reign 
of  terror,  the  first  victims  of  a  national  guillotine."  3 

Similar  utterances  were  made  in  other  cities,  espe 
cially  in  Boston  and  Philadelphia. 

The  old-time  saver  of  the  Union  was  moved  by  pas 
sion  rather  than  by  reason,  in  this  emergency;  but  the 
angry  trouble  oppressed  all  classes  of  citizens  and  in 
volved  every  shade  of  opinion.  The  question  forced  on 
every  citizen  of  the  United  States  in  the  critical  months 
following  the  election  was,  Shall  the  seceding  States  be 

1  Cited  by  Burgess,  Civil  War  and  Constitution,  vol.  i,  147. 

2  Von  Hoist,  Constitutional  Hist.  U.  S.  1859-61,  p.  66. 
8  Burgess,  vol.  i,  148. 


22   WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

allowed  to  go,  or  compelled  to  stay  ?  This  puzzle  was 
embodied  in  the  word  coercion.  Few  persons  in  the 
South  actually  believed  that  the  substantial  power  of 
the  North  would  be  brought  to  bear  in  compelling  the 
seceding  States  back  to  their  allegiance.  As  we  have 
indicated,  officers  and  trustees  of  the  Union,  like  James 
Buchanan,  could  see  only  that  States  could  not  go, 
but  must  not  be  made  to  stay.  Before  the  minds  or 
the  conscience  of  the  Northern  people  —  whether  Re 
publicans  or  Democrats — could  be  cleared  and  crys 
tallized  for  action,  immense  effort  had  to  be  made. 

Northern  Democrats  or  old  Whigs,  who  had  been 
carried  like  Seward,  Chase,  Trumbull,  and  Lincoln  into 
the  Republican  party,  —  as  against  the  extension  of 
slavery,  —  now  underwent  a  separating  process  that 
we  may  call  political  polarity.  The  Union-savers  of 
this  critical  winter  seemed  to  themselves  to  be  animated 
by  one  political  purpose,  as  they  scanned  the  hori 
zon  line  of  the  United  States  in  those  days.  As  they 
looked  across  the  dark  sea  of  this  constitutional  Union, 
lighted  as  it  was  by  flashes  of  insurrection,  and  shaken 
as  it  was  by  the  far-reaching  thunders  of  rebellion,  they 
perceived,  as  they  fancied,  one  visible,  sensible  horizon. 
But  there  is  a  deep,  compelling  force  in  political 
polarity.  The  limits  of  a  political  horizon  are  not  the 
same  for  the  positive  and  negative  political  poles 
which  subsist  in  every  statesman.  One  set  of  positive 
conditions  affecting  the  statesman  ascends  to  a  zenith 
and  'culminating  point  of  political  conviction,  where 
the  forces  of  order  fuse  all  concentrating  elements  into 
one  spring  of  government  —  into  the  essence  of  fidelity 
and  loyalty. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  23 

The  other  set  of  conditions  —  negative  and  disinte 
grating —  descends  to  a  nadir  of  rebellion  and  revo 
lution.  It  matters  not  how  good  the  intentions  of  a 
self-conscious  patriot  may  be  when  he  starts  on  this 
descending  path.  The  course  of  disorder  polarizes  him, 
converting  his  doubtful,  embracing  limitations  into 
constraining  bands,  which  warp  his  movement,  until 
his  course  ends  at  the  nadir  of  the  rebel  and  revolu 
tionist.  Such  was  the  implacable  current  of  rebellion, 
as  it  drove  the  Northern  sympathizers  from  their  shifting 
stools  of  old  party  allegiance  and  conservative  Unionism, 
to  the  encouragement  and  support  of  a  formidable  re 
bellion  in  the  Southern  States.  James  Buchanan,  as  we 
have  indicated,  was  only  half  evolved  when  he  handed 
over  the  bedraggled  Union  to  his  successor  in  office ; 
while  his  hinder  parts  had  been  wabbling  towards 
Yancey,  Toombs,  and  the  fire-eating  promoters  of  re 
bellion. 

It  is  the  merit  of  Edwin  M.  Stan  ton  that  his  fierce 
intuition  saw  the  issue  and  recognized  the  point  of 
polarity,  thus  perceiving  the  political  necessity  for 
separating  the  elements ;  one  stream  of  which  should 
fight  for  the  Union,  while  the  other  must  end  in 
cooperate  support  of  the  rebellion.  He  was  Attorney- 
General,  and  the  crisis  was  precipitated  in  the  cabinet, 
December  29,  1860,  when  Floyd l  the  secret  rebel  and 
Buchanan  the  maudlin  sympathizer  would  have  ordered 
Anderson  from  Fort  Sumter,  which  was  the  new  posi 
tion  of  the  aggressive  Union,  back  into  Fort  Moultrie, 

1  The  Secretary  of  War,  who  posted  United  States  troops  to  accord 
with  rebel  strategy  and  placed  arms  convenient  for  seizure.  This  genera 
tion  can  hardly  comprehend  that  this  peaceful  negative  posed  in  the 
cabinet  as  a  Union-saver  in  the  early  months  of  the  rebellion. 


24  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

which  was  the  insecure  post  of  old  constitutional 
Unionism. 

The  last  Facing-Both-Ways  was  sloughed  off  when 
Black  l  left  his  maze  of  constitutional  quibbles,  while 
Stanton  and  Dix  rallied  to  the  front.  In  Stanton's  own 
words  to  his  brother-in-law  when  Floyd  resigned,  "  One 
by  one  the  secessionists  have  been  worked  out.  We  are 
now  a  unit.  Who  will  come  into  the  present  vacancies 
is  uncertain."  2  The  path  thus  opened  carried  Douglas, 
Grant,  Sherman,  Thomas,  Logan,  with  thousands  of  the 
best  fighting  Democrats  of  the  North,  to  the  zenith  of 
the  Union.  This  irresistible  polar  current  turned  an 
other  set  downward,  carrying  Vallandigham,  Seymour, 
Fernando  Wood,  the  Sons  of  Liberty,  and  other  halt 
ing  doubters  to  the  depths  of  revolutionary  discord, 
in  spirit,  though  their  pusillanimous  bodies  skulked 
under  the  American  flag. 

In  this  winter  of  discontent  two  great  movements 
—  one  in  the  course  of  legislative  action,  the  other  in 
the  form  of  an  informal  representation  of  States,  known 
as  the  Peace  Convention  —  were  initiated  to  stem  the 
tide  of  disunion.  The  Congressional  movement  toward 
definite  legislation  for  compromise  was  led  by  Critten- 
den  of  Kentucky,  well  fitted  for  the  task  by  experi 
ence  and  by  his  life-long  political  connections.  A 
committee  of  thirteen  was  appointed  in  the  Senate  to 

1  Black  put  forth  the  extraordinary  doctrine  that  "  the  Union  must 
utterly  perish  at  the  moment  when  Congress  shall  arm  one  part  of  the 
people  against  another  for  any  purpose  beyond  that  of  merely  protecting 
the  general  government  in  the  exercise  of  its  proper  constitutional  func 
tions."   He  evolved  a  positive  constitutionalism,  which  could  end  only 
in  the  negation  of  the  Union  —  born  long  before  the  Constitution  was 
conceived. 

2  Cited  by  Gorham,  Stanton,  vol.  i,  159. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  25 

facilitate  the  passage  of  the  Kentucky  statesman's 
measure,  consisting  of  Powell  of  Kentucky,  Hunter 
of  Virginia,  Crittenden  of  Kentucky,  Seward  of  New 
York,  Toombs  of  Georgia,  Douglas  of  Illinois,  Collamer 
of  Vermont,  Davis  of  Mississippi,  Wade  of  Ohio,  Bigler 
of  Pennsylvania,  Rice  of  Minnesota,  Doolittle  of  Wis 
consin,  and  Grimes  of  Iowa.  The  formation  of  the  com 
mittee  shows  all  the  American  skill  in  organization ;  it 
was  representative,  able,  and  patriotic ;  its  deliberations 
and  endeavors  l  reveal  the  springs  of  the  whole  trouble, 
and  exhibit  the  inevitable  nature  of  the  conflict.  The 
committee  met  December  21,  when  the  news  came  that 
South  Carolina  had  passed  her  ordinance  of  secession 
unanimously  on  the  20th. 

If  compromise  had  been  possible,  the  movement  of 
Crittenden  would  have  accomplished  it.  Moderate  men 
of  all  parties  at  the  North  desired  to  avoid  war  by  any 
means.  Commercial  derangement  had  induced  severe 
financial  pressure,  and  the  trading  classes  desired  any 
settlement  which  would  bring  peace  out  of  the  political 
agitation.  But  the  main  body  of  the  Republicans 2  felt 
that  no  practicable  concession  would  turn  back  the  tide 
of  rebellion.  Lincoln  was  disposed  to  yield  largely, 
until  it  came  to  the  further  extension  of  slavery  in  the 
Territories,  which  he  resisted  absolutely.  He  wrote, 
December  11 :  — 

Entertain  no  proposition  for  a  compromise  in  regard  to 
the  extension  of  slavery.  The  instant  you  do,  they  have  us 

1  Rhodes,  U.  5.,  vol.  iii,  151-155. 

2  C.  F.  Adams  wrote,  February  11,  1861  :  "My  apprehension  has  been 
that  the  Crittenden  measure  would  find  favor  among  our  friends.   At  one 
time  there  was  a  little  danger  of  it.   There  is  little  or  none  now."  —  Cited 
by  Rhodes,  ibid.,  p.  288. 


26  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

under  again ;  all  our  labor  is  lost,  and  sooner  or  later  must 
be  done  over.  .  .  .  The  tug  has  to  come,  and  better  now  than 
later.  You  know  I  think  the  Fugitive  Slave  clause  of  the 
Constitution  ought  to  be  enforced  —  to  put  it  in  its  mildest 
form,  ought  not  to  be  resisted.1 

The  Crittenden  compromise  failed.  The  other  great 
attempt  to  avoid  war  was  initiated  by  Virginia,  the  fos 
ter  mother  of  the  Union,  and  the  eldest  child  in  the 
family  of  the  States.  Her  general  assembly  invited 
the  other  States,  whether  slaveholding  or  not,  to  send 
commissioners  to  meet  in  convention  at  Washington, 
February  4, 1861,  to  try  "to  adjust  the  present  unhappy 
controversies."  Virginia  gave  formal  notice  that  she 
would  accept  the  Crittenden  compromise.  Twenty-one 
States  were  represented,  leaving  out  the  seven  cotton 
States,  Arkansas,  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  Cal 
ifornia,  and  Oregon. 

On  the  same  day,  at  the  call  of  South  Carolina,  six 
cotton  States,  by  delegates,  met  at  Montgomery,  Ala 
bama,  and  formed  the  Southern  Confederacy.  Jefferson 
Davis  was  elected  President,  and  Alexander  H.  Stephens 
Vice-President,  of  the  new  government. 

The  Peace  Convention  was  composed  of  men  of  high 
character  and  fine  ability,  and  was  presided  over  by  ex- 
President  Tyler.  Its  debates  and  action  were  along  the 
lines  of  the  Crittenden  compromise.  On  the  morning  of 
March  4,  Crittenden  offered  in  the  Senate  the  project 
of  the  Peace  Conference;  which  received  in  the  vote 
only  seven  yeas,  including  Crittenden,  Douglas,2  and 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  iii,  259. 

2  Douglas's  appeal  for  peace,  made  in  Congress  January  3,  was  elo 
quent,  though  his  arguments  were  hardly  sound:    "I  do  not,  however, 
believe  the  rights  of  the  South  will  materially  suffer  under  the  adminis- 


THE  GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  27 

two  Republicans.  Zachariah  Chandler  of  Michigan  per 
haps  expressed  the  conviction  of  positive  minds  North 
and  South.  "  The  whole  thing  [i.  e.,  the  convention] 
was  gotten  up  against  my  judgment  and  advice,  and  will 
end  in  thin  smoke."  1 

The  compromise  and  peace  movements  were  the  well- 
meant  misdoings  of  a  type  of  excellent  people,  who 
never  can  comprehend  a  crisis  or  act  with  decision  in 
grave  affairs.  They  have  their  say,  and  do  not  have 
their  way.  On  this  occasion,  their  peaceful  intentions 
had  full  weight,  while  stronger  men  vainly  tried  to 
secure  representation  for  their  ideas.  Not  only  did  the 
Northern  supporters  of  Douglas,  Breckinridge,  and  Bell 
labor  for  compromise;  the  veteran  political  manager 
of  New  York,  Thurlow  Weed,  matured  a  plan  which 
would  restore  the  Missouri  line  in  territorial  extension. 
He  urged  it  in  December  "with  cogent  reasoning,  the 
result  of  profound  reflection  irradiated  by  his  long 
public  experience.  It  was  a  bold  step  for  a  partisan 
Republican  to  take." 2  William  H.  Seward  at  this  time 
was  the  most  popular  member  of  the  Republican  party, 
and  he  appeared  to  favor  compromise,  however  he  may 
have  voted.3  Henry  Ward  Beecher  had  a  large  follow 
ing,  and  with  characteristic  flippancy  he  answered  the 

tration  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  But  this  apprehension  has  become  wide-spread 
and  deep-seated  in  the  Southern  people.  ...  In  my  opinion,  South  Caro 
lina  had  no  right  to  secede;  but  she  has  done  it.  Are  we  prepared  for  war  f 
I  do  not  mean  that  kind  of  preparation  which  consists  of  armies  and 
navies  and  supplies  and  munitions  of  war;  but  are  we  prepared  in  our 
hearts  for  war  with  our  own  brethren  and  kindred  ?  I  confess  I  am  not. 
I  prefer  compromise  to  war.  I  prefer  concession  to  a  dissolution  of  the 
Union."  —  Congressional  Globe,  Appendix,  p.  38. 

i  Cited  by  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  307.  2  Ibid.,  p.  145. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  157,  164,  174,  288. 


28  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

prevailing  question,  about  the  end  of  November,  as  to 
whether  the  South  would  secede,  "  I  don't  believe  they 
will;  and  I  don't  care  if  they  do." 

But  this  careless  optimism  did  not  represent  the 
American  people.  There  were  deep  forces,  impelling 
large  principles  beneath  the  surface;  and  these  cur 
rents  swayed  thinking  men,  whether  North  or  South,  as 
the  tide  swept  on.  We  may  well  study  two  utterances, 
which  interpret  the  signs  of  the  time,  as  revealed  to  the 
two  sections  of  our  country.  Jefferson  Davis  said  in  the 
Senate,  December  10,  1860  :  — 

Say  so,  if  your  people  are  not  hostile ;  if  they  have  the 
fraternity  with  which  their  fathers  came  to  form  this  Union ; 
if  they  are  prepared  to  do  justice ;  to  abandon  their  opposition 
to  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  Give 
us  that  declaration  .  .  .  then  we  may  hopefully  look  for 
remedies  which  may  suffice ;  not  by  organizing  armies,  not  so 
much  by  enacting  laws,  as  by  repressing  the  spirit  of  hostility 
and  lawlessness,  and  seeking  .to  live  up  to  the  obligations  of 
good  neighbors  and  friendly  States  united  for  the  common 
welfare.2 

James  Russell  Lowell  wrote  and  published  in  Jan 
uary,  1861 :  — 

The  fault  of  the  free  States  in  the  eyes  of  the  South  is 
not  one  that  can  be  atoned  for  by  any  yielding  of  special 
points  here  and  there.  Their  offence  is  that  they  are  free,  and 
that  their  habits  and  prepossessions  are  those  of  freedom. 
.  .  .  Our  very  thoughts  are  a  menace.  It  is  not  the  North, 
but  the  South  that  forever  agitates  the  question  of  slavery. 
The  seeming  prosperity  of  the  cotton-growing  States  is  based 
on  a  great  mistake  and  a  great  wrong ;  and  it  is  no  wonder 
that  they  are  irritable  and  scent  accusation  in  the  very  air. 

1  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  139.  2  Congressional  Globe,  p.  29. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  29 

It  is  the  stars  in  their  courses  that  fight  against  their  system, 
and  there  are  those  who  propose  to  make  everything  comfort 
able  by  act  of  Congress.1 

Statesmen  and  preachers,  jurists  and  politicians,  jour 
nalists  and  men  of  affairs,  —  all  wrought  with  might 
and  main  through  this  winter,  to  bring  the  North  to 
accept  any  result,  rather  than  a  stern  decree  of  war. 
Although  not  apparent  at  the  time,  the  greatest  influ 
ence  in  all  this  seething  turmoil  of  national  forces  was 
in  and  through  the  personality  of  Abraham  Lincoln. 
Taken  as  candidate  for  the  presidency  because  he  could 
most  surely  carry  the  elections,2  and  moreover  because 
some  friends  of  Seward,  in  their  secret  consciousness, 
feared  his  jaunty  good  nature  in  administration,  even  if 
elected,  Lincoln  was  little  known  by  most  of  his  sup 
porters  throughout  the  North.  But  gradually,  after  the 
election,  the  nature  of  this  man  of  destiny  asserted 
itself,  and  began  to  affect  the  more  thoughtful  citizens 
of  the  North.  Politicians,  who  expected  a  neutral  chief 
tain,  to  be  moulded  and  handled  by  the  old  leaders  like 
Seward  or  Chase,  were  soon  disappointed  by  the  large 
qualities  they  discovered  in  the  man  himself.  Certainly, 
Thurlow  Weed  was  a  competent  judge  of  American 
statesmen,  and  he  very  early  recorded  his  impression 3 

1  Rhodes,  U.  S.t  vol.  iii,  149. 

2  McClure,  Our  Presidents,  p.  155. 

8  December  22, 1860.  "  An  interview  with  Mr.  Lincoln  [at  Springfield] 
has  confirmed  and  strengthened  our  confidence  in  his  fitness  for  the  high 
position  he  is  to  occupy.  .  .  .  The  American  people  will  not  have  cause, 
so  far  as  the  head  and  heart  of  Abraham  Lincoln  are  concerned,  to  regret 
the  confidence  they  have  reposed  in  him.  He  is  not  only  honest  and  true, 
but  he  is  capable  —  capable  in  the  largest  sense  of  the  term.  He  has  read 
much  and  thought  much  of  government.  His  mind  is  at  once  philosophical 
and  practical.  He  sees  all  who  go  there,  hears  all  they  have  to  say,  talks 


30  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

that  the  true  ruler  of  the  future  Union  was  then  in  the 
humble  homestead  at  Illinois. 

Popular  government  has  been  a  constant  and  fertile 
theme  for  statesmen,  as  well  as  demagogues.  Yet  few 
men  have  actually  grasped  the  principles  which  reach 
from  the  deep  sources  of  popular  conviction  to  the 
heights  of  executive  control  and  administrative  action. 
It  is  true  that  the  people  are  the  source  as  well  as  the 
instrument  of  power;  and  in  a  government  like  ours, 
no  leader  can  carry  them  forward  unless  he  is  actuated 
by  principles  large  enough  to  comprehend  the  whole 
trend  of  popular  conviction  and  action.  Weed  indicated 
the  method  of  Lincoln,  which  was  to  saturate  himself 
with  information  direct  from  the  representatives,  if  not 
the  agents,  of  the  people.  Douglas,  with  all  his  politi 
cal  tact,  did  not  comprehend  the  governing  force  of 
the  people  as  clearly  and  completely  as  did  Abraham 
Lincoln,  born  and  bred  in  the  great  middle  West.  Mr. 
Seward  was  a  statesman  of  considerable  force  and  of 
the  largest  experience.  He  was  writing  home  early  in 
December,  "  No  one  has  any  system,  few  any  courage 
or  confidence  in  the  Union  in  this  emergency."  1 

The  lucid  idea  which  should  dissipate  the  fogs  and 
clarify  the  political  atmosphere  was  lacking  in  all  the 
varied  efforts  of  the  varying  men  who  tried  to  compro 
mise  between  South  and  North  during  the  winter.  The 
house  was  divided  against  itself  already ;  how  was  it  to 
stand  without  reverting  to  the  original  foundations? 
And  those  foundations,  as  has  been  shown,  were  in  the 

freely  with  everybody,  reads  whatever  is  written  to  him,  but  thinks  and 
acts  by  himself  and  for  himself."  — Cited  by  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  305. 
1  Ibid.,  p.  157. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE   UNION  31 

Union,  which  even  Mr.  Seward  could  hardly  discern  in 
this  doubtful  moment. 

It  took  but  one  idea  to  penetrate  this  mass  of  hesi 
tancy  and  contradiction ;  and  that  one  must  be  unifying 
and  controlling.  Lincoln,  shut  away  in  an  upper  room 
of  a  shop  in  Springfield,  perceived  that  something  had 
happened  in  November.  After  forty  years  of  debating 
by  Webster  and  Calhoun,  by  Clay  and  Douglas,  the 
question  had  been  submitted  to  the  people.  All  shades 
of  opinion  had  been  represented  at  the  polls,  by  Breck- 
inridge  or  Bell,  by  Douglas  or  Lincoln.  The  verdict 
was  given,  and  slavery  was  found  wanting.  This  was 
politics  and  history  in  one  action.  The  technical  Union- 
savers  forgot  that  the  people  had  spoken.  Lincoln  never 
forgot  it ;  and  the  people,  in  all  the  trials  of  the  Civil 
War,  remembered  him,  their  chosen  agent.  All  theo 
retical  exposition  of  law  and  constitution,  privilege  of 
secession,  power  of  coercion,  right  of  appeal  to  arms, 
gradually  faded  away  in  the  white  light  of  union, 
where  alone  could  a  solid  and  capable  government  be 
conceived  of  or  maintained. 

Communicating  with  Kellogg  and  Washburne  in 
Congress,  Lincoln  spoke *  in  the  clear  tones  of  a  states 
man.  To  the  latter  he  said,  December  11 :  "  Let  that 
be  done  [restoration  of  the  Missouri  line],  and  imme 
diately  filibustering  and  extending  slavery  recommences. 
On  that  point  hold  firm  as  a  chain  of  steel."  Even 
more  significant  was  his  language  to  John  A.  Gilmer  of 
North  Carolina,  when  he  was  trying  to  bring  him  into 
the  cabinet  as  projected,  in  a  sincere  effort  to  draw  the 
latent  Southern-Union  sentiment — not  yet  overwhelmed 

i  Rhodes,  U.  5.,  vol.  iii,  161. 


32  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

by  secession  —  to  the  support  of  his  future  administra 
tion.  December  15  Lincoln  wrote  :  — 

On  the  territorial  question  I  am  inflexible.  On  that  there 
is  a  difference  between  you  and  us ;  and  it  is  the  only  sub 
stantial  difference.  You  think  slavery  is  right  and  ought  to 
be  extended ;  we  think  it  is  wrong  and  ought  to  be  restricted. 
For  this  neither  has  any  just  occasion  to  be  angry  with  the 
other.1 

Mark  the  words  "  only  substantial  difference."  All 
past  rights  of  holding  slaves,  whether  at  home  in  South 
Carolina,  or  fugitive  in  Massachusetts,2  Lincoln  pledged 
himself  to  maintain  with  all  the  executive  power,  and 
he  besought  the  legislature  through  the  winter  to  make 
those  rights  in  every  way  secure.  Here  was  no  threat 
against  the  institutions  of  the  States  of  the  South. 
Every  pretense  of  wrong  and  spoliation,  on  which  the 
Southern  statesmen  were  building  up  secession,  was 
swept  away,  in  so  far  as  it  affected  the  accrued  rights 
and  privileges  of  those  States.  But  the  extension  of 
those  rights  had  been  cut  off  positively,  by  vote  of  the 
whole  people.  As  he  signified  in  many  forms  of  expres 
sion,  it  was  useless  to  go  over  that  ground  again, 
whether  in  peace  or  war.  I  am  not  rehearsing  these 
arguments  merely  to  rebuke  secession,  but  to  bring  out 
the  historic  sources  and  the  genesis  of  the  Union. 

No  one  inheriting  the  potent  logic  of  Calhoun  or  the 
persuasive  suavity  of  Clay  could  perceive  more  -clearly 

1  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  161. 

2  Woodrow  Wilson,  of  competent  authority,  born  in  Virginia,  says  : 
"  The  Republican  party  had  indeed  always  and  with  all  proper  emphasis 
disavowed  any  wish  or  intention  to  lay  any  hand  of  molestation  or  change 
upon  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  South  itself."  —  American  People, 
vol.  iv,  190. 


THE   GENESIS   OF  THE  UNION  33 

than  Mr.  Lincoln  that  this  sublime  difference  must  be 
met,  even  if  the  issue  were  in  blood.1  We  are  not  argu 
ing  the  main  point  with  the  South.  The  question  is  too 
large  for  a  paragraph.  But  the  position  of  Lincoln  at 
this  instant  was  significant  and  momentous.  This  prin 
ciple  of  non-extension  of  slavery,  adopted  by  the  people, 
was  one  of  the  staying  props  which  went  down  to  the 
bed-rock  of  the  Union.  It  was  such  power  in  the  man 
Lincoln,  of  grasping  these  mastering  principles  and 
holding  them  through  victory  or  defeat,  which  distin 
guished  him  among  politicians  and  leaders  of  the  nine 
teenth  century,  and  will  make  him  one  of  the  chosen 
men  of  all  time. 

1  Lincoln  said  simply  in  his  inaugural :  "  No  State  of  its  own  mere 
motion  could  get  out  of  the  Union."  Davis  had  said  in  his  inaugural  that 
secession  was  based  on  "  the  American  idea  that  governments  rest  on  the 
consent  of  the  governed,  and  that  it  is  the  right  of  the  people  to  alter  or 
abolish  them  at  will,  whenever  they  become  destructive  of  the  ends  for 
which  they  were  established."  Let  us  define  the  sources  of  this  proposi 
tion,  according  to  disinterested  authorities.  W.  K.  Clifford  says  of  duty 
in  the  public  sense:  "  Duty  to  one's  countrymen  and  fellow-citizens,  which 
is  the  social  instinct  guided  by  reason,  is  in  all  healthy  communities  the 
one  thing  sacred  and  supreme."  Probably  the  Southern  statesmen,  in 
their  sober  moments,  would  have  absolutely  repudiated  the  Jacobin  idea 
in  all  government.  Yet  they  were  complete  Jacobins  in  their  acts  of 
secession.  "  It  is  precisely  this  idea  of  divinely  appointed,  all-pervading 
obligation,  as  the  paramount  law  of  life,  that  contemporary  Jacobinism 
holds  in  the  greatest  abhorrence,  and  burns  to  destroy." 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    EXECUTIVE    CRISIS 

WE  have  traced  the  growth  of  Union  sentiment 
through  its  first  adumbrations  and  symbolic 
images  in  colonial  time  to  its  inevitable  manifestation  in 
welding  the  differing  States  into  a  coherent  whole  after 
the  revolutionary  contests.  The  half  century  or  more 
ensuing  was  dominated,  in  this  higher  region  of  popular 
polity,  more  by  sentiment  than  thought,  more  by  feel 
ing  than  opinion.  John  Quincy  Adams,  "the  old  man 
eloquent,"  might  struggle  manfully  for  the  right  of  peti 
tion,  but  the  mass  of  the  state  —  while  the  sway  of  Union 
was  dormant  —  was  drifting  surely  toward  the  new  ele 
ment  of  control  as  exercised  by  slavery.  Yet  Webster's 
great  phrase, "  keeping  step  to  the  music  of  the  Union/' l 

1  Woodrow  Wilson  says  (American  People,  vol.  iv,  201)  that  in  1860  the 
South  had  kept  "  to  the  first  conception  of  the  Union.  .  .  .  For  a  majority 
of  the  nation  no  conception  of  the  Union  was  now  possible  but  that  which 
Mr.  Webster  had  seemed  to  create  and  bring  once  for  all  to  their  con 
sciousness."  Mr.  Wilson's  statements  are  always  fair,  and  entitled  to 
consideration  ;  but  this  expression  indicates  the  mental  condition  prevail 
ing  at  the  South.  That  phrase  "  seemed  to  create  "  is  a  fair  example  of 
the  process  undergone  by  every  intellect  once  befogged  by  slavery.  Could 
any  philosopher  or  jurist,  even  a  Webster,  create  such  an  overpowering 
force  in  government,  the  resultant  sum  of  all  the  arts  of  civilization  ?  Did 
Webster  create  the  enormous  power  of  Marshall  as  brought  by  his  tre 
mendous  reasoning  force  to  the  elucidation  of  the  inevitable  powers  of 
government  involved  in  the  Union  of  the  Constitution  ?  "  Marshall  in 
cluded  not  only  the  powers  expressed  in  the  Constitution,  but  those 
also  which  should  be  found  as  time  unfolded  to  be  fairly  and  clearly  im- 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  35 

involved  the  inheritance  of  the  past  and  the  feeling  of 
the  moment.  The  great  ground-swell  of  popular  convic 
tion  invoked  by  this  master  of  expression  in  his  time 
held  the  consciousness  'of  the  American  people,  even 
while  the  process  of  disintegration  wrought  by  slavery 
and  cotton  was  going  forward.  That  phrase  of  Web 
ster's  was  more  than  a  figure  of  speech,  inasmuch  as  it 
brought  the  average  citizen  into  accord  with  a  principle 
so  profound,  so  thoroughly  in  harmony  with  the  crea 
tive  forces  of  the  state. 

Philosophical  publicists,  foreign  observers,  or  sciolists 
naturally  could  not  comprehend  this,  the  greatest  of 
the  forces  that  was  building  up  the  American  nation. 
They  consulted  constitutions,  adjusted  technical  points, 
noted  lapses  and  faults,  thinking  they  had  set  forth  the 
American  future  in  the  light  of  past  experience.  Gen 
erally  they  predicted  failure  for  democracy  in  its  Amer 
ican  form.  Fortuitous  circumstances,  as  they  claimed, 
had  enabled  an  endogenous  government  to  maintain 
itself  in  the  absence  of  hostility,  and  consequently 
adverse  conditions  would  bring  disaster.  The  inner 
process  we  have  been  sketching,  hidden  as  it  was,  lay 
beyond  and  beneath  their  ken.  Prior  to  1861-65,  who 
could  perceive  the  enormous  forces,  latent  and  mighty 
in  a  popular  will,  born  out  of  the  new  conditions  of 

plied  in  the  objects  for  which  the  federal  government  was  established. 
...  It  was  Marshall's  strong  constitutional  doctrine,  explained  in  detail, 
elaborated,  powerfully  argued  over  and  over  again  with  unsurpassable  ear 
nestness  and  force,  placed  permanently  in  our  judicial  records,  holding  its 
own  during  the  long  emergence  of  a  feeble  political  theory,  and  showing 
itself  in  all  its  majesty  when  war  and  civil  dissension  came,  —  it  was 
largely  this  that  saved  the  country  from  succumbing  in  the  great  struggle 
of  forty  years  ago,  and  kept  our  political  fabric  from  going  to  pieces." 
—  Thayer,  Life  of  Marshall,  pp.  58,  59. 


36  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

America  and  trained  by  destiny  to  meet  continental 
issues  ? 

Much  was  made  of  the  fact  that  Lincoln  was  elected 
by  a  minority  of  the  votes  cast.1  But  such  quibbling 
over  the  terms  major  and  plural  can  hardly  reach  the 
actual  nature  of  instituted  suffrage.  It  was  the  boast 
of  America  that  her  instituted  privileges  so  fettered  and 
obstructed  the  individual  votes  that,  in  simple  majority, 
they  never  could  get  at  an  institution  and  overthrow  it 
without  long  and  tedious  legislation  by  accumulating 
majorities.  Checks  and  controlling  balances  were  essen 
tial  to  the  system.  As  well  object  to  much  of  the  past 
legislation,  when  in  the  Senate  a  minority  of  voters  in  a 
majority  of  States  brought  about  change,  or  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  when  the  lesser  number  electing 
Smith,  Brown,  and  Jones  outclassed  the  majority,  who 
had  elected  Robinson  and  Tompkins.  Or  object  that  a 
minority  of  able-bodied  six-foot  men  had  been  outvoted 
by  five-footers,  cripples  and  sick,  who  could  not  muster 
with  bullet  and  bayonet  against  the  stronger  men  mak 
ing  the  minority,  and  beaten  by  civic  organization. 

The  great  method  of  modern  government,  unknown 
to  Greece  or  Rome,  had  established  the  fixed  principle 
that  representation  was  more  essential  than  numbers; 
that  constituted  right  went  beyond  major  strength  of 
the  moment  in  the  every-day  work  of  legislation  and  of 
government,  where  the  masses  could  not  act  directly,  but 
must  be  represented. 

The  only  possible  means  of  electing  a  President  in  this 
republic  was  by  a  majority  of  electoral  votes,  or  if  that 
failed,  by  a  vote  of  the  House  of  Representatives  under 

1  Wilson,  American  People,  vol.  iv,  190. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  37 

prescribed  conditions.  To  say  that  a  man  elected  might 
transgress  and  infringe  on  a  State  or  citizen,  thus  viti 
ating  an  election  which  was  past,  was  to  beg  the  question 
beyond  all  historic  experience.  In  the  campaign  of  I860, 
roughly  speaking,1  one  vote  was  thrown  for  Bell,  one 
and  one  third  for  Breckinridge,  two  for  Douglas,  and 
three  for  Lincoln.  Would  the  principle  of  representa 
tion  have  been  changed  essentially  if  one  half  of  Doug 
las's  votes,  or  all  of  Bell's  and  a  few  more,  had  gone 
over  to  Lincoln?  It  was  the  Breckinridge  minority 
which  like  Aaron's  rod  absorbed  the  whole  South,2  and 
deflected  a  portion  of  the  North  to  support  the  Southern 
Confederacy  in  war.  It  did  not  require  a  majority  to 
cause  civil  war,  such  purists  should  remember,  if  they 
must  have  a  popular  majority  for  President.  As  Lin 
coln  put  it  at  the  Cooper  Institute  in  the  winter,  these 
gentlemen  were  bound  to  rule  or  ruin.  The  party  which 
could  not  muster  any  technical  majority  for  making 
slavery  the  main  function  of  the  American  Union 
could  drag  the  country  into  a  war  that  shocked  all 
humanity.  Does  any  sane  student  of  history  imagine 
that  the  course  of  events  would  have  been  changed 
substantially,  if  Bell's  old  constitutional  Whigs  or  some 
of  Douglas's  squatters  had  thrown  their  votes  for  Lin 
coln  in  November,  1860? 

Whatever  grievances  on  account  of  the  restricted  and 
confined  institution  of  slavery  the  Confederate  States 
had  cherished  against  the  people  of  the  North,  they 
did  not  seek  redress  in  the  world's  tribunal.  They  did 
not  ask  more  of  the  civilized  world  than  overwhelming 
majorities  at  the  North  had  offered  them  again  and 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  17.  2  Wilson,  American  People,  vol.  iv,  208. 


38  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

again.  Jefferson  Davis  in  his  inaugural  address  said : 
"  '  As  a  necessity,  not  a  choice,  we  have  resorted  to  the 
remedy  of  separation.'  With  remarkable  astuteness  he 
made  not  the  slightest  allusion  to  slavery.  By  a  section 
of  the  provisional  constitution,  the  African  slave-trade 
had  been  prohibited.  Thus  did  the  cotton  States  and 
their  president  show  that  the  public  opinion  of  Christen 
dom  must  be  taken  into  account."  For  better  or 
for  worse,  the  people  of  the  South  had  thrown  aside 
their  inherited  share  of  the  American  Union,  and  had 
attempted  through  secession  to  establish  a  revolution, 
and  to  place  the  dogma  of  State-Bights  on  the  economic 
institution  of  Slavery,  seeking  a  new  political  devel 
opment.  In  spite  of  conventions  for  separation  and 
negotiations  for  peace,  the  Union  existed,  and  inaugu 
rated  its  President  on  the  4th  of  March,  1861.  The 
politician  and  representative  of  the  Republican  party, 
the  statesman  of  Illinois,  now  became  by  right  the 
President  of  the  United  States ;  it  was  a  right  seriously 
disputed.  In  assuming  the  office,  the  man  appealed  to 
this  larger  constituency  and  to  the  world.  We  must 
consider  the  man.2 

Abraham  Lincoln  came,  perhaps,  more  directly  from 
the  people  than  any  man  who  has  ever  played  a  great 
part  in  history.  It  was  not  merely  that  his  mother,  an 
excellent  woman,  was  of  humble  birth,  and  that  his 
father  was  a  shiftless  settler  in  Kentucky,  descended 
from  Pennsylvania  Quakers,  living  in  the  narrowest 

*  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  293. 

2  I  have  read  much  of  Lincoln.  The  accounts  are  well  summed  up  by 
Mr.  Rhodes,  vol.  ii,  308-314,  with  a  list  of  authorities  at  p.  313.  Again, 
vol.  v,  144. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  39 

circumstances  poverty  could  provide.  His  whole  cul 
ture,  growing  out  of  the  conditions  of  his  life,  was  popu 
lar,  both  in  a  narrow,  material  view,  and  in  the  largest 
intrinsic  and  spiritual  sense.  He  drew  from  the  instant 
breath  of  the  people  inspiration  that  lifted  him  far 
away,  while  it  strengthened  the  ties  binding  him  to  the 
common  souls  he  loved. 

From  somewhere  back  of  his  father,  or  more  probably 
from  his  mother,  he  inherited  his  massive  intellect.  Born 
in  1809,  after  seven  years  in  Kentucky  his  youth  was 
spent  in  Indiana,  and  the  man  of  twenty-one  removed 
to  Illinois.  At  intervals  he  had  passed  one  year  in 
school.  When  nineteen  years  of  age  he  went  to  New 
Orleans  in  a  flat-boat,  and  made  a  second  trip  in  his 
early  manhood;  there  was  no  larger  school  than  the 
river  voyage  in  those  days.  His  capacity  to  lead  is 
shown  in  that  he  was  elected  at  twenty-three  years  to 
be  captain  in  the  Black  Hawk  war,  freely  and  without 
solicitation.  Drifting  from  one  occupation  to  another 
with  little  success,  always  reading  eagerly  and  studying 
law  by  the  way,  he  began  practice  at  twenty-eight. 
The  Western  lawyers  then  handled  the  court  with  one 
hand  and  politics  with  either  hand.  Hundreds  of  Ameri 
cans  have  passed  through  a  similar  experience,  limited 
by  poverty,  yet  impelled  by  ambition1  to  lift  their  con 
scious  capacity  to  eminence.  Wherein  was  the  charac 
teristic  greatness  of  Lincoln  ? 

1  Lincoln's  ambition,  never  buoyant,  subjected  him  to  severe  fits  of 
depression,  in  periods  of  failure.  As  when  he  said  to  his  close  friend  and 
partner,  Herndon:  "I  have  done  nothing  to  make  any  human  being  re 
member  that  I  ever  lived.  To  connect  my  name  with  something  that  will 
redound  to  the  interest  of  my  fellow-men,  is  all  that  I  desire  to  live  for." 
—  Herndon,  Life  of  Lincoln,  p.  217. 


40   WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Education  has  been  termed  "the  unfolding  of  the 
whole  human  nature."  No  one  ever  illustrated  this 
truth  more  fully  than  our  lank  and  lofty  son  of  Ken 
tucky.1  Surveying  the  land  as  well  as  chopping  for  its 
fences,  he  was  forced  into  mathematics,  where  six  books 
of  Euclid  laid  the  foundations  of  a  logic  which  could 
grapple  with  Taney  or  Douglas,  Davis  or  Seward.  Burns 
was  the  effective  poet  of  that  generation,  and  Lincoln's 
sympathies  were  touched  by  the  popular  lyrist.  But  the 
very  own  books  of  the  man  were  the  Bible  and  Shake 
speare.  While  the  current  religiosity  of  his  Baptist  and 
Methodist  neighbors  repelled  him,  the  humanity  of 
Scripture  drew  out  his  largest  nature.2  This  was  not 
common  in  the  Hebraic  and  Calvinistic  atmosphere  of 
that  region.  Eggleston  has  set  forth  plainly  the  reli 
gious  culture  of  Indiana  and  Illinois3  in  the  time  of 
Lincoln's  youth.  Men  like  "honest  Abe"  — as  he  was 
called  at  twenty-four  years  —  and  Oliver  P.  Morton, 
gifted  with  large  perceptions,  could  rise  out  of  the  local 
mists  and  inhale  the  inspiring,  wholesome  currents  of 
the  Christian  civilization  of  the  world. 

It  was  fortunate  that  beyond  Paine  and  V olney,  while 
his  mind  was  testing  systems,  human  and  divine,  he 
came  under  the  influence  of  the  great  iconoclast  of  New 
England,  Theodore  Parker.  This  preacher  and  publicist 

1  "  While  Mr.  Lincoln  was  an  uneducated  man  in  the  college  sense, 
he  had  a  singularly  perfect  education  in  regard  to  everything  that  con 
cerns  the  practical  affairs  of  life.     His  judgment  was  excellent  and  his 
information  was  always  accurate.     He  knew  what  the  thing  was.     He 
was   a   man   of   genius."  — C.  A.  Dana,  Recollections  of  the  Civil  War, 
p.  182. 

2  His  partner  said  that  he  was  filled  with  the  spirit  of  natural  religion, 
but  had  no  faith  in  forms.    Herndon,  p.  538. 

8  Cf.  infra,  p.  142. 


THE   EXECUTIVE   CRISIS  41 

never  could  have  furnished  Lincoln  the  constructive 
faculties  to  build  a  new  Union,  as  the  breaking  timbers 
of  the  old  one  were  falling  around  him.  But  his  logical 
force  and  its  influence  were  profound.  In  all  modern 
dialectic,  Lincoln  could  not  have  found  a  more  trusty 
Ithuriel  spear  to  puncture  and  rend  the  false  growths 
Slavery  had  wrought  into  the  political  development  of 
the  forties  and  fifties  of  the  nineteenth  century.  There 
were  certain  large  principles  affecting  these  shifting, 
political  tendencies,  as  Slavery  pushed  its  remorseless 
way  through  the  yielding  mass.  Webster,  even,  did  not 
grasp  these  deep-going  roots  of  popular  and  constitu 
tional  government  more  firmly,  or  hold  them  with  a 
stronger  hand,  than  this  homely  student  as  he  pored 
over  his  circumscribed  learning  in  the  intervals  of  his 
pleading  and  story-telling. 

Libraries  stimulate,  a  book  educates.  Lincoln  may 
have  lacked  in  the  experience  of  Greece  and  Rome  and 
in  the  lessons  of  European  history,  though  Shakespeare 
in  some  measure  corrected  those  defects.  And  we  are 
coming  to  learn,  through  the  statutes  of  Hamurabai  and 
other  Babylonian  records,  that  Moses,  the  Psalmist,  and 
Isaiah  drew  from  deeper  wells  of  human  wisdom  than 
were  known  to  our  fathers. 

Object  teaching  is  known  to  be  a  positive  power.  The 
common  law  taught  our  student  the  new  out  of  the  old, 
whether  he  was  interpreting  it  in  a  formal  court-room, 
or  to  the  critical  audience  of  a  bar-room.  He  avoided 
the  whiskey  and  tobacco  prevailing  everywhere  ;  yet  he 
was  ever  welcome  in  this  mob, 'constantly  exhaling  raw 
wisdom  and  radiating  sagacious  humor.  Out  of  this 
restless  mass  of  mankind  he  formulated  a  principle  that 


42  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

"  the  great  leading  law  of  human  nature  is  motive." 1 
His  story-telling  is  historic ;  but  his  use  of  story  went  far 
deeper  than  the  purpose  of  the  most  strenuous  novelist. 
Douglas  recognized  the  power  of  the  man  when  about 
to  meet  him  in  their  great  debates.  "  He  is  the  strong 
man  of  his  party  —  full  of  wit,  facts,  dates,  and  the 
best  stump-speaker,  with  his  droll  ways  and  dry  jokes, 
in  the  West.  He  is  as  honest  as  he  is  shrewd ;  and 
if  I  beat  him,  my  victory  will  be  hardly  won."  2  His 
opponent  knew  and  respected  him,  while  sciolists  were 
laughing  at  the  gaunt  retailer  of  aphorisms.3 

Though  Judge  Douglas  used  the  word,  the  mind  of 
Lincoln  seldom  discharged  wit.  Such  a  mind  did  not 
work  readily  in  that  unhuman  atmosphere  where  hard 
gleams  of  truth  are  stricken  forth  as  from  flint  or  steel  or 
diamond  or  glass.  That  assemblage  of  ideas,  —  whether 
in  resemblance  or  contrast,  —  the  play  of  intellect,  fas 
cinating  the  great  wits  of  the  world,  did  not  attract 
the  Hoosier  transferred  to  Illinois.  Wit  shocks,  humor 
touches  our  fellows  and  our  kind.  Humor  penetrates 
the  individual  and  separable,  outflowing  into  those 
humane  currents  of  feeling,  mournful  or  funny,  where 
people  unite  and  move  onward  into  larger  streams  of 

1  Herndon,  Life  of  Lincoln,  p.  597. 

2  Forney's  Anecdotes,  vol.  ii,  179. 

3  "  Not  that  there  was  ever  any  lack  of  dignity  in  the  man.    Even  in 
his  freest  moments  one  always  felt  the  presence  of  a  will  and  of  an  intel 
lectual  power  which  maintained  the  ascendency  of  his  position." — C.  A. 
Dana,  Recollections  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  148. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  Dana  wrote  late  and  after  Lincoln's  whole 
character  had  impressed  the  nation  and  the  time.  Such  universal  dignity 
did  not  impress  all  observers.  On  the  contrary,  the  lack  of  it  often  offended. 
Governor  Andrew  might  have  been  priggish  when  he  sulked  after  an  inter 
view  ;  but  he  had  reason  to  be  offended  by  Lincoln's  coarse  buffoonery. 


THE   EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  43 

compassion.  All  true  orators  have  something  of  this 
power  of  passion  that  fuses  their  individual  hearers  into 
a  "  living  sea  of  upturned  faces ;  "  but  only  statesmen 
who  are  prophets  also  can  carry  this  momentary  passion 
into  the  larger  personality  of  their  constituents.  Emer 
son  said,  "  What  an  ornament  and  safeguard  is  humor ! 
Far  better  than  wit  for  a  poet  and  writer.  It  is  a  genius 
itself,  and  so  defends  from  the  insanities." 

There  is  a  power  in  genius,  not  simply  to  represent 
or  impersonate  itself  in  another,  as  in  the  sympathy  of 
friendship,  but  the  greater  man  touches  other  natures, 
reaching  out  and  collecting  from  any  and  all  the  true 
and  large  connections  of  humanity.  Honest  and  kindly 
men  are  not  naturally  suspicious  or  ungrateful ;  yet  Lin 
coln,  a  good  neighbor  and  loyal  friend,  seldom  praised 
another  person.  While  Emerson  recommended  the  his 
tory  of  individual  men  above  aU  reading,  our  subject 
thought  all  biographies  were  lies;  seeming  to  move 
aloof  from  individual  man,  while  he  extracted  from 
mankind  the  secrets  of  humanity. 

Thousands  of  dewdrops  sparkle  like  diamonds  in  the 
morning  sunshine.  Only  one  gathers  its  iridescent  rays 
from  the  opal  and  sends  a  fire  as  of  rubies  dancing 
through  the  ambient  air.  The  same  light,  the  same  air, 
for  each  single  aggregate  of  matter ;  but  by  joining  the 
triumphant  play  of  atoms  in  the  encompassing  air,  that 
one  simple  drop  of  water  glistens  with  all  the  hues  of 
heaven.  The  subtle  powers  of  genius  have  never  been 
rendered  in  common  words ;  but  beyond  doubt,  it  adapts 
its  circumstances  to  new  conditions  which  resemble 
creation  in  swaying  anew  the  affairs  of  humanity. 

Nasby,  who  knew  the  ways  of  humor  and  the  meth- 


44  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

ods  of  jokers,  said  of  Lincoln  in  1858  that  he  had  the 
saddest  countenance  he  ever  saw ;  but  we  know  now 
that  there  was  a  tale  therein.  In  the  sadness  as  well  as 
in  the  fun  the  two-fold  nature  of  the  man  exhibited  itself. 
N.  P.  Willis/  an  observer  of  experience,  noted  this 
fact  very  well.  This  quality  or  faculty,  the  obverse  of 
duplicity,  was  highly  active  in  Lincoln,  and  it  carried 
him  forward  like  the  double  action  of  the  voyager's 
paddle  in  its  one  stroke.  He  was  always  present,  and  in 
the  same  moment  he  was  generally  aloof,  diving  down 
ward  with  his  Quaker  ancestry  toward  an  "  inner 

light.- 

How  far  this  double  nature  affected  the  movement  of 
his  intellect  is  a  mystery.  According  to  Hern  don,2  his 
perceptions  were  "slow,  cold,  clear,  and  exact,"  depict 
ing  everything  in  its  precise  form  and  color.  Then  he 
reasoned  by  firm,  logical  process.  He  read  less  and 
thought  more  than  any  similar  man,  and  was  not  that 
easy  master  of  language  so  common  among  speakers. 
His  stories,  jokes,  and  maxims  clothed  ideas  which  were 
often  beyond  his  own  powers  of  expression  or  the  ready 
apprehension  of  his  hearers.  These  ideas  were  odd  and 
original  for  the  reason  that  the  man  himself  was  a  pe 
culiar  and  original  creation. 

1  Cited  by  Tarbell,  Life  of  Lincoln,  vol.  ii,  61.  Willis,  at  a  flag-raising 
in  Washington  in  the  spring  of  1861,  describes  the  two-fold  working  of  the 
two-fold  nature  of  the  man  :  "  Lincoln,  the  Westerner,  slightly  humorous 
but  thoroughly  practical  and  sagacious,  was  measuring  the  '  chore  '  that 
was  to  be  done.  .  .  .  Lincoln,  the  President  and  statesman,  was  another 
nature  seen  in  those  abstract  and  serious  eyes,  which  seemed  withdrawn  to 
an  inner  sanctuary  of  thought,  sitting  in  judgment  on  the  scene  and  feel 
ing  its  far-reach  into  the  future.  Completely  and  yet  separately,  the  one 
strange  face  told  both  stories,  and  told  them  well." 

3  Life  of  Lincoln,  pp.  591-595,  598. 


THE   EXECUTIVE   CRISIS  45 

When  this  innate  conception  moved  outward,  the 
result  was  uncertain.  His  judgment,  the  sum  of  all  the 
faculties,  was  unerring  where  justice  and  the  greater 
issues  of  life  brought  his  ethical  power  into  full  play. 
But  in  the  myriad  affairs  of  life  he  was  like  an  elephant 
picking  up  pins.  His  dull  sensitivity  and  want  of  taste 
left  him  senseless  in  the  ordinary  fitness  of  life.  Mr. 
Herndon  was  a  partner  thoroughly  trusted,  and  his  close 
relations  to  our  subject  make  his  conclusions  important 
as  well  as  interesting.  His  summary  of  predominating 
qualities  is  "  first,  his  great  capacity  and  power  of  rea 
son  ;  second,  his  conscience  and  his  excellent  under 
standing  ;  third,  an  exalted  idea  of  the  sense  of  right 
and  equity ;  fourth,  his  intense  veneration  of  the  true 
and  the  good." 

No  one  knew  our  hero  so  well,  when  we  include  the 
life  before  and  after  his  great  elevation. 

Lincoln  has  been  compared  to  Socrates,  and  there 
is  something  in  the  Socratic  analogy.  But  the  situa 
tions  of  these  homely  intellects  differed  essentially.  If 
Socrates  picked  up  a  gem  in  the  slums  of  Athens,  he 
polished  it  on  Plato's  wheel.  The  prairies  and  woods 
of  Illinois  afforded  no  education  like  or  approaching 
that  of  the  streets  of  the  Grecian  city. 

This  double  energy  must  have  served  in  purifying 
the  inmost  soul  of  Lincoln,  and  keeping  him  to  his 
best  capacity.  No  matter  how  rough  the  shells  of  the 
crowd  around,  or  how  slimy  the  wit  of  the  Hoosier, 
our  hero  generally  appropriated  the  pure  pearl  from 
within  and  bathed  his  spirit  in  its  transcendent  light. 
It  is  true  both  natures  were  active,  and  partook  more  or 
less  of  the  occasion.  He  was  superficially  gross  in  his 


46  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

enlightenment,  and  sometimes  superstitious,1  when  he 
ought  to  have  been  inspired  by  his  insight.  The  potsherd 
and  the  pearl-shell  are  near  akin.  Had  the  right  sort 
of  feminine  influence  affected  his  life,  the  results  might 
have  differed.  Taste  was  beyond  and  above  his  simple 
organism.2  The  "sense  to  discern  and  the  heart  to 
love  and  reverence  all  beauty  "  was  beyond  the  ken  of 
this  excellent  Hoosier. 

But  in  the  great  business  of  life,  in  the  exercises  be 
tween  man  and  man,  be  they  monetary  or  legal  or  polit 
ical,  our  subject  was  always  sound.  "  As  honest  as  he  is 
shrewd,"  said  his  clever  opponent,  Douglas,  who  was  born 
in  intellectual  New  England  and  trained  in  all  the  ready 
opportunity  of  the  West.  This  masterly  fencer  recog 
nized  that  the  man  of  our  sketch  was  greater  than  the 
conditions  fettering  his  lofty  nature.  He  had  the  minor 
defects  along  with  the  large  attributes  of  greatness.3 

A  late  tribute  to  Lincoln  from  one  who  knew  thor 
oughly  Bismarck,  Gladstone,  and  the  whole  circle  of 
European  statesmen  is  worthy  of  attention.  Sir  Edward 
Malet,  who  was  secretary  to  Lord  Lyons  in  those  crucial 
days,  says  that  our  Hoosier  was  a  "  sterling  son  of 
God." 4  Even  more  weighty  is  the  testimony  of  John 

1  According  to  LamonJ  Recollections  of  Lincoln,  the  sense  of  duty  over 
came  his  tendency  to  superstition  through  dreams,  etc.  —  Pages  112, 113, 
115.   And  his  sound  sense  rested  in  the  affirmation  that  the  best  inter 
preter  of  dreams  was  the  common  people.  —  Page  120. 

2  "  I  never  cared  for  flowers  ;  I  seem  to  have  no  taste,  natural  or 
acquired,  for  such  things." —  Herndon,  Life  of  Lincoln,  p.  509. 

3  Mr.  Hay  said  in  1866  :    "  It  is  absurd  to  call  him  a  modest  man.   No 
great  man  was  ever  modest.    It  was  his  intellectual  arrogance  and  uncon 
scious  assumption  of  superiority  that  men  like  Chase  and  Sumner  never 
could  forgive."  —  Ibid.,  p.  516. 

4  "  Abe  Lincoln  was  a  great  man  —  one  whom  the  homely  and  loving 
appellation  cannot  belittle.    Of  all  the  great  men  I  have  known,  he 


THE  EXECUTIVE   CRISIS  47 

Hay,  uttered  recently,  and  just  now  published  :  "  Abra 
ham  Lincoln  was  the  greatest  man  I  have  ever  known 
or  shall  ever  know." 

How  did  this  man  of  the  country  and  the  time  — 
this  popular  Jackson  with  the  mental  scope  of  a  Web 
ster  —  become  the  President  of  the  Union  and  the  leader 
of  a  nation  in  this  period  of  agony  ?  Nominating  con 
ventions  are  not  ideal,  but  they  were  the  surest  means 
then  discovered  for  exhibiting  popular  energy.  At  the 
Republican  Convention  in  May,  1860,  through  and 
beyond  the  mists  of  chicanery  and  political  wire-pulling, 
above  the  noise  of  hustlers  and  rail-splitting,  we  may 
get  an  occasional  true  note  of  conviction  and  popular 
sympathy,  all  of  which  at  last  culminated  in  the  nomi 
nation  of  Lincoln.  Politician  as  he  was,  the  twofold 
nature  we  have  sketched  worked  singly  for  the  right  and 
the  true.  Aspiring  though  he  was,  something  larger 
than  self  entered  into  every  movement  of  this  rustic 
and  unique  statesman,  slowly  working  his  way  to  the 
inmost  heart  of  the  American  people.  We  can  now 
comprehend  that  the  largest  features  of  the  conflict 
within  the  United  States  were  first  conceived  by  Lin 
coln.  In  June,  1858,  in  the  beginning  of  the  campaign 
with  Douglas,  he  set  forth  the  doctrine,  now  famous, 
"  A  house  divided  against  itself  cannot  stand.  I  believe 

is  the  one  who  has  left  upon  me  the  impression  of  a  sterling  son  of 
God.  Straightforward,  unflinching,  not  loving  the  work  he  had  to  do, 
but  facing  it  with  a  bold  and  true  heart ;  mild  whenever  he  had  a  chance  ; 
stern  as  iron  when  the  public  weal  required  it,  following  a  bee-line  to 
the  good  which  duty  set  before  him.  I  can  still  feel  the  grip  of  his  massive 
hand  and  the  searching  look  of  his  kindly  eye."  —  Malet,  Shifting  Scenes, 
p.  22. 

1  In  conversation  with  Walter  Wellman.    Review  of  Reviews,  voL 
xxxii,  169. 


48  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

this  government  cannot  endure  permanently  half  slave 
and  half  free.  I  do  not  expect  the  Union  to  be  dis 
solved  —  I  do  not  expect  the  house  to  fall  —  but  I  do 
expect  it  will  cease  to  be  divided.  It  will  become  all 
one  thing  or  all  the  other." l 

Whatever  the  abolitionists,  pursuing  an  abstract  ideal 
of  humanity,  may  have  said,  no  practical  political  doc 
trine  of  this  sort  had  been  uttered.  The  speech  was 
submitted  in  advance  to  all  the  local  leaders  of  the 
party,  and  repudiated  by  every  one.  Even  Herndon, 
partner  and  abolitionist  as  he  was,  asked,  "  Is  it  wise  ?  " 
The  author  replied :  "  That  expression  is  a  truth  of  all 
human  experience,  ( a  house  divided  against  itself  cannot 
stand.'  ...  I  want  some  universally  known  figure 
expressed  in  simple  language  as  universally  well  known, 
that  may  strike  home  to  the  minds  of  men  in  order  to 
raise  them  up  to  the  peril  of  the  times.  I  would  rather 
be  defeated  with  this  expression  in  the  speech,  and 
uphold  it  and  discuss  it  before  the  people,  than  be  vic 
torious  without  it." 

Herndon 2  said  at  last:  "  Deliver  that  speech  as  read, 
and  it  will  make  you  President." 

Can  history  bring  forward  a  finer  instance  of  cautious 
wisdom,  or  of  the  high  executive  courage  that  proceeds 
from  a  sense  of  duty? 

Some  four  months  later,  at  Kochester,  Mr.  Seward 
uttered  substantially  the  same  thought  in  a  speech  more 
famous  at  the  time,  and  which  became  the  shibboleth 
of  the  party :  "  It  is  an  irrepressible  conflict  between 
opposing  and  enduring  forces."  Probably  Seward  did 
not  copy  from  his  Western  counterpart,  and  it  matters 

1  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  p.  1.          2  Life  of  Lincoln,  pp.  398,  400. 


THE   EXECUTIVE   CRISIS  49 

little  whether  he  did  or  not.  Mr.  Seward's  ideas,  power 
ful  and  moving  as  they  were,  did  not  affect  his  own 
being  or  the  consciousness  of  the  nation,  as  did  the  con 
ceptions  of  the  more  simple  and  downright  Lincoln. 
This  difference  of  fibre  in  the  two  statesmen  showed 
itself  only  too  clearly  in  the  subsequent  three  years. 
Seward  could  make  an  excellent  phrase;  he  could  not 
put  his  whole  being  into  an  idea,  then  meet  life  or 
death  through  that  one  absorbing  issue.  This  con 
viction  of  the  inevitable  contention  between  the  two 
sections  —  an  original,  creative  impulse  —  sunk  deep 
into  Lincoln's  heart,  as  after  events  proved,  and  it 
developed  a  consuming  zeal  far  beyond  the  ordinary 
workings  of  statecraft.  In  defining  his  radical  saying, 
in  the  debates  with  Douglas,  he  went  to  the  sources  of 
the  whole  course  of  the  two  systems  of  civilization. 
This  generation  can  hardly  comprehend  the  satanic 
fascination  wielded  by  squatter  sovereignty  in  the  Ter 
ritories  over  the  Western  mind  of  the  nineteenth  cen 
tury.  Douglas  knew  the  American  people  as  well  as  any 
politician  could,  and  the  issues  in  the  crisis  of  1861 
proved  that  he  was  not  a  mere  self-seeking  schemer. 
He  believed,  and  probably  with  sincerity,  that  he  saw  a 
way  out  of  the  jungles  of  the  fifties  by  means  of  the 
Nebraska  legislation.  Among  his  constituents,  men  then 
living  had  carried  the  American  idea  —  the  fulfillment 
of  the  eighteenth  century — across  the  Alleghanies,  and 
had  pioneered  the  wild  West  and  Southwest  for  liberty 
and  independent  government.  In  their  mind  the  fron 
tier  was  literally  the  front  of  civilization.  The  rough 
but  intelligent  pioneers  knew  little,  and  cared  less,  about 
the  defects  of  this  abounding  frontier  life,  instinct  with 


50  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Elizabethan  courage  and  Gallic  hope.  Under  the  quiet 
of  the  citizen  there  lingered  the  original  berserk  spirit; 
and  to  be  at  once  a  free  squatter  and  a  legal  inhabitant 
embraced  their  whole  political  ideal.  Who  can  measure 
the  force  of  this  buoyant  Western  impulse  of  the  nine 
teenth  century?  More  important  to  them  than  the 
dogmas  for  or  against  African  slavery  was  the  over 
mastering  idea  of  the  sovereign  will  of  the  individual 
citizen.  Trust  that  for  the  right  and  all  will  be  well, 
cried  the  great  advocate  of  the  squatters.  These  pio 
neers  and  their  sons  desired  for  their  descendants  the 
control  of  the  soil  forever  won  from  crown  and  aris 
tocracy  by  our  Revolutionary  forefathers. 

In  a  healthy  condition  of  the  body  politic  all  of  this 
might  be  true ;  but  Lincoln,  the  Hoosier  of  "  judicious 
prescience,"  lanced  through  this  fair  semblance  of  free 
dom  to  the  slave-wound  festering  beneath.  He  argued 
fiercely  with  his  plausible  opponent  that  popular  sov 
ereignty  in  this  form  was  "the  most  arrant  humbug 
that  had  ever  been  attempted  on  an  intelligent  com 
munity."  1  He  had  been  always  against  slavery,  but 
had  believed,  until  the  introduction  of  the  Nebraska  Act, 
that  it  was  gradually  going  out.  It  was  the  offensive- 
defensive  strategy  of  slavery,  introduced  by  Douglas, 
which  had  convinced  him  that  the  "  house  divided  " 
could  not  endure ;  in  other  words,  that  the  Union  must 
finally  prevail  in  spite  of  slavery. 

The  winter  of  discontent  brought  this  stalwart  son 
of  the  West  into  the  centre  of  the  national  government, 
made  him  manifest  to  the  eye  of  the  civilized  world. 
His  executive  capacity  was  to  be  tested  now  on  the 

1  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  p.  31. 


THE  EXECUTIVE   CRISIS  51 

largest  stage.  Those  who  knew  him  in  the  closest 
relations  testified  to  his  steadiness  in  word  and  act. 
"  His  sagacity  gave  him  a  marked  advantage  over  other 
men  in  enabling  him  to  forecast  probable  events." l  The 
art  of  government  had  been  assumed  generally  to  be 
an  especial  function  of  culture,  though  many  of  the 
greatest  rulers  in  history  had  been  unlearned.  Euro 
peans  and  Eastern  Americans  held  that  a  statesman 
must  know  "  all  the  old  and  new  results  of  intellectual 
activity  in  all  the  departments  of  knowledge."  The 
man  of  Illinois  was  a  rude  scholar  and  a  most  informal 
prophet;  yet  he  could  "enlighten  the  present,"  and 
bore  the  mark  of  him  who  prayed  for  "  seed  unto  our 
heart  and  culture  to  our  understanding  that  there  may 
come  fruit  of  it."  This  son  of  the  people  —  bred  in  all 
popular  wisdom  —  came  to  lead  the  nation  along  the 
dark  path  of  Disunion,  clouded  as  it  was  by  uncertain 
counsel  and  timid  statecraft.  The  national  cause  had 
widened  away  from  the  slave-trading  aspirations  of 
Gaulden 2  or  the  classic  management  of  Jefferson  Davis, 
on  the  one  hand ;  while  on  the  other  it  was  sweeping 
away  the  halting  timidity  of  the  border  States,  or  the 
inconsistent  manoeuvres  of  leaders  in  the  North,  like 
Seward.  The  Genius  of  the  Nation  had  to  face  Dis 
union  as  against  Union. 

The  President  was  inaugurated  peacefully  on  the  4th 
of  March ;  and  his  address 3  was  a  masterly  statement 4 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  iv,  170.  2  Cf.  ante,  p.  15  n. 

3  "  With  the  Constitution,  Clay's  speech  of  1850,  Jackson's  proclama 
tion  against  nullification,  and  Webster's  reply  to  Hayne  as  authorities, 
he  locked  himself  in  a  room  upstairs  over  a  store  (at  Springfield)  and 
wrote  an  immortal  state-paper."  —  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  316. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  317,  318. 


52  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

of  the  appalling  issues  that  possessed  the  hour.  The 
President  would  not  interfere  directly  or  indirectly  with 
slavery  in  the  States. 

No  state  upon  its  own  mere  motion  can  lawfully  get  out 
of  the  Union.  .  .  .  The  power  confided  to  me  will  be  used  to 
hold,  occupy,  and  possess  the  property  and  places  belonging 
to  the  government,  and  collect  the  duties  and  imposts ;  but 
beyond  what  may  be  necessary  for  these  objects  there  will  be 
no  invasion.  .  .  .  Physically  speaking,  we  cannot  separate. 
...  In  your  hands,  my  dissatisfied  countrymen,  and  not  in 
mine,  is  the  momentous  issue  of  civil  war. 

The  Inaugural  met  the  average  sentiment  of  the  North 
as  a  temperate  expression  of  the  issues  impending. 
But  the  South  construed  it  to  mean  war.  Douglas, 
certainly  a  fair  interpreter,  spoke  of  these  apprehen 
sions  in  the  South,  March  6,  with  the  comment,  "It  is 
a  peace-offering  rather  than  a  war  message." 

Events  for  the  next  six  weeks  wore  the  appearance 
of  extraordinary  calm  upon  the  surface,  considering  the 
undercurrent  of  revolution  which  was  bearing  the  two 
sections  to  their  great  struggle.  Men  of  foresight  on 
either  side  knew  and  felt  that  war  was  inevitable,  yet 
they  acted  as  if  it  might  be  averted  by  some  diplomatic 
exercise  of  statecraft.  Both  Davis  and  Stephens,  re 
presenting  the  potent  and  also  the  most  conservative 
parts  of  the  Confederacy,  had  stated  to  their  friends  in 
February  that  there  would  be  a  long  and  severe  war.2 

Those  elements  in  the  North  which  were  being  be 
wildered  by  any  possibility  of  peace  were  best  repre 
sented  by  Seward,  in  so  far  as  his  capricious  course 

1  Congressional  Globe,  p.  1436. 

2  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  299. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  53 

could  be  representative.  His  self-intoxicating  vanity 
occasioned  curious  misconceptions  of  events  as  they  oc 
curred.1  The  pregnancy  of  the  issues  amid  the  whirling 
impulses  of  the  times  seemed  to  excite  him  and  delude 
him  into  a  peculiar  exaggeration  of  his  own  powers  and 
opportunities.2  As  he  belittled  the  son  of  the  prairies 
adapting  lonely  habits  to  new  social  constraint,  so  he 
magnified  the  graduate  of  Union  College  and  the  rheto 
rician  who  could  charm  the  Senate.  This  moral  auto 
crat,  perched  on  his  own  pinnacle  of  superior  under 
standing,  forgot  that  truly  great  men  construe  events 
by  merging  themselves  into  the  larger  action  compelled 
by  the  occasion.  They  shape  the  form  of  the  deed,  but 
its  motive 3  comes  out  of  a  larger  purpose,  inspired  by 
the  occasion  itself.  In  the  same  trend  of  events  the 
appearance  of  things  hid  the  essence  of  things  from 
Seward,  fancying  himself  a  dictator  ;  while  Lincoln,  the 
man  of  the  people,  controlled  by  the  actual,  lifted  him 
self  into  the  lead  of  affairs  as  they  were  coming  to  be. 

History  does  not  yield  such  an  example  of  the  power 
of  genius,  basing  itself  on  popular  intuitions  and  the 
strict  popular  conscience,  as  Lincoln  manifested.  Every 
thought  of  the  man,  every  throb  of  his  heart  brought 

1  January  13,  1861,  he  wrote  home  :  "  I  have  assumed  a  sort  of  dicta 
torship  for  defense."  —  Seward  at  Washington,  1846-61,  p.  491. 

2  February  15,  1861,  he  wrote  again  :  "  We  have  passed  the  13th  [the 
counting  of  votes  and  proclamation  of  the  election  of  Lincoln]  safely; 
and  although  there  is  still  feverish  anxiety,  and  unrest,  it  is  satisfactory 
to  me  that  each  day  brings  the  people  apparently  nearer  to  the  tone  and 
temper,  and  even  to  the  policy  I  have  indicated.  .  .  .  I  am  at  last  out  of 
direct  responsibility.   I  have  brought  the  ship  off  the  sands,  and  am  ready 
to  resign  the  helm  into  the  hands  of  the  Captain  whom  the  people  have 
chosen."  —  Ibid.,  p.  505. 

3  Cf.  ante,  p.  42,  Lincoln's  discovery  of  "  motive." 


54  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

him  into  closer  contact  with  the  people,  whose  child  he 
was.  Contrariwise,  Seward  and  Chase,  learned  in  the 
schools,  cultured  by  experience,  worked  from  within 
outward.  While  they  grew  through  the  marvelous 
opportunity  of  the  Civil  War,  they  were  not  relatively 
as  large  at  the  end  as  at  the  beginning  of  it. 

Probably  the  possible  fantasy  of  a  statesman's  brain 
was  never  revealed  more  completely  than  it  was  in  the 
detailed  proposition  and  scheme  of  public  policy  made 
by  Seward  after  a  month's  experience  as  Secretary  of 
State,  and  submitted  to  the  President  for  his  adoption. 
At  the  time  his  vagaries  astonished  his  peers ;  for  Sum- 
ner  said,  "  Seward  is  infatuated."  But  it  was  not  until 
both  President  and  secretary  were  dead  that  we  knew 
how  far  the  ingenious  theories  of  Seward  had  carried 
him  in  an  amiable  attempt  to  invent  a  policy  and  con 
trol  the  great  issues  of  state,  thus  in  his  own  mind 
virtually  superseding  Mr.  Lincoln  in  the  proper  func 
tions  of  his  office. 

The  President  never  showed  this  document  to  any 
one,  and  acknowledged  it  kindly,  although  he  made  it 
clear  that  he  would  be  the  master  in  his  own  political 
household.  Mr.  Seward l  said,  "  We  are  at  the  end  of  a 
month's  administration,  and  yet  without  a  policy,  do 
mestic  or  foreign."  In  domestic  affairs  he  would  change 
from  "  slavery  to  a  question  upon  union  or  disunion, 
evacuate  Fort  Sumter  and  defend  and  reinforce  all  the 
forts  in  the  Gulf."  Abroad  "  I  would  demand  explana 
tions  from  Spain  and  France  categorically  at  once,  I 
would  seek  explanations  from  Great  Britain  and  Russia. 
...  If  satisfactory  explanations  are  not  received  from 

1  N"icolay  and  Hay,  vol.  iii,  445. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  55 

Spain  and  France,  would  convene  Congress  and  declare 
war  against  them.  Whatever  policy  we  adopt  .  .  . 
either  the  President  must  do  it  himself  ...  or  devolve 
it  on  some  member  of  his  cabinet.  ...  It  is  not  in 
my  especial  province.  But  I  neither  seek  to  evade  nor 
assume  responsibility." 

It  was  not  a  mere  whim,  capricious  as  it  seems  now. 
For  the  sagacious  Russell  drew  from  the  statesman 
himself  impressions  which  impelled  him  to  say,  "  Was 
it  consciousness  of  the  strength  of  a  great  people,  who 
would  be  united  by  the  first  apprehension  of  foreign 
interference,  or  was  it  the  peculiar  emptiness  of  a 
bombast  which  is  called  buncombe?  In  all  sincerity 
I  think  Mr.  Seward  meant  [his  dispatches]  as  it  was 
written." 

To  construe  Seward  properly,  we  must  refer  to  his 
own  inmost  conception  of  his  peculiar  functions.  He 
wrote  home  in  January  and  February2  that  he  held  a 
"  sort  of  dictatorship  "  that  "  each  day  brings  the  peo 
ple  apparently  nearer  to  the  tone  and  temper  and  even 
to  the  policy  I  have  indicated.  ...  I  have  brought 
the  ship  off  the  sands,  and  am  ready  to  resign  the  helm 
into  the  hands  of  the  Captain  whom  the  people  have 
chosen." 

It  is  true  that  Mr.  Seward's  colaborers  thought  he 
had  "  no  systematic  ideas  of  administration." 3  But 
there  is  something  more  involved  than  executive  pro 
portion,  or  that  personal  egotism  which  fills  all  objects 
with  one's  self.  We  see  in  Seward  the  converse  of  the 
large  principles  of  education  we  have  tried  to  bring 

1  Diary  cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  342.  2  Cf .  ante,  p.  53  n. 

8  Lincoln  and  Seward,  Welles,  p.  11. 


56  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

out  in  Lincoln's  experience.  Lowell 1  said,  "  There  has 
been  nothing  of  Cleon,  still  less  of  Strepsiades  striving 
to  underbid  him  in  demagogism,  to  be  found  in  the 
public  utterances  of  Mr.  Lincoln." 

Lincoln  led  the  people  often,  and  more  frequently 
was  led  by  them.  Seward  exalted  his  own  conceptions, 
until  his  swelling  vanity  overwhelmed  the  people,  and 
would  have  morally  usurped  the  presidential  office. 
Jefferson  said,  "  The  people  are  the  only  censors  of 
their  governors ;  and  even  their  errors  will  tend  to  keep 
these  to  the  true  principles  of  their  institution." 

Lincoln  could  learn,  where  Seward  fancied  himself  to 
be  capable  of  teaching ;  and  thus  advanced  himself 
through  the  progressive  changes  of  the  time  into  a 
larger  growth.  As  we  have  set  forth,  only  the  large 
ness  of  the  Union  could  have  so  inspired  any  man. 

Early  in  April,  the  anomalous  condition  of  the  na 
tional  affairs  was  working  toward  determination.  Either 
the  President's  inaugural  assertion  that  he  "  would 
hold,  occupy,  and  possess  the  property  and  places  be 
longing  to  the  government "  was  a  transparent  lie,  or 
it  must  advance  from  words  into  deeds.  The  North 
had  strongly  backed  this  positive  watchword,  evincing 
the  power  behind  the  Union.  A  few  still  hoped  for 
compromise,  as  the  words  of  Mr.  Seward  have  shown ; 
but  the  mind  of  the  North  was  gravitating  slowly 
toward  the  necessary  conclusion. 

Meanwhile,  the  condition  of  Fort  Sumter  enforced 
action  of  some  sort.  Anderson,  the  commandant,  was 
very  popular  at  the  North  —  loyal  as  he  had  been,  where 
so  many  officers  were  wanting,  and  skillful  in  the  trans- 

i  Study  Windows,  p.  176. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  57 

fer  from  Moultrie  to  Sumter.  The  President  decided 
to  send  supplies  to  Fort  Sumter,  which  was  nearing 
rapidly  the  point  of  starvation.  The  Confederate  au 
thorities  at  Montgomery,  learning  of  this  intention, 
determined  to  attack  the  fort.  Toombs  saw  the  issue 
with  prescient  eye,  saying  to  Davis,  "  You  will  wantonly 
strike  a  hornet's  nest  which  extends  from  mountain  to 
ocean,  and  legions  now  quiet  will  swarm  out  and  sting 
us  to  death."  l 

The  expedition  for  supply  was  mismanaged,  and, 
encountering  storms,  it  failed;  which  were  fortunate 
circumstances  for  the  loyal  cause.  Anderson,  when  sum 
moned,  refused  to  surrender,  but  answered  through 
Beauregard's  aides  and  messengers  on  the  12th  that 
he  would  evacuate,  compelled  by  necessity,  on  the  15th. 
The  cool  heads  on  both  sides  were  manoeuvring  for 
the  wind,  and  were  carefully  avoiding  collision ;  not  so 
the  Hotspurs  eager  for  contest.  Three  of  these  aides 
were  of  South  Carolina,  and  the  fourth  was  Roger  A. 
Pryor,  a  Virginian,  who  had  said  publicly  two  days 
before,  "  I  will  tell  your  governor  what  will  put  Vir 
ginia  in  the  Southern  Confederacy  in  less  than  an  hour 
by  Shrewsbury  clock.  Strike  a  blow  !  "  2 

The  aides  did  not  waste  time  or  purpose,  even  by 
reporting  to  the  general  in  command.  The  answer  was 
a  technical  refusal  of  immediate  surrender,  though  a 
virtual  compromise,  situated  as  the  assailed  garrison 
was.  They  went  immediately  to  Fort  Johnson  in  the 
early  morning  and  ordered  the  firing  to  begin  ;  and 
thus  the  fateful  die  was  cast.  And  yet,  when  years 

1  Cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  347. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  349. 


58  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

had  passed,  leading  men  of  the  South  could  maintain  1 
that  this  attack  was  in  self-defense.  Like  every  action 
of  Slavery,  it  was  an  offensive-defensive. 

If  the  Union  could  have  been  saved  so  easily  by  the 
Crittenden  or  other  compromise,  as  Douglas,  Greeley, 
Horatio  Seymour,  "Kichmond  Whig,"  and  thousands 
like  them  asserted,  why  was  it  not  saved  ?  Let  us  agree 
with  Lowell,  that  the  Providence  of  history  holds  in  the 
imminent  thunderbolt  some  power  to  solve  social  evils 
which  neither  prudent  citizen  nor  peaceful  moralist  can 
comprehend,  much  less  administer.  It  is  true  there  are 
not  many  conditions  or  states  of  society  worse  than  war ; 
yet,  like  the  mighty  poisons  which  enter  into  a  diseased, 
unsound  human  frame,  there  contend  with  the  alien 
destroyers  and  convert  their  warring  functions  to  pro 
cesses  of  health,  so  war,  the  final  reason,  the  clarifying 
and  purifying  master,  rends  the  shams  of  politics  and 
amends  the  faulty  ways  of  decadent  civilization. 

We  have  treated  the  United  States,  after  its  forma 
tion  in  1789,  as  one  great  entity,  permeated  and  con 
trolled  by  the  Union.  Into  this  orderly  procedure  of 
civilized  government  comes  African  Slavery,  which  had 
existed  as  a  latent  political  force  in  the  original  polity. 
Slavery  was  an  enormous  accident  in  the  development 
of  the  United  States.  The  effect  of  its  progress  and 
conversion  into  a  political  factor  that  sought  a  division 
of  the  country,  and  the  tremendous  structural  changes 
wrought  thereby,  was  fairly  stated  by  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  March  21, 1861 :  — 

Our  new  government  is  founded  upon  exactly  the  oppo 
site  idea ;  its  foundations  are  laid  ;  its  corner-stone  rests  upon 
1  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  351,  352  n. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  59 

the  great  truth  that  the  negro  is  not  equal  to  the  white  man ; 
that  slavery  —  subordination  to  the  superior  race  —  is  his 
natural  and  normal  condition.  This  our  new  government  is 
the  first  in  the  history  of  the  world  based  upon  this  great 
physical,  philosophical,  and  moral  truth.1 

Yet  the  political  action  of  the  South  had  not  set  forth 
these  principles  in  all  the  agitation  and  negotiation 
since  Lincoln's  election.  The  social  convictions  under 
lying  had  come  from  slavery;  the  political  action  on 
the  surface  had  grounded  itself  on  State-rights  and  had 
talked  of  individual  freedom.  But  "  words  are  women, 
deeds  are  men,"  said  saintly  Herbert.  The  attack  on 
Sumter  changed  substantially  the  attitude,  and  even 
more  the  feeling,  of  every  man,  North  or  South.  Mr. 
Woodrow  Wilson  shows  clearly  that  "the  thrill  of  a 
new  purpose  and  passion  shot  through  the  country"2 
as  Beauregard's  guns  echoed  from  Maine  to  Texas  and 
California.  This  new  purpose  went  deeper  than  Union- 
saving,  slavery-extension,  or  abolition.  It  took  hold  of 
those  deep  sources  of  feeling  and  innate  conviction 
we  call  "the  rights  of  man," — always  vaguely  inter 
preted  and  never  formulated.  "What  his  heart  thinks 
his  tongue  speaks,"  said  the  great  master  of  English 
expression.  The  cotton  States,  and  soon  the  border 
States,  —  now  in  April,  —  believed  that  the  right  of 
each  citizen  extended  to  the  soil  of  Fort  Sumter  and  to 
the  symbolic  use  of  the  flag  thereon,  representing  a  na 
tional  principle  —  government  in  short.  This  was  some 
thing  more  than  a  constitutional  conviction  inherited 
from  Calhoun  or  Webster ;  it  was  a  flaming  passion. 
The  North,  on  the  other  hand,  found  itself  and  its 

1  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  324.  2  American  People^  vol.  iv,  208. 


60  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

heart  most  speedily.  The  "New  York  Herald/'1  a  deli 
cate  weathercock  in  a  weather-breeding  centre,  in  one 
day  changed  from  the  mildest  peace  to  a  front  of  grim- 
visaged  war.  That  greater  fealty,  the  loyalty  which 
rounds  out  from  the  organic  whole  of  a  country  and 
nation,  was  sundered  unavoidably  into  a  patriotism  of 
parts.  The  Union  was  the  larger,  —  ultimately  and  of 
necessity  it  became  the  only  whole ;  but  while  it  was 
in  abeyance,  the  sense  of  right  appealed  to  any  and 
every  man  according  to  his  inmost  conviction. 

This  passionate  emotion  infuriated  the  men  of  the 
North^  causing  them  in  their  suffering  to  denounce 
opponents  as  "  traitors  " 2  betraying  the  public  interest. 
John  Doe,  whose  affairs  were  shrinking  and  whose  son 
was  volunteering  bravely  to  hard  service  or  possible 
death,  saw  in  the  traitor  a  scoundrel  injuring  him  in 
his  own  person.  Contrariwise,  the  South  defined  all  those 
opposing,  or  even  wavering,  as  traitors.  Even  Lee  was 
called  a  traitor  to  his  State  while  he  was  hesitating. 

Beneath,  over,  beyond  this  passion  was  an  energy 
new  in  history;  for  such  expression  of  a  whole  people 
had  never  manifested  itself  in  human  experience.  "  Man 

1  April  15,  it  said  :  "  The  people  of  this  metropolis  owe  it  to  themselves 
...  to  make  a  solemn  and  imposing  effort  in  behalf  of  peace."  April  16, 
it  thundered  :  "  The  time  has  passed  for  such  public  peace  meetings  as 
was  advocated  and  might  have  effected  some  beneficial  result  a  few  weeks 
since.    War  will  make  the  Northern  people  a  unit."  —  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol. 
iii,  371. 

The  atmosphere  of  the  great  city,  according  to  Russell,  a  most  com 
petent  observer,  was  totally  changed  between  two  of  his  visits. 

2  Even  Douglas  —  far  from  radical  in  his  views  —  defined  this  position 
severely  :  "  There  are  only  two  sides  to  the  question.   Every  man  must 
be  for  the  United  States  or  against  it.   There  can  be  no  neutrals  in  this 
war-,  only  patriots  or  traitors.  —  Speech,  April  26,  cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  414. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  61 

being  not  only  the  noblest  creature  in  the  world,  but 
even  a  very  world  in  himself."  The  men  and  women 
of  the  North  unconsciously  entered  into  this  sublime 
state  of  being,  until  each  individual  sunk  himself  in 
that  great  patriotic  movement1  which  has  affected  the 
world  even  to  this  day.  The  more  intense  the  feeling 
of  each  man  and  woman,  the  more  force  accumulated 
in  the  mass,  —  not  in  mere  weight  and  numbers,  but  in 
its  quality  of  enthusiasm. 

The  Southron  was  brave,  devoted,  great  in  himself. 
But  the  world-power,  the  might  of  the  Union  embodied 
in  a  free  people,  was  not  with  him ;  it  was  against  his 
chivalrous  doing,  and  it  pursued  him  to  the  destruc 
tion  of  his  social  system  painfully  nurtured  for  a  half 
century. 

On  Sunday  the  President  made  and  signed  his  pro 
clamation2  calling  for  75,000  militia  to  suppress  com 
binations  resisting  the  laws  in  seven  of  the  Southern 
States.  It  was  issued  on  Monday,  April  15.  The  re 
sponse  was  instantaneous  and  marvelous.  All  sorts  and 
conditions  of  men  volunteered  eagerly  for  this  need  of 
their  country.  Intelligent,  educated,  well-placed  men 
took  commissions,  or  just  as  cheerfully  went  into  the 
ranks.  The  period  of  service  specified  was  ninety  days ; 
for  under  the  act  of  1795  the  term  of  militia  called  out 
by  the  Executive  was  limited  to  thirty  days  after  con 
vening  the  next  Congress.  The  President  called  an 
extra  session  of  Congress  for  the  4th  of  July,  and  ordered 

1  "  The  war  was  an  eye-opener,  and  showed  the  men  of  all  parties  and 
opinions  the  values  of  those  primary  forces  that  lie  beneath  all  political 
action.   Every  one  was  taken  by  surprise,  and  the  more  he  knew  probably 
the  greater  was  his  surprise."  —  Cabot's  Emerson,  vol.  ii,  604. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  iv,  77. 


62  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

all  combinations  opposing  the  laws  to  disperse  within 
twenty  days.1  A  call  for  three-years'  volunteers  was 
received  with  equal  enthusiasm,  and  by  the  first  of 
July  310,000  men  were  in  the  field  under  arms. 

Such  unanimity  prevailed  throughout  the  North  that 
we  wonder  how  apathy  could  have  come  about  subse 
quently,  and  how  it  could  have  worked  into  positive  op 
position  to  the  administration  before  a  year  had  passed 
away.  We  shall  see  that  the  burden  carried  by  true 
patriots  was  multiplied  many  fold  by  a  potential  disloy 
alty  in  Northern  recreants,  which  damaged  the  cause 
of  order  more  than  false  allegiance. 

The  energies  of  the  Northern  people,  so  far  as  exerted 
through  the  administration  or  the  collateral  governing 
forces  at  Washington,  had  been  devoted  to  a  painful 
exposition  of  constitutional  law  and  to  negotiations  for 
peaceful  compromise.2  Meanwhile  the  new  Confeder 
ate  government  had  been  preparing  steadily  for  war. 
Throughout  the  South  threats  were  loud  and  urgent 
that  Washington  would  be  seized  immediately.  The 
North  was  aroused  and  thoroughly  alarmed  for  the 
safety  of  the  capital,3  the  seat  of  the  nation.  The  first 
troops  to  reach  the  threatened  centre  were  a  small  band 
from  Pennsylvania.  Massachusetts,  though  distant,  was 
the  most  ready,  and  dispatched  the  6th  regiment  armed 
and  equipped  on  Wednesday  the  17th  of  April.  On 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  67. 

2  Burgess,  The  Civil  War  and  the  Constitution,  vol.  i,  135. 

3  "  The  people  of  the  North  are  very  apprehensive  lest  the   capital 
should  be  taken,  which  they  determine,  however,  shall  not  take  place  if 
men  and  money  can  prevent  it.   They  can  submit  to  no  terms  whatever 
without  the  South  submits  unconditionally."  —  New  York,  April  23, 1861, 
John  E.  Wool,  Major-General,  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  106. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  CRISIS  63 

the  19th,  it  was  attacked  by  a  mob  in  Baltimore  and 
fired  on  by  the  assailants.  Four  soldiers,  besides  some 
of  the  mob,  were  killed ;  but  the  command  soon  reached 
Washington.  Direct  communication  with  the  capital  by 
rail  and  telegraph  was  cut  off ;  leaving  the  8th  Massa 
chusetts,  7th  New  York,  and  1st  Rhode  Island  regi 
ments  en  route.  This  force,  of  necessity  delayed,  went 
by  Chesapeake  Bay,  landing  at  Annapolis,  against  the 
remonstrances  of  Governor  Hicks  of  Maryland.  Bridges 
had  been  broken,  rails  torn  up,  locomotives  wrecked, 
but  the  ready  skill  of  New  England  repaired  damages 
instantly,  and  the  troops  reached  their  destination  on 
the  25th.  The  power  and  energy  manifested  in  this 
reinstated  connection  of  the  loyal  States  with  their 
centre  was  most  dramatic,  and  it  forecast  the  charac 
teristics  of  the  coming  struggle. 

At  the  isolated  capital  they  could  know  nothing  of 
this  excellent  doing,  and  the  suspense  was  an  agony  al 
most  passing  endurance.  Lincoln,  the  great  protagonist 
of  the  republic,  in  the  name  of  order  had  summoned 
the  spirits  of  liberty  from  a  vasty  deep  whose  hidden 
possibilities  were  unknown :  he  now  in  his  inmost  heart 
bent  under  this  responsibility  new  in  political  affairs, 
though  he  was  calm  in  outward  demeanor.  Mr.  Hay's 
diary 1  reveals  him  on  the  23d,  looking  out  toward  the 
dark  horizon  and  ejaculating,  "  Why  don't  they  come ! 
Why  don't  they  come  !  " 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  yol.  iv,  152. 


CHAPTER  III 

ADMINISTRATION 

THE  uprising  of  the  Northern  people,  after  the  attack 
on  Fort  Sumter,  ought  to  be  one  of  the  most 
instructive,  as  it  was  perhaps  the  most  surprising  and 
impressive,  scenes  in  the  whole  history  of  representative 
government.  The  South  had  the  harder  part,  in  that  it 
had  to  do,  —  to  act  on  a  conviction  inbred  for  two  gen 
erations  ;  and  its  act  would  break  in  pieces  a  system  of 
government  which  had  been  the  hope  and  the  admira 
tion  of  the  civilized  world. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  action  of  the  North  must  pro 
ceed  from  a  belief  in  the  indissoluble  substance  of  the 
Union,  —  a  Websterian  conception  rendered  into  the 
consciousness  of  the  least  citizen,  —  a  belief  that  must 
issue  in  action,  of  necessity  sacrificing  life  and  property. 
The  South  knew  what  it  would  have  —  the  right  to  hold 
slaves  at  all  hazards.  The  North  felt  that  the  Union 
must  be  preserved  —  but  how  and  when  ? l 

1  "  Slavery  was  undoubtedly  the  immediate  fomenting  cause  of  the 
woful  American  conflict.  .  .  .  But  slavery  was  far  from  being  the  sole 
cause  of  the  prolonged  conflict.  Neither  its  destruction  on  the  one  hand, 
nor  its  defense  on  the  other,  was  the  energizing  force  that  held  the  con 
tending  armies  to  four  years  of  bloody  work.  If  all  living  Union  soldiers 
were  summoned  to  the  witness-stand,  every  one  of  them  would  testify  that 
it  was  the  preservation  of  the  American  Union  and  not  the  destruction  of 
Southern  slavery  that  induced  him  to  volunteer  at  the  call  of  his  coun 
try." —  Confederate  General  John  B.  Gordon,  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil 
War,  p.  19. 


ADMINISTRATION  65 

There  was  a  virtual  interregnum  from  March  4  to 
April  15.  The  North  was  not  deliberating,  "it  was  hesi 
tating  its  opinion."  During  this  pause  of  the  storm, 
while  war  and  peace  pervaded  the  whole  threatening 
atmosphere,  the  new  government  was  held  potentially, 
in  a  negative  way,  to  an  impossible  standard  of  excel 
lence.  The  same  hesitating  persons  who  were  expecting 
wonderful  deeds  and  achievement  in  the  administration 
that  succeeded  to  the  weak  and  execrated  Buchanan, — 
these  persons  would  have  disclaimed  and  condemned 
any  excess  of  prerogative  in  an  executive,  though  the 
excess  might  be  compelled  by  the  furies  of  secession 
and  rebellion  opposed  to  it. 

The  very  fact  that  the  conciliating  and  temporizing 
Seward  would  improvise  a  foreign  war  and  threaten  all 
the  nations  of  the  earth,  in  order  that  the  administra 
tion  might  check  domestic  rebellion  in  the  South, — 
this  scheme,  though  it  was  fantastic,  shows  the  desperate 
condition  of  the  internal  affairs  of  the  United  States. 
Something  must  be  done  —  what,  how?  Across  the 
table,  and  almost  equal  in  the  councils  of  the  cabinet, 
sat  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Salmon  P.  Chase  of 
Ohio,  who  always  made  "  an  impression  of  strength, 
readiness,  and  power."  While  the  representative  of  the 
Empire  State  stood  for  the  old  Whig  political  cult, 
Chase  was  Democratic, — a  brand  plucked  early  from 
the  burning,  —  and  now  become  the  most  conspicuous 
moral  as  well  as  political  exponent  of  the  abolition  ele 
ment  in  the  North.  What  was  his  proposed  solution  of 
the  enigma  fronting  and  ensnaring  the  President  ?  In 
his  own  words  we  have  it,  to  recognize  the  "  organiza 
tion  of  actual  government  by  the  seven  seceded  States 


66  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

as  an  accomplished  revolution,  accomplished  through 
the  complicity  of  the  late  administration,  and  to  let 
that  Confederacy  try  its  experiment  of  separation."  1 

Beauregard's  guns  crashing  through  the  flag  of  the 
Union  at  Sumter  solved  and  precipitated  these  skeptical 
doubts  and  faltering  purposes.  As  above  said,2  New 
York  city,  pulsating  with  the  life  of  all  the  North,  in 
one  day  changed  from  peaceful  indifference  to  the  most 
positive  spirit  of  war.  The  greedy  tradesman,  the  dilet 
tante  "  impartial  in  his  inertia  of  mind  "  and  incapable 
of  action,  the  common  man-of-all-work,  each  in  the 
twinkling  of  an  eye  became  an  American  citizen  throb 
bing  and  thrilling  with  the  blood  of  the  Union.  The 
occasion  was  a  very  instructive  episode  in  the  capacity 
of  government  founded  on  popular  representation,  and 
it  issued  in  enormous  power  poured  into  the  hands  of 
the  administration  at  Washington.3  For  more  than  a  year 
the  whole  possible  force  of  the  Northern  States  might 
be  used,  it  being  drawn  from  all  sources  of  supply,  — 
Republican,  Democratic,  Whig,  or  Abolition,  —  and  it 
might  be  devoted  to  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion. 
These  powers  could  be  exercised  by  any  means  the 
President  might  choose  to  exert,  with  Congress  back 
ing  him,  though  it  was  frequently  anticipated  by  the 
Executive. 

1  Hart,  Salmon  Portland  Chase,  p.  209.  2  Ante,  p.  60. 

8  Cf.  Burgess,  Civil  War  and  Constitution,  vol.  i,  229,  232,  236.  A  full 
discussion  of  the  reserved  powers  of  the  President.  "  It  is  perhaps  best 
that  the  Constitution  should  recognize  the  power  as  belonging  to  the  Pre 
sident  in  so  general  and  vague  a  manner  as  to  make  him  feel  the  great 
weight  of  the  responsibility  which  he  assumes  in  its  exercise."  —  Page  229. 

"  The  development  of  constitutional  law  on  the  side  of  the  temporary 
dictatorial  powers  of  the  President  is  still  an  unsolved  problem  in  our 
system."  — Page  236. 


ADMINISTRATION  67 

Mankind  cannot  afford  to  lose  any  instituted  force, 
once  established  out  of  its  experience.  The  Homeric 
leader  was  a  "  king  of  men."  The  traveler  of  the  four 
teenth  century  found  a  "  Kyng  nought  for  to  do  Justice 
to  every  man,  for  he  schalle  fynde  no  forf ete  amonge  us, 
but  for  to  kepe  noblesse,  and  for  to  schewe  that  wee  ben 
obeyssant,  wee  have  a  Kyng"  The  new  world  shed  off 
the  trappings  of  the  office,  but  in  the  single-hearted 
man  from  Illinois  it  kept  a  royal  chieftain,  whose  manly 
force  prevailed  until  the  assassin's  bullet  ended  his 


career.1 


According  to  Hamilton,  administration  in  a  large 
sense  comprehended  ah1  operations  of  the  body  politic, 
whether  legislative,  executive,  or  judicial,  but  "in  its 
most  usual  and  perhaps  its  most  precise  significance  it  is 
limited  to  executive  details."  Never  was  concise  definition 
more  clearly  justified  by  the  stern  marshaling  of  events. 
The  conscientious  and  patient  Lincoln  was  scrupulous 
in  using  these  powers  and  the  resources  of  the  country, 
but  he  might  have  had  them  all  for  the  country's  good. 
Never  did  a  whole  people  work  more  thoroughly  toward 
a  single  end.  In  a  certain  sense  the  South  did  the 
same,  in  bringing  its  resources  into  the  conflict ;  but  it 
had  not  an  equal  constituency  in  its  people.  Though 
democratic  in  form,  its  institutions  were  essentially  aris 
tocratic,  and  worked  toward  limited  rather  than  popular 
ends.  The  historical  student,  whatever  his  theoretical 
convictions,  must  wonder  and  ask  why  this  outpouring, 
popular  effort  of  the  North,  in  doing  so  much,  did  not 

1  "  The  illimited  power  exercised  by  the  government,  Mr.  Lincoln  is, 
in  that  respect,  the  equal,  if  not  the  superior,  of  Louis  Napoleon."  — 
Schleiden  to  Sumner,  cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  442. 


68  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

accomplish  more,  and  accomplish  it  more  rapidly.  Why 
did  the  North,  excelling  in  numbers  and  wealth,  require 
four  years  of  agony  to  subdue  the  weaker  party  work 
ing  for  the  poorer  cause  ?  We  must  study  the  adminis 
tration  of  affairs  in  1861  and  early  in  1862,  to  get  at 
some  factors  in  this  interesting  problem.  If  we  cannot 
solve  the  whole  question,  we  can  reach  and  comprehend 
some  of  the  causes  underlying  it. 

One  cause,  possibly  the  most  potent  of  all,  consisted 
in  the  inadequate  conception  of  the  immediate  business 
in  hand  that  prevailed  at  Washington,  especially  in  the 
early  stages  of  the  war.  After  every  allowance  for 
depreciation  of  the  President,  personal  jealousies  among 
the  statesmen  of  the  cabinet,  and  inevitable  individual 
petulance,  there  was  a  greater  disturbance  tending  to 
inefficiency  in  the  powers  which  ought  to  have  been. 
Mr.  Lincoln,  great  as  he  was,  had  some  serious  defects 
in  executive  action.  He  could  not  execute  in  the  largest 
sense  by  care  that  "foresees,  provides,  administers" 
affairs.  Great  as  his  motive  might  be,  his  interference 
in  the  bureaus  became  petty  and  pernicious.  Any 
woman  weeping  in  the  White  House  could  get  an  order 
pardoning  a  sentinel  for  sleeping  on  post.  But  that 
order  would  cost  hundreds  or  thousands  of  lives. 
When  checked  at  times  by  the  vigorous  Stanton,  the 
man  of  great  heart  was  forced  to  answer,  "he  is  always 
right."  But  this  interference,  careful  in  an  individual, 
petty  in  principle,  produced  mischief  in  the  bureaus  of 
the  departments.  The  bigness  of  the  executive  multi 
plied  the  littleness  of  smaller  men  who  followed  his 
dicta. 

The  immense  forces  agitating  the  people  and  seeking 


ADMINISTRATION  69 

opportunity  to  act  through  the  executive  power  of  the 
administration  seemed  to  transcend  the  capacity  of  that 
administration  to  handle,  to  grasp,  even  to  comprehend. 
We  shall  see  these  tremendous  defects,  made  more 
defective  by  their  own  operation,  cropping  out  as  the 
events  of  the  passing  struggle  became  dire  exigencies 
of  the  State. 

We  may  note,  by  the  way,  the  great  assistance  ren 
dered  by  prominent  citizens  in  various  parts  of  the 
Union,  —  holding  no  office  but  serving  constantly  in 
the  immediate  needs  of  the  State.  Among  these  no 
one  was  more  distinguished  or  effective  than  John  M. 
Forbes  of  Massachusetts,  a  civilian  of  immense  experi 
ence,  who  combined  the  force  and  ready  tact  of  the 
great  merchant  with  the  native  insight  of  a  strategist. 
These  great  civilians  were  not  mere  sporadic  individuals. 
As  they  were  the  highest  outgrowth  of  American  life 
and  Northern  culture,  they  brought  to  the  unpaid  service 
of  their  country  powers  trained  in  the  affairs  of  life, 
which  contributed  immensely  to  our  political  develop 
ment  and  to  the  final  restoration  of  the  Union. 

Forbes  was  in  Washington  as  early  as  the  19th  of 
April,  suggesting  to  Governor  Andrew l  a  confiden 
tial  dispatch  to  General  Scott.  But  he  fears  treachery 
among  telegraph  operators.  "  Ought  to  have  a  confi 
dential  agent  there  with  mercantile  key."  Perhaps 
Sumner  or  Wilson  might  be  employed,  but  he  would 
prefer  a  less  prominent  man.  "It  needs  a  man  of  sense 
and  secretiveness."  We  shall  see  much  of  his  force  and 
ingenious  activity. 

One  of  the  first  means  of  communication  between 

1  Massachusetts  Executive  Files,  vol.  169,  April  19,  1861. 


70  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

administration  and  people  was  afforded  in  the  prompt 
action  of  Governor  Andrew  and  of  Massachusetts  in 
sending  George  S.  Boutwell,  "  with  full  general  author 
ity  to  represent  me,"  l  to  Washington.  A  Democratic 
Republican,  beginning  life  in  a  country  store,  passing 
through  all  the  varied  work  of  statesmen  to  high  rank 
as  a  constitutional  lawyer,  he  was  a  typical  citizen  of 
New  England.  Sent  by  the  governor  of  Massachusetts 
on  the  recommendation  of  John  M.  Forbes,  no  layman 
could  have  brought  a  more  weighty  embassy  or  more 
forcible  suggestions  to  the  men  in  power.  Andrew  had 
written  to  Governor  Boutwell  on  the  19th  of  April,  at 
the  moment  regular  communication  with  Washington 
was  being  broken  off,  asking  him  to  accept  the  mis 
sion,  for  "we  need  your  information,  influence,  and 
acquaintance  with  the  cabinet  and  knowledge  of  Eastern 
public  sentiment."  2  He  arrived  on  the  27th,  two  days 
after  the  column  of  troops  which  went  by  Annapolis, 
having  spent  those  two  days  between  Philadelphia  and 
Washington.  His  first  word  of  information  to  his  prin 
cipal  was,  "  You  may  easily  understand  the  mighty 
public  sentiment  of  the  free  States  is  not  fully  appre 
ciated  here."  3  The  next  day  he  wrote,  "  The  President 
and  cabinet  are  gaining  confidence,"  and  martial  law 
was  to  be  proclaimed  on  the  morrow.  He  talked  freely 
with  General  Scott  and  admired  the  old  soldier's  national 
sense  of  duty,  but  the  general  was  no  longer  in  condi 
tion  to  organize,  much  less  to  lead  armies.  He  arose 
with  difficulty  from  a  sofa,  and  limping  across  the 
room,  complained  in  consequence  of  a  wound  received 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  99.  2  Boutwell,  Sixty  Years,  vol.  i,  284. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  286  et  seq. 


ADMINISTRATION  71 

at  Lundy's  Lane.  From  New  York  Mr.  Boutwell  wrote 
Governor  Andrew,  May  2,1  that  all  the  members  of  the 
administration,  —  with  whom  he  had  been  in  free  con 
verse,  —  excepting  perhaps  Mr.  Seward,  favored  the 
vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  Seward  repeated, 
"  The  crisis  is  over." 

J.  H.  Martindale,  graduated  from  West  Point,  then 
a  lawyer  and  afterward  general  of  brigade  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  wrote  from  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  April  25, 
to  Montgomery  Blair,  Postmaster-General :  — 

The  high,  painful  excitement  which  is  stirring  the  hearts 
of  all  men  must  have  expression  in  action.  Clear  the  road  to 
the  capital  and  keep  it  cleared.  .  .  .  For  God's  sake  and  our 
country's,  let  us  take  hold  of  the  military  spirit  of  our  people 
and  direct  it  aright  now,  when  we  can.  We  can  have  a  long 
and  exhausting  war,  or  we  can  conquer  a  peace  before  the 
end  of  another  winter  if  we  will  only  organize  and  use  our 
power  promptly.2 

Galusha  A.  Grow,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  had  been  to  New  York  and  wrote  from  his 
home  in  Pennsylvania  to  Secretary  Cameron,  May  5, 
something  of  his  interesting  observations  :  — 

You  have  no  conception  of  the  depth  of  feeling  universal 
in  the  Northern  mind.  .  .  .  The  people  in  New  York  and  the 
cities  are  very  impatient  for  Baltimore  to  be  opened,  and  on 
the  rumor  that  the  government  would  not  invade  Virginia 
they  were  perfectly  indignant,  and  I  wish  to  say  that  if  the 
government  adopts  that  policy  there  will  be  a  universal 
execration  go  up  from  the  North,  and  you  will  be  as  powerless 
in  thirty  days  as  you  are  now  powerful.  I  saw  many  of  the 
solid  men  in  New  York,  and  they  have  embarked  their  all  in 

1  Boutwell,  Sixty  Years,  vol.  i,  289,  290. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  110. 


72  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

this  contest,  provided  the  administration  will  prosecute  it  to  the 
bitter  end,  if  need  be,  to  quell  insurrection  and  hang  traitors, 
so  that  no  madcaps  will  ever  try  the  experiment  again.1 

From  far-away  Maine  W.  P.  Fessenden  wrote,  May  9, 
to  the  Secretary  of  War :  — 

.  .  .  Put  down  at  once  and  forever  this  monstrous  re 
bellion.  The  masses  are  far  ahead  of  the  politicians  in  this 
feeling.  I  have  been  surprised  as  well  as  gratified  that  our 
most  cautious  and  money-loving  men  say  that  now  is  the 
time  to  establish  our  government  upon  a  permanent  basis 
.  .  .  until  the  cause  of  government  is  vindicated  and  the  trai 
tors  doomed.  While  mere  invasion  is  to  be  avoided,  I  hold 
that  wherever  the  public  property  has  been  seized  it  must 
be  repossessed,  and  wherever  rebels  appear  in  arms  to  resist 
the  laws  they  should  be  dispersed.2 

Oliver  P.  Morton  said,  April  28,  "  Indiana  is  loyal  to 
the  core,  and  will  expend  her  best  blood  and  treasure  with 
out  limit  for  the  successful  prosecution  of  this  war."  3 

These  participating  observers4  were  not  speculative 
theorists,  but  American  politicians.  As  a  class  they 
were  the  readiest  exponents  of  popular  will  ever  known  ; 
and  catching  the  instant  beating  of  the  heart  of  the 
people,  they  would  have  girded  themselves  with  prompt 
skill  to  build  up  an  ascendant  administration  of  the 
United  States.  Not  only  must  rebellion  and  treason  be 
subdued,  but  the  Union  must  be  strengthened  and  lifted 
above  all  perils  of  the  future. 

The  changed  popular  attitude  toward  coercion  will 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  160. 

2  Ibid.  p.  182.  8  Ibid.  p.  126. 

4  The  well-known  Joshua  Leavitt  of  New  York  wrote  to  Governor 
Andrew,  April  24,  abusing  the  administration  severely,  "  imbecile  .  .  . 
we  must  have  leaders."  —  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  168,  6. 


ADMINISTRATION  73 

indicate  sufficiently  the  increase  in  national  scope  and 
force  wrought  by  two  short  months  in  the  every-day 
feeling  and  conviction  of  the  people.  The  secessionists, 
sympathizers,  and  apologists  —  South  and  North  —  chose 
their  ground  well  in  the  winter  now  passed,  when  they 
made  coercion  of  a  State  a  main  bugaboo.  To  genera 
tions  trained  in  the  buoyant  atmosphere  of  the  Western 
world,  all  idea  of  any  curbing  restraint  on  the  indi 
vidual  freeman  was  abominable  and  repugnant  to  the 
spirit  of  the  American  Revolution.  The  essence  of 
America  was  freedom ;  and  they  fancied  that  freemen 
once  in  possession  would  want  and  therefore  could  seek 
nothing  wrong.  This  American  function  had  become 
politically  a  virtual  category ;  an  inherited,  innate  con 
dition  of  the  understanding,  and  moreover  a  subcon 
scious  exercise  of  the  highest  faculties  of  reflection. 
The  average  American  of  the  middle  nineteenth  century 
not  only  knew,  he  felt  that  his  country  was  right ;  and 
in  some  way  he  believed  the  Union  would  be  saved, 
because  it  ought  to  be  saved.  On  this  class  and  on  this 
condition  of  dreaming  the  secessionists  struck  a  rude 
blow  at  Sumter,  which  not  only  sounded  the  hour  by 
Shrewsbury  clock  through  Virginia,  according  to  Roger 
A.  Pryor,1  but  which  vibrated  through  every  nerve 
of  the  Northern  people.  Instantly,  passive  dislike  of 
coercion  changed  into  the  firm  category  of  the  seven 
teenth  century,  when  "  governments  had  coercion  and 
animadversion  upon  such  as  neglect  their  duty."  On 
the  rumor  that  "  the  government  would  not  invade 
Virginia,  they  were  perfectly  indignant,"  2  said  Speaker 
Grow.  This  observation  was  in  New  York  city,  the 

i  Cf.  ante,  p.  57.  2  Cf.  supra,  p.  71. 


74  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

home  of  conservative  life,  and  one  of  the  last  places  to 
put  forth  its  patriotic  energy. 

We  have  said  that  the  interpretation  of  popular  feel 
ing  was  through  politicians ;  in  this  light  let  us  consider 
Abraham  Lincoln,  the  greatest  politician  of  them  all. 

There  was  great  contrast  between  Lincoln  and  Oliver 
P.  Morton,  bred  from  similar  stocks  in  Kentucky  and 
Indiana,  and  called  to  two  of  the  most  powerful  and 
influential  positions  in  the  conduct  of  the  Civil  War. 
The  governors  of  the  great  commonwealths  were  in  one 
sense  even  greater  executives  than  the  national  presi 
dent  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  Civil  War,  or  until 
after  the  draft  was  thoroughly  enforced.  It  ought  not 
to  have  been  so,  but  it  was ;  the  governors  furnished 
the  raw  material  for  the  new  fabric  that  was  weaving 
imperial  textures.  The  lawyer-politician  from  Illinois 
gradually  grew  into  the  statesman,  who  marshaled  the 
largest  armies  since  Napoleon,  freed  millions  of  slaves, 
and  finally  wielded  the  powers  concentrating  in  the 
general  government  so  justly  that  they  rested  in  the 
hands  of  a  necessary  dictator.  But  the  President  of 
the  Republic  in  1861-62  exhibited  no  such  executive 
force  as  Andrew,  Curtin,  and  Morton  constantly  exer 
cised,  until  the  power  of  their  States  was  mustered  into 
the  field.  Especially,  in  the  first  year,  they  were  the 
only  war-ministers  the  country  had  or  could  have,  until 
the  pressure  of  affairs  developed  Stanton.  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  worrying  himself  into  exhaustion,  when  he  was 
running  from  one  department  to  another  —  followed 
by  troops  of  office-seekers  —  and  meddling  conscien 
tiously  with  details  which  should  have  been  determined 
for  better  or  worse  by  each  master  of  his  own  bureau. 


ADMINISTRATION  75 

This  need  not  apply  even  by  inference  to  his  enforced 
supervision  of  generals  in  the  field.  There  was  no  ac 
tual  leader  of  the  armies  until  Grant  was  evolved.  The 
President  honestly  tried  many,  and  found  them  want 
ing.  Mere  force  of  circumstance  carried  Lincoln  to 
military  headship ;  and  history  reveals  more  and  more 
that  he  was  in  that  respect  a  good  leader  —  inevitable 
limitations  being  fairly  admitted. 

But  the  officious  intermeddling  in  the  bureaus  at 
Washington  at  first  experienced  is  almost  beyond  be 
lief.  The  printed  record  cannot  show  its  whole  extent, 
— though  plenty  is  revealed,  —  but  occasionally  we  get 
a  stray  document  which  displays  the  "  inwardness  "  of 
the  circumlocution  office  in  a  great  capital.  We  must 
go  forward  to  September  10,  to  a  little  scrawled  note  of 
Governor  Andrew's,  if  we  would  recall  a  significant  pic 
ture  of  those  times.  Bear  in  mind,  this  occurrence  was 
half  a  year  after  the  organization  of  the  administration, 
when  the  bureaus  were  working  smoothly  after  their 
fashion ;  this  was  not  a  hurried  mistake  of  the  early 
confusion. 

The  expedition  against  Wilmington,  N.  C.,  finally 
conducted  so  brilliantly  by  General  Burnside,  was  pro 
jected  for  General  T.  W.  Sherman,  one  of  the  older  offi 
cers  whom  the  war  gradually  displaced.  Massachusetts 
was  much  interested,  and  the  governor  had  promised 
his  effective  assistance.  Meanwhile  McClellan  was  pre 
paring  to  play  the  part  of  General-in-Chief  at  Washing 
ton,  and  from  his  influential  post  was  naturally  absorb 
ing  the  best  troops  into  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as 
far  as  he  could.  Major-General  Butler  —  of  varied  and 
varying  fame  —  was  recruiting  in  New  England  for  his 


76  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

expedition  to  New  Orleans,  —  of  which  more  anon, l  — 
through  struggles  and  bitter  quarrels  with  the  execu 
tive  of  Massachusetts.  Hence  the  course  and  the  pecul 
iar  interest,  local  and  national,  of  these  incidents  we  are 
relating. 

Mr.  Seward,  now  to  appear,  was  so  great  a  political 
manipulator  that  he  could  hardly  play  a  second  fiddle  2 
without  some  discord.  But  it  is  fair  to  say  that  he  was 
trying  to  do  the  best  that  Seward  was  capable  of  doing. 
It  was  the  President's  misfortune  that  so  capable  an 
intriguer  —  generally  out  of  work  —  was  at  hand,  and 
ready  to  help  the  President  in  matters  which  should 
never  have  been.  All  this  applies  inversely  to  the  fol 
lowing  incident,  where  Mr.  Seward  probably  helped 
Andrew  to  prod  Cameron.  I  am  only  trying  to  show 
the  general  course  of  intrigue  at  Washington  by  hold 
ing  up  these  transactions  to  the  light. 

This  note,  very  unlike  the  most  of  the  governor's 
communications,  was  brief,  scrawled  on  the  executive 
note-paper  addressed  only  to  "  My  Dear  Sir." 3  "  We 
are  raising  five  new  regiments,  all  of  which  I  mean 
Sherman  shall  have,  if  you  will  get  an  order  from 

1  Cf.  infra,  p.  197  et  seq. 

2  He  writes  to  his  wife,  May  17,  1861,  a  complete  exposition  of  this 
whole  administrative  business :  "  I  am  a  chief  reduced  to  a  subordinate 
position  and  surrounded  with  a  guard,  to  see  that  I  do  not  do  too  much 
for  my  country,  lest  some  advantage  may  revert  indirectly  to  my  own 
fame.  ...  It  is  due  to   the  President  to  say  that  his  magnanimity  is 
almost   superhuman."  —  Seward  at  Washington,  1846-61,   p.   575.   The 
artist's  portrait  by  "  his  own  hand  "  has  an  interest  altogether  its  own. 
Here  a  second-class  man  vainly  tries  to  comprehend  the  "  superhuman  " 
nature  of  one  of  the  first  class.   A  self-seeking  politician  could  not  enter 
into  the  conceptions  of  a  truly  great  man.   Far  less,  could  he  do  as  the 
hero  did. 

3  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  143,  7. 


ADMINISTRATION  77 

the  War  Department."  Returned  indorsed,  "  Respect 
fully  submitted  to  the  War  Department.  A.  Lincoln." 
"  Sept.  10,  1861.  Let  this  be  done.  Simon  Cameron, 
Secretary  of  War."  Again,  "I  send  the  order  you  de 
sire.  Wm.  H.  Seward."  By  every  inference  the  note 
must  have  been  addressed  to  the  President,  but  the 
"  chief  reduced  to  a  subordinate  position  "  returned  it 
as  if  it  were  his  own  affair.  These  three  masterly  poli 
ticians,  when  they  conferred  in  the  grim  old  bureau  of 
the  War  Department,  —  like  the  Roman  augurs  behind 
the  altar,  —  must  have  smiled  — 

As  if  he  mocked  himself  and  scorned  his  spirit, 
That  could  be  moved  to  smile  at  anything. 

I  dwell  on  this  curious  incident,  not  only  for  its  fasci 
nating  historical  detail,  but  for  the  significance  of  the 
picture ;  as  its  scenes  bring  out  the  course  of  early  ad 
ministration  at  Washington.  Each  man  reveals  himself 
in  a  flash  :  the  restless,  tactful  executive,  Andrew,  free 
ing  his  shifty  arm  from  the  incumbering  red  tape  ;  the 
President,  cool,  sagacious,  unselfish  —  sending  the  arch- 
plotter  and  "subordinate  chief"  on  an  office-boy's 
errand ;  Cameron,  the  artless,1  simple-minded  public 
servant,  dashing  off  a  straightforward  order.  Finally, 
something  was  done ;  and,  as  sometimes  happened,  in 
this  case  it  was  done  right.  But  great  affairs  cannot 
be  greatly  conducted  by  too  constant  indirection. 

Lincoln's  personality  has  not  been  sufficiently  or  fairly 
studied  as  a  factor  in  the  first  direction  and  early  man 
agement  of  the  national  resources.  As  shown,  it  was 
not  known  in  the  beginning  by  Seward,  Chase,  or  any 
of  the  coordinate  officials,  that  Lincoln  in  himself  was 

1  Cf.  infra,  p.  199. 


78  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

to  be  the  master  and  ruling  influence  of  the  future.1 
These  officials  were  representative  and  necessary  func 
tionaries  of  the  government,  however  they  might  appear 
to  themselves  or  their  leader. 

But  the  great  aims  and  objects  of  the  state  had  to 
pass  through  Lincoln's  nature,  and  to  be  transmuted  by 
him  into  common  political  methods,  and  into  the  man 
agement  of  ordinary  political  agents.  The  President, 
according  to  all  authorities,  —  especially  Herndon,  his 
bosom  friend,2 — obeyed  implicitly  his  own  sense  of  right, 
never  subordinated  to  any  personal  or  selfish  end.  It  is  a 
trite  saying  that  evil  communications  corrupt  good  man 
ners.  Notwithstanding  the  dignity  of  the  man,  the 
President  had  not  taste,3  and  therefore  no  manners  of  his 
own.  In  the  gravest  crisis  of  the  whole  period,  treated  as 
statecraft,  —  in  the  deliberations  preceding  the  issue  of 
the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  —  at  the  formal  meet 
ing  of  the  cabinet  for  definite  action,  he  read  with  high 
glee  a  chapter  out  of  Artemus  Ward.4  Did  ever  such 
text  precede  such  a  sermon  ?  As  Lincoln  knew,  the 
ministers  of  state  were  far  from  being  his  own  equals  in 
personal  capacity.  But  they  in  themselves  did  not  know 
this,  and  they  were  among  the  very  best  men  the  coun 
try  possessed.  Did  they  not  perceive  that  the  politician 
Lincoln  was  toying  with  their  judgment  and  their  respon 
sibility,  while  he  joked  by  the  way  with  Artemus  Ward? 

We  may  say  that  the  weary  Lincoln  needed  such  re 
laxation  to  carry  him  through  the  oppressive  mental 

1  "  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  it  any  longer,  this  man  from  Illinois  is 
not  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Seward."  —  Diary  of  a  Public  Man,  cited,  Tarbell, 
Lincoln,  vol.  ii,  27. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  45.  3  Cf.  ante,  p.  46. 
4  Hart,  Salmon  P.  Chase,  p.  266. 


ADMINISTRATION  79 

crises  of  the  time.  But  this  occasion  was  not  for  ease 
ment  of  his  own  spirit ;  it  was  the  entrance  of  the  presi 
dential  protagonist,  —  an  entrance  which  became  his 
fall,  when  he  entertained  the  subordinate  actors  with 
the  diversions  of  a  clown.  Better  breeding  would  have 
carried  the  man  in  his  true  greatness  into  proper  accord 
with  the  occasion.  This  occasion  was  big  with  fate,  — 
greater  even  than  Gettysburg  became  with  its  obsequies 
of  services  and  love,  when  the  President's  memorable 
words  charmed  the  whole  world. 

High  political  morals,  out  of  his  own  pure  conscience, 
became  the  poorest  political  manners  when  rendered  into 
the  common  arts  of  a  politician.  This  incident  in  the 
progress  of  emancipation  was  not  a  casual  accident.  The 
President  knew  that  he  was  a  larger  man  than  his  asso 
ciates;  but  a  finer  sense  of  the  fitness  of  actual  life 
would  have  brought  better  manners  and  a  better  presi 
dential  action  than  a  comic  rehearsal.  We  dwell  on 
these  minor  details  of  history,  for  they  foreshadow  some 
of  the  underlying  causes  of  events.  The  political  arts 
of  the  man  in  the  executive  chair  were  often  most  use 
ful  in  overcoming  momentary  obstacles ;  but  in  a  large 
sense  they  were  not  of  the  best.  A  better  master  of  the 
situation  in  the  first  year  would  not  have  required  politi 
cal  arts  to  piece  out  a  reelection  four  years  later.  We 
are  now  treating  these  personal  characteristics  as  they 
affected  the  inevitable  course  of  affairs,  and  would  apply 
the  lesson  to  the  immediate  failure  of  the  executive  — 
both  President  and  Cabinet — in  concentrating  the  ener 
gies  of  the  people,  and  in  putting  forth  the  power  of 
the  government  through  administration,  for  subduing 
the  rebellion. 


80  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

This  criticism  is  inspired  by  methods;  in  that  the 
method  of  the  time  did  not  proceed  according  to  well- 
established  principles.  Lincoln,  in  the  closest  revelation 
we  have  of  his  thought  and  purposes,  —  the  diary  of 
John  Hay,  May  1,  1861,  —  saw  then  the  proportions  of 
the  problem  as  it  hovered  in  the  dim  distance.  "  There 
exists  in  our  case  an  instance  of  a  vast  and  far-reaching 
disturbing  element  which  the  history  of  no  other  free 
nation  will  probably  ever  present."  1 

Yet  Lincoln  and  those  around  him  could  not  perceive 
how  far  the  people  had  advanced  in  putting  the  powers 
of  administration  into  dictatorial  form.  Washington  was 
saying  that  Jefferson  Davis  was  a  virtual  dictator,  and 
"  understood  the  crushing,  fusing,  welding  power  of 
military  rule." 2  But  competent  critics  now  perceive  that 
Lincoln  was  "  practically  in  position  of  a  military  dicta 
tor,  which  was  good  political  science,  and  good  public 
policy." 3  We  shall  see  the  demonstration  of  this  in  the 
message  of  the  President,  July  4,  and  in  the  action  of 
Congress  thereon. 

There  is  a  certain  atmospheric  power  influencing  the 
American  statesman,  embodied  in  the  term  responsibil 
ity.  This,  according  to  Hamilton,  in  order  to  be  reason 
able,  "  must  be  limited  to  objects  within  the  power  of 
the  responsible  party."  Though  Jackson  almost  traves 
tied  this  term,  it  has  never  ceased  to  be  potent  in  all 
our  councils  of  state.  The  men  responsible  for  the  im 
mediate  administration  of  affairs  in  these  great  emer 
gencies  were  human,  and  they  might  not  have  been 
able  to  render  full  service  in  heroic  measure  at  every 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  iv,  258.  2  Ibid.,  p.  265. 

3  Burgess,  Civil  War  and  the  Constitution,  vol.  i,  232. 


ADMINISTRATION  81 

need  of  their  embarrassed  country.  Their  petty  defects 
and  corresponding  shortcomings,  however,  must  be  re 
cognized,  because  these  unconsidered  trifles  produced 
far-reaching  results  that  hindered  and  sometimes  ob 
structed  the  cause  of  the  Union.  But  these  minor 
defects  in  the  rulers  of  the  time  have  been  illumined 
and  properly  overborne  by  the  large  positive  service 
rendered  by  the  same  men. 

It  will  be  more  agreeable  to  study  the  great  move 
ments  which  ultimately  subdued  the  hydra  of  secession. 
Let  us  turn  to  the  message  sent  by  the  President  to 
Congress  on  the  4th  of  July,  1861.  However  our  man 
of  the  people  might  fail  in  treatment  of  his  associates 
and  fellows,  toward  the  whole  people,  his  constituency 
proper,  his  manners  were  perfect.  This  message  ren 
dered  account  of  deeds  done  by  means  of  a  kingly  pre 
rogative,  —  exercised  for  nearly  three  months,  —  and 
the  masterly  statement  was  worthy  of  the  leader  of  such 
a  people. 

The  President  soon  comes  to  the  first  great  question, 
the  projected  relief  and  consequent  assault  on  Fort 
Sumter. 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  assault  upon  and  reduction  of 
Fort  Sumter  was  in  no  sense  a  matter  of  self-defense  on  the 
part  of  the  assailants.  They  well  knew  that  the  garrison  in 
the  fort  could  by  no  possibility  commit  aggression  upon  them. 
They  knew  —  they  were  expressly  notified  —  that  the  giving 
of  bread  to  the  few  brave  and  hungry  men  of  the  garrison 
was  all  which  would  on  that  occasion  be  attempted  unless 
themselves,  by  resisting  so  much,  should  provoke  more.1 

With  consummate  wisdom  he  lays  broadly  on  these 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  313. 


82  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

simple  facts  a  proposition  which  involves  the  whole  basis 
and  structure  of  popular  government.  "  Is  there  in  all 
republics  this  inherent  and  fatal  weakness?  Must  a 
government,  of  necessity,  be  too  strong  for  the  liberties 
of  its  own  people,  or  too  weak  to  maintain  its  own  exist 
ence  ?  So  viewing  the  issue,  no  choice  was  left  but  to 
call  out  the  war  power  of  the  government." 

He  does  not  reply  directly  to  these  reasoned  queries, 
but  in  substance  invokes  the  voice  of  millions,  as  he 
reports  quietly,  as  mere  business,  the  marvelous  response 
of  the  people  to  the  administration  in  its  appeal  to  the 
country  in  its  need.  And  in  sum,  "  no  compromise  by 
public  servants  could,  in  this  case,  be  a  cure ;  not  that 
compromises  are  not  often  proper,  but  that  no  popular 
government  can  long  survive  a  marked  precedent,  that 
those  who  carry  an  election  can  only  save  the  govern 
ment  from  immediate  destruction  by  giving  up  the  main 
point  upon  which  the  people  gave  the  election.  The 
people  themselves,  and  not  their  servants,  can  safely 
reverse  their  own  deliberate  decisions." 2 

This  was  the  firm  ground  on  which  he  rested  in  No 
vember,  1860,  and  which  he  held  serenely  when  he  was 
in  the  midst  of  all  the  bogs  and  morasses  of  Congress 
and  peace  conventions  throughout  the  winter.  There 
was  one  pilot  who  could  lay  a  course. 

In  a  similar  large  way  he  tramples  over  petty  argu 
ments  and  distinctions  between  secession  and  rebellion, 
arriving  at  State-Rights  and  clenching  with  a  giant's 
grasp  the  main  idea,  "  the  Union  is  older  than  any  of 
the  States."3  Border  state  neutrality  is  shattered  by 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  314.  2  Ibid.,  p.  230. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  318. 


ADMINISTRATION  83 

the  same  mighty  hand.  Douglas,  whose  untimely  death 
Greeley  had  termed  "  a  national  calamity/'  had  rein 
forced  the  President  in  April  and  May  in  this  direction  as 
only  so  great  a  popular  leader  could  have  done.  "  There 
can  be  no  neutrals  in  this  war ;  only  patriots  or  trai 
tors."  1  Beauregard,  bombastic  as  Orlando,  had  informed 
Virginia  by  proclamation  that  "  a  reckless  and  unprin 
cipled  tyrant  has  invaded  your  soil." 2  The  President 
quietly  shows  that  the  great  whole  must  be  considered 
and  not  the  parts.  "  The  people  of  Virginia  have  thus 
allowed  this  giant  insurrection  to  make  its  nest  within 
her  borders,  and  this  government  has  no  choice  left  but 
to  deal  with  it  where  it  finds  it." 3 

The  first  75,000  troops  called  out  were  militia.  Under 
the  Act  of  1795,  May  3,  a  call  was  made  for  42,034 
volunteers  to  serve  for  three  years,  with  an  increase  of 
the  regular  army  and  navy.  These  measures,  "  whether 
strictly  legal  or  not,"  responded  to  popular  demand  and 
public  necessity,  and  it  was  believed  nothing  had  been 
done  beyond  the  "  constitutional  competency  of  Con 
gress."  After  much  consideration  the  administration 
had  appointed  regimental  commanders  for  the  militia 
and  volunteers,  one  half  from  the  regular  army  and  one 
half  from  civil  life.5 

While  awarding  "  great  honor  "  to  those  officers  of 
the  army  and  navy  who  remained  true  to  the  Union, 
the  President  does  not  forget  his  inborn,  democratic  prin 
ciples  when  he  comes  to  praise  the  common  soldiers  and 

1  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  Hi,  414. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  435.    The  same  document  declares  "  their  war-cry  is  « Beauty 
and  booty.'  " 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  314.  4  Ibid.,  p.  315. 
5  Ibid.,  Rep.  War  Dept.,  p.  305. 


84  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

sailors.  "  To  the  last  man,  so  far  as  known,  they  have 
successfully  resisted  the  traitorous  efforts  of  those  whose 
commands  but  an  hour  before  they  obeyed  as  absolute 
law.  This  is  the  patriotic  instinct  of  plain  people."  1 

Yet  more  intimately  does  he  come  into  the  heart  of  the 
people  with  massive  common  sense  and  a  never-failing 
grasp  of  principles,  when  he  discusses  the  suspension  of 
the  law  of  habeas  corpus.  No  constitutional  casuist 
nor  any  demagogue  could  ever  break  this  charmed  inter 
course  between  the  ruler  and  the  main  body  of  the  peo 
ple.  Although  it  was  done  under  a  military  necessity, 
he  admits  that  "  one  who  is  sworn  to  '  take  care  that 
the  laws  be  faithfully  executed  '  should  not  himself  vio 
late  them.  .  .  .  But  to  state  the  question  more  directly, 
are  all  the  laws  but  one  to  go  unexecuted  and  the  gov 
ernment  itself  go  to  pieces  lest  that  one  be  violated?"2 

In  effect,  he  confutes  many  Southern  contentions  by 
his  simple  account  of  the  condition  of  our  foreign  rela 
tions.  Through  the  "  extraordinary  forbearance  "  of 
our  government  the  opinion  had  obtained  abroad  that 
destruction  of  the  Union  was  probable.  Now  our  sov 
ereignty  and  rights  are  respected  throughout  the  world. 

The  administration  was  then  in  full  swing,  and  the 
petty  depreciation  of  Lincoln  that  had  prevailed  more 
or  less  since  his  election  was  passing  by.  Seward  even 
wrote  his  family,  "  Executive  skill  and  vigor  are  rare 
qualities  ;  the  President  is  the  best  of  us."  3  A  signifi 
cant  admission  for  the  egotist  who  thought  in  February 
that  he  had  saved  the  state  from  the  people,  and  in 
March  was  ready  to  save  it  from  the  President. 


1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  320.  2  /fa/.,  p.  315. 

8  Seward  at  Washington,  1846-61,  June  5,  1861,  p.  590. 


ADMINISTRATION  85 

Congress  met  the  emergency  at  this  first  session  with 
ample  patriotism  and  a  ready  political  adaptability,  im 
manent  only  in  Americans.1  The  power  pertaining  to  an 
absolute  ruler  had  been  exercised  virtually  by  the  plain 
President,  and  it  never  was  abused.  More  extraordinary 
even  than  this  comprehensive  specific  legislative  sup 
port  was  the  executive  action,  which  was  sustained  and 
legitimated  by  the  general  action  of  Congress.  These 
incidental  actions  could  not  be  recorded  always  in  detail. 
April  30,  1862,  the  House  of  Representatives  passed  a 
resolution  censuring  Secretary  Cameron  for  authorizing 
Alexander  Cummings  to  control  money,  purchase  arms, 
etc.  This  drew  from  the  President  a  special  message, 
May  26,  1862,2  which  recited  at  length  the  methods  of 
carrying  forward  executive  action,  immediately  after  the 
assault  on  Sumter.  The  bureaus  were  so  honeycombed  by 
treason  that  the  business  initiated  at  a  secret  conference 
of  the  heads  of  all  the  departments  could  be  transmitted 
in  orders  only  by  "  private  messengers  in  circuitous 
ways."  "  I  .believe  that  by  these  and  other  similar  mea 
sures  taken  in  that  crisis,  some  of  which  were  without 
any  authority  of  law,  the  government  was  saved  from 
overthrow.  I  am  not  aware  that  a  dollar  of  the  public 
funds  thus  confided  without  authority  of  law  to  unoffi 
cial  persons  was  either  lost  or  wasted." 3  Large  discre 
tion  was  given  to  Governor  Morgan,  Evarts,  Cummings, 
and  others.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  directed 
to  advance  without  security  to  Dix,  Opdyke,  and  Blatch- 

1  In  the  opinion  of  Speaker  Grow,  "  No  Congress  of  the  United  States 
was  ever  confronted  with  questions  of  national  concern  more  momentous 
and  far-reaching."  —  Egle,  Life  of  Curtin,  p.  484. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  73.  3  Ibid.,  p.  74. 


86   WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

ford  $2,000,000  of  public  money.  The  President  said 
that  Secretary  Cameron,  though  approving,  did  not 
initiate  these  measures ;  that  he  in  his  office  with  all 
the  heads  of  departments  was  equally  responsible.  We 
may  cite  this  as  an  immense  lesson  in  the  experience  of 
government.  Though  the  habitually  jealous  legislative 
branch  of  the  government  had  been  encroached  upon, 
there  was  hardly  a  murmur  of  dissent.  Congress  author 
ized  the  President  to  accept  500,000  volunteers  where  he 
asked  for  400,000.  It  provided  for  a  loan  of  $250,000,- 
000  for  a  new  tariff  and  taxes  including  one  on  incomes, 
hoping  thereby  for  a  revenue  of  $75,000,000  per  annum. 
Under  the  lead  of  McClernand,  a  Democrat,  the  House 
of  Eepresentatives  pledged  itself  to  vote  "  any  amount 
of  money  and  any  number  of  men  "  to  suppress  the 
rebellion.  There  were  only  five  negatives,  one  cast  by 
Vallandigham,  the  future  Copperhead. 

Some  political  elements  were  more  eloquent  in  their 
absence  from  this  important  message  than  they  would 
have  been  if  proclaimed  and  treated  at  length.  The 
Confederacy  had  not  alluded  to  domestic  slavery  in  the 
operations  founding  its  government.  No  more  did  Lin 
coln  speak  of  this,  the  most  dangerous  and  disturbing 
element  of  the  whole  contest.  State-Rights  and  Anti- 
Rebellion  were  the  categories  and  rallying-cries  of  the 
two  parties.  In  the  end,  slavery  became  the  one  absorb 
ing  factor. 

The  administration  failed  in  all  its  early  estimates  of 
the  size  and  force  of  the  rebellion.  A  mighty  conse 
quence  of  these  inadequate  conceptions  of  the  tumult 
agitating  the  body  politic  opened  out  in  the  methods 
and  the  progress  made  in  recruiting  troops.  More 


ADMINISTRATION  87 

damaging  even  than  these  faulty  methods  was  the  lack 
of  forecast  that  failed  to  discern  the  mischievous  result 
ant  of  popular  energies  turned  awry  and  misdirected.1 
These  latent  yet  potent  moral  forces,  underlying  the 
popular  will,  had  been  indicated  already  by  patriotic  and 
interested  observers.2 

The  President  and  Secretary  of  War  both  seemed  to 
plume  themselves  in  having  checked  the  torrent  of 
troops  offering  from  all  quarters.  Secretary  Cameron 
reported  July  1  :  "  The  government  presents  the  strik 
ing  anomaly  of  being  embarrassed  by  the  generous 
outpouring  of  volunteers.  .  .  .  One  of  its  main  dif 
ficulties  is  to  keep  down  the  proportions  of  the  army."3 
And  the  President  supported  him  by  telling  Congress : 
"  One  of  the  greatest  perplexities  of  the  government  is 
to  avoid  receiving  troops  faster  than  it  can  provide  for 
them."  4 

Many  men  saw  the  weak  attitude  of  the  rulers  at 
Washington.  Pennsylvania  has  claimed  always  to  be 
the  Keystone  of  the  Union.  Its  forest-acres — imbued 
with  the  gentle  spirit  of  its  founder,  holding  massive 
stores  of  coal  and  iron  between  most  fertile  valleys  — 
in  the  very  name  put  forth  the  embodiment  of  both 
peace  and  power.  Its  people,  greatly  intermingled  in 
stocks  of  English,  German,  Swedish,  Dutch,  and  Irish 

1  In  May,  1861,  when  expecting  a  call  for  volunteers  for  the  war,  all 
classes,  young  and  old,  were  eager  to  follow  the  drill-sergeant's  stick. 
The  writer  remembers  a  conscious  perception,  when  drilling  then,  that 
all  capable  of  bearing  arms  should  be  enrolled  ;  and  that  each  and  every 
one  should  be  habituated  to  the  idea  that   the  Union  might   need  his 
particular  services.   We  did  not  comprehend    the   power  of    German 
methods  then,  but  we  had  a  better  basis  for  a  conscription. 

2  Cf.  ante,  pp.  71,  72.     *  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  303.     4  Ibid.,  p.  316. 


88  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

blood,  were  slow  of  action.  Yet  they  had  been  educated 
opportunely  to  the  significant  import  of  the  present 
crisis.  By  their  location  on  the  border  and  the  affilia 
tions  of  trade,  they  had  been  inclined  to  sympathize  with 
the  South  in  the  middle  of  the  century  ;  but  the  politi 
cal  campaigns  of  1860  — wherein  Republicans  did  not 
dare  to  appear,  but  a  People's  Party  sought  the  votes  — 
stirred  the  community  to  its  depths  and  informed  them 
of  the  crisis.  Old  political  elements  were  fused  into  a 
new  compound,  ready  to  resist  rebellion. 

The  man  Andrew  Gregg  Curtin  fitted  the  occasion 
which  made  him  governor.  Born  in  the  State  and  de 
scended  from  excellent  Irish  stock,  according  to  his  inti 
mate  associate,  Colonel  A.  K.  McClure,  "  he  had  every 
quality  for  aggressive  leadership.  Of  imposing  person, 
impressive  manner,  capable  of  forceful  logic  mingled 
with  the  keenest  wit  and  sarcasm,  and  unsurpassed  in 
wit  and  eloquence,  he  was  just  the  man  to  lead  in  a  great 
revolution."  An  old  Whig,  he  could  bring  into  line 
"  Free-Soilers  "  and  « Know-Nothings."  Though  a 
lawyer,  he  readily  touched  farmers  and  iron-men,  as  well 
as  the  merchants  and  manufacturers  of  Philadelphia.2 
In  his  inaugural  address,  delivered  two  months  before 
Lincoln's  inauguration,  he  sounded  the  clear  note,  "  The 
people  mean  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  national 
Union  at  every  hazard."  3 

Possibly  the  position  of  his  native  State  on  the  border 
inspired  Curtin. to  a  keener  sense  of  responsibility  and 
impelled  him  to  forcible,  independent  action ;  certainly 
there  was  no  sympathy  with  his  fellow-citizen  at  the 

1  Egle,  Life  of  Curtin,  p.  103.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  36,  37. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  40. 


ADMINISTRATION  89 

head  of  the  War  Department.  According  to  Colonel 
McClure,  the  secretary  and  governor  were  not  friends; 
old  political  "  wounds  were  yet  fresh  and  inspired  the 
bitterest  hostility."  * 

Governor  Curtin  called  an  extra  session  of  the  legis 
lature  on  April  30,  proclaiming  in  his  message  "the 
time  is  passed  for  temporizing  or  forbearing  with  this 
rebellion."  2  General  Patterson,  in  command  of  the  De 
partment  of  Washington,  with  headquarters  at  Phila 
delphia,  had  made  requisition  on  him,  April  26,  for 
twenty-five  regiments  of  three  months'  men  in  addition 
to  the  twenty-three  already  mustered  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States.  In  his  message,  the  governor  recom 
mended  that  fifteen  additional  regiments  be  raised. 
May  3,  Secretary  Cameron  disavowed  the  action  of 
General  Patterson,  who  "had  no  authority  to  make  any 
requisition  on  you,"  3  eliciting  the  spicy  rejoinder,  May 
6,  "  It  would  be  well  for  me  to  understand  how  author 
ity  is  divided,  so  that  we  can  move  with  certainty,  and 
the  ardor  of  the  people  of  this  State  should  not  be  again 
cooled  by  changes."  4  May  13,  the  secretary,  among 
other  queries,  inquired  how  many  regiments  of  three 
months'  men  were  willing  to  be  mustered  for  three 
years.5  And  on  the  14th  he  issued  to  many  States,  in 
cluding  Pennsylvania,  Massachusetts,  and  Indiana,  his 
plan  for  organizing  the  volunteers  for  three  years'  ser 
vice  ; 6  and  with  ten  regiments  assigned  to  Pennsylvania. 
In  all  these  orders,  it  was  urged  constantly,  "  It  is  im 
portant  to  reduce  rather  than  enlarge  this  number,  and 

1  Egle,  Life  of  Curtin,  p.  103.  2  Ibid.,  p.  259. 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  161.         4  Ibid.,  p.  167.          5  Hid.,  p.  192. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  202,  203,  and  Gen.  Orders  No.  15,  151. 


90  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

in  no  event  to  exceed  it."  May  16,  the  governor  l  in 
formed  the  War  Department  that  the  bill  creating  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps  had  been  passed,  and  asked 
that  the  men  be  mustered,  which  was  granted.  Evidently 
some  time  was  spent  in  negotiating,  for  Curtin  did  not 
answer  the  telegrams  of  the  13th  and  14th  until  May 
20,  when  he  discussed  at  length  the  actual  and  possible 
questions  of  muster.  Of  the  probable  action  of  those 
not  yet  mustered  he  says  that  "  8  or  10  regiments  are 
organized  and  300  companies  pressing  for  admission, 
eager  to  serve  for  any  period."  2  Of  the  whole  question 
he  says,  "  I  have  been  thus  explicit,  because  I  regard 
this  question  of  vital  importance  to  the  service,  and 
upon  the  decision  of  which  by  the  War  Department 
much  of  its  efficiency  will  depend."  3 

June  25,  Colonel  John  A.  Wright,  aide  to  the  gov 
ernor,  called  on  the  President  and  secretary,  pressing 
acceptance  of  the  reserve  corps  with  a  major-general 
and  brigadiers.  The  secretary  declined,  thinking  he 
had  "  taken  responsibility  enough  and  will  await  action 
of  Congress."4  He  refused  positively  to  commission  the 
generals ;  and  we  should  consider  in  this  connection  that 
the  difficulty  was  not  local  or  peculiar.  Many  of  the 
States  were  assiduously  pressing  general  officers  for 
commission,  while  tendering  their  troops.  To  concede 
these  appointments  generally  would  have  been  to  take 
virtual  control  of  the  army  away  from  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  and  the  War  Department. 

A  historical  illustration  of  official  astigmatism,  that 
might  be  reinforced  hundreds  of  times,  is  afforded  in 

1  Egle,  Life  of  Curtin,  p.  266.  2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  218. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  219.  *  Ibid.,  p.  297. 


ADMINISTRATION  91 

the  casual  remark  of  the  secretary  to  Colonel  Wright : 
66  If  three  months'  men  go  home,  they  will  in  a  short 
time,  when  another  call  is  made,  be  the  more  anxious 
to  reenlist."  *  A  fine  example  of  "  cooling  the  ardor," 
as  Curtin 2  puts  it.  This  was  a  touch  of  the  bureaucratic 
obscurantism  of  Washington  that  cost  the  American 
people  thousands  of  lives  and  seasons  of  agony.  It  was 
not  the  common  form  of  "  red  tape  "  inevitably  possess 
ing  the  great  business  of  governments.  Cameron  was 
not  a  dawdler  of  the  Circumlocution  Office ;  he  was  a  man 
bred  to  large  affairs.  He  was  en  wrapt  in  the  deadly 
atmosphere  of  a  capital ;  immersed  in  the  centripetal 
influences  of  political  opportunism;  "Happy-go-lucky  ;" 
send  off  your  volunteers,  and  they  may  come  back  with 
yet  more  eager  enthusiasm. 

Colonel  Wright  was  in  Washington  again  July  13,  and 
submitted  the  secretary's  offer  to  accept  fifteen  regi 
ments  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  and  "  to  appoint 
the  general  a  brigadier-general  in  volunteer  force."  3 
George  A.  McCall  declined  this  tender  with  the  sup 
port  of  Governor  Curtin.4  July  17,  when  McDowell 
had  started  for  Bull  Eun,  the  department  accepted  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserves.5  July  22,  in  the  excitement 
after  Bull  Run,  and  with  the  interposition  of  Secretary 
Chase,  General  McCall  "  under  the  circumstances  accepts 
the  commission  of  brigadier-general." 6 

We  dwell  on  these  incidents  of  the  raising  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserves,  not  only  to  show  the  splendid 
energy  of  the  governor  and  his  people,  but  to  indicate 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  p.  297.       2  Cf.  ante,  p.  89. 

3  Egle,  Life  Curtin,  p.  269.  4  Ibid.,  p.  270. 

6  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  336.          «  Egle,  Life  of  Curtin,  p.  273. 


92  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

the  historic  significance  of  the  popular  enthusiasm  of 
the  time,  and  the  failure  of  the  administration  at  Wash 
ington  to  comprehend  and  direct  it.  One  may  rejoin 
that  the  authorities  were  doing  all  they  could  in  raising 
troops  as  they  did.  In  fact,  Curtin  did  this  much  more 
as  other  people  would  have  done,  and  without  an  effort 
from  Washington,  excepting  a  nod  of  acceptance.  Be 
fore  the  first  military  movement  of  Scott  and  McDowell 
was  completed,  the  administration  was  trembling  like 
an  aspen  leaf,  every  member  save  Lincoln 1  —  "  who  was 
imperturbable"  -quaking,  if  not  shrieking  for  more 
troops,  for  anything  to  save  Washington.  This  capacity 
of  scare,  this  propensity  to  centre  every  weakness  of 
the  Union  in  Washington,  was  supreme.  Whatever  else 
failed  —  troops,  money,  or  wisdom  —  here  was  enough  ; 
this  emotion  of  fear  was  infinite  in  quantity,  in  quality 
it  was  despicable. 

Before  treating  the  movement  to  Bull  Run,  naturally 
suggested  by  the  history  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves, 
we  must  refer  to  a  few  points  especially  interesting, 
both  at  home  and  abroad.  One  of  these  is  the  gradual 
subsidence  of  the  impassioned  hatred  of  treason  at  the 
North.  May  27,  the  fiery  «  New  York  Tribune  "  had 
specified  by  name  numerous  civilians  and  soldiers  who 
must  succeed,  or  die  as  traitors.  April  29,  the  sedate 
Suffolk  Bar  of  Massachusetts,  in  resolutions  bearing  the 
signature  of  Benjamin  F.  Thomas,  as  chairman,2  pro 
claimed  that  the  rebellion  was  "treason  without  even 
forms  of  law."  These  lawyers  expressed  the  heartiest 
sympathy  for  the  government,  with  pride  that  the  Chief 

1  I  have  this  from  a  trustworthy  eye-witness. 

2  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  69,  23. 


ADMINISTRATION  93 

Magistrate  of  the  Nation,  and  the  Chief  Magistrate  of 
"our"  Commonwealth  were  members  of  their  own 
profession.  They  tendered  professional  service  free  of 
cost  to  families  of  soldiers,  and  advocated  measures  for 
"  more  thorough  training  of  the  militia." 

Legally,  the  Confederates  were  held  to  be  traitors 
in  December,  1862,  by  the  Supreme  Court.1  But  Chief 
Justice  Chase  in  1868  affirmed  that  "  very  soon  after 
the  war  began"  the  rights  of  belligerency  canceled 
the  odium  of  treason.2  The  rebellion  was  too  large  to 
be  formulated  in  treason.  The  musket-volley  and  rifled 
shell  do  not  pertain  to  those  whom  "  faith  unfaithful 
keeps  falsely  true." 

This  change  of  sentiment  was  recorded  unconsciously 
by  one  of  the  most  passionate  as  well  as  magnanimous 
of  our  patriots,  John  A.  Andrew.  He  was  attending 
Commencement  in  June  at  Cambridge,  where  they  sang 
Psalm  78.  On  the  sheet  he  penciled,  "  Gen1  Scott,  You 
have  to-day  given  him  a  degree  at  the  North  —  he  will 
presently  take  several  degrees  to  the  South  —  where,  as 
a  Doctor  of  Laws,  he  will  teach  rebels  (&  traitors)  obe 
dience."  3  The  sentiment  is  pathetic  in  that  it  embodies 
the  child-like  confidence  of  the  day,  reposed  in  General 
Scott.  Scratching  and  bracketing  "  traitors  "  marks  the 
passing  of  personal  hatred  into  the  calm  responsibility 
of  a  public  officer. 

The  President,  as  we  saw  in  his  message,  felt  assured 
of  virtual  neutrality  in  Europe,  resting  on  the  belliger 
ent  rights  of  the  Confederacy.  In  July,  this  assurance 

1  Miller,  Decisions,  vol.  iv,  876. 

2  Wallace,  Reports,  December,  1868,  p.  10. 

3  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  166,  88. 


94  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

was  proved  by  flippant  manifestations  from  various  re 
presentatives  of  public  opinion.  In  England,  especially, 
Palmerston  —  whether  a  great  or  a  lesser  statesman  — 
was  English  to  the  core.  He  told  Belmont,  "  We  do  not 
like  slavery,  but  we  want  cotton,  and  we  dislike  very 
much  your  Morrill  tariff."  "Punch,"  whose  politics  are 
more  comprehensible  always  than  its  fun,  said :  — 

Though  with  the  North  we  sympathize, 
It  must  not  be  forgotten 
That  with  the  South  we  Ve  stronger  ties 
Which  are  composed  of  cotton. 

May  27,  the  "  New  York  Tribune  "  printed  Butler's 
phrase,  "  The  negro  must  now  be  regarded  as  contra 
band."1  Literally  a  happy  thought.  The  poor  Afro- 
American,  whose  wrongs  had  brought  vengeance  on 
both  North  and  South,  —  hitherto  ignored  both  in  Con 
federate  rebellion  and  Federal  reaction, — was  hovering 
about  the  camps,  intuitively  seeking  war's  desperate 
but  absolute  remedies.  The  great  protagonist  of  jury- 
box  and  of  political  artifice  deftly  placed  the  negro  in 
that  category  of  goods,  "  which  a  neutral  cannot  send 
into  either  of  the  countries  at  war,  without  wrong  to 
the  other." 

The  mercurial  "  New  York  Tribune  "  voiced  a  restless 
public  sentiment  when,  as  early  as  June  26,  it  shrieked, 
"  Forward  to  Richmond."  On  July  21,  this  movement 
opened  a  fated  though  not  fatal  scene  in  the  Civil  War, 
which  at  evening  widened  out  into  a  tragical  issue. 
Those  living  who  participated  with  me  in  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run  will  accept  General  Sherman's  dictum  of  a 
"  best  planned  and  worst  fought  action." 

1  Cf.  infra,  p.  196. 


ADMINISTRATION  95 

Most  of  the  causes  leading  to  these  results  were  in 
evitable  ;  yet  we  can  discern  certain  elements  more 
pregnant  and  effective  in  the  Federal  than  in  the  Con 
federate  operations.  The  Confederacy  had  a  new  field, 
and  so  far  as  it  could  know,  it  put  forward  its  most 
efficient  men.  The  Union  sent  to  the  front  what  it 
could  and  must.  Chief  among  Federal  defects  was  the 
lack  of  an  efficient  general  staff.  And  in  all  ways  the 
Federal  cause  was  incumbered  by  a  line  of  brave  and 
patriotic  officers  whom  some  good  fairy  ought  to 
have  knocked  in  the  head.  War  is  action  incarnate ; 
but  these  worthy  gentlemen  were  drifting  down  into 
"set  gray  and  apathetic"  life.  Beyond  all  delineation 
through  the  reason,  there  was  something  indescribable  in 
their  condition ;  and  no  one  has  defined  it  more  saga 
ciously  than  Governor  Andrew.  Of  a  fine  old  regular 
officer  he  said,  November  4,  1861,  to  Mr.  Blair,1  he  has 
"not  much  realizing  sense  of  the  work  in  hand."  In  the 
postscript,  he  enlarges  in  the  direction  we  are  discuss 
ing  ;  he  would  "  not  seem  officious.  But  nearly  all  our 
mishaps  from  the  first  have  been  due  to  the  sleeping 
confidence  that  all  was  well  of  the  old  army  officers." 
They  were  so  long  used  to  "  being  protected  by  peace- 
officers,  rather  than  guarding  and  defending  us  by  their 
arms."  Cannot  this  generation  recall  the  perspective  of 
that  time,  and  recognize  the  deadly  somnolence  "  dul  in 
body  and  in  soule  "  that  could  imagine  itself  awake. 

In  a  large  sense,  perhaps,  Bull  Run  affected  Europe 
more  than  it  did  any  portion  of  the  United  States. 
August  8,  Adams  wrote  Seward 2  that  the  division  of  the 

1  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  107,  pp.  172,  173.  * 

2  MS.  cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  457. 


96  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Union  was  now  held  to  be  an  accomplished  fact.  But 
Europe  continued  in  its  Platonic  indifference,  and 
would  not  yield  the  recognition  sought  by  Confederate 
agents  after  their  victory. 

The  people  of  the  South  exulted  for  the  moment,  but 
the  Confederate  government  agreed  with  A.  H.  Stephens 
concerning  the  North,  that  "  their  defeat  will  increase 
their  energy."  Lincoln  spent  a  sleepless  night  in  mak 
ing  definite  plans  to  remedy  disaster.1 

The  shock  to  the  complacent  assurance  of  the  North 
ern  people,  imparted  by  the  casualties  of  Bull  Run,  was 
soon  transformed  into  renewed  activities  in  support  of  the 
administration.  August  22,  Governor  Andrew  speaks 
cheerily :  "  I  think  I  perceive  a  reviving  of  the  spirit  of 
our  people,  and  that  encouragement  and  zealous  effort 
from  all  in  power,  with  the  cooperation  of  private  indi 
viduals,  will  render  it  general  and  successful,  but  we 
must  strike  immediately."  2  September  10,  Governor  E. 
D.  Morgan  of  New  York  corroborates  "  an  evident  and 
favorable  reaction  manifest  in  all  parts  of  the  State."  3 
The  governors  had  been  begging  constantly  for  "reg 
ular  "  instructed  officers  to  command  the  new  organi 
zations  of  volunteers.  The  "  set  gray  "  bureaucrats  had 
clung  to  a  myth,  that  in  some  impossible  way  the  regular 
army  would  be  secluded  as  a  superior  machine,  and  not 
become  an  influence  radiating  through  its  officers  and 
permeating  the  great  mass  of  the  volunteers.  General 
McClellan  was  more  sagacious  and  tractable.  August  24, 
he  responded  to  Governor  Andrew's  appeal,  "  I  do  not 
think  it  possible  to  employ  our  army  officers  to  more 

*      i  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  425,  426. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  443.  8  Ibid.,  p.  497. 


ADMINISTRATION  97 

advantage  than  in  commanding  divisions,  brigades,  and 
regiments  of  new  troops." 

One  of  the  few  new  military  appointees  at  first  and 
always  successful  was  Montgomery  C.  Meigs,  the  quarter 
master-general.  Whether  under  the  dilatory  McClellan, 
the  ferocious  Stanton,  or  the  imperturbable  Grant,  he 
was  a  great  administrator.  That  he  comprehended  affairs 
with  the  grasp  of  a  statesman  appears  in  that  Mr.  Lin 
coln  soon  sent  him  to  Missouri  with  Montgomery  Blair 
of  the  cabinet,  to  aid  in  the  very  delicate  task  of  ousting 
John  C.  Fremont.2  A  Georgian  engineer  of  West  Point, 
engaged  in  planning  and  accomplishing  the  great  ex 
tensions  of  the  Capitol  from  1852,  he  may  then  have 
comprehended  that  the  massive  dome  embraced  the 
Union  and  not  districts  of  States.  He  was  made  quar 
termaster-general  in  May,  1861.  The  "gret  travayle 
and  bysynes  "  of  war  in  our  army  is  rendered  through 
the  quartermaster's  department  into  the  common  life  of 
a  fighting-machine.  A  modern  army  is  the  servant  of 
communication  as  well  as  supply,  and  the  quartermaster 
holds  all  these  vital  threads  in  his  ready  hand.  The 
opinions  of  such  a  master  in  this  direction  have  more 
than  mere  technical  interest. 

The  wiseacres  had  nearly  pushed  through  Congress 
a  severe  act  constraining  every  officer  in  the  quarter 
master's  department  to  "  prevent  frauds  "  by  officers 
making  contracts.  August  2,  General  Meigs  wrote  to 
Senator  Wilson  3  a  manly  remonstrance,  saying  such 
"  red  tape  "  would  insure  the  success  of  the  Southern 

'  0,  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  444. 

2  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iii,  477. 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  378,  379. 


98  WAK  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

rebels ;  "  they  are  directed  by  one  mind,  prompt,  deter 
mined,  bold.  They  are  not  distracted  by  divided  coun 
sels,  are  not  restrained  by  rules,  laws,  customs,  prece 
dents."  Officers  in  his  department  were  enormously 
strained,  physically  and  mentally,  to  provide  means  for 
moving  the  army  —  wagons,  animals,  forage  —  as  well 
as  tents,  clothing,  etc.,  for  thousands  who  were  suffering 
for  supplies.  If,  in  addition,  these  officers  must  put  "  in 
writing  every  verbal  contract  on  printed  paper  of  a  cer 
tain  shape,  take  a  certain  oath  before  a  magistrate,"  etc., 
etc.,  then  our  defeat  would  be  assured.  "  The  greater 
the  fraud,  the  more  perfect  the  papers.  The  law  of 
1861,  chapter  84,  section  10,  in  regard  to  making  con 
tracts,  contains  all  that  is  really  needed  to  secure  the 
public."  An  admirable  exposition  of  the  inevitable 
opposition  between  the  feeble  civic  checks  of  common 
life  and  the  tyrannous  necessity  of  war. 

General  Meigs  was  obliged  to  meet  the  tremendous 
exigencies  of  supply  in  this  summer  and  autumn  with 
forecast  and  energy  equal  to  the  strategic  efforts  of 
a  great  general.  He  was  soon  confronted  by  the  im 
mediate  and  pressing  demands  of  the  hour;  having 
promised  through  his  subordinates  what  the  Treasury 
could  not  pay.  His  correspondence  is  characteristic  and 
interesting.  October  3,  he  writes  Governor  Morgan  of 
New  York:  — 

While  all  agree  that  men  are  necessary,  and  to  make 
these  effective,  equipments,  wagons,  and  horses,  yet  the 
Treasury  finds  it  difficult  to  meet  the  great  calls  which,  at 
this  time,  when  every  soldier  is  to  be  provided  with  complete 
outfit,  when  every  army  is  purchasing  the  means  of  transpor 
tation,  are  much  heavier  than  they  will  be  when  the  expendi- 


ADMINISTRATION  99 

ture  is  confined  to  keeping  up  a  stock  of  animals,  wagons, 
clothing,  arms,  and  ammunition  once  provided  and  paid  for. 
There  may  be  delay  in  payment,  though  I  have  full  confidence 
that  the  people  will  support  the  government  to  the  last 
extremity.  .  .  .  No  nation  probably  ever  so  quickly  and  so 
thoroughly  organized  and  equipped  so  large  an  army  and  so 
nearly  paid  its  way  as  we  have  done.1 

November  16,  he  said  to  Colonel  D.  H.  Vinton,2  in 
charge  at  New  York,  and  feeling  the  pressure  at  that 
great  commercial  centre  :  — 

I  know  that  injustice  is  done  to  all  deserving  contractors, 
who  had  the  right  to  expect  cash.  I  have  asked  for  the  re 
mittance  ;  I  cannot  make  it,  as  I  am  not  the  banks,  the  capi 
talists,  the  people,  nor  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Many 
other  injustices  are  the  result  of  this  war,  and  great  as  this  is, 
it  is  one  of  the  least ;  so  long  as  there  are  found  merchants, 
manufacturers,  or  capitalists  who  will  take  the  risk  of  sup 
plying  this  department  with  clothing  or  other  indispensable 
stores  for  the  defense  of  the  country,  we  must  continue  to 
exert  ourselves  to  obtain  them. 

We  cite  these  glowing  phrases,  not  for  their  historic 
interest  alone,  but  to  reveal  the  citizen  reciprocally 
bound  with  his  fellows,  and  doing  his  whole  duty  to 
the  state.  Here  was  not  a  mere  soldier  or  bureaucrat, 
but  the  man  bent  to  the  work  in  hand ;  just  as  Curtin 
raised  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

We  do  not  intend  to  set  forth  a  financial  any  more 
than  a  military  history  of  the  Civil  War.  But  certain 
facts  must  be  entertained  in  this  connection,  for  they 
are  features  of  the  time.  It  has  been  affirmed  of  Sec 
retary  Chase  that,  unlike  Hamilton  and  financiers  of 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  669. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  649. 


100  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

genius,  he  sought "  the  easiest  instead  of  the  best  way." l 
He  succeeded  to  a  treasury  exhausted  either  by  neces 
sity  or  design,  and  a  government  credit  ten  per  cent 
below  par  in  the  open  market.  We  would  not  under 
rate  the  great  work  of  the  secretary  in  conducting  the 
Treasury ;  for  in  fact  he  pulled  through  the  heaviest 
financial  burden  as  yet  recorded  in  history.  But  no 
where  in  the  business  of  administration  did  the  inade 
quate  conception  of  the  rebellion  prevailing  at  Wash 
ington  2  produce  more  evil  consequence  than  it  did  in 
forecasting  the  energies  needed  to  secure  the  sinews  of 
war. 

Governor  Boutwell,  who  worked  with  him  in  the 
closest  relations  of  finance,  said :  "  Mr.  Chase's  mental 
processes  were  slow,  but  time  being  given,  he  had  the 
capacity  to  form  sound  opinions." 3  The  financier 
"  needs  must "  work  quickly  at  times,  when  thorns  of 
judgment  should  yield  place  to  action  which  is  "  the 
perfection  of  thought."  He  was  often  "penny  wise 
and  pound  foolish  "  in  his  measures,  because  the  ad 
ministration  as  a  working  body  could  not  perceive  that 
the  wish  —  the  active  desire  —  for  a  speedy  reduction 
of  rebellion  could  become  accomplished  fact  only  by 
creating  a  force,  unreasonable,  tremendous,  overwhelm 
ing  in  itself. 

I  remember  some  caricatures  in  the  press,  before  we 
went  out  to  Bull  Run.  A  lusty  boy  extended  his  naked 
arm  to  the  surgeon  shrinking  back  with  his  lancet, 

1  Hepburn,  Sound  Money,  p.  182. 

2  "  In  his  report  in  December,  1861,  Chase,  still  hopeful  of  an  early  ces 
sation  of  the  war,  discussed  two  plans  for  the  currency."  —  Ibid.,  p.  179. 

8  Boutwell,  Sixty  Years,  vol.  i,  304. 


ADMINISTRATION  101 

and  cried  out,  "  Dr.  Chase,  we  want  to  be  taxed  ! " 
Taxes  were  applied  sparingly  1  and  did  not  yield  largely 
at  once,  though  the  receipts  became  enormous  during 
the  progress  of  the  war  and  after  industrial  life  had 
expanded. 

Chase  was  hampered  greatly  by  the  subtreasury 
system  imposed  by  Jackson  and  Van  Buren ;  a  mili 
tary  chieftain's  strong  box  hung  round  the  neck  of  the 
most  enterprising  nation  the  world  had  known.  To 
separate  a  nation's  currency  from  the  daily  and  nat 
ural  working  of  its  credits  was  a  mediaeval  device 
worthy  of  weak  politicians.  Chase  did  not  construe  the 
system  and  use  it  liberally  by  depositing  his  funds  in 
banks  properly  secured,  as  we  have  been  obliged  to  do 
latterly ;  but  he  required  the  lenders  and  bankers  taking 
his  loans  to  carry  their  specie  over  to  Cisco's  vaults, 
there  to  be  sequestered  from  the  needy  community  that 
thirsted  for  it,  as  the  hart  pants  after  the  water-brooks. 
Although  banks  and  subtreasury  were  overflowing 
relatively  with  specie,  both  were  obliged  to  suspend  its 
payment2  in  December,  1861,  in  a  semi-panic  at  the 
time  of  the  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell.  A  mere 
accident  of  fate  stopped  the  flow  of  specie ;  not  inev 
itable  to  finance,  but  a  disaster  which  cost  the  nation 
ultimately  millions  on  millions.  The  expenditure  of  the 
United  States— $60,000,000  in  1860  — mounted  to 
$1,217,000,000  in  1865.  A  large  fraction  of  this 
swollen  increase  was  due  to  petty  mistakes,  far-reach 
ing  in  their  consequence. 

January  13,  1862,  Edwin  M.  Stan  ton  became  Secre- 

1  Hepburn,  Sound  Money,  p.  182,  confirmed  by  Adams  in  Public  Debts. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  183,  184,  and  citing  White,  Money  and  Banking. 


102     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

tary  of  War.  The  original  cabinet  was  a  result  and 
consequence  of  the  struggles  against  the  extension  of 
slavery.  Now  a  Jackson  Democrat  and  opponent  of 
the  Republicans,  but  one  who  had  signalized  his  ardent 
devotion  to  the  Union,  was  brought  into  the  presi 
dential  family.  This  excellent  statecraft  emphasized 
Lincoln's  purpose,  and  informed  the  people  in  the  most 
direct  manner  that  he  would  bring  every  possible  ele 
ment  in  the  North  to  crush  rebellion  and  restore 
order. 

'The  political  exigency  was  important,  but  the  per 
sonality  of  the  new  secretary  was  even  more  weighty, 
as  he  brought  his  tremendous  energy  to  the  conduct 
of  affairs  snarled  and  confused  by  Cameron's  faulty 
management.  There  was  a  seething  vortex  of  patriot 
ism  and  plunder  encompassing  the  department  of  war. 
Cameron  had  proved  incapable  of  organizing  the  one 
or  controlling  the  other.1  Descended  from  Quakers, 
Stanton's  family  was  of  New  England  stock  transported 
into  North  Carolina.  His  mother  was  Virginian,  and 
our  subject  was  born  in  Ohio  in  1814,  a  fair  type  of 
the  middle  West. 

The  boy  was  self-reliant  and  with  immense  energy, 
"  somewhat  imperious,  never  combative  or  abusive."  2 
Distinguished  at  the  bar,  he  was  noted  for  exact  know 
ledge  of  law  and  fact,  and  for  unwearied  labor  in  the 
preparation  of  his  cases.  Eloquent,  his  speeches  had 
the  stability  of  elaborate  study,  though  unwritten,  and 
the  fervor  of  the  living  voice,  though  they  were  care 
fully  prepared. 

1  Piatt,  Union  Memories,  p.  59. 

2  Gorham,  Stanton,  vol.  i,  9. 


ADMINISTRATION  103 

After  Stanton's  brief  but  very  effective  service  as 
attorney-general  in  Buchanan's  cabinet,  he  had  little 
to  do  with  national  affairs  until  he  was  called  to  the 
War  Department.  This  pregnant  appointment  was  a 
romance  such  as  seldom  arises  in  public  affairs.  When 
both  were  young,  Stanton,  much  the  superior  in  legal 
position,  abused  Lincoln  shamefully  when  they  were 
employed  in  the  same  cause.  At  Washington  he  felt 
and  openly  expressed  his  contetnpt  for  Lincoln.1  When 
Lincoln,  serenely  magnanimous,  appointed  his  former 
presumptuous  rival  to  such  honorable  service,  Stantbn 
could  hardly  believe  the  news.  With  the  deepest  emo 
tion  he  promised  his  own  friends  absolute  allegiance  to 
the  President.  If  the  men  had  varied  their  paths  and 
swerved  apart  in  their  development,  the  mature  patriots 
agreed  in  every  fibre,  and  their  intercourse  became  the 
ideal  of  heroes  and  friends.  John  Hay  said  to  Stanton 
in  1865,  "  Not  every  one  knows  as  I  do  how  close  you 
stood  to  our  lost  leader;  how  he  loved  you  and  trusted 
you,  and  how  vain  were  all  the  efforts  to  shake  that 
trust  and  confidence,  not  lightly  given  and  never  with 
drawn."2 

Like  all  great  men  who  master  passing  events  and 
control  those  that  are  coming,  Stanton  was  dominated 
by  his  imagination.  Judge  Holt  said  his  loyalty  to  the 
Union  was  "a  passion."3  And  this  was  not  of  the 
hasty  sort,  but  an  ardent,  forceful  intuition,  which  con 
verted  the  least  occasion  into  matter  for  forwarding  the 
great  cause  in  the  largest  way. 

This  tendency  affected  his  faults,  while  it  inspired 

1  Piatt,  p.  56,  and  Gorham,  vol.  i,  224. 

2  Cited  by  Gorham,  vol.  i,  4.  3  Ibid.,  p.  159. 


104  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

his  forceful  enterprise.  It  gave  him  power  to  infuse 
Congress  with  an  energy  much  needed,  and  to  project 
great  armies  into  the  field.  But  the  same  tendency  at 
times  prostrated  the  man  in  despair,  when  the  minister 
needed  every  atom  of  courage  to  sustain  immediate  and 
necessary  work.  Adverse  affairs  not  only  "  deepened 
the  gloomy  spells  to  which  he  was  addicted,  but  made 
him  so  irritable  and  impatient  that  official  business  with 
subordinates  got  to  be  insult."1  Passionate  impulses 
also  deflected  his  judgment  sometimes.  He  lacked  Lin 
coln's  triumphant  hope  and  serene  courage,  nor  did  he 
possess  Grant's  calm  indifference  to  adverse  circum 
stance.  When  on  his  gaining  tack,  he  could  inspire 
others  very  happily.  His  many  bouts  with  Governor 
Andrew  are  suggestive,  and  he  always  appealed  to  the 
best  motives  in  the  impulsive  Yankee.  He  had  noble 
intercourse  with  Morton  of  Indiana.  They  seemed  to 
play  on  each  other,  as  one  touches  the  strings  of  a 
responsive  instrument.  April  13,  1864,  Stanton  says, 
"  Come,  gird  yourself  up,  and  once  more  to  the  field, 
old  chief,  with  every  horse  and  man." 2 

The  Puritan  spirit  was  highly  developed  in  Stanton, 
and  in  his  youth  he  had  written  on  the  "  Poetry  of  the 
Bible."  When  the  victories  at  Forts  Henry  and  \Donel- 
son  and  at  Roanoke  electrified  the  country,  Greeley  pub 
lished,  "  But  it  is  by  the  impassioned  soul,  the  sleepless 
will,  and  the  great  practical  talents  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  that  the  vast  power  of  the  United  States,"  etc. 
Stanton  addressed  the  editor  directly,  repudiating  such 
"  undue  merit."  He  claimed  that  "  organizing  victory  " 
originated  in  infidel  France  and  ended  in  Waterloo. 

1  Piatt,  p.  62.  2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iv,  229. 


ADMINISTRATION  105 

"  We  owe  our  recent  victories  to  the  spirit  of  the 
Lord." l 

Incorruptible,  disregarding  self  and  reputation,  he 
lived  only  for  the  nation,  as  he  conceived  it.  Charles 
A.  Dana  said,  "He  loved  the  American  democracy,  its 
ideas,  its  unity,  its  form  of  government,  its  mission 
among  mankind,  with  a  passion  whose  depth,  constancy, 
and  energy  partook  of  fanaticism.  This  was  the  inspi 
ration  of  his  career  and  the  source  of  his  extraordinary 
capacity  for  the  transaction  of  public  business." 2 

As  E.  K.  Hoar  affirmed  in  the  critical  winter  of 
1860-61,  he  stood  "  between  the  living  and  the  dead." 
Speaking  of  his  faults,  "He  was  said  to  be  despotic 
and  overbearing,  and  he  may  have  been  sometimes  un 
just  ;  but  his  work  was  done  in  a  time  when  there  was 
little  chance  for  deliberation.  .  .  .  But  the  American 
people  knew  that  he  was  honest,  able,  and  faithful.  He 
never  stopped  for  explanation  or  condescended  to  ex 
culpate  himself." 3 

A  problem,  political  in  effect,  military  in  its  working 
causes,  was  suddenly  precipitated  by  General  John  C. 
Fremont.  He  was  a  type  of  the  speculative  adven 
turers,  common  in  all  ages,  who  demonstrate  that  the 
popular  imagination  cannot  distinguish  between  what 
is  notable  and  what  ought  to  be  famous.  Superficial  in 
every  essential  quality,  excepting  a  pioneer's  energy, 
he  filled  a  great  space  in  the  public  eye  from  1856  to 
1862.  Apparently  he  had  imposed  the  fiction  on  his 
wife,  the  daughter  of  Thomas  H.  Benton,  virago  as  she 
was,  that  he  was  a  great  man.  That  such  a  woman 

1  Gorham,  vol.  i,  285.  2  Cited  ibid.,  vol.  ii,  467. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  482. 


106    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

could  dare  to  tell  Abraham  Lincoln,  more  than  once  in 
an  interview  at  midnight,  that  if  such  a  man  "  should 
decide  to  try  conclusions  with  me,  he  could  set  up  for 
himself,"1  is  a  marvel  of  history  —  greater  than  any 
myth  or  story. 

Nebulous  dictators  were  impending  in  those  days. 
The  modest  McClellan  revealed  in  confidence  to  his 
wife  his  constant  readiness  to  o'erleap  himself  at  any 
favorable  opportunity.  This  sadly  incompetent  general 
and  amateur  statesman,  Fremont,  was  another  possible 
recipient  of  potential,  Napoleonic  responsibility.  Om 
niscient  as  they  were,  none  of  them  were  sagacious 
enough  to  perceive  that  the  patient  Lincoln  already 
grasped  in  his  knotted  knuckles  the  substance  of 
arbitrary  power,  in  so  far  as  possible  under  the  forms 
of  representative  government. 

The  contraband  question,  initiated  by  Butler,  was 
fast  bringing  the  mastering  influence  of  slavery  into 
the  domain  of  practical  politics.  The  whole  matter, 
vastly  important  as  it  was,  constantly  occupied  President, 
cabinet,  and  Congress,  being  handled  in  a  tentative 
way.  Congress  passed  an  Act  of  Confiscation,  which 
was  approved  August  6. 

This  act  and  the  instructions  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  provided,  as  far  as  possible,  for  maintaining  rights 
of  loyal  masters,  as  they  had  existed.  August  30,  Fre 
mont  suddenly  issued  a  proclamation  for  Missouri, 
confiscating  their  property  and  declaring  their  slaves  to 
be  free,  and  "  set  up  a  bureau  of  abolition."  Septem 
ber  2,  the  President,  in  a  kindly  letter,  begged  his 
subordinate  general  to  modify  "of  his  own  motion" 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  iv,  415. 


ADMINISTRATION  107 

the  proclamation  to  conform  to  the  Confiscation  Act  of 
Congress.  The  President  stated  that  "  liberating  slaves 
of  traitorous  owners"  would  alarm  Southern  Union 
friends  and  precipitate  disaster  in  Kentucky,  and  possi 
bly  in  Maryland.  Fremont  declined  to  retract  unless 
directly  ordered,  and  the  President,  September  11,  ac 
cordingly  directed  a  change  of  the  clause  "  in  relation 
to  the  confiscation  of  property  and  the  liberation  of 
slaves  "  to  conform  to  Act  of  Congress. 

The  mischief  done  by  the  rash  and  meddling  Fremont 
—  though  he  was  promptly  removed  and  replaced  by  a 
more  competent  soldier  —  was  literally  incalculable.  It 
is  true  the  radical  Republicans  and  a  few  Northern 
Democrats  supported  the  inchoate  scheme.  Sumner,  im 
practicable  as  always  when  in  actual  contact  with  affairs, 
would  have  exalted  Fremont.  He  wrote  Lieber,  "our 
President  is  now  dictator,  imperator  —  which  you  will ; 
but  how  vain  to  have  the  power  of  a  god  and  not  to 
use  it  godlike  !  " l 

Whether,  if  all  had  been  put  at  hazard  on  one  cast 
of  the  die,  the  North  might  have  rallied  to  a  propa 
ganda  of  emancipation  at  this  period,  is  a  proposition 
belonging  to  an  order  of  speculation  not  pertaining  to 
history.  The  most  significant  sign  of  statesmanship, 
after  Lincoln's  own  careful  discerning  and  wise  action, 
was  in  the  course  of  Secretary  Chase.  No  one  was 
more  judiciously  ardent  to  destroy  slavery,  and  no  one 
was  in  closer  touch  with  formative  public  sentiment, 
both  in  the  West  and  in  the  East.  McLean,  of  the 
"  Cincinnati  Enquirer,"  wrote  Chase  that  in  spite  of 
the  momentary  clamor  against  slavery,  nine  tenths  of  the 

1  Pierce,  Sumner,  vol.  iv,  42. 


108    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

Democrats  wanted  peace.  William  Gray,  a  Boston  Ke- 
publican  of  the  highest  type,  affirmed  the  same.  Chase's 
massive  judgment  upheld  the  President  fully  in  his 
judicious  treatment  of  this  delicate  and  difficult  matter. 
But  the  mischief  was  done,  nevertheless.  A  rift  was 
opened  between  radicals  and  conservatives  in  the  Re 
publican  organization.  The  Democrats  were  conciliated 
for  the  time  by  the  moderation  of  the  administration ; 
so  that  the  elections  generally  favored  it  in  the  autumn 
of  1861.1 

A  principle,  potential  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  as  a 
business,  was  asserted  and  maintained  by  a  committee 
of  eminent  Boston  merchants,  October  18,  1861.  More 
or  less  clothing  and  supplies,  as  well  as  arms,  were  being 
imported  from  Europe.  The  committee  proved  that 
these  goods  could  be  made  here  as  quickly  as  abroad ; 
that  foreign  purchase  would  deprive  our  people  of 
needed  employment  and  our  bankers  of  the  specie 
destined  to  pay  for  the  bonds  of  the  United  States 
issued  by  the  Treasury;  that  bad  economy  and  bad 
finance  would  induce  bad  patriotism.  "  It  is  the  entire 
oneness  of  feeling  and  of  interest  between  the  govern 
ment  and  the  people  of  the  loyal  States,  and  entire 
confidence  each  in  the  other,  that  has  induced  the  vast 
army  now  in  the  field  to  spring  as  one  man  to  the 
defense  of  the  nation."  2  These  principles  encouraged 
the  patriotic  energies  of  the  people,  and  promoted  the 
marvelous  industrial  development  which,  by  organized 
manufacture  and  agricultural  implements  in  the  field, 

1  Cf.  the  thorough  and  temperate  discussion  of  this  engrossing  episode, 
Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  468-487. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  583. 


ADMINISTRATION  109 

produced  both  crops  and  commodities  to  support  the 
nation. 

Our  small  navy,  now  increased  by  the  strenuous  effort 
of  Secretary  Welles  and  his  assistant,  G.  V.  Fox,  was 
becoming  an  important  factor  in  the  reduction  of  the 
rebellion.  An  efficient  blockade  was  established,  which 
virtually  isolated  the  South,  and  threw  it  on  its  own 
resources. 

General  McClellan  was  drilling  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  thoroughly,  and  organizing  for  the  victories 
hoped  for,  which  never  came.  He  was  supported  mag 
nificently  by  public  sentiment.  General  Scott  was  retired 
courteously,  October  31,  that  nothing  might  conflict 
with  McClellan's  boundless  and  singular  superiority. 
The  enigmatic  Cameron  had  been  replaced  at  the  turn 
of  the  year  by  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  whose  fierce  energy 
became  an  essential  element  in  the  three  years  of  war 
following. 

Though  General  Scott  was  piqued  and  sore,  he  said 
nobly  that  his  "  ambitious  junior  "  had  "  unquestionably 
very  high  qualifications  for  military  command."  l  This 
candid  and  sagacious  judgment  impels  us  to  wonder 
why  the  hero  did  not  qualify  even  to  success.  In 
structed  as  he  was,  beloved  by  his  soldiers  as  he  was, 
why  did  ngt  "  Little  Mac  "  win  ?  He  was  immersed  not 
in  swelling  vanity,  but  in  a  sublime  egotism  which  was 
worse,  and  that  filled  all  objects  with  himself.  Per 
sonally  brave,  he  had  not  that  comprehensive  and  exten 
sive  courage  that  incites  whole  armies  to  victory.  The 
mechanical  perception  of  the  engineer  was  ever  dis 
possessing  the  dynamic  idea  of  the  soldier,  incarnate  in 
i  0.  R.,  vpl.  xi,  Pt.  Ill,  6. 


110    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

action.  He  had  not  the  big  heart  that  trusts  a  well- 
made  plan  to  fellow-hearts  in  action ;  but  cautiously  he 
curled  his  legs  beneath  the  table  at  headquarters,  when 
he  ought  to  have  embraced  the  centaur-horse,  neighing 
for  the  battle.  We  saw  this  too  plainly  in  the  field ; 
and  the  revelations  of  his  "  Own  Story  "  prove  that  the 
performance  was  not  casual  but  constitutional  and  vital. 
His  mind  was  filled  with  vague  illusions  of  his  own  des 
tiny,  mystic  dreams  of  a  possible  providence  that  should 
exalt  him  over  the  whole  country  when  those  "  greatest 
geese  of  the  cabinet" 1  should  be  out  of  his  heroic  way. 
This  was  not  mere  vanity,  but  a  constant  lack  of  that 
force,  ever  rare,  which  must  not  only  plan  but  compel 
victory.  When  he  was  dodging  the  anxious  President 
in  October  and  November,  he  ought  to  have  practically 
contrived  to  beat  or  at  least  injure  severely  Johnston, 
and  to  cut  him  off  from  Manassas  Gap.  Nothing  is 
finer  in  Lincoln's  whole  conduct  than  his  patient  endur 
ance  at  this  time  and  his  support  of  McClellan  again, 
when  the  bombastic  and  beaten  Pope  made  him  about 
the  only  safe  reliance  of  the  administration.  Again  he 
lost  at  Antietam  his  opportunity,  that  to  "  those  who 
doubt  or  hesitate,  I  answer  not,  and  I  return  no  more  !  " 
There  he  forgot  that  the  business  of  a  "  reserve  "  is 
not  to  rest,  but  to  serve  powerfully  in  an  exigency. 

A  thorough  trial  of  McClellan  by  the  administration 
was  unavoidable  ;  for  such  as  he  was,  the  country  had 
to  prove  and  endure  him.2  He  formed  the  Army  of  the 

1  Ovm  Story,  pp.  167-169. 

2  "  The  designation  of  General  McClellan  is,  therefore,  in  considerable 
degree  the  selection  of  the  country,  as  well  as  of  the  Executive."  — 
President's  Message,  December  3,  1861,  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  719. 


ADMINISTRATION  111 

Potomac,  a  great  work  in  itself.  Our  business  now  is 
to  consider  his  operations  in  this  autumn  and  early 
winter.  The  present  writer  spent  the  winter  in  com 
mand  of  a  field  battery  in  Porter's  Division,  near  Falls 
Church,  Va.  He  is  convinced  the  army  might  well 
have  moved  early  in  November.  The  weather  was  good 
until  the  25th  of  November.  McClellan  was  not  quite 
ready ;  but  he  never  would  have  been  absolutely  ready. 
He  multiplied  his  enemy  two  or  threefold;  but  that 
tendency  was  innate  and  chronic.  Actually,  he  had  two 
or  three  times  the  force J  opposed  to  him,  and  his  com 
mand  was  composed  of  as  good  half-seasoned  troops 
as  ever  mustered  under  a  battle-flag.  Johnston  was  an 
excellent  general,  but  the  Army  of  Virginia  was -not 
then  the  trusty  instrument  it  became  under  Lee.  In 
drill  and  discipline  it  was  certainly  no  better  than  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  was  nearer  its  base,  and 
better  supplied  and  equipped,  especially  in  artillery. 

It  was  an  immense  misfortune  that  he  did  not  initiate 
a  campaign,  instead  of  being  pushed  forward  by  the 
President's  direct  order,2  occasioned  by  Johnston's  evacu 
ation  of  Manassas,  March  7.  The  hampering  necessity 
—  which  afterward  neutralized  about  one  third  of  his 
force  to  protect  a  shivering  cabinet  in  Washington  — 
would  not  have  been  present  and  operative  in  an  earlier 

1  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  497. 

2  The  War  Order  No.  3,  March  11,  1862,  was  one  of  the  President's 
"  most  far-reaching  acts  of  military  authority."    (Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol. 
v,  315.)    This  order  removed  McClellan  from  the  chief  command  and 
sent  him  to  the  field  for  his  campaign  against  Richmond.    It  made  pos 
sible  changes  in  the  West  affecting  these  departments  under  Halleck, 
and  resulted  in  the  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing  or  Shiloh.    The  victory 
here  was  felt  through  the  war,  though  it  was  due  to  the  troops  and  not 
to  "  Halleck  or  his  subordinate  commanders." 


112  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

movement  toward  Manassas.  Probably  he  would  have 
been  half  whipped,  as  he  generally  was.  The  coming 
victories  in  Tennessee  and  at  New  Orleans  would  have 
been  reinforced  largely  by  stiff  fighting  in  Virginia. 
Possibly  the  severe  conflict  and  victory  at  Shiloh,  half 
wasted  as  it  was  by  Halleck's  inertia,  might  not  have 
been  needed.  Certainly  action,  even  of  McClellan's 
temperate  sort,  would  have  sapped  the  Confederate 
resources.  The  hammer  of  the  Franks  changed  the  fate 
of  Europe  at  Tours.  The  hammer  of  Ulysses  S.  Grant 
broke  the  Confederacy.  It  would  have  shortened  our 
war  at  least  one  half,  conditions  being  as  they  were, 
if  pounding  with  the  Union's  best  instrument  had 
begun  in  the  melancholy  days  of  autumn,  instead  of 
waiting  for  a  late  spring  on  the  peninsula  of  Yorktown. 
In  comprehensive  conduct  of  the  war  the  adminis 
tration  was  now  adrift  and  only  half  conscious  in  its 
aims.1  General  Sherman  was  saying  that  200,000  men 
would  be  required  to  open  and  control  the  Mississippi 
valley,  and  people  called  him  crazy.  Secretary  Cameron 
—  whatever  his  gifts  or  defects  —  was  a  masterly  poli 
tician.  His  report  of  doings,  showing  affairs  as  re 
garded  by  politicians  then,  gives  back  a  facetious  note 
not  even  imagined  by  the  humorous  Lincoln  in  those 
days.  The  volunteers  numbered  500,000.  "So  thor 
oughly  roused  was  the  national  heart  that  I  have  no 
doubt  this  force  would  have  been  swollen  to 'a  million 
had  not  the  department  felt  compelled  to  restrict  it." 2 
Then,  like  Jack  Horner  gloating  over  his  plum,  he 

1  Seward  to  Adams,  about  July  22,  1861:  "  The  policy  of  the  United 
States  is  not  a  creature  of  the  government  but  an  inspiration  of  the  peo 
ple."  —  Seward  at  Washington,  1846-61,  p.  600. 

2  Report  War  Dept.,  December  1, 1861,  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  700. 


ADMINISTRATION  113 

cites  Jomini  and  Napoleon,  contrasting  these  results  of 
the  "wonderful  strength  of  our  institutions,  without 
conscriptions,  levies,  or  drafts."1  Cameron  could  not 
perceive  the  humor  of  the  situation  then,  and  it  be 
came  tragic  for  us  in  the  drafts  and  riots  of  1863. 

Reverting  to  our  view  of  the  military  necessities  of 
slavery,2  it  might  be  said  that  we  are  debarred  from 
speculative  argument  respecting  what  might  have  been 
done  with  the  aroused  strength  of  the  nation.  There 
is  no  parallel  in  the  two  cases.  The  administration,  as 
Lincoln  and  Chase  wisely  decided,  had  no  business  with 
slavery  in  1861 ;  but  the  military  situation  demanded 
every  possible  effort  strained  to  the  uttermost.  Cam 
eron's  revelation  that  they  smothered  "  the  national 
heart"  was  a  criminal  confession.  If  other  States  had 
been  encouraged  to  emulate  Pennsylvania  in  May,  there 
would  have  been  a  million  men  —  double  the  force 
afield  —  in  the  autumn,  and  they  would  have  been 
efficiently  organized  like  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 
Glacier-like,  such  an  overwhelming  power  would  have 
pushed  even  McClellan  forward,  and  would  have  over 
come  the  Confederacy  before  it  could  have  rallied  every 
available  man,  as  it  did  in  1864.3 

Resources  were  ample  for  every  present  emergency 
or  possible  endeavor.  The  President,  in  his  temperate 

1  Report  War  Dept.,  December  1,  1861,  0.  R.t  Series  III,  vol.  i,  700. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  107. 

8  "  Had  the  government  been  prepared  to  meet  promptly  with  the 
overwhelming  force  which  the  loyal  States  could  have  supplied  the  first 
rebel  armies,  the  rebellion  might  have  been  crushed  without  a  long  and 
desolating  war,  and  without  disturbance  of  the  relations  between  the  two 
races  in  the  South."  —  November  18,  1862,  Report,  M.  C.  Meigs,  Q.- 
G.,  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  809. 


114  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

and  judicious  message,  expressed  the  fullest  confidence 
in  the  financial  outlook  and  in  the  patriotic  spirit  of 
the  people1  —  not  yet  differentiated  into  party  action. 
Prudence,  the  art  of  securing  present  well-being,  is  a 
great  virtue  in  small  affairs.  But  statesmen  must,  un 
avoidably  they  must  look  into  future  time  "er  I  was  in 
the  snare.  Koude  I  not  sen,  that  cause th  now  my  care." 
The  "  national  heart "  knew  what  it  was  about  in  tender 
ing  a  million  men,  while  it  was  animated  by  one  purpose 
and  driven  by  one  impulse  —  to  put  down  rebellion. 

The  military  conditions  in  the  summer  of  1862  were 
bringing  out  the  tremendous  powers  immanent  in  the 
will  of  the  two  peoples,  and  now  evolved  by  the  con 
flict.  The  greater  the  forces  elicited,  the  greater  became 
the  effect  of  individual  mistakes.  Stanton  succumbed 
to  bureau-miasma,  even  as  Cameron  had  done.  Deluded 
by  incomplete  success  in  the  West,  he  stopped  recruiting 
April  3,  1862.  That  this  was  most  imprudent  appeared 
to  General  Sherman  at  the  time,  as  shown  in  confiden 
tial  criticism  to  his  brother.  He  did  not  believe  the  war 
ended,  "  or  even  fairly  begun."  2  In  three  months  the 
President  was  begging  for  instant  dispatch  of  new  re 
cruits3  in  the  ordinary  course  of  the  campaigns. 

1  "  It  is  gratifying  to  know  that  the  expenditures  made  necessary  by 
the  rebellion  are  not  beyond  the  resources  of  the  loyal  people,  and  to 
believe  that  the  same  patriotism  which  has  thus  far  sustained  the  govern 
ment  will  continue  to  sustain  it  till  peace  and  union  shall  again  bless  the 
land.  .  .  .  The  number  of  troops  tendered  greatly  exceeds  the  force  which 
Congress  authorized."  —  President's  Message,  Decembers,  1861,  0.  R., 
Series  III,  vol.  i,  712. 

2  Cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  637. 

8  July  3,  1862  :  « I  should  not  want  the  half  of  300,000  new  troops, 
if  I  could  have  them  now.  If  I  had  50,000  additional  troops  here  now, 
I  believe  I  could  substantially  close  the  war  in  two  weeks."  —  A.  Lincoln, 
confidential  to  the  loyal  governors,  0.  7?.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  200.  And 


ADMINISTRATION  115 

McClellan  went  to  the  Chickahominy  with  more 
than  100,000  men,  —  fighting  gallantly,  when  circum 
stances  compelled,  —  then  marched  back  again.  Pope 
in  action  fraught  with  disaster,  where  McClellan's  inac 
tion  only  entailed  repulse,  carried  a  fine  army  to  the 
verge  of  destruction.  McClellan,  little  again  even  in  his 
greatest  acts,  half-won  at  Antietam  and  lost  the  fruits 
of  that  desperate  battle. 

The  immense  importance  of  these  operations  in  the 
field,  a  physical  demonstration,  was  outweighed  by  the 
moral  issues  impending  and  now  gathering  to  break 
out  in  storms  which  were  to  elevate  the  national  sover 
eignty  ultimately.  This  growing  ascendency  of  an  hon 
est  executive  was  evolving  an  opposition  of  discordant 
elements  which  was  to  array  parties  against  this  natural 
and  inevitable  result  of  governing  principles,  and  was 
to  neutralize  by  one  half  the  powerful  action  of  some 
of  the  great  Northern  States. 

These  moral  issues,  involving  puzzling  questions  of 
government,  uprooting  property  and  social  prestige 
hardly  less  potent,  clustered  about  the  enslavement  of 
the  African  race.  Such  issues,  immanent  hitherto,  were 
precipitated  now  into  defined  political  action ;  that  sort 
of  achievement  which  is  "  the  perfection  and  publication 
of  thought."  The  emancipation  of  the  negroes  was 
virtually  decided  in  two  months  of  the  early  summer. 
The  actual  process  and  practical  accomplishment  of  this 
social  revolution  involved  some  of  the  highest  functions 

yet  in  the  next  month  the  enthusiasm  was  being  checked  again.  Thurlow 
Weed  wrote  to  Stanton,  August  15,  1862:  "The  popular  feeling  is  at 
high  war  heat.  It  has  cost  much  to  get  this  steam  up.  Pray,  do  not 
require  the  governor  '  to  blow  it  off.'  "  —  Ibid.,  p.  393. 


116    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

of  executive  power,  which  were  hardly  comprehended 
at  the  moment. 

Sumner  and  Wade  were  blustering  in  Congress  that 
the  legislative  power  they  fancied  inherent  in  them 
selves/  and  those  like  them,  would  be  tyranny  in  a 
president;  yet  it  is  more  than  doubtful  if  the  slaves 
could  have  been  freed  at  any  time  by  act  of  Congress. 
Mr.  Lincoln's  invincible  sagacity  divined  that  he  might 
freely  order  armies  and  fleets,  use  public  funds,  conduct 
immediate  affairs  toward  the  execution  of  a  popular 
will  not  yet  expressed  in  legislation  or  formulated  in 
representative  action.  That  was  a  "  military  neces 
sity  "  easily  comprehended  in  the  lurid  light  of  war.  To 
flippantly  forestall  the  popular  will,  to  avail  of  its  half- 
formed  impulses  toward  destroying  institutions  inter 
twined  with  the  country's  lif  e,  that  would  be  executive 
action  of  another  sort.  Such  contingency  must  proceed 
not  from  accidental  defeat  in  the  field ;  it  would  require 
a  "strong  necessitee  fast  tyde  to  Jove's  eternall  seat." 
The  survivals  of  the  kingly  power,  so  often  and  happily 
exercised  in  this  contest,2  can  never  be  formulated 
into  acts  of  parliament  or  congress.  Though  quickly 
entertained  by  an  intelligent  people  in  what  we  call 
"the  popular  heart,"  they  are  beyond  the  perception 
and  practical  grasp  of  pragmatical  statesmen  like  Charles 
Sumner. 

The  moral  issue,  the  action  through  perfection  of 
thought,  was  working  itself  out  painfully,  in  the  dark 

1  Seward  wrote  his  wife  :  "  Congress  is  occupied  with  great  responsi 
bilities,  .  .  .  especially  the  conduct  of  the  war.     In  this  they  are  repre 
sentatives  of  the  press,  which  they  mistake  for  the  people."  —  Seward  at 
Washington,  1861-72,  p.  23. 

2  Cf.  ante,  pp.  xvi,  67. 


ADMINISTRATION  117 

days  after  McClellan's  retreat.  Facts  and  deeds  had  been 
forcing  the  issue.  May  9,  Major-General  David  Hunter, 
by  an  order,  proclaimed  the  slaves  free  in  his  depart 
ment  of  Georgia,  Florida,  and  South  Carolina.  May 
19,  the  President  nullified  this  action  not  perfected  in 
thought,  proclaiming  that  the  freeing  of  slaves  would 
be  his  responsibility  as  Commander-in-Chief,  questions 
"which  I  cannot  feel  justified  in  leaving  to  the  decision 
of  commanders  in  the  field.  These  are  totally  different 
questions  from  those  of  police  regulations  in  armies 
and  camps." l 

The  military  necessity  proceeding  from  the  Olympian 
seat  of  Jove  did  not  run  through  Generals  Fremont 
and  Hunter,  any  more  than  it  supernaturally  inspired 
the  violent  debates  of  Sumner  and  Wade.  The  deli 
cate  nature  of  these  transactions  can  be  appreciated 
best  if  we  study  the  varying  expression  of  the  friends 
of  emancipation  and  of  a  radical  policy.  The  warm  and 
impulsive  Andrew  answered  a  call  for  troops,  May  19, 
"  I  think  they  (our  people)  will  feel  that  the  draft  is 
heavy  on  their  patriotism.  But  if  the  President  will 
sustain  General  Hunter,  recognize  all  men,  even  black 
men,  as  legally  capable  of  that  loyalty  the  blacks  are 
waiting  to  manifest,  the  roads  will  swarm,  if  need  be, 
with  multitudes  whom  New  England  would  pour  out  to 
obey  your  call." 2  The  calm  and  discreet  Secretary 
Chase  said  to  General  Butler,  June  24,  "  In  my  judg 
ment,  the  military  order  of  Hunter  should  have  been 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  43. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  45.     This  momentary  chill  did  not  long  affect  Governor 
Andrew  nor  prevent  prompt  action.    May  23,  he  wired,  "  Am  making  all 
preparations  possible  in  advance  of  your  directions.  Make  any  requisition 
on  me  you  desire,  and  we  will  do  our  utmost."  —  Ibid.,  p.  66. 


118     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

sustained.  The  President,  who  is  as  sound  in  head  as 
he  is  excellent  in  heart,  thought  otherwise,  and  I,  as  in 
duty  bound,  submit  my  judgment  to  his."  l  On  the 
other  hand,  Richard  H.  Dana  wrote  Sumner,  June  7,2 
that  the  voters  of  Massachusetts  would  place  themselves, 
three  to  one,  in  favor  of  the  President  in  this  action. 

Nothing  could  exceed  the  wise  and  patient  delibera 
tion  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  as  he  took  steps  for  his  own  action, 
perfecting  his  thought.  June  18,3  he  read  to  Vice- 
President  Hamlin  a  draft  of  a  proclamation  for  eman 
cipation.  July  22,4  he  read  to  the  whole  cabinet  the 
definite  proclamation,  which  would  emancipate  the  slaves 
January  1,  1863.  All  the  members  gave  it  complete  or 
qualified  support  excepting  Blair.  But  Seward,  while 
fully  approving,  asked  for  delay,  holding  that  it  should 
be  issued  after  a  victory  and  not  in  the  midst  of  defeat. 
This  decided  the  President,  who  accordingly  postponed 
action  until  after  the  battle  of  Antietam. 

Knowing,  as  we  now  know,  the  earnest  efforts  of 
Lincoln  to  direct  and  manage  slavery,  —  the  disturbing 
cause  of  the  conflict,  —  the  radical  opposition  at  the  time 
seems  almost  incomprehensible.  In  July,  Hill,  the  cor 
respondent  of  the  "  Tribune,"  notes  a  disheartening 
conversation  with  General  Wadsworth,5  who  had  been 
in  close  converse  with  the  President  at  the  War  Depart 
ment  many  hours  every  day  for  several  months.  He 
regarded  Lincoln  as  wholly  "  without  anti-slavery  in 
stincts,"  as  talking  frequently  of  the  "  nigger  question," 
on  the  wrong  side.  Much  of  this  false  impression  was 

1  0.  R.,  Ill,  vol.  ii,  p.  173.  2  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  66  n. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  71.  *  Ibid.,  p.  69  n. 

6  MS.  Papers,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  64  n. 


ADMINISTRATION  119 

due  to  Lincoln's  manner;  not  the  morals  of  manners, 
but  the  "  air  and  manner"  more  expressive  than  words. 
While  he  was  grappling  in  his  very  soul  with  one  of 
the  largest  moral  questions  ever  treated  practically  by 
a  ruler  of  men,  his  clownish  exterior  could  disport  it 
self  before  statesmen  in  buffoonery  about  the  "  nigger," 
adapted  to  the  crowd  in  a  tavern  or  grocery. 

The  radical  hostility  culminated  in  the  famous  Prayer 
of  Twenty  Millions,  printed  in  the  "  Tribune  "  August 
20,  in  which  Horace  Greeley  posed  for  the  whole  peo 
ple.  "  We  require  of  you  as  the  first  servant  of  the 
republic,  charged  especially  and  preeminently  with  this 
duty,  that  you  execute  the  laws.  .  .  .  We  complain 
that  the  Union  cause  has  suffered  and  is  now  suffering 
immensely  from  your  mistaken  deference  to  rebel 
slavery."  The  true  emancipator  now  appeared.  The 
clownish  child  of  nature  quit  his  motley,  and  the  man 
—  in  proper  proportions  of  largest  manhood  —  seized 
that  opportunity  he  always  loved  to  speak  direct  to  the 
whole  people.  He  answered  the  letter  directly,  not 
stopping  to  combat  errors,  or  its  "  impatient  and  dicta 
torial  tone."  The  President  "  would  save  the  Union. 
If  there  be  those  who  would  not  save  the  Union  unless 
they  could  at  the  same  time  save  slavery,  I  do  not 
agree  with  them.  If  there  be  those  who  would  not  save 
the  Union  unless  they  could  at  the  same  time  destroy 
slavery,  I  do  not  agree  with  them.  If  I  could  save  the 
Union  without  freeing  any  slave  I  would  do  it,  and  if 
I  could  save  it  by  freeing  all  the  slaves  I  would  do  it."2 

That  universal  logic  that  underlies  constitutional  law 
was  rendered  here  for  the  plain  comprehension  of  any  and 
1  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  73.  2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  433. 


120  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

every  citizen,  —  an  easy  lesson  in  political  science.  The 
impossible  ethics  of  the  abolitionist,  craving  to  include 
character  and  conduct  in  one  individual  action,  were  re 
placed  here  by  the  plain  duty  of  any  citizen.  "Every  sub 
ject's  duty  is  the  king's,  but  every  subject's  soul  is  his 
own."  The  moral  universality  of  the  Union  overwhelms 
all  else,  while  the  accidental  relation  of  master  and  slave 
is  relegated  to  a  new  political  category,  preeminence  of 
the  Union,  all  things  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 
Lincoln,  the  man,  struck  home  and  touched  the  popular 
heart.  This  was  proved  by  the  refrain,  in  answer  to  a 
call  for  more  troops,  which  rang  through  the  Northern 
States  like  a  soft  Angelus  bell,  "  We  are  coming,  Father 
Abraham,  three  hundred  thousand  more." 

September  23  the  proclamation  of  emancipation  —  an 
experiment  in  government  by  decree,  rare  for  us,  but 
common  in  continental  Europe1  —  was  issued,  to  be 
come  the  law  of  the  land  January  1,  1863.  The  conse 
quences  of  this  act,  executive  in  the  fullest  sense,  were 
far-reaching.  When  we  consider  the  course  of  events 
as  set  forth  in  these  pages,  in  that  the  whole  power  of 
the  slave-masters  had  been  arrayed  in  rebellion  through 
the  lapses  of  the  Northern  administration  in  the  first 
year,  it  may  be  asserted  safely  that  no  other  course  than 
an  emancipation  of  the  slaves  was  possible  now  for  a 
practical  conduct  of  the  war. 

i  "  To  an  American,  accustomed  to  see  in  the  law  the  expression  of  the 
people's  will,  it  must  seem  strange  that  the  only  distinction  which  may 
be  made  in  Russia  between  a  law  and  an  administrative  order  is  the  fact 
of  its  passing  through  the  deliberations  of  the  council  of  state.  In  this 
way  the  same  act  which  in  France,  for  instance,  would  be  considered  as 
a  proclamation,  in  the  sense  in  which  the  word  was  used  in  the  time  of 
the  Tudors  and  Stuarts,  possesses  in  Russia  the  character  of  law."  — 
Kovalesky,  Russian  Political  Institutions,  p.  170. 


ADMINISTRATION  121 

Ignored  hitherto  as  a  political  factor  in  this  absorbing 
drama,  whether  at  Montgomery  or  at  Washington,  the 
negro  had  become  a  military  force  of  the  first  impor 
tance.  Experts  agreed  that  these  poor  waifs,  an  errant 
factor  in  civilization,  must  be  taken  now  from  the 
ciphers  dormant  before  the  decimal,  and  be  put  into 
the  working  columns  of  figures  which  represented  men. 
"  The  labor  of  the  colored  man  supports  the  rebel  sol 
dier,  enables  him  to  leave  his  plantation  to  meet  our 
armies,  builds  his  fortifications,  cooks  his  food,  and 
sometimes  aids  him  on  picket  by  rare  skill  with  the 
rifle,"  said  General  Meigs  on  November  18.1  "  By  strik 
ing  down  this  system  of  compulsory  labor,  which  en 
ables  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion  to  control  the  resources 
of  the  people,  the  rebellion  would  die  of  itself,"  said 
Secretary  Stanton,  December  I.2 

The  immediate  results  were  very  disheartening  to  the 
President.  "  The  North  responds  to  the  proclamation 
sufficiently  in  breath ;  but  breath  alone  kills  no  rebels."  3 
The  radical  Republicans  welcomed  it,  but  their  constit 
uents  did  not  send  out  in  recruits  that  strong  adult 
element,  the  lusty  thews  and  sinews  from  which  the 
working  military  strength  of  a  nation  must  be  drawn. 
These  constituents  were  brave  and  loyal,  and  were  fairly 
well  represented  in  the  field,  in  proportion  to  the  num 
bers  at  home.  But  in  a  military  sense  the  radicals  em 
bodied  the  nervous  force  of  the  North,  rather  than  the 
robust  spirit  and  brawny  muscle  which  should  subdue 
the  solid  enforced  strength  of  the  Southern  people. 

From  England  the  rejoining  utterances  are  most  inter- 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  809.  2  Ibid.,  p.  912. 

8  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  vol.  ii,  242. 


122    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

esting.  The  overwhelming  unfriendly  majority  spoke 
through  the  "  Times."  "  The  death  of  slavery  must 
follow  upon  the  success  of  the  Confederates  in  this 
war."  But  Mr.  Lincoln's  emancipation  "can  only  be 
effected  by  massacre  and  utter  destruction."  l  Another 
sapient  critic  called  the  proclamation  "  the  most  unpar 
alleled  last  card  ever  issued  by  a  reckless  gambler." 
Did  ever  wish  and  will  so  commingle  in  the  thought  ? 
Our  friends  even  did  not  comprehend  the  motives  of 
the  act,  or  recognize  its  constitutional  scope.  John 
Bright,  addressing  his  own  constituents,  December  18, 
did  not  allude  to  it.  Mill,  however,  spoke  clearly  in 
appreciation,  as  early  as  October.  We  cite  these  details 
from  the  world  at  large  for  their  inherent  interest,  and 
for  the  reason  that  they  throw  light  on  the  mind  of 
alien  elements  at  home,  as  will  appear. 

President  Lincoln,  after  mature  reflection,  could  say 
in  his  message,  December  1 : 2  "  The  dogmas  of  the  quiet 
past  are  inadequate  to  the  stormy  present.  The  occasion 
is  piled  high  with  difficulty,  and  we  must  rise  with  the 
occasion.  As  our  case  is  new,  so  we  must  think  anew 
and  act  anew."  For  better,  for  worse,  four  millions  of 
tribal  Africans,  chatteled  in  body  and  soul,  were  to  be 
transformed  into  citizens  of  the  greatest  civilized  state. 

Secretary  Stanton  brought  in  a  truly  great  account 
of  military  performance,  whether  in  victory  or  defeat. 
But  all  his  eloquence  could  not  surpass  these  silent 
figures.  December  I,3  800,000  men  were  under  arms, 
and  existing  quotas  would  soon  make  this  force  one 
million.  The  same  number  of  patriots  that  was  thrust 

1  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  344. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  897.  8  Ibid.,  p.  897. 


ADMINISTRATION  123 

forward  by  the  eager  loyal  governors  the  preceding 
year,  then  discarded  1  to  depress  "  the  national  heart " 
by  bureaucratic  Washington,  now  stood  ready  to  enforce 
the  national  will.  The  million  now  was  not  enough,  as 
the  half  of  it  had  been  far  inadequate  previously. 

We  began  this  chapter  with  a  salient  question  :  Why 
did  not  the  loyal  North  quicker  accomplish  its  great 
task,  its  comparative  resources  surpassing  those  of  its 
weaker  opponent  as  they  did  ?  We  have  brought  for 
ward  some  of  the  facts  which  obtained  in  the  results  as 
queried.  Most  historians  and  critics  have  blamed  this  or 
that  immediate  policy  or  general,  or  have  praised  General 
Lee  for  our  delays  and  our  losses.  The  President  was 
often  censured  for  interfering  with  generals  and  cam 
paigns.  Larger  information  proves  that  he  was  obliged 
to  do  this.  In  the  extraordinary  circumstances  of  the 
occasion  he  had  to  be  literally  Commander-in-Chief  at 
times. 

A  much  larger  compelling  cause  than  any  of  these 
factors  is  found  in  the  inconstant  purpose  of  the  ad 
ministration  2  when  it  mustered  the  force  of  the  nation, 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  114. 

2  John  A.  Andrew  was  not  a  model,  but  he  had  some  of  the  large 
qualities  of  a  statesman.    Not  from  intellectual  perception  alone,  but 
from  his  deep  sympathies,  he  sometimes  struck  into  the  heart  of  a  matter. 
He  wrote  to  Bird  in  that  complete  harmony  of  intercourse  that  often 
brings  out  more  than  one  man  alone  is  capable  of  expressing  :  "  The  truth 
is,  I  never  found  in  many  men  in  Washington  what  I  call  realizing  sense, 
practical  sagacity,  and  victorious  faith.  .  .  .  Where  is  the  union  of  noble 
spirits,  where  the  few  noble  and  unselfish  hearts  ?  .  .  .  We  have  very 
able  men  in  Washington,  but  they  have  very  little  idea  of  what  God 
made  them  for."  —  Cited,  Browne,  Andrew,  p.  139.    His  estimate  of  Lin 
coln  was  radically  wrong,  as  he  finally  saw  for  himself.    Lincoln  moved 
on  heights  and  saw  into  depths  which  were  quite  beyond  Andrew's  scope. 
But  we  perceive  in  the  above  wanderings  of  an  intense  nature  that  An 
drew  comprehended  Washington  as  a  whole. 


124  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

either  military  or  financial.  The  fatal  hesitancy  in 
recruiting,  constantly  rebuked  by  loyal  governors  and 
patriotic  leaders,  entailed  a  draft  and  caused  the 
slaughter  of  thousands. 

President  Lincoln,  great  in  administering  principles, 
petty  in  working  out  affairs,  by  his  interference  with 
business,  rather  increased  than  lessened  the  bureaucratic 
inertia  incident  to  the  process  of  government.  The 
harness  of  routine  enables  little  men  to  live  respectably, 
but  it  compels  larger  ones  into  a  lessening  course  of 
energy. 

More  comprehensive  administration  in  1861  would 
have  suppressed  the  rebellion  while  that  was  the  single 
issue  of  government.  When  the  great  issues  involved 
emancipation,  and  parties  divided  for  and  against  the 
administration  in  being,  then  new  problems  were  insti 
tuted.  Thomas  H.  Benton  said : 1  "  The  government 
of  the  United  States  is  a  limited  government,  instituted 
for  great  national  purposes,  and  for  those  only."  Beyond 
question  he  represented  deep  convictions  in  our  country. 
The  course  of  events  had  at  this  time  compelled  us 
to  define  limits,  not  alone  by  legislative  debate  and 
judicial  decision,  but  through  action  corresponding  to 
Bismarck's  "  blood  and  iron."  The  action  of  political 
states  and  social  communities,  compelled,  if  not  devel 
oped,  by  this  force  of  arms,  will  afford  the  matter  for 
our  further  studies. 

1  Thirty  Years,  vol.  i,  25. 


CHAPTER  IV 

STATE    SUPPORT 

IN  the  story  of  administration  we  alluded  to  political 
states  and  social  communities  within  the  northern 
portion  of  the  Union.  Maine  said :  "  In  every  inde 
pendent  political  community  the  power  of  using  or 
directing  the  irresistible  force  stored  up  in  the  society 
resides  in  some  person  or  combination  of  persons  who 
belong  to  the  society  themselves." 

Calhoun  affirmed  long  before :  "  Although  society 
and  government  are  thus  intimately  connected  with  and 
dependent  on  each  other,  of  the  two  society  is  the 
greater." 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  in  April,  1861,  neither 
statesmen  nor  politicians  at  Washington  took  into 
account  these  great  truths,  adumbrated  but  hardly 
operative  hitherto,  in  any  form  of  political  action. 
Society  as  a  whole,  —  the  large  principles  of  association 
based  on  political  conditions,  on  industry  and  the  dis 
tribution  of  wealth,  swayed  by  the  forces  of  heredity 
and  the  ways  of  fashion, — that  aggregate  and  resultant 
of  the  powers  of  civilization,  has  seldom  been  compre 
hended  fully  in  the  United  States.1  The  rude  assault  on 

1  It  may  be  said  in  passing  that  the  chief  power  of  President  Roosevelt 
lies  in  his  ready  comprehension  of  this  large  truth.  Generally  he  has 
appealed  to  large  principles  underlying  political  association,  overlooking 
technical  partisan  organization.  The  whole  people  have  quickly  responded 
to  this  stalwart  idea. 


126  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

the  body  politic  had  affected  these  social  institutions  in 
their  essential  action ;  for  government  and  society  act 
and  react,  as  the  logical  master  of  political  science  indi 
cated.  Certain  sagacious  men  at  the  North,  social  leaders 
in  the  largest  sense,  saw  at  once  that  these  prodigious 
forces  must  be  economized  and  used  in  the  new  direc 
tions  prescribed  for  government  by  the  issues  of  the 
rebellion,  or  government  itself  would  suffer.  There  was 
not  only  the  question  of  helping  forward  necessary 
work,  but  the  yet  larger  necessity  of  preventing  im 
pending  harm  by  providing  immediate  and  adequate 
outlets  for  the  enormous  floods  of  popular  sympathy. 
The  strength  and  courageous  ardor  of  young  men  could 
be  concentrated  in  bullet  and  bayonet.  How  should  the 
passionate  vehemence  of  the  sympathizing  sex,  so 
powerful  in  America,  be  formulated  and  converted  from 
social  means  to  political  ends  ? 

Let  us  turn  to  the  every-day  occurrences  of  those 
times.1  On  the  15th  of  April,  women  of  Bridgeport, 
Conn.,  of  Charlestown,  Mass.,  and  a  few  days  later  some 
in  Lowell,  Mass.,  formed  associations  to  strengthen  the 
government  and  to  assist  it,  if  possible.  The  immediate 
questions,  what  is  the  best  material  for  lint,  how  scrape 
and  prepare  it,  could  hardly  absorb  the  gathering  social 
energies  of  the  country.  In  the  last  days  of  April, 
ninety-two  ladies  of  New  York  city  called  a  meeting  at 
the  Cooper  Institute,  in  which  Rev.  Dr.  Bellows  and  Dr. 
Elisha  Harris  participated,  "  their  minds  preoccupied 
with  the  necessity  for  some  great  exertion  to  preserve 
the  health  of  the  army  now  gathering." 

Rev.  Dr.  Bellows  with  Doctors  Van  Buren,  Harris, 

1  Stilld,  Sanitary  Commission,  pp.  44,  47,  53,  58,  59,  69. 


STATE   SUPPORT  127 

Harsen,  went  to  Washington,  in  consequence  of  these 
various  social  proceedings,  to  lay  the  matter  before  the 
administration.  They  found  all  in  confusion,  respecting 
the  immediate  care  of  the  troops.  They  were  received 
with  the  greatest  courtesy  by  the  officials,  owing  to 
their  high  personal  and  professional  standing,  but  not 
from  any  sympathy  with  their  mission.  The  highest 
officials  were  rather  suspicious  or  indifferent,  the  Presi 
dent  himself  regarding  the  movement  as  a  "  fifth  wheel 
to  the  coach."  The  proposed  voluntary  assistance  in 
caring  for  the  health  and  in  nursing  the  troops,  "  the 
zeal  of  the  women  and  the  activity  of  the  men  assisting 
them,"  was  regarded  by  the  men  of  the  bureaus  as 
likely  to  be  more  troublesome  than  useful.  We  must 
remark  that  this  characteristic  lethargy  was  manifested 
but  a  very  few  years  after  the  necessary  labors  of 
Florence  Nightingale  in  the  Crimea  astonished  the  whole 
world.  Finally,  Acting  Surgeon-General  Woods  was 
moved  and  interested  enough  to  approve  and  allow  a 
commission  in  a  modified,  advisory  relation  to  the  Med 
ical  Department,  and  to  care  for  the  volunteers.  General 
Woods  reports  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  May  22  : 1  "  The 
Medical  Bureau  would  in  my  judgment  derive  important 
and  useful  aid  from  the  counsels  and  well-directed  ef 
forts  of  an  intelligent  and  scientific  commission,  acting 
in  cooperation,"  etc. 

He  recommended  Henry  W.  Bellows,  D.  D.,  Professor 
A.  Bache,  Professor  Wolcott  Gibbs,  Doctors  Jeffries 
Wyman  and  W.  H.  Van  Buren  to  constitute  the  com 
mission,  with  power  to  fill  vacancies  and  to  appoint  a 
competent  secretary.  Secretary  Cameron  approved  and 
»  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  224. 


128  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

confirmed  the  appointments  June  7:1  the  commission 
to  "  direct  its  inquiries  to  the  principles  and  practices 
connected  with  the  inspection  of  recruits  and  enlisted 
men,  the  sanitary  condition  of  the  volunteers,  to  the 
means  of  preserving  and  restoring  the  health  and  of 
securing  the  general  comfort  and  efficiency  of  troops, 
to  the  proper  provision  of  cooks,  nurses,  and  hospitals, 
and  to  other  subjects  of  like  nature." 

Thus  was  born  the  United  States  Sanitary  Commis 
sion,2  and  it  was  developed  out  of  the  direst  need  of  the 
moment.  Its  work  was  to  be  as  comprehensive  as  its 
title :  health  out  of  sickness,  out  of  wounds,  and  the 
order  of  death :  health  out  of  the  moral  disorder, 
whether  present  or  impending  at  the  North,  though 
actual  war  might  be  pursuing  its  dreadful  work  far 
away. 

Dr.  Bellows  was  unanimously  selected  and  chosen 
for  the  presidency.  He  combined  the  most  powerful 
emotional  nature  with  a  good  intellectual  apparatus, 
capable  of  large  views  of  the  state  and  public  policy; 
then  a  ready  insight  into  the  popular  mind  and  feeling 
enabled  him  to  sweep  into  efficient  action  all  the  varying 
currents  of  popular  will.  That  his  practical  sagacity  in 
action  equaled  and  could  re-create  his  pale  cast  of 
thought  is  shown  in  the  fact  that  his  plan  of  organi 
zation  for  this,  the  greatest  ethical  engine  of  the  last 
century  —  struck  out  in  a  single  morning  —  was  hardly 
changed  in  all  the  actual  work  of  the  commission. 
Frederick  Law  Olmsted,  the  secretary,  was  the  one  man 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  258.  And  cf.  ibid.,  p.  308. 

2  Mr.  Rhodes  gives  a  graphic  account  of  the  Sanitary  Commission,  vol. 
v,  244-257. 


STATE   SUPPORT  129 

of  destiny  for  such  place.  It  is  obvious  that  the  great 
est  president  could  not  have  forecasted  the  work,  had  it 
not  been  moulded,  fashioned,  and  driven  by  an  absolute 
master  of  detail.  His  self-effacement  in  his  office  was  as 
remarkable  as  his  masterly  conduct  of  affairs. 

In  the  enlarged  military  operations  of  the  second 
year,  the  commission  bore  its  part.  September  17, 1862, 
President  Bellows  addressed  an  important  letter  to 
General  Halleck,  commander-in-chief  .*  "  In  perfect 
harmony  with  the  Medical  Bureau/'  the  commission 
claimed  that  many  "irregular  and  eccentric  movements" 
used  its  name  and  asked  for  official  sanction.  The  na 
tion  had  already  contributed  $160,000,  directly,  with 
supplies  to  the  value  of  $2,000,000  more.  Therefore 
the  commission  asked  for  the  confidence  and  "full 
moral  support  of  the  government." 

Our  energetic  and  comprehensive  friend,  General  M.  C. 
Meigs,  who  urged  forward  the  administration  so  wisely 
in  the  previous  year,  now  appeared  in  a  somewhat  criti 
cal  letter  to  Dr.  H.  I.  Bowditch.^  Speaking  in  defense 
of  the  Quartermaster's  Department  he  said :  — 

There  seems  to  be  a  desire  in  some  quarters  to  make  the 
Medical  Department  self -sustaining  and  independent  of  all 
aid  or  assistance  from  the  quartermaster's,  and  indeed  from 
all  other  departments.  This  is  a  mistake.  .  .  .  No  nation 
has  ever  made,  I  believe,  such  large,  such  prodigious  provision 
for  its  sick  and  wounded  soldiers.  It  is  the  greatest  charity  on 
earth.  It  has  been  the  duty  of  the  Quartermaster's  Depart 
ment  under  my  charge  to  make  a  part  of  this  provision,  and 
I  believe  it  has  been  faithfully  and  efficiently  done,  but  the 
nation  gets  not  the  credit  it  deserves. 

Then  he  pays  his  respects  pretty  pungently  to  the 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  564.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  697-703. 


130  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Sanitary  Commission  which  had  spread  its  flag  over  the 
fleet  of  transports,  carrying  the  sick  and  wounded  away 
from  the  Peninsula  :  — 

Probably  the  Sanitary  Commission  spent  upon  this  fleet, 
whose  honors  it  carried  off,  $100  or  $200  a  day,  while  the 
niggardly  government  spent  its  daily  thousands.  Now,  all 
this  was  well  meant.  There  was  no  intention  on  the  part  of 
the  gentlemen  of  the  Sanitary  Commission  to  claim  for  them 
selves  undeserved  credit,  but  the  impression  on  the  public  is 
that  detailed  above  ;  and  it  was  most  unjust  and  most  injurious, 
though  it  doubtless  swelled  the  contributions  which  they,  I 
believe,  faithfully  disburse  for  the  benefit  of  the  soldier.  Yet 
it  did  great  injustice  to  the  department  and  to  the  govern 
ment  whose  large  lump  of  dough  their  little  leaven  leavened.1 

In  the  pregnant  figure  of  the  dough  and  leaven,  the 
vigorous  man  of  affairs  confirms  the  motives  and  result 
ant  action  of  the  men  who  initiated  and  established  the 
Sanitary  Commission.  They  meant  to  project  the  fer 
menting  force  of  the  religious  spirit  of  the  North  into 
the  tented  fields ;  to  carry  love  with  fury ;  to  embrace 
tenderly,  even  when  obliged  to  destroy  ruthlessly  in  the 
strife  of  war.  Secretary  Stanton  amplified  this  befitting 
theme  in  his  report  of  December  1 :  — 

The  services  of  the  medical  profession  have  been  volun 
tarily  and  gratuitously  offered  on  every  occasion.  Relief 
associations  in  every  State  have  done  much  to  comfort  and 
assist  the  sick  and  wounded  in  camps  and  hospitals,  and  their 
vigilant  superintendence  has  perhaps  operated  to  check  the 
negligence,  abuse,  and  fraud  that  too  often  prevail,  even  in 
such  institutions.  Religious  congregations  and  societies  have 
also  tendered  to  the  government  their  church  buildings  for 
hospitals,  while  their  pastors  have  ministered  to  the  patients. 2 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  702.  2  Ibid.,  p.  910. 


STATE  SUPPORT  131 

In  Indiana  l  there  was  some  clashing  of  functions, 
because  the  local  relief-societies  would  confine  expendi 
ture  for  the  benefit  of  men  of  their  own  State.  This  was 
criticised  by  the  Sanitary  Commission  as  counteracting 
the  larger  national  spirit  and  influence  needed  for  the 
times.  The  appointment  of  a  Western  Sanitary  Com 
mission  under  the  direction  of  Surgeon-General  Woods, 
December  16,  1862,2  met  this  difficulty. 

Certain  worthy  persons,  patriotic  but  limited  in  the 
scope  of  their  vision,  conceived  that  naked  charity 
aided  by  science  was  not  sufficiently  clothed  in  a  Chris 
tian  garb.  Hooker  said, "  There  are  in  men  operations, 
some  natural,  some  supernatural,  some  politic,  some 
finally  ecclesiastical."  It  was  thought  that  theological 
exegesis  might  reinforce  and  repair  the  lack  of  dogmatic 
domination  in  scientific  benevolence  and  plain  works  of 
charity.  The  ways  of  love  are  various,  but  its  issues  are 
certain.  The  whole  movement  resulted  in  the  formation 
of  the  U.  S.  Christian  Commission,3  an  institution  very 
useful  in  alleviating  distress. 

At  the  outbreak  of  rebellion,  the  women  of  the  North 
in  their  self-consecration  rivaled  the  men  who  offered 
their  lives  to  their  country.  They  required  immediate 
work.  April  23,  1861,  the  administration  was  glad  to 
avail  itself  of  the  ability  and  experience  of  the  life- 

1  The  Indiana  Sanitary  Commission,  "  to  care  for  Indiana  troops  first, 
then  others,"  was  rebuked  by  the  U.  S.  Sanitary  Commission.    "  Another 
development  of  state  sovereignty  ;  .  .  .  against  this  stateish  spirit,  the  San 
itary  Commission  set  its  face  at  all  times."  —  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  153. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  947. 

3  War  Department  to  George  H.  Stuart,  Chairman,  0.  R.,  Series  III, 
vol.  i,  742  :  "  This  department  is  deeply  interested  in  the  *  spiritual  good 
of  the  soldiers  in  our  army,'  as  well  as  in  their  intellectual  improvement 
and  social  and  '  physical  comfort.'  " 


132  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

long  philanthropist,  Miss  Dorothea  Dix.  She  was  given 
charge  of  hospital  methods  by  the  War  Department/ 
as  recommended  by  the  Medical  Bureau ;  "  also  the 
regulations  and  routine  through  which  the  services  of 
patriotic  women  are  rendered  available  as  nurses.' '  It 
was  necessary  to  specify  by  general  order,  June  9,  that 
"women  nurses  should  not  reside  in  camps  nor  accom 
pany  regiments." 2 

Philosophers  have  conceived  an  "  aggregate  societary 
movement "  carrying  forward  the  work  of  civilization 
and  including  the  varied  issues  of  modern  social  living. 
'It  was  certainly  the  spirit  of  this  largest  social  life 
which  Calhoun  embodied  in  his  counterpoised  statement, 
where  he  placed  society  acting  in  correspondence  with 
political  government,  and  in  a  close  encounter  prevail 
ing  over  it. 

The  great  social  functions  initiated  by  the  Sanitary 
Commission,  as  indicated  by  General  Meigs  and  empha 
sized  by  Secretary  Stanton,3  penetrated  the  ways  of 
practical  government  and  brought  into  action  higher 
civilizing  forces  than  war  had  known  before  that  day. 
^Vs  slavery  was  semi-barbaric  and  triumph  of  the  Union 
would  become  an  essential  conquest  of  civilization,  so 
the  higher  social  movement,  aroused  and  incurred  by 
horrid  war,  carried  the  government  with  it  and  by  it 
to  a  higher  level  of  civilization. 

Our  political  facility  in  America  is  so  prominent  and 
the  work  accomplished  through  it  is  so  eminent  that 
we  often  forget  by  what  devious  ways  political  develop 
ment  has  come  to  its  distinction.  We  must  remember 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  107, 139,  217,  308. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  262.  »  Cf.  ante,  p.  130. 


STATE  SUPPORT  133 

social  principles,  constantly  inhering,  productive  in  them 
selves  and  still  larger  through  their  influence  over  prac 
tical  government — according  to  Calhoun.  The  Northern 
States,  as  we  shall  perceive,1  put  forth  their  political 
functions  in  strangely  eccentric  ways ;  beginning  with 
the  autumnal  election  of  New  York  in  1862,  and  end 
ing  in  the  defeat  of  McClellan  in  the  national  campaign 
of  1864.  Meanwhile  the  great  agencies  of  society,2  em 
bodied  in  charitable  associations  stimulated  by  fashion, 
in  church  connections 3  inspired  by  religion,4  in  intellec 
tual  exercise  enforced  by  science,  conveyed  the  people 
and  finally  the  government  impelled  by  the  people  into 
political  expression,  enabling  it  to  win  victory  over  re 
bellion  and  to  reestablish  the  Union. 

We  must  search  more  carefully  into  the  nature  of  the 
societies  which  became  States  in  our  country.  The  Eng 
lish  colonies  painfully  wrenched  themselves  away  from 
the  mother  country  and  the  stability  of  crown  govern- 
ent.  From  colonists,  tillers  of  the  soil  and  planters, 
they  were  to  become  creators  of  new  communities  and 

1  Infra,  p.  258. 

2  In  the  large  cities,  where  the  old-fashioned   clubs  were   often   in 
clined  to  sympathize  with  the  South,  new  and  powerful  social  clubs  were 
formed  to  counteract  the  tendency.    These  became  great  social  pivots  on 
which  Union  sentiment  could  rally. 

8  The  Methodist  Church  was  a  strong  support  of  the  administration, 
especially  in  the  Western  States.  It  was  said  of  Bishop  Simpson  that  he 
commanded  his  "  corps  "  as  vigorously  as  any  general  in  the  field. 

4  "  I  am  greatly  pleased  at  the  determination  so  emphatically  expressed 
by  the  United  Presbyterian  Church  to  ( uphold  the  government  in  all  its 
lawful  efforts  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  these  States,'  and  with  the 
earnestness  of  its  appeal  to  all  under  its  care  '  to  do  what  they  can  to 
support,  defend,  and  perpetuate  the  free  institutions  bequeathed  to  us  by 
our  fathers.'"  —  July  16,  Secretary  Cameron,  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i, 
333. 


134    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

founders  of  sovereign  States.  Of  the  several  States  *  we 
are  considering,  Pennsylvania  has  been  mentioned  al 
ready  in  the  general  course  of  administration.2  She  was 
neither  Eastern  nor  Western  in  character.  Greatly  di 
versified  in  racial  stocks,  animated  by  the  humane  Quaker 
element,  settled  on  lands  rich  in  minerals,  —  and  more 
immediately  affluent  in  fertile  fields,  —  she  was  a  great 
conserving  element  of  the  time.  As  between  Northeast, 
Northwest,  and  South,  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century, 
before  the  Mississippi  had  embraced  and  the  Pacific 
slope  had  affected  the  old  States,  she  was  a  literal  key 
stone  of  the  Union.  a*. 

New  York  was  a  factor  of  another  sort  —  a  great  re 
ducing  crucible  of  colonial  and  early  state  immigration. 
Bred  in  Europe  or  passing  over  from  New  England,  her 
citizens  partook  of  the  intense  Dutch  temperament  — 
powerful  rather  than  expansive.  Overflowing  Eastern 
limits,  these  peoples  swarmed  through  the  Mohawk  val 
ley,  growing  larger  through  the  opportunity  of  the 
beautiful  interior  lakes. 

The  Cumberland  Eoad  was  a  great  and  influential 
arterial  communication  through  the  Alleghanies ;  but 
the  current  of  travel  and  intercommunication,  resulting 
at  last  in  the  Erie  Canal,  was  greater  in  effect.  This 
migrating  stream  in  and  out  of  New  York  was  a  true 
American  solvent  as  it  spread  over  the  prairies  of  the 

1  "  Since  the  national  administration  had  been  from  the  first  dependent 
on  the  State  machinery  for  furnishing  troops  and  to  some  extent  for  their 
equipment,  the  governors  of  the  Northern  States  were  larger  factors  in 
the  conduct  of  the  war  than  is  easily  made  to  appear  in  a  history  where 
the  aim  is  to  secure  unity  in  the  narration  of  crowded  events."  — Rhodes, 
U.  5.,  vol.  iv,  182. 

2  Cf.  ante,  pp.  90,  92. 


STATE  SUPPORT  135 

West.  The  "York  State  Yankee"  was  a  well-recog 
nized  type  in  Ohio,  Michigan,  and  the  neighboring 
States  in  the  fifties  of  the  last  century.  And  he  was  a 
most  influential  factor  in  amalgamating  races  and  in 
shaping  the  destinies  of  these  potent  communities.  Less 
incisive  intellectually  than  his  Yankee  progenitor,  he 
was  broader  socially  and  industrially.  Animated  by  his 
Eastern  culture,  strengthened  by  his  larger  opportunity, 
he  assimilated  Western  life  on  a  scale  more  ample  than 
his  quicker-minded  kinsman  could  comprehend.  Every 
thing  cannot  be  produced  and  included  in  one  cult  and 
community.  The  intense  local  patriotism  generally  pre 
vailing  in  American  communities  was  not  altogether 
apparent  here.  The  cosmopolitan  is  not  always  the  most 
effective  citizen.  Each  of  our  other  three  commonwealths 
went  through  the  Civil  War  with  one  governor,  and 
practically  with  one  purpose.  New  York  lost  relatively, 
by  too  much  counsel  and  too  many  counselors. 

Just  now,  studying  the  East  and  the  West  separately, 
we  must  look  more  precisely  into  the  comparative  struc 
ture  of  Massachusetts  and  Indiana.  These  are  not  ex 
clusive  types,  but  they  are  sufficient  examples  of  the  old 
and  new  tendencies  of  our  life,  as  they  prevailed  in  the 
sixties. 

The  historian  of  the  Bay  says,  "  The  Massachusetts 
may  be  considered  the  parent  of  all  the  other  colonies 
of  New  England." 1  This  is  strictly  true.  Roger  Wil 
liams  developed  an  idea  larger  than  his  little  plantation 
and  too  large  for  the  New  England  of  his  time.  Con 
veyed  in  the  mould  of  William  Coddington's  laws,  it 
established  itself  against  the  opposition  of  Massachu- 

1  Hutchinson,  Mass.  Bay,  vol.  i,  iii. 


136  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

setts,  and  finally  made  a  State.  But  the  soul-liberty  of 
Williams  in  the  seventeenth  century  did  not  much  affect 
New  England.  Massachusetts  had  the  separatist1  or  radi 
cal  element,  as  well  as  the  larger  Puritan  constituent 
within  her  people.  After  the  Antinomian  controversy 
in  the  early  days,  the  clergy  were  whipped  into  the 
Orthodox  fold.  There  was  a  large  liberal  faction  among 
the  people,  but  it  was  generally  outside  the  regular  com 
munion.2 

It  is  not  generally  recognized  that  Connecticut  was  a 
much  better  developed  Puritan  community  than  Massa 
chusetts.  Thomas  Hooker  led  an  emigration  into  the 
Connecticut  valley  which  both  departed  and  differed 
from  its  parent  colony  in  that  it  was  a  thoroughly  ho 
mogeneous  people.  Hooker  had  conceived  and  worked 
out  a  system  of  civil  government  more  advanced  and 
more  tenable  than  the  average  Puritan  of  the  Bay  could 
entertain.  Hooker's  polity  as  embodied  in  the  charter, 
furnishing  an  even  prosperity  to  an  orderly  community 
for  a  century  and  a  half,  proves  the  proposition.  These 
settled  Puritan  characteristics  went  up  the  valley  and 
possessed  Vermont.  The  Bible  was  the  basis  and  guide 
of  Puritan 3  culture.  Hooker  so  far  separated  his  theory 
of  the  Bible  and  the  practice  of  a  state  that  his  descend 
ants  could  live  under  a  representative  government.  He 
did  not  actually  separate  church  and  state  in  his  Church 

1  Barry,  Mass.,  vol.  i,  149,  150. 

2  Brooks  Adams,  Emancipation  of  Mass.,  p.  79. 

8  "  The  Bible  was  to  the  Puritan  what  it  had  never  been  to  any  class 
or  community  of  Christians.  .  .  .  Their  love  of  liberty,  their  fidelity 
to  conscience,  their  stern  and  heroic  constancy  in  self-sacrifice,  the  pene 
trating  intelligence  in  their  institutions  in  their  generous  thoughtfulness 
for  their  posterity,  ...  all  were  under  the  inspiration  and  guidance  of 
the  Bible."  —  Ellis,  Puritan  Age  in  Mass.,  p.  125. 


STATE   SUPPORT  137 

Discipline ;  but  he  so  far  established  the  functions  of  a 
state  that  a  fiery  priest  could  not  go  into  town-meeting 
and  put  down  John  Doe  and  Richard  Roe  by  "  inspira 
tion." 

Institutions  conveying  the  experience  of  the  Old 
World  did  much  in  forming  New  England ;  the  ingrained 
character  of  its  people  did  more.  The  men  and  women 
of  these  communities  began  with  certain  innate  quali 
ties  which  went  to  the  making  of  the  future  citizen  of 
America.  It  is  important  to  study  the  racial  stock  and 
social  partitions  which  pervaded  Massachusetts  from 
the  beginning.  There  are  more  lines  of  departure  than 
are  commonly  comprehended.  Every  one  knows  the 
great  Puritan  features  of  organization  —  pastor  and 
congregation,  teachers,  elders,  and  laity  —  which  in 
duced  and  supported  family  culture.  But  underlying 
and  preceding  these  social  institutions  were  the  heredity 
and  condition  of  the  individual,  which  influenced  every 
turn  of  affairs.  An  accurate  observer  has  detailed  these 
matters  in  a  close  study  of  an  old  town  —  Braintree, 
now  Quincy. 

The  Crown  always  addresses  representative  Britain 
as  "  My  Lords  and  Gentlemen."  Lord  Fairfax  accom 
plished  little  in  Virginia  ;  Lords  Say  and  Brook' did  less 
in  New  England.  The  English  gentry,  as  well  as  that 
of  other  countries,  was  a  great  factor  in  the  colonies. 
The  Washingtons  were  conspicuously  first ;  but  there 
were  many  good  seconds  in  all  the  colonies.  Persons 
like  Edmund  and  Judith  Quincy  were  "  the  legitimate 
offspring  of  the  old  English  landowners."  Of  their 
kindred,  Joanna  Hoar  has  distinguished  her  descent 

C.  F.  Adams,  Three  Episodes,  vol.  ii,  699. 


138    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

through  many  generations  of  patriots,  including  Evarts 
and  other  illustrious  families.1  Following  closely  and 
intermingling  were  the  farmers,  whom  John  Adams 
described  in  his  own  vigorous  expression.2  These  farm 
ers  descended  from  yeomen  of  the  feudal  guard,  and 
became  "  the  yeomen  or  common  people  who  have  some 
lands  of  their  own."  Springing  from  these  new  yeomen 
came  the  mechanics,  —  a  class  increasing  fast  in  New 
England,  and  represented  in  Quincy  in  the  eighteenth 
century  by  John  Marshall,3  a  mason,  at  sixty-seven  cents 
per  day.  Milton's  man  and  woman,  a  created  essence, 
stand  forth  in  the  phrase,  "labour  still  to  dress  this 
garden  our  pleasant  task  enjoined."  Marshall  labored, 
and  his  way  of  living  is  manifest  in  his  comment  at 
the  death  of  Rev.  Samuel  Willard :  "  A  person  of  excel- 
ent  accomplishments,  natural  and  acquired  :  an  hard 
student,  a  powerful  preacher  of  the  word  of  God,  an 
exemplary  Christian :  a  mirror  of  all  that  is  good." 
Holinshed's  "  gentlemen  be  those  whom  their  race  and 
bloud,  or  at  the  least  their  vertues,  do  make  noble  and 
knowne."  Not  every  gentlewoman  was  distinguished 
like  Joanna  Hoar,  not  every  mechanic  could  express 
himself  like  John  Marshall ;  but  many  have  been  those 
noble  and  known  by  their  "  vertue,"  and  thick  as  leaves 
in  Vallombrosa  have  been  those  modest  men,  stout- 

1  C.  F.  Adams,  Three  Episodes,  Vol.  ii,  p.  705. 

2  "  Descent  from  a  line  of  virtuous  and  independent  New  England 
farmers  for  a  hundred  and  sixty  years  was  a  better  foundation  for  (pride) 
than  a  descent  through  royal  or  noble  scoundrels  ever  since  the  flood." 
—  Ibid.,  p.  712. 

3  His  diary  records  "  being  at  a  great  losse  whether  any  true  grace  be 
wrought  in  my  soul  or  no  :  corruption  in  me  is  very  powerful  ;  grace  (if 
any)  very  weak  and  languid."  —  Ibid.,  p.  718. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  720. 


STATE  SUPPORT  139 

hearted  as  any  yeomen  of  the  guard.  Old  Braintree 
was  one  town  ;  but  most  early  townships  in  New  Eng 
land  were  like  it.  These  three  orders  of  citizens  were 
indissolubly  combined  in  the  fabric  of  the  state. 

Massachusetts,  inspired  by  Cotton  and  governed  by 
Winthrop,  held  more  varied  forces  than  Connecticut, 
and  included  more  and  more  possibilities  of  civilization 
within  the  actual  scope  of  her  daily  life  as  time  went 
on.  Her  political  exegesis  was  in  abnormal  form,  for 
she  was  constantly  trying  to  bring  heaven  and  earth 
into  one  kind  of  political  action.  She  was  rid  of  Roger 
Williams,  and  more  moderate  statesmen,  like  Codding- 
ton,  but  soul-liberty  was  not  annihilated  or  annulled; 
agony  of  spirit  still  possessed  her.  "  The  heroic  strug 
gle  to  break  down  the  sacerdotal  barrier,  to  popularize 
knowledge,  and  to  liberate  the  mind  began  ages  before 
the  crucifixion  upon  Calvary ;  it  still  goes  on.  ...  In 
that  drama  Massachusetts  has  played  her  part;  it  may 
be  said  to  have  made  her  intellectual  life." 

Such  growth,  such  life  of  the  mind  and  of  the  soul, 
naturally  produced  Garrison,  as  it  entertained  Webster 
and  Everett.  The  culture  of  the  community  clung  to 
the  old  ways  in  Webster's  pupils  and  in  Everett,  but  its 
passionate  feeling  shook  the  Commonwealth  from  Plym 
outh  to  Berkshire,  when  the  people  arose  as  one  man 
,to  subdue  the  rebellion,  and  to  reestablish  that  order 
which  is  heaven's  first  law. 

Crossing  the  mountain  chain  which  divided  East  and 
West  in  those  days,  and  descending  the  Ohio  valley,  we 
find  another  country  and  a  different  people.  The  States 
along  the  Ohio  were  the  first  American  States  as  dis- 

1  Brooks  Adams,  Emancipation  of  Mass.,  p.  42. 


140  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

tinguished  from  European  colonies.  As  Walker  has 
shown,  they  were  the  first  national  product,  —  the  spawn 
of  the  Union,  so  to  speak.  Moreover,  they  were  settled 
by  a  population  more  thoroughly  amalgamated  than  the 
Atlantic  communities.  The  victories  of  George  Rogers 
Clark  over  the  Indians  had  opened  the  country  both  for 
political  organization  and  for  racial  mixture.  The  ordi 
nance  of  1787  had  limited  the  territory  of  slavery,  and 
it  had  founded  the  educational  system  of  the  North 
west  ;  or  briefly,  it  had  insured  a  triumphant  civiliza 
tion,  animated  by  the  spirit  of  the  new  Western  world. 
Kentucky  and  Ohio  preceded,  while  Indiana  was 
almost  contemporary  with  the  nineteenth  century, 
drawing  its  population  chiefly  from  Pennsylvania,  the 
Carolinas,  and  Virginia,  especially  in  the  southern  dis 
trict.1  With  these  immigrants  from  older  communities 
was  a  large  infusion  of  the  essentially  American  and 
migratory  population  of  frontiersmen  from  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee.  The  northern  district2  was  settled  by 
people  from  the  Middle  States  and  from  New  England. 
There  was  more  genius  in  the  southern  counties. 
Through  all  was  scattered  a  strong  element  of  Presby 
terian  Irish,  which  was  to  form  the  cutting  edge  of  our 

1  I  have  drawn  many  social  characteristics  from  Nicholson's  The  Hoo- 
siers,  and  have  used  his  authorities  freely. 

2  ..."  prevented  the  self-denying  missionaries  of  New  England  from 
making  any  considerable  impression  on  the  country  south  of  the  belt  peo 
pled  by  the  current  of  migration  from  New  England.    The  civilization 
of  the  broad  wedge-shaped  region  on  the  north  side  of  the  Ohio  River, 
which  was  settled  by  the  Southern  and  Middle  State  people,  and  which 
is  the  great  land  of  the  Indian  corn,  has  been  evolved  out  of  the  healthier 
elements  of   its  own  native  constitution."  —  Eggleston,   The  Graysons, 
p.  76.   He  says  the  latter  region  was  indebted  to  New  England  in  the 
early  days  for  teachers,  grammar,  and  arithmetic. 


STATE  SUPPORT  141 

new  American  citizenship.  Some  were  reckless  adven 
turers,  but  they  were  mostly  thrifty  and  full  of  energy. 
Andrew  Jackson  and  Samuel  Houston  merely  suggest 
the  many  names  that  adorn  our  fighting-list.  Likewise 
in  principle,  race  was  much  more  intermingled  in  our 
early  history  than  is  generally  supposed.  The  Eggle- 
stons  found  nineteen  Swiss-descended  names  in  the 
little  town  of  Vevay  alone.1 

Lincoln's  boyhood  was  spent  in  this  State,  and  his 
early  life  in  Illinois  was  not  different.  The  picture  of 
his  surroundings 2  is  very  interesting,  and  may  be  ap 
plied  in  studying  the  beginnings  of  Indiana.  As  late 
as  1835,  it  was  not  dreamed  that  the  great  prairies 
would  become  settled  communities ;  but  they  were 
viewed  as  extensive  grazing  plains  for  stock.  The  iron 
horse  and  the  rail  changed  all  that.  The  people  were 
simple,  living  in  a  plain  home,  generally  a  log-cabin. 
A  householder  who  squared  his  logs  was  known  as 
Split-Log  Mitchell.  The  folk  wore  homespun  clothing, 
dyed  with  the  butternut.  The  men  made  buttons,  and 
the  women  dug  roots  for  a  decoction  called  tea.  But 
there  was  plenty  of  game,  bacon,  and  hoecake.  There 
was  no  luxury  while  the  life  had  its  own  stringent  wants. 
When  the  axe  was  lost,  there  was  panic  in  the  family. 
There  were  many  superstitions,  and  witchcraft  tinged 
by  African  voodoo  or  magic  was  fully  entertained. 

Students  should  abandon  the  notion  that  because 
these  pioneer  communities  were  rough  and  rude  they 
were  essentially  clownish  or  brutal.  The  Egglestons 
had  good  blood,  and  excellent  opportunities  for  substan- 

1  The  First  of  the  Hoosiers,  p.  69. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  i,  39,  50,  52. 


142  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

tial  culture.1  Abraham  Lincoln  inherited  the  strong 
traits  of  Nancy  Hanks,  though  the  family  drooped  for 
a  time  in  squalid  poverty.  And  wherever  we  find  su 
perior  work,  there  will  appear  a  good  strain  of  blood 
influencing  it,  whether  in  New  England  or  elsewhere. 

"  Manliness,  honesty,  and  industry  among  men,2  and 
a  proud  self-respect  among  women,  were  strongly  marked 
in  this  typically  Western  backwoods  community." 3  The 
Methodist  preacher,  hardly  educated  but  very  earnest, 
an  effective  agent  in  migratory  civilization,  "  rode  cir 
cuit."  He  prayed  with  the  family,  lectured  the  children 
gently,  and  was  the  shining  light  of  a  "  local  society  " 
invited  to  meet  him.  There  were  many  petty  super 
stitions,  and  scriptural  interpretation  was  absolutely  lit 
eral.4  Sternly  Protestant,  the  people  feared  and  hated 
Catholics. 

Edward  Eggleston  makes  merry  over  the  "  yellow  " 
aspect  of  Indianapolis  in  1840.5  Clothes,  soil,  and  floors, 
alkaline  biscuit  and  fried  middling,  all  were  modulated 
in  one  hue  and  color.  The  culture  if  strong  was  rough. 
All  America  before  the  war  was  crude,  but  the  Protestant 
Episcopal  Bishop  Upf  old  in  1863  was  very  harsh  when 
he  refused  to  "  visit  or  officiate  in  any  parish  " 6  where 
flowers  might  be  displayed  in  the  service.  It  was  con 
sidered  that  Indiana  was  profoundly  moved  by  the  Civil 
War,  perhaps  more  than  her  neighbors.7 

1  Cf.  The  Hoosiers,  Nicholson,  p.  89  ;  Eggleston,  The  First  of  the  Hoo- 
siers,  pp.  59,  61. 

2  "  The  Broad  Run  people  entertained  a  contempt  for  the  law.   A  per 
son  mean  enough  to  'take  the  law  onto'  his  neighbor  was  accounted 
'  too  triflin'  to  be  respectable."  —  Eggleston,  The  Graysons,  p.  134. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  88.  4  Ibid.,  pp.  94,  95, 117. 
6  Cited,  Nicholson,  p.  18. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  63.  7  Ibid.,  p.  265. 


STATE  SUPPORT  143 

Ohio  and  Illinois  on  either  side  were  like,  but  in  less 
degree.  Kentucky  was  modified  by  slavery.  Indiana 
was  the  most  thorough  amalgam  produced  by  the  first 
state  migrations.  The  State  did  not  touch  the  Allegha- 
nies  on  the  one  side,  nor  the  Mississippi  on  the  other. 

Oliver  P.  Morton,  inaugurated  governor  in  January, 
1861,  was  a  typical  child  of  this  community  we  have 
been  sketching.  Brought  up  by  old-fashioned  Scotch 
Presbyterian  aunts  until  fifteen  years  old,  his  heredity 
marked  his  early  development.  Strong,  earnest,  logical, 
reading  widely  and  devouring  the  Bible  by  the  way, 
he  revolted  from  the  narrow  religious  cult  prevailing, 
and  became  independent,  as  indicated  by  the  well-known 
term  "  non-professor."  At  some  sacrifice,  being  intensely 
studious,  he  obtained  regular  legal  education;  even  at 
tending  school  after  his  marriage.  He  was  eloquent  by 
strength,  a  powerful  and  successful  advocate.  Leaving 
the  Democracy  in  1854,  he  helped  to  organize  the  Re 
publican  party.  Of  unflinching  courage  and  energy, 
skillful  in  handling  men,1  and  above  all  clearly  perceiv 
ing  the  impending  issues,  he  became  at  thirty-eight 
years  of  age  the  natural  chieftain  of  this  crisis. 

The  marked  and  interesting  contrast  between  Oliver 
P.  Morton  and  Abraham  Lincoln  may  be  noted  here. 
Lincoln  learned  by  heart  six  books,2  and  these  included 
Euclid,  who  furnished  his  penetrating  and  overwhelming 
logic.  No  one,  not  even  Webster,  excelled  him  in  the 

1  "  Morton  was  a  great  party  leader.    He  had  in  this  respect  no  su 
perior  in  his  time,  save  Lincoln  alone."  —  Hoar,  Autobiography,  vol.  ii,  75. 
"  Tom  "  Reed,  whose  pungent  sayings  are  not  forgotten,  said  a  states 
man  is  a  politician  who  is  dead.   Morton  was  more  than  a  politician  in 
his  life. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  i,  299. 


144  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

grasp  of  a  perplexed  question  and  lucid  power  of  state 
ment.  Morton,1  on  the  other  hand,  had  the  advantage 
of  schools,  substantially  good,  arid  of  the  culture  pre 
vailing  among  intelligent  and  simply  educated  people. 
The  minds  of  the  men  differed,  and  Morton's  method 
was  cyclopean.  A  voracious  reader,  he  was  fully  armed, 
and  could  shatter  his  opponent's  position  with  a  single 
stroke.  His  own  argument  was  not  so  succinct.  He 
gathered  materials  in  heaps,  and  did  not  build  up  a  case 
in  architectural  development.  Though  the  matter  was 
exhausted  when  he  had  finished  an  argument,  he  did 
not  leave  the  hearer  entertaining  a  new  arid  positive 
thing,  an  actual  creation  in  place  of  the  antecedent 
matter. 

This  engrossment  in  his  subject  reveals  a  strong 
phase  of  his  character.  He  was  not  self-conscious, 
but  was  absorbed  in  the  work  of  the  moment,  in  the 
doing,  and  not  standing  without  and  exploiting  the 
matter,  for  statement  or  otherwise.  This  faculty  made 
him  the  great  executive  he  was;  and  if  Abraham 
Lincoln  had  had  something  more  of  the  same  Napoleonic 
power  of  action,  it  would  have  been  a  great  boon  to 
the  American  executive.  President  Lincoln,  instead  of 
doing  the  matter  simply,  generally  stood  outside  and 
was  making  a  case,  which  was  handled  before  the 
American  people  in  a  masterly  manner.  Sincere  in 
patriotic  intent,  he  hardly  ever  lost  himself  in  the  force 
of  creative  action,  whether  manosuvring  for  a  con 
vention  or  laying  plans  for  congressional  legislation. 
In  the  largest  executive  sense  the  creative  spirit,  the 
eminent  force  of  the  immanent  crises,  did  not  enter 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  ii,  507,  508. 


STATE  SUPPORT  145 

into  him  and  mould  him  to  the  work.  Morton  said  to 
an  immense  multitude,  January  22,  "I  am  not  here 
to  argue  questions  of  state  equality,  but  to  denounce 
treason  and  uphold  the  cause  of  the  Union." 1  Such  a 
speech  naturally  cleared  the  air. 

Indiana  was  a  mighty  pivot  between  the  elder  East 
and  the  expanded  Northwest,  and  Morton  was  a  fit 
diamond  point  bearing  the  governmental  structure. 
The  disordered  finances  of  the  State  were  mended  by  a 
loan  of  $50,000,  February  20.  On  March  8,  a  bill  or 
ganizing  the  militia  passed,  notwithstanding  a  threat 
ened  bolt  of  the  Democrats.  After  Sumter,  the  fire  of 
patriotism  blazed  through  people  and  parties,  and  for 
the  time  burned  away  everything  poorer  than  itself. 
We  who  are  to  the  manner  born  seldom  —  foreigners 
perhaps  never  —  comprehend  the  marvelous  civic  ges 
tation  of  those  days.  In  political  conditions  where  all 
people  have  opinions,  and  most  express  them  freely, 
where  the  constable's  badge  is  rare  and  an  armed  sol 
diery  almost  mythical,  government  strong  and  speedy 
had  to  be  forged  anew  for  the  occasion.  Three  days 
before,  the  "  Indianapolis  Sentinel "  had  said,  "  Gov 
ernor  Morton  could  not  make  good  his  promises  to  the 
President  of  6000  volunteers;  the  people  of  Indiana 
did  not  intend  to  engage  in  a  crusade  against  the 
South." 2  Morton  had  to  guard  the  office  of  the  news 
paper  now  in  the  cause  of  public  order.  The  "  Cincinnati 
Enquirer  "  in  February  had  laughed  at  Morton,  "  His 
sword  at  his  side,  fe-fi-fo-fum." 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  102.   I  have  drawn  freely  from  this  excellent 
biography. 

2  Cited,  Foulke,  vol.  i,  115. 


146    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

It  is  strange  that  Lincoln  and  Morton,  bred  in  vir 
tually  the  same  way, — though  Morton  was  more  favored 
in  early  education,  —  should  have  differed  so  much  in 
their  conceptions  of  the  constant  power  required  to 
subdue  the  rebellion.  Morton  was  in  himself,  by  his 
own  superior  foresight  and  tremendous  executive  en 
ergy,  the  power  needed  for  the  occasion.  Enough  al 
ways  meant  for  him  the  overwhelming  heap  which  no 
bounding  circumstance  could  render  inadequate.  The 
modicum  of  sense  and  quiet  living  can  never  be  a 
revolutionary  sufficiency.  This  appears  in  the  swift 
recurring  facts  of  the  record,  even  more  positively  than 
can  be  stated  now  in  sober  words.  That  this  overflowing 
patriotism  did  not  exceed  the  limits  of  judgment  is 
proved  by  the  fact  that  he  maintained  himself  in  the 
governor's  seat  throughout  the  most  fiery  opposition 
ever  known  under  constitutional  forms.  Morton  was  the 
embodiment  of  state  support,  federate  government  in 
carnate  in  the  immediate  local  representative  of  the 
people  ;  not  merely  an  instituted  executive,1  but  a  think 
ing,  acting  head,  whom  John  Doe  and  Kichard  Koe 
recognized  as  their  own  essential  chieftain  and  leader. 

Morton  had  visited  Washington  in  March  and  advised 
a  vigorous  policy  against  the  rebellion  as  it  then  existed. 
He  was  engaged  on  the  morning  of  April  15,  and  before 
the  President's  call  for  troops  arrived  he  wired,  "  On 
behalf  of  the  State  of  Indiana,  I  tender  you  for  the 
defense  of  the  nation  and  to  uphold  the  authority  of 
the  government  10,000  men."  *  The  quota  under  the 
proclamation  calling  for  75,000  was  4683  men  for  three 
months.  The  governor  knew  this  to  be  inadequate,  and 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  70. 


STATE  SUPPORT  147 

on  the  16th  called  out  six  regiments.  The  legislature, 
on  receiving  his  message,  promptly  appropriated  two 
millions,  provided  bonds  for  a  loan,  arranged  a  militia 
system,  defined  treason,  etc.  The  military  condition  was 
the  worst  possible,1  there  being  thirteen  muskets  and 
two  rusty  horse-pistols  in  the  arsenal,  and  not  five  hun 
dred  stand  of  arms  in  the  whole  commonwealth. 

Going  back  to  our  representative  Eastern  community, 
we  must  remember  that  Indiana  was  opposed  to  the 
extension  of  slavery,  being  turned  from  sympathy  with 
the  South  by  the  aggressive  Southern  propaganda  of 
1854.  Moreover,  she  had  not  experienced  the  thorough 
intellectual  unrest  of  a  Puritan  community  in  the  early 
nineteenth  century.  "  Non-professors  "  like  Morton  were 
few  and  were  misunderstood.  Massachusetts,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  been  immersed  in  the  constant  "  strug 
gle  to  liberate  the  mind,"  already  noted.2  Her  inherited 
tendencies  from  the  seventeenth  century  were  an  active 
and  never-ceasing  factor  in  her  enlargement.  Though 
the  "  Unspotted  Lambs  of  the  World  "  have  been  mat 
ter  for  satirical  censure  on  many  occasions,  they  have 
been  on  the  whole  powerful  opponents  of  wrong, 
whether  political  or  ethical.  While  the  West  was  against 
the  extension  of  slavery,  the  great  Puritan  common 
wealths  were  literally  anti-slavery.  It  is  true,  Massachu 
setts  bore  Webster  to  exalt  the  Union,  and  furnished 
forth  Everett  in  a  forlorn  hope  to  save  it.  Her  mass 
was  conservative,  but  her  rising  spirit  was  radical  in  the 
new  agitations  of  the  middle  century.  Her  governor, 
John  A.  Andrew,  inaugurated  January  1,  1861,  fairly 
represented  the  new  wine  which  was  bursting  the  old 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  110.  2  Cf.  ante,  p.  139. 


148     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

bottles.  I  shall  detail  his  personal  characteristics  in 
another  connection.1  In  1858  he  had  said,  while  argu 
ing  against  the  Dred  Scott  decision  in  the  General 
Court,  "  The  sun  of  a  new  morning  begins  to  dawn.  I 
see  its  foreshine  already  on  the  mountain-tops,  when 
these  opinions  will  be  accepted  and  justified  by  the 
great  heart  and  intellect  of  America."  2 

In  a  great  meeting  at  the  Tremont  Temple  he  had 
said,  "Whether  the  enterprise  itself  was  one  or  the 
other,  John  Brown  himself  is  right."  In  the  vigorous 
words  of  "  Warrington,"  Andrew  was  a  "regular-built 
anti-slavery  man  for  governor." 

"  Since  they  will  have  it  so,  —  in  the  name  of  God,  — 
Amen  !  Now  let  ah1  the  governors  and  chief  men  of  the 
people  see  to  it  that  war  shall  not  cease  until  emanci 
pation  is  secure."  These  were  the  words  of  Samuel 
G.  Howe,  April  13.  Garrison,  Howe,  Phillips  were  of 
Massachusetts — all  great  names,  but  varying  enormously 
in  their  individual  powers,  and  in  their  practical  effect 
on  the  Civil  War.  We  have  treated  the  abolitionists  as 
a  political  element  elsewhere;  it  is  only  necessary  to 
mention  Wendell  Phillips  as  an  individual.  April  9,  at 
New  Bedford,  he  had  argued  long  against  coercion  of 
the  South 3  as  being  both  wrong  and  unwise.  He  was  a 

1  Cf.  infra,  p.  192.  2  Pearson,  Andrew,  vol.  i,  79. 

8  Phillips  was  reported,  "You  cannot  go  through  Massachusetts  and 
recruit  men  to  bombard  Charleston  or  New  Orleans.  The  Northern  mind 
will  not  bear  it.  The  first  onset  may  be  borne,  .  .  .  but  the  sober  second 
thought  of  Massachusetts  will  be,  '  wasteful,  unchristian,  guilty.'  ...  If 
the  administration  provokes  bloodshed,  it  is  a  trick  —  nothing  else.  It  is 
the  masterly  cunning  of  the  devil  of  compromise,  the  Secretary  of  State." 
—  Schouler,  Massachusetts  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  45. 

April  21,  Phillips  reversed  his  position  in  a  rather  clumsy  manner,  at 
Boston,  but  his  final  attitude  was  correct.  "It  is  sublime  to  see  the 


STATE   SUPPORT  149 

marvel  among  men,  in  any  time.  A  man  of  the  highest 
intellectual  calibre,  of  the  purest  ethical  insight,  and 
with  inflexible  sincerity  of  purpose  from  his  own  point 
of  view,  he  was  a  political  imbecile  of  the  worst  sort. 
No  one  better  illustrated  the  strange  fact  that  the 
thorough  orator  must  speak  ;  he  cannot  act.  His  great 
speech  at  New  Bedford  was  not  an  accidental  word ;  it 
was  the  typical,  captious  abortion  of  a  gigantic  scold. 
When  all  was  over,  he  could  not  see,  like  Garrison,  that 
the  enormous  forces  of  the  Civil  War  had  changed  the 
inmost  issues  of  American  life,  totally  and  forever.  He 
went  on  even  after  the  war,  sounding  his  magnificent 
periods  1  and  building  up  his  climaxes  in  antediluvian 
speech.  He  lived  in  a  sublimated,  vitriolic  atmosphere 
that  common  patriots  could  not  breathe  and  assimilate. 
It  showed  the  volcanic  heat  of  the  crisis,  the  Civil  War, 
that  Phillips,  the  abolition  "  come-outer,"  the  old  Massa 
chusetts  Whigs,  the  Indiana  Calvinists  and  Methodist 
exhorters,  —  all  these  variously  formed  citizens  were 
fused  into  one  patriotic  current  that  impelled  each  in 
his  own  community. 

Fortunately,  Andrew,  though  inspired  for  freedom, 
was  not  a  "conscientiously  rigid  doctrinaire,"  for  the 
statesman's  forecasting  insight  animated  his  restless 
enthusiasm.  Guided  by  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the 
statesman,  and  John  M.  Forbes,  the  enlarged  man  of 
affairs,  no  one  could  have  better  handled  the  immense 
resources  of  Massachusetts  in  this  instant  need.  In 

rallying  of  a  great  people  to  the  defense  of  the  national  honor."  —  Ibid., 
p.  113. 

1  I  saw  a  private  letter  from  George  William  Curtis,  at  the  time  of 
the  Phillips  Phi  Beta  Kappa  oration.  He  said  it  was  not  surpassed  by 
Pericles. 


150    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

e very-day  management  he  was  assisted  forcibly  by 
Colonel  Henry  Lee,  not  to  mention  others.  He  had 
visited  Washington  in  December  and  discovered  that 
the  South  meant  to  fight.  Conventions  and  resolutions 
would  not  stop  a  bullet.  February  6,  the  governor 
persuaded  his  council  to  buy  overcoats  *  and  other 
equipments  needed  to  mobilize  the  militia.  For  two 
months  Boston  jeered  at  this  sagacious  preparation, 
just  as  Morton's  critics  in  Indiana  laughed  at  him.2 
Seward  had  said  that  the  new  administration  would  be 
so  embarrassed  by  the  empty  treasury  that  it  might  be 
necessary  for  Massachusetts  to  indorse  the  United  States 
bonds.3  In  fact,  individuals  and  corporations  loaned 
liberally  to  the  United  States  Treasury.  The  loyal  States 
provided  indiscriminately  for  the  wants  of  the  adminis 
tration  or  their  own.  April  15,  the  Boston  banks  offered 
to  the  State  $3,600,000,  assuming  that  the  General 
Court  would  legalize  the  obligations  when  it  should 
meet.  New  York  responded,  also,  in  the  most  liberal 
manner. 

Beyond  all  was  the  outpouring  of  popular  feeling  and 
enthusiasm.  On  Sunday,  Fletcher  Webster,  from  the 
rear  of  the  Old  State  House,  at  a  street  meeting,  offered 
to  raise  a  regiment.  When  we  remember  his  valiant 
death  on  the  field,  it  is  pathetic  to  read  his  request  to 
Andrew  a  few  days  after  for  an  interview  "  on  matter 
of  some  delicacy  for  one  moment."  4  On  the  27th,  at  a 
vast  meeting  in  Chester  Square,  Edward  Everett  spoke 
to  the  disciplined,  conserving  mind  of  the  old  Whigs : 

1  Schouler,  Massachusetts  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  35. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  145. 
8  Schouler,  p.  37. 

4  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  171,  May  3,  1861. 


STATE   SUPPORT  151 

"All  former  differences  of  opinion  are  swept  away. 
We  forget  that  we  ever  had  been  partisans.  We  re 
member  only  that  we  are  Americans  and  that  our 
country  is  in  peril."  l 

Equally  significant  was  the  utterance  of  Benjamin 
F.  Hallet,  a  consistent,  life-long  Democrat,  at  the  same 
meeting.  And  from  a  flag-raising,  May  1,  he  indorsed 
on  the  circular  to  Governor  Andrew :  "  With  Mr.  Hal- 
let's  respects  for  the  great  administrative  talent  you 
have  shown  in  this  terrible  crisis  to  our  country,  which 
God  grant  may  pass  over  us,  with  the  purification, 
without  the  desolation  of  the  tempest."  2 

The  spirit  of  the  old  Puritans  now  animated  their 
descendants,  and  it  blazed  forth  in  the  fiercest  heat. 

We  may  cite  from  the  governor's  rough  draft  of  a 
statement  issued  Sunday  noon,  April  20,  to  the  friends 
of  the  Fourth  Regiment,  apprising  them  of  its  safe 
arrival  at  Fortress  Monroe :  — 

The  welfare  of  our  gallant  and  patriotic  citizen-soldiers, 
for  whom  every  possible  provision  has  been  made  or  antici 
pated,  will  be  carefully  watched  over,  and  friends  and  relatives 
they  have  left  behind  shall  constantly  read  around  their 
hearthstones  the  earliest  reliable  intelligence  concerning  the 
progress  and  achievements  of  these  noble  and  patriotic  regi 
ments  of  Massachusetts  volunteers,  for  whom  the  country  has 
already  one  of  the  fairest  pages  in  her  history.  3 

This  is  a  type  of  the  constant  energy  and  abounding 
sentiment  of  Andrew,  seeking  every  opportunity  to 
reach  the  heart  of  the  people,  out  of  his  own  earnest 
and  overpowering  devotion. 

1  Schouler,  p.  115. 

2  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  169,  43.  3  Ibid.,  vol.  129, 155. 


152  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

In  this  connection  we  may  note  the  pressure  bearing 
on  the  government,  before  the  Sanitary  Commission 
was  organized,  to  afford  aid  and  comfort  to  the  soldiers 
in  every  possible  way — wise  and  unwise.  Forbes,  sen 
sible  as  always,  struck  home ; l  the  government  had  to 
allow  individuals  as  such  to  contribute  their  efforts,  to 
satisfy  both  the  sentiment  and  practical  views  of  the 
people. 

A  powerful  union  defense  committee  was  formed  in 
the  city  of  New  York,  and  the  Committee  of  Correspond 
ence,  Hamilton  Fish,  W.  M.  Evarts,  James  T.  Brady, 
John  J.  Cisco,  Edwards  Pierrepont,  opened  communi 
cation  with  Governor  Andrew,  April  24.2 

An  interesting  phase  of-  these  mighty  affairs  is  re 
vealed  through  the  action  of  Caleb  Gushing,  one  of  the 
most  complex,  capable,  and,  entertaining  characters  in 
all  our  history.  When  an  upheaval  of  patriotic  spirit 
brings  all  and  every  one  to  the  surface,  common  policy 
and  tact  fail.  The  representative  state  must  use  all  forces 
and  avail  of  every  individual  within  its  limits  —  but 
how  ?  Mr.  Gushing  offered  his  services  to  the  governor, 
April  25,  in  an  urgent  note  desiring  "  to  discharge  my 

1  To  the  governor,  May  2,  on  ice,  fresh  meats,  etc. :  "  I  fear  we  have 
weeks  and  months  of  dull,  hard  work  to  keep  our  men  in  the  necessaries 
of  a  soldier's  life,  in  daily  food,  shelter,  and  clothes  —  and  until  we  have 
fully  cared  for  these,  I  want  to  have  all  the  fancy  work  come  in  on  the 
responsibility  of  individual  good-will.     By  turning   the  Ice  voyage  to 
account  for  Hospital  service  and  fresh  rations,  I  hope  we  shall  hit  both 
the  sentimental  and  practical  views  of  the  people." — Mass.  Exec.  Files, 
vol.  168,  168. 

Dr.  S.  G.  Howe  reported  on  luxuries  the  same  date:  "Their  principal 
value  (and  that  is  priceless)  is  in  testimony  of  the  patriotism  of  men  and 
women  who  must  do  something  for  their  country  and  for  humanity." 
—  Schouler,  p.  154. 

2  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  168,  157. 


STATE  SUPPORT  153 

duty  to  our  common  country."  1  We  must  call  attention 
to  the  consequent  correspondence  cited,2  for  it  shows 
the  inner  situation,  and  exhibits  the  nature  of  the  task 
of  those  governing  the  country.3 

The  inmost  convictions  of  Massachusetts  were 
wounded  severely  by  the  action  of  General  Butler  in 
Maryland,  when  he  offered  her  troops  on  his  way  to 
Washington,  to  subdue  a  hypothetical  insurrection  of 
the  negro  slaves.  Andrew  took  ground  very  sagaciously 
—  as  the  ultimate  negro  problem  was  to  prove  —  that 
the  affair  was  a  military  matter,  not  to  be  embarrassed 
by  political  or  even  sentimental  action.  The  citizens  at 
home  were  moved  to  anxiety.  Lewis  Tappan,  the  famous 
abolitionist,  remonstrated  from  New  York.  S.  E.  Sewall 
and  others 4  wrote  Governor  Andrew ;  but  perhaps  the 
clearest  voice  was  that  of  A.  Henry  Harlow  of  Worces 
ter  County,  April  30,  speaking  for  others  as  well  as 
himself :  "  Can  you  assure  us  that  if  we  enlist  in  the 

1  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  169,  192. 

2  The  Boston  Herald  cautions  Governor  Andrew,  "  Massachusetts  wants 
no  traitors  to  command  troops." 

O.  C.  B.,  Greencastle,  Pa.,  April  22,  advises  the  governor,  knowing 
from  Union  men  that  C.  Gushing,  late  President  of  the  Charleston  Con 
vention,  "  spent  yesterday,  Sunday,  at  Hagerstown,  Md.,  with  well-known 
secessionists." 

April  29,  an  anonymous  correspondent  at  Worcester  has  seen  Cushing's 
Union  speech,  but  yet  protests  against  him.  About  May  1,  "  Admirer  of 
her  Present  Governor  "  says  of  Gushing:  "  Now  in  the  name  of  the '  Triune 
God,'  let  me  respectfully  entreat  that  no  son  of  my  Native  State  ever 
be  required  to  serve  with,  still  less  under,  so  vile  and  black  a  traitor."  — 
Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  168,  Nos.  146,  71,  20,  155. 

8  Cf.  Pearson,  Andrew,  vol.  i,  196-199,  Andrew's  refusal  of  Gush 
ing,  and  Forbes's  comment  approving.  It  was  a  nice  question  between 
Butler  and  Gushing.  Perhaps  an  uncertain  statesman  would  have  been 
better  than  a  certain  demagogue. 

4  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  168,  92  ;  vol.  169,  56. 


154  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

war  to  put  down  treason,  we  shall  not  in  any  possible 
contingency  be  compelled  to  assist  in  quelling  negro 
insurrection  ?  " 1 

We  may  read  between  the  lines  symptoms  of  the 
grave  troubles  which  were  to  come  to  the  surface  and 
vex  the  country  in  the  year  1863.  And  the  women  — 
blessed  creatures  —  they  clung  to  the  wheels  of  gov 
ernment  at  every  precipitate  turn,  and  they  drove  the 
governors  to  distraction.  A  commander-in-chief  and 
father-of-his-people  might  expect  all  sorts  of  personal 
woes  and  complaints.  The  Files  are  full  of  these  mur 
murs,  as  of  fathers  enlisting  without  knowledge  of  their 
families,  etc.  All  of  which  agony  Andrew  soothed  as 
best  he  could,  in  the  most  conscientious  and  faithful 
manner.  But  what  should  he  say  to  the  female  Puritan 
when  she  came  in  the  formal  Protest  of  the  Mothers 
and  Sisters  of  Reading,2  against  "desecration  of  the 
Sabbath  in  camps,"  etc.,  and  in  moving  troops  so  they 
must  break  the  Sabbath,  asking  "to  have  the  Laws 
of  God  obeyed,"  —  a  large  contract  for  either  mascu 
line  or  feminine  Puritan. 

In  this  weltering  tangle  of  agony  and  passion  An 
drew  did  not  go  mad,  as  might  have  been.3  He  had 
strong  men  and  nimble  workers  to  help  him.  It  is 

1  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  169, 17. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  172,  August,  1861. 

3  In  the  midst  of  these  troubles  Andrew  struck  right  and  left  at  de 
tractors  and  critics.    October  31,  1863,  he  printed  a  circular  to  Hon.  M. 
M.  Fisher,  Medway,  concerning  recruiting,  and  refuting  certain  stories 
about  "  shoddy  "  overcoats.    "  So  false  as  to  be  strange  and  extraordinary, 
even  if  the  atmosphere  produced  lies  without  human  agency." 

He  protested  to  Generals  Meigs  and  Banks:  "  If  there  is  anything  about 
which  my  conscience  is  clear,  both  before  God  and  man,  it  is  in  regard 
to  my  earnest  efforts  to  serve  and  protect  the  soldiers  of  Massachusetts. 


STATE  SUPPORT  155 

cheering  to  read  at  every  turn  John  M.  Forbes's  prac 
tical  and  eminently  sensible  sayings  in  words  from  his 
own  elastic  pen,  before  mechanical  typewriters  and 
bulky  stub-pens  marred  the  delicacy  of  personal  inter 
course.  May  21,  about  many  affairs ;  then  "  Nota  Bene, 
I  shall  come  to-morrow  with  a  Fast  horse,  in  hopes  to 
carry  you  off  beyond  reach  of  your  immediate  perse 
cutors."  l 

Massachusetts  was  liberating  her  mind.  From  the 
days  of  the  Antinomian  controversy,  through  the  Half 
way  Covenant  and  the  American  Revolution,  the  Unita 
rian  dispute  and  the  abolition  agitation,  to  the  uprising 
of  the  Civil  War,  she  grew  in  strength  as  she  wrestled 
in  her  agony.  Her  quiet  was  unstable  equilibrium. 
Other  communities,  especially  in  New  England,  were 
more  or  less  similar ;  none  excelled  her  in  these  vigor 
ous  attributes,  and  she  used  her  whole  strength  to  sub 
due  the  rebellion. 

In  his  day,  Charles  Dickens  was  a  great  humorist,  and 
he  accented  "red  tape,"  the  excessive  attention  to  for 
mality  and  routine,  and  made  it  immortal,  when  he 
festooned  it  around  the  Circumlocution  Office  of  all 
governments.  The  government  of  the  United  States 
was  not  constructed  to  carry  on  war  chiefly,  and  least  of 
all  carry  it  on  among  its  own  citizens.  But  whatever 
might  fail  the  men  in  bureaus  at  Washington,  their  sup 
ply  of  red  tape  was  ample  in  every  contingency.  Such 
energetic  administrators  as  Andrew  and  Morton  were 
constantly  meshed  in  its  entangling  twists  and  knots. 

And  in  respect  to  those  duties  I  have  never  had  a  petition  or  a  favorite, 
nor  a  disfavored  nor  a  neglected  corps."  —  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  64, 
61  D. 

1  Ibid.,  vol.  170,  90. 


156  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Andrew  let  himself  out  in  his  own  characteristic  manner 
when  he  wrote  the  President1  that  his  chief  business  was 
to  act  as  if  it  were  not.  His  apt  phrase  "took  up  the 
war  "  embodies  the  action  of  the  loyal  North.  We  have 
heretofore  indicated 2  the  deadly  influence  of  this  subtle 
administrative  principle,  as  it  often  prevailed  in  the 
general  government.  The  prevention  and  emendation 
of  red  tape  was  one  of  the  largest  functions  of  the  loyal 
governors  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  war.  No  part  of 
these  studies  is  more  important  or  more  interesting,  in 
the  light  thrown  on  the  working  of  federal  government, 
arising  in  the  States  and  centring  at  Washington,  or 
vice  versa. 

New  York  responded  amply  to  the  calls  of  the  admin 
istration  after  the  attack  on  Sumter.  Governor  Edwin 
D.  Morgan  could  say  truly  in  his  message,  "Her  bank 
ers,  and  particularly  those  of  the  city  of  New  York,  with 
a  patriotism  and  an  enlightened  confidence  which  is  a 
wonder  to  Europe  and  a  marvel  to  ourselves,  have  fur 
nished  a  most  important  element  to  the  government."3 

The  United  States  Treasury  in  its  turn  placed  $2,000,- 
000  in  the  control  of  the  Union  Defense  Committee, 
and  Messrs.  Dix,  Blatchford,  and  Opdyke  obtained  in 
structions  for  expending  it.4  As  illustrating  the  prompt 
support  afforded  by  the  great  industrial  corporations 
throughout  the  North,  we  may  note  the  action  of  the 

1  "  I  beg  leave  to  add,  that,  immediately  upon  receiving  your  pro 
clamation  we  took  up  the  war,  and  have  carried  on  our  part  of  it  in  the 
spirit  in  which  we  believe  the  Administration  and  the  American  People 
intend  to  act ;  namely,  as  if  there  was  not  an  inch  of  red  tape  in  the  world." 
—  May  3,  1861,  Schouler,  p.  130. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  75. 

3  Message,  January  7, 1862,  p.  2. 

4  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  136. 


STATE   SUPPORT  157 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company  l  directed  from  New 
York,  in  keeping  an  "  open  highway."  On  the  24th  the 
governor  reported2  eight  thousand  militia  dispatched 
and  several  other  regiments  "  perfectly  impatient  to 
start."  July  26,  the  resources  of  the  State  were  "nearly 
spent/'  but  the  executive  of  the  great  State  went  for 
ward  cheerfully,3  in  no  fear  of  red  tape.  He  tendered 
Parrott  guns4  to  the  War  Department,  but  they  were 
not  needed. 

The  first  actual  assistance  for  the  administration 
came  from  Pennsylvania  on  the  evening  of  April  18. 
A  body  of  five  hundred  and  thirty  men 5  without  arms 
reached  Washington,  and  Major  McDowell  took  com 
mand.  This  was  two  days  before  the  arrival  of  the 
Massachusetts  Sixth,  and  the  House  of  Representatives 
recorded  its  thanks  July  22,  1861.  The  most  powerful 
and  far-reaching  support  of  the  government,  in  any  one 
act  by  a  single  State,  was  in  the  levying  of  the  Reserves 
by  Curtin  in  Pennsylvania,  which  has  been  treated  pre 
viously.6  The  governor  and  the  arch-politician,  Simon 

1  "  Have  in  their  control  110  engines  and  2600  freight  cars,  and  about 
3500  men  employed  ;   that  the  regular  business  of  the  company  shall  be 
set  aside  at  any  moment,  and  every  facility  which  the  utmost  energy  and 
an  earnest  desire  to  sustain  the  government  can  bring  to  bear  shall  be 
afforded."  —  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  121. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  108. 

3  To  Secretary  Seward  :  "  I  have  no  time  to  call  the  legislature,  and 
there  will  be  no  doubt  of  the  sanction  of  all  proper  acts  done  by  me  and 
no  question  save  that  of  money.    Ours  is  nearly  spent,  but  if  the  General 
Government  will  make  payment  on  account  of  past  expenditures  incurred 
all  will  go  smoothly.    I  infer  the  government  will  make  such  payment 
and  am  acting  accordingly."  —  Ibid.,  p.  354. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  347. 

5  Bates,  Pennsylvania,  vol.  v,  7,  8. 

6  Ante,  p.  90. 


158    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Cameron/  were  far  from  friendly,  but  the  patriotic 
spirit  of  the  executive  bursts  forth  in  every  line  April 
17,  and  the  dispatch  is  typical  of  his  energetic  life  dur 
ing  the  whole  war.  "  Volunteers  are  arriving,  many  of 
them  without  arms,  and  most  of  those  in  use  unfit  for 
active  service.  We  have  no  ammunition.  I  wish  to  march 
them  in  large  bodies  and  prepared  to  defend  themselves. 
Shall  I  order  the  Philadelphia  regiments  to  start  ?  "2 

Every  possible  faculty  of  an  executive  was  needed  in 
those  days.  The  community  was  rich,  but  the  state 
credit  had  been  shattered  by  the  onset  of  war.  To  these 
delicate  problems  of  finance 3  the  governor  addressed 
himself  with  excellent  sense.  The  cares  of  great  expend 
ing  and  disbursing  officers  show  in  the  appointment 
of  a  committee  to  supervise  supplies  and  investigate 
frauds.4  Curtin  cared  incessantly  and  in  every  way  for 
the  soldiers  in  the  field,  and  his  especial  delegate,  Dr. 
Robert  K.  Smith,5  major,  made  himself  felt  throughout 
the  hospitals. 

Before  discussing  the  particular  action  of  the  States 
in  raising  volunteers,  we  may  glance  at  the  message  of 

1  A  lady,  who  had  every  opportunity  of  knowing  what  the  best  men  in 
Pennsylvania  thought,  told  me  that  Cameron  was  a  tremendous  load  for 
the  administration  in  1861.    His  appointment  proceeded  from  the  only 
bargain  made  before  nomination,  and  it  was  not  Lincoln's  fault  that  he  was 
in  the  War  Department.    She  said  when  he  left  the  War  Department  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  telegraphed,  "  The  devil  is  loose,  thank 
Heaven  !  "   What  was  the  matter  with  Cameron  ?   "His  devotion  to  his 
own  interests.    Once,  Pennsylvania  wanted  a  regiment  accepted.   He  re 
plied  that  *  it  could  be  taken,  if  sent  by  Harrisburg  to  come  by  Northern 
Central  Railroad,  which  he  controlled.    He  was  a  great  politician,  able, 
and  never  forgot  his  friends,  nor  his  enemies." 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  82.  3  Egle,  Curtin,  p.  154. 
4  Pennsylvania  Exec.  Files,  Letter  Book  No.  12,  June  1,  1861. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  99. 


STATE  SUPPORT  159 

the  President,  July  4,  where  he  defined  the  true  condi 
tion  of  the  States,  and  their  basis  as  a  portion  of  the 
whole  country :  — 

The  States  have  their  status  in  the  Union,  and  they  have 
no  other  legal  status.  If  they  hreak  from  this,  they  can  only 
do  so  against  law  and  by  revolution.  The  Union,  and  not 
themselves  separately,  procured  their  independence  and  their 
liberty.  By  conquest  or  purchase  the  Union  gave  each  of 
them  whatever  of  independence  and  liberty  it  has.  The  Union 
is  older  than  any  of  the  States,  and  in  fact  created  them  as 
States.1 

We  must  dwell  on  this  masterly  statement,  for  its  true 
significance  and  overpowering  weight  were  not  fully 
comprehended,  North  or  South,  until  four  years  later. 
As  suggested  heretofore,2  the  greatest  mistake  pos 
sible  for  any  administration  was  committed  by  ours  at 
this  time.3  It  consisted  in  laying  the  Washington  extin 
guisher,  the  quenching,  benumbing  influence  of  a  great 
capital,  on  the  energies  of  a  whole  people ;  instead  of 
opening  out  all  the  possibilities  of  state  support,  —  as 
developed  by  Governor  Curtin4  in  the  hard  fact  of 
15,000  Pennsylvania  Reserves, — and  rallying  that  sup 
port  in  an  overwhelming  force  before  the  rebel  Con 
federacy  could  marshal  its  lesser  people  in  its  desperate 
struggles,  1862—65. 

In  spite  of  adverse  influences, — Virginia,  Kentucky, 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  317.    "  Our  adversaries  omit '  We  the  people,' 
and  substitute  *  We  the  deputies  of  the  sovereign  and  independent  States.' 
Why?"—  Ibid.,  p. 319. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  87. 

3  "  One  of  the  greatest  perplexities  of  the  government  is  to  avoid  re 
ceiving  troops  faster  than  it  can  provide  for  them."  —  President's  Message, 
0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  316. 

4  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  218. 


160    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

and  Missouri  refusing  peremptorily  to  send  the  first 
quota  of  militia,  and  the  executive  of  Delaware  not 
cooperating,  —  these  particular  States  furnished  regi 
ments.  Maryland  was  prevented  by  the  outbreak  at 
Baltimore.  All  the  other  States  in  the  loyal  district 1 
promptly  sent  their  quotas  toward  the  first  75,000  men. 
In  the  present  view  of  the  lamentable  inefficiency  shown 
by  all  the  departments  the  first  year  at  Washington,  it 
is  exquisitely  funny  to  read  Secretary  Cameron's  cita 
tions,  with  comments,  from  ex-Secretary  Floyd's  report. 
"Adequate  preparations  and  a  prompt  advance  of  the 
army  was  an  act  of  mercy  and  humanity  to  those  de 
luded  people  of  the  Mormons  at  Utah,  for  it  prevented 
the  effusion  of  blood.  I  recommend  the  same  vigorous 
and  merciful  policy  now."2 

In  the  beginning,  very  interesting  complications  had 
arisen,  under  some  of  the  state  laws,  for  handling  the 
first  quotas  of  militia ;  these  will  receive  attention 
in  another  connection.3  May  4,  General  Order  No.  15  4 
called  for  42,034  men  for  three  years  —  the  nucleus 
of  the  actual  army  as  distinguished  from  the  militia, 
which  had  done  such  good  service,  who  were  minute 
men  hurrying  to  the  front.  The  powerful  work  of 
the  great  States  is  indicated  in  the  stirring  report  of 
Governor  E.  D.  Morgan  to  the  War  Department,  though 
the  same  spirit  prevailed  everywhere. 

1  Red  tape  had  not  then  arrived  at  waterproof  caps  and  blankets  in 
campaigning.     "  Some  of  the  States  of  New  England  have  sent  their 
quotas  forward  equipped  most  admirably  in  this  respect.     I  would  re 
commend  that  this  subject  be  commended  to  Congress  for  its  favorable 
consideration."  —  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  307. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  303-306. 

8  Cf.  infra,  p.  180  et  seq. 

4  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  151. 


STATE  SUPPORT  161 

For  our  previous  organization  of  troops  we  had  a  state 
law  and  funds.  Both  are  now  exhausted.  I  do  not  propose 
calling  the  legislature  if  it  can  be  avoided,  for  that  would 
produce  delay ;  but  I  require  specific  directions  as  to  the 
mode  of  organization,1  and  money  or  Treasury  notes  placed 
at  my  command  now,  as  I  wish  to  get  out  a  general  order, 
for  which  the  people  all  over  the  State  are  anxiously  waiting, 
and  I  have  not  information  whether  this  25,000  men  are  to 
be  enrolled  according  to  Orders  No.  15,  or  under  some  law  of 
the  present  Congress.  That  no  time,  however,  shall  be  lost,  I 
have  already  contracted.  ...  I  have  unusual  facilities  now 
in  getting  supplies.  With  such  [orders  and  fundsj  there  is 
nothing  I  would  not  do  for  the  government,  and  in  the  most 
prompt  and  effective  manner  which  the  exigencies  require.  I 
have  no  doubt  of  getting  the  troops.2 

All  kinds  of  management  were  used  by  the  vigorous 
governors  to  stimulate  the  admin stration,  —  which  was 
to  move  without  punching  or  prodding  after  the  coming 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  —  and  to  induce  the  acceptance  of 
more  troops.  We  have  seen  that  New  York3  was  steadily 
putting  forth  its  energies  in  filling  its  large  quotas. 
June  12,  Massachusetts  had  ready  its  six  regiments 
called  out,  and  Governor  Andrew  begged  General  Hiram 
Walbridge  of  New  York  to  "  procure  a  further  requi 
sition  for  ten  regiments,  thoroughly  armed,  equipped, 
clothed,  and  provided  with  tents,  baggage  train,  rations, 
and  subsistence  stores;  these  advances  will  be  made  by 
this  State."4 

1  Communicated  August  3.     O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  386. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  361. 

3  The   powerful  Union  Defense  Committee  telegraphed  to  the  gov 
ernors  of  thirteen  States  and  received  replies,  stating  the  number  and 
preparation  of  their  forces.    Messrs.  Draper,  Wetmore,  and  Evarts  com 
municated  this  information  to  the  War  Department.  —  Ibid.,  p.  148. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  268,  275,  282. 


162  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Were  there  ever  such  little  kingdoms,  within  a  great 
kingdom,  in  the  history  of  government  ?  At  the  same 
time  Fletcher  Webster  had  raised  his  regiment  above 
mentioned,  "which  Hon.  Daniel  Webster's  old  friends 
very  much  wish  to  get  into  the  service,"1  in  the  words 
of  President  Lincoln,  who  took  a  hand  with  Senator 
Wilson  in  forcing  it  on  the  War  Department.  The  whole 
matter  issued  in  directly  accepting  the  ten  regiments, 
which  included  Webster's. 

Some  States2  —  as  Ohio — had  proposed  to  enlist 
their  three  months'  men  by  regiments,  having  been  led 
to  expect  a  "unanimous"  response.  Only  a  portion  of 
the  men  enlisted.  Then  Ohio  proposed  to  disband  them 
altogether  after  paying  off.  The  President  declined,  to 
General  McClellan,  as  "this  would  not  only  be  to  dis 
appoint  too  rudely  the  patriotic  order  of  these  gallant 
volunteers,  but  it  would  be  a  breach  of  the  public  faith." 3 

While  the  Atlantic  States  thus  flamed  with  excite 
ment,  what  was  the  great  West  doing  in  these  opening 
scenes  of  the  tremendous  drama?  Never  did  clarion 
to  "all  the  sensual  world  proclaim"  more  clearly  than 
the  voice  of  Oliver  P.  Morton  as  it  sounded  across  the 
prairies  of  Indiana  and  echoed  through  the  bureaus  at 
Washington,  which  were  busy,  but  not  always  opera 
tive.  To  the  Secretary  of  War,  April  19 :  "  Twenty-four 
hundred  men  in  camp  and  less  than  half  of  them  armed. 
Why  has  there  been  so  much  delay  in  sending  arms  ? 
We  have  received  none,  and  cannot  learn  that  they 
have  ever  been  shipped.  .  .  .  Allow  me  to  ask  what  is 
the  cause  of  all  this?"4 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  269,  271. 

2  For  Pennsylvania,  cf .  ibid.,  p.  178.      3  Ibid.,  p.  266.      4  Ibid.,  p.  89. 


STATE  SUPPORT  163 

Again/  April  28  :  - 

The  organization  of  the  six  regiments  required  of  Indiana 
has  this  day  been  completed.  ...  I  regret  to  add  that  great 
dissatisfaction  prevails  in  the  army  with  regard  to  the  quality 
of  the  arms  furnished,  and  the  delay  and  uncertainty  in  the 
reception  of  stores  and  accoutrements.  I  hazard  nothing  in 
saying  that  a  finer  body  of  men  has  never  been  assembled 
on  the  continent.  .  .  .  This  State  is  one  of  the  four  exposed 
by  its  geographical  position  to  the  immediate  evils  of  civil 
war.  ...  I  trust  that  at  least  20,000  stand  of  arms  will  be 
promptly  shipped  to  this  State.2 

The  transactions  with  the  wavering  State  of  Kentucky 
at  this  period'  are  very  interesting.  Morton's  ample 
energies  overflowed,  as  it  were,  and  did  much  to  keep 
that  State  from  drifting  into  the  Cpnfederacy.  With 
Governor  Dennison,  he  tried  to  get  Governor  Magoffin 
to  attend  a  meeting  at  Cincinnati.  The  vacillating  se 
cessionist  would  not  come,  but  sent  his  representative, 
Colonel  Crittenden,  to  persuade  Morton  and  Dennison  to 
unite  with  him  in  a  chimerical  effort  to  bring  about  a 
truce  between  the  general  government  and  the  seceded 
States  until  a  meeting  of  Congress  could  be  called  in 
extraordinary  session.  Morton  rebuked  him  severely 
and  taught  constitutional  exposition  in  the  briefest 
terms :  "  I  hold  that  Indiana  and  Kentucky  are  but  in 
tegral  parts  of  the  nation,  bound  to  obey  the  requisitions 
of  the  President."3  These  peculiar  conditions  induced 
a  close  relationship  between  the  loyal  people  of  Ken- 

1  The  enthusiastic  Cincinnati  Commercial  said,  as  the  troops  passed 
through,  "  The  governor  of  Indiana  has  out-generaled  the  governor  of 
Ohio.     The  former  has  sent  four  admirably  equipped  regiments,  and  has 
two  more  ready  to  march.     The  governor  of  Ohio  has  not  a  single  regi 
ment."  —  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  126. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  125.  3  Ibid.,  p.  137. 


164  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

tucky  and  Morton,  who  was  like  a  foster-nurse  to  the 
half-orphaned  State.  After  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  the  om 
nipresent  governor  had  chartered  boats  to  bring  home 
his  own  wounded.  A  Kentucky  major  tried  to  get  a 
score  on  board  those  reserved  boats.  "But  damn  it, 
sir !  is  n't  Morton  governor  of  Kentucky  ?  If  he  can 
care  for  our  State,  he  certainly  can  protect  you."  l 

In  this  summer  the  executives  of  the  several  States 
were  straining  every  nerve  to  bring  out  the  power  of 
their  peoples,  and  to  muster  every  possible  force,  phy 
sical  and  moral,  for  effort  in  the  great  struggle.  Gov 
ernor  Andrew,  in  accepting  a  resignation  and  granting 
honorable  discharge,  where  there  had  been  a  misunder 
standing,  said,  very  well,  in  his  abounding  rhetoric : 
"Every  citizen  must  yield  everything  to  his  country 
save  Truth  and  Honor."  2  Governor  Andrew  received 
many  petitions  from  the  towns  direct,3  asking  him  to 
use  the  state  credit  and  to  push  affairs  in  every  way 
toward  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion.  Petty  local 
jealousies  creep  in  to  stain  the  best  work  in  the  best 
times.  Some  expatriated  Yankee  was  worried  by  West 
ern  newspapers,  which  clamored  that  New  England, 
New  York,  and  Pennsylvania  were  behind  in  filling 
their  quotas,  while  Indiana  was  ahead.  Andrew's  most 
vigorous  scrawl  emphasizes  on  the  report :  "  Will  Mr. 
Drew  see  to  this  ?  Hurry  up  the  statistics  on  this  sub 
ject.  I  want  to  write  a  letter  immediately  to  satisfy 
this  class  of  .  .  ." 4 

The  large  States  imported  arms  from  Europe,  and 
Massachusetts  could  say,  October  11,  1861,  that  she 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  165.  2  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  2,  53. 

3  Tbid.,  vol.  168.  4  Ibid.,  vol.  173,  October  7, 1861. 


STATE   SUPPORT  165 

had  "  taken  pride  in  permitting  none  of  her  three  years 
regiments  to  appear  in  Washington  until  fully  equipped. 
This  is  the  first  instance  in  which  she  has  asked  the 
federal  government  to  assist."  1  There  was  inevitable 
conflict  in  purchasing  military  supplies  abroad  between 
the  federal  and  state  governments.  The  national  mis 
fortune  was  that  there  was  not  more  of  it.  If  the  ad 
ministration  could  not  grasp  the  rebellion  in  total,  it 
would  have  been  far  better  had  it  allowed  the  States 
which  were  parts,  each  to  attack  its  own  part  in  sup 
port,  and  thus  to  render  the  parts  into  the  national 
whole.  The  small  loss  through  competition  abroad 
would  have  been  recompensed  a  hundred  fold  by  the 
large  muster  of  well-equipped  troops  rendered  abso 
lutely  necessary  at  each  turn  of  the  struggle.  The 
strange  somnolence  of  the  administration  is  completely 
illustrated  in  letters  of  Governor  Morgan 2  to  the  War 
Department,  November  30,  1861.  To  the  order  stop 
ping  purchase  of  arms  :  "  I  beg  to  say  that  in  view  of 
the  inability  of  the  General  Government  to  supply  all 
the  volunteers  with  arms  the  government  of  this  State 
authorized  the  purchase  of  Enfield  arms  in  England, 
some  of  which  are  still  to  arrive.  No  other  purchase 
has  been  or  will  be  made."  To  the  order  stopping  re 
cruiting  :  "  I  will,  of  course,  comply  with  the  wishes 
of  the  War  Department  in  the  respect  named,  but  I 
beg  to  add  that,  unless  the  rebellion  is  crushed  out  by 
the  1st  of  February  next,  I  shall  ask  the  acceptance 
by  the  government  of  at  least  25,000  additional  volun 
teers  from  this  State."  The  contrast  is  stupendous : 
existence  in  a  bureau  and  the  doing  of  the  work,  the 

1   0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  571.  2  Ibid.,  p.  698. 


166    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

account-maker  and  the  actor,  one  gasping  in  a  vacuum, 
the  other  breathing  the  free  air  o£  all  the  sky.  There 
might  be  deficiency  of  money,  powder,  and  ball  in  the 
War  Department,  but  there  was  ample  time  and  op 
portunity  for  politician's  palaver.  Secretary  Cameron 
"  thanks  for  the  prompt  and  satisfactory  manner  in 
which  you  have  responded  to  the  call  of  the  President " 
in  a  hundred  forms  throughout  these  records. 

December  3,  the  War  Department  issued  Order  105,1 
based  on  the  fact  that  the  500,000  volunteers  author 
ized  had  been  raised.  It  overhauled  the  whole  business 
of  recruiting,  and  especially  stopped  the  raising  of  more 
troops  except  on  special  requisition  of  the  department. 
A  better  conceived  plan  for  constraining  and  repress 
ing  the  energies  of  the  loyal  people  could  not  have 
been  invented  by  a  Circumlocution  Office.  One  point 
desired  was  to  restrain  volunteer  enlistment  and  encour 
age  that  of  regulars.  Governor  Morgan,  in  mild  but 
pungent  irony,  showed  that  the  services  were  different, 
and  that  people  volunteered  "  to  defend  their  institu 
tions  rather  than  a  desire  to  find  employment."2  He 
justly  said  that  the  spirit  of  the  order  would  "  touch 
the  pride  of  the  State."  Secretary  Cameron,  with  his 
eternally  bland  smile,  "  fully  appreciates  the  ability  and 
energy  displayed  by  the  authorities  of  the  State  of 
New  York," 3  but  he  does  not  modify  the  paralyzing 
influence  of  the  order. 

The  reader  must  pardon  these  returns  to  an  oft-told 
tale,  for  similar  events,  oft  repeated,  compel  the  record. 
And  these  events  contain  the  essential  history  of  the 
Civil  War.  The  more  one  studies  these  movements 

i  0.  R.,  Series  in,  vol.  i,  722.         2  Ibid.,  p.  758.         8  Ibid.,  p.  761. 


STATE   SUPPORT  167 

of  the  departments,  the  more  incomprehensible  appear 
these  violent  and  repeated  interruptions  of  the  recruit 
ing  service.  No  sooner  were  all  the  varied  energies  of 
local  government  stimulated  and  set  at  work  than  the 
national  heart  began  to  beat  slower  and  strove  to  lessen 
all  the  vigorous  efforts  of  the  members.  Or,  as  if 
a  captain,  having  just  replaced  his  storm-blown  sails, 
should  say,  "  Stop  sewing  and  fitting,  for  we  are  head 
ing  into  port  with  never  a  chance  of  another  squall  of 
wind." 

Moving  forward  to  the  spring  of  1862,  the  scene 
changes,  and  the  men,  while  the  country  suffers  from 
disabilities  of  another  sort.  Stanton  had  succeeded 
Cameron  in  the  War  Department,  and  brought  in  great 
energy.  But  Stanton,  like  many  eminent  men,  great 
as  he  was  in  moving  cabinets,  misconceived  when  he 
imagined  himself  a  strategist.  McClellan  was  conducting 
his  campaign  on  the  Peninsula  with  a  splendid  army. 
Stonewall  Jackson  began  the  first  of  his  large  enter 
prises  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  struck  terror  into 
the  bureaus  at  Washington.  A  portion  of  McDowell's 
right  wing  of  the  Peninsular  army  was  diverted  too  late 
to  save  Banks  from  disastrous  defeat.  This  "great 
scare"  was  memorable,  even  in  that  capital  of  scares. 
No  strength  was  expended  now  in  stopping  off  States 
from  raising  troops  without  "special"  instructions.  The 
electric  wires  burned  May  19  under  the  force  of  the 
excitement.  Secretary  Stanton  shrieks  to  all  the  loyal 
governors,1  —  Curtin,  Morgan,  and  the  rest,  —  "  How 
soon  can  you  raise  six  or  more  regiments?"  or  "one 
or  more,"  as  the  case  might  be. 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  44. 


168    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

Andrew  made  one  of  his  worst  mistakes  in  respond 
ing  :  "  A  call  so  sudden  and  unforewarned  finds  me 
without  materials  for  an  intelligent  reply.  ...  If  our 
people  must  fight  rebels,  who  use  their  slaves  against 
them,  I  think  they  will  feel  that  the  draft  is  heavy 
on  their  patriotism.  But  if  the  President  will  sustain 
General  Hunter,  recognize  all  men,  even  black  men,  as 
legally  capable  of  that  loyalty,"  1  etc. 

Such  temporizing  allegiance  could  not  survive  long 
in  the  resilient  atmosphere  of  Massachusetts,  nor  was  it 
the  thorough  feeling  of  her  loyal  governor.  His  true 
self  speaks  out  May  23 :  "I  am  making  all  prepara 
tions  possible  in  advance  of  your  directions.  Please 
make  any  requisition  on  me  you  desire,  and  we  will  do 
our  utmost." 2  Morton  was  on  deck,  as  usual,  with  five 
regiments,  in  "  from  four  to  six  weeks." 3 

In  view  of  the  above-mentioned  correspondence  in 
December  with  Governor  Morgan,  there  is  ghastly  satire 
in  the  dispatch,  May  21,  less  than  six  months  later : 
"  Raise  one  regiment  immediately.  Raise  as  many  there 
after  as  you  can."  The  governor  answers  with  the 
dignity  due  from  the  principality  which  he  directed : 
"  It  is  essential  that  I  fully  understand  in  what  manner 
the  expenses  attending  this  duty  shall  be.  met.  The 
legislature  of  this  State  has  made  no  appropriation 
applicable  to  the  organization  of  additional  volunteers. 
...  I  now  ask  that  the  General  Government  at  once 
assumes  the  payment  of  all  necessary  expenses,  and  that 
all  needful  authority,  therefore,  be  formally  issued  to 
me  by  return  mail." 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  45.  2  Ibid.,  p.  66. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  46.  4  Ibid.,  p.  62. 


STATE   SUPPORT  169 

Only  stating  the  massive  facts  of  the  impending  situ 
ation,  he  works  on  as  patiently  as  if  he  had  not  been 
repeatedly  snubbed  in  proffered  service  by  the  rumi 
nating  officials  at  Washington.  Such  were  the  burdens 
of  the  loyal  States  in  the  Civil  War. 

The  sapient  strategists  at  Washington  had  not  yet 
exhausted  the  nervous  energy  devoted  to  mischief.  May 
25,1  the  telegraph  flashes  forth  to  Curtin,  Andrew, 
and  Sprague  of  Rhode  Island :  "  Send  all  the  troops 
forward  that  you  can  immediately.  Banks  is  completely 
routed.  The  enemy  are  in  large  force,  advancing  on 
Harper's  Ferry." 2  At  the  same  time  the  secretary  calls 
for  the  dispatch  of  the  Seventh  Regiment  from  New 
York.  Governor  Curtin  was  justly  alarmed  also,  being 
threatened  with  the  invasion  of  the  Cumberland  Valley. 
Then  follows  the  secretary's  report,  the  same  day,  that 
Banks  had  arrived  near  the  Potomac,  "having  saved 
his  trains  and  the  chief  part  of  his  command."  3 

The  Devil,  convalescent,  no  longer  a  monk  would  be. 
The  Seventh  New  York  was  on  the  march  May  27, 
when  the  old  chills  for  the  recruiting  in  the  great  State 
returned.  "  We  shall  be  able  to  procure  promptly  enough 
three  years'  men  to  serve.  You  will  please  accept  no 
more  for  less  term  without  special  order." 4 

Congress  also  excelled  at  times  in  the  evolution  of 
how  not  to  do  it.  It  took  upon  itself  to  pursue  Cameron 
after  his  retirement,  for  misfeasance  in  buying  supplies 
and  appointing  agents  without  proper  red  tape.  In  the 
midst  of  this  fearful  excitement  the  President  was 

1  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  126,  101. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  70. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  72.  *  Ibid.,  p.  86. 


170    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL   AND   STATE 

obliged  to  send  a  special  message  to  Congress,  wherein, 
as  an  example,  he  recited  the  necessary  doings  of  the 
Union  Defense  Committee  of  New  York  to  save  the 
capital  a  year  previous.  He  assumed  full  responsibility 
for  the  acts  in  question.  "It  is  due  Mr.  Cameron  to 
say  that,  although  he  fully  approved  the  proceedings, 
they  were  not  moved  or  suggested  by  himself,  and  that 
not  only  the  President,  but  all  the  other  heads  of 
departments,  were  at  least  equally  responsible  with  him 
for  whatever  error,  wrong,  or  fault  was  committed  in 
the  premises."  1 

Friction  often  occurred,  even  when  the  best  inten 
tions  prevailed.  Secretary  Stanton  takes  up  a  dispatch 
of  Governor  Curtin's  to  a  third  party :  "I  would  be  glad 
to  have  you  specify  what  '  want  of  support  from  Wash 
ington  has  retarded  your  efforts/  in  order  that  it  may 
be  corrected.  It  has  been  the  desire  of  the  department 
to  act  harmoniously  with  the  state  executives."  2 

At  the  same  time,  he  grants  the  immediate  want,  the 
detail  of  one  Captain  Dodge.  The  same  day  the  re 
sponsive  Curtin  wires,  "  Your  dispatch  relieves  me. 
.  .  .  Rest  assured  that  there  is  no  want  of  harmony  in 
our  intercourse.  I  only  wish  authority  and  assistance, 
and  Pennsylvania  shall  far  exceed  all  the  previous 
efforts  to  crush  the  rebellion." 

The  secretary's  personality  was  one  of  the  most 
powerful  and  interesting  developed  during  the  war. 
McClellan  and  his  friends  misunderstood  him,  and 
slighted  his  efforts  to  sustain  operations,  suffering  ac 
cordingly.  The  President  as  Commander-in-Chief  was 
forced  to  interfere  with  inadequate  generals,  and  Stan- 

i  0.  R.,  Series  in,  vol.  ii,  74.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  79,  80. 


STATE  SUPPORT  171 

ton  sometimes  clashed  with  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
He  was  without  tact,  and  accordingly  made  things  as 
hard  as  possible  for  every  one.  But  his  energy  was 
unbounded ;  and  it  was  inspired  by  a  patriotism  never 
surpassed  in  the  history  of  our  country  or  any  other. 

Governor  Morton  saw  the  great  mistake  made  in 
stopping  recruiting  at  this  time  in  Indiana  and  pro 
tested  against  it.  He  was  very  anxious  about  Kentucky 
in  June,  and  was  reinforced  by  Robert  Dale  Owen  * 
in  his  applications  for  arms  which  might  be  used  in 
Kentucky.  Governors  Morgan2  and  Sprague  had  re 
ceived  commissions  from  the  national  government,  and 
Morton  desired  a  military  command.3 

After  McClellan's  "  change  of  base "  to  the  James 
River,  the  administration  changed  tone  and  purpose 
again,  in  respect  of  recruiting  in  the  States.  July  1, 
Secretary  Seward  4  arranged  with  the  Union  Defense 
Committee  in  New  York,  and  in  consequence  the  loyal 
governors  addressed  a  letter  to  the  President  advising 
a  call  for  300,000  or  more  troops.  Mr.  Lincoln  con 
curred  in  the  "  views  expressed  to  me  in  so  patriotic  a 
manner  "  and  issued  the  call. 

The  Sanitary  Commission,  —  that  novel  instrument 
acting  between  the  throbbing  heart  of  the  many,  the 
enlightened  knowledge  of  a  few,  and  the  practiced 
routine  of  the  executive,  —  that  remarkable  American 
organization,  had  been  at  work  for  fifteen  months.  July 
21,  on  the  occasion  of  these  movements  for  recruiting 
the  army,  it  attempted  to  bring  the  fruits  of  its  obser 
vation  and  critical  experience  to  bear  on  the  action  of 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  109,  110.       2  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  547. 

3  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  180.  4  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  187. 


172    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

the  administration.  The  studies  pursued  by  this  in 
telligent  and  far-sighted  body  of  experts  were  about 
the  first  regular  effort  to  investigate  the  science  of  war 
other  than  as  an  art  for  manoeuvring  troops  against 
an  enemy.  How  to  get  the  men  there,  how  to  care  for 
and  keep  them  efficient,  had  received  little  attention, 
even  from  the  masters  like  Frederick  and  Napoleon.  In 
view  of  300,000  more  "  raw  recruits,"  the  Commission 
addressed  an  elaborate  and  grave  letter 1  of  advice  to 
the  President.  The  "  careless  and  superficial  medical 
inspection  "  had  made  at  least  one  quarter  of  the  pre 
vious  volunteers  worse  than  useless ;  for  the  weak 
portion  had  filled  the  hospitals  and  disheartened  the 
country.  Some  regiments  left  ten  per  cent  in  hospital 
before  reaching  the  seat  of  war.  "  No  national  crisis 
can  excuse  the  recruiting  of  such  material."  The  Com 
mission  respectfully  submitted  that  no  new  recruits 
should  be  accepted  until  examined  by  regular  and  ex 
perienced  medical  officers  "entirely  without  personal 
interest  in  the  filling  up  of  any  regiment."  The  "  wan 
and  wasted  forms"  carried  North  were  teaching  the 
people  that  our  soldiers  were  "  in  far  greater  danger 
from  disease  than  from  the  violence  of  their  enemies." 
Sanitary  practices  had  been  constantly  urged  and  the 
life  of  the  camps  greatly  improved.  The  Commission 
begged  that  the  new  men  be  sent  forward  not  by  regi 
ments,  but  as  fast  as  they  were  collected  and  "  digested 
into  the  body  of  the  army,  without  sensibly  diluting 
its  discipline."  It  claimed  that  it  suggested  the  plan 
on  purely  sanitary  grounds,  but  it  could  be  shown 
that  "  military  and  political  wisdom  are  in  exact  har- 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  235. 


STATE  SUPPORT  173 

mony  with  sanitary  requirements."  August  5,  when 
the  draft  was  impending,  the  Commission  referred  to 
the  above  letter  and  addressed  another,1  even  more 
pregnant  in  weighty  suggestions.  It  asked  that  the 
militia  be  thoroughly  organized  under  the  inspection  of 
federal  officers,  medical  and  military,  and  that  the  States 
should  maintain  in  camps  of  instruction  "  a  constant 
force  of  at  least  a  million."  "  In  the  theory  of  our 
government  every  citizen  is  a  soldier  at  the  command 
of  the  President."  They  recite  sanitary  principles  and 
affirm  that  nothing  projected  for  the  new  recruiting 
will  reach  the  soldier's  difficulties  and  "  restore  the 
needed  confidence."  The  actual  and  the  largest  trouble 
had  been  that  our  unseasoned  men,  worn  by  disease 
and  battle,  had  been  further  depressed  by  necessary 
guard  and  fatigue  duty,  until  their  nervous  exhaustion 
had  extended  to  their  friends  at  home  and  the  whole 
country.  The  remedy  must  be  large  and  deep  going. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  war  many  hundred  thousand  men, 
not  then  able  or  disposed  to  volunteer  at  once,  formed  them 
selves  into  squads  for  military  drill,  thus  recognizing  the 
necessity  for  large  reserves  to  be  put  in  training.  Govern 
ment,  however,  did  not  avail  itself  in  any  manner  of  the 
great  strength  and  security  offered  in  this  disposition  of  the 
people.  .  .  .  The  disposition,  however,  still  exists.2 

.  .  .  Suppose  that  a  million  men  had  thus  been  in  a  great 
measure  detached  in  advance  from  their  ordinary  business 
entanglements  and  obligations,  and  each  man  accustomed, 
under  training  however  imperfect,  to  act  with  others.  When 
the  sudden  and  urgent  call  for  300,000  volunteers  was  made 
a  month  ago,  is  it  likely  there  would  have  been  a  month's 
delay  in  meeting  it  ?  ...  The  number  we  have  named  as 

1  0.  R.y  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  p.  297.  »  Ibid.,  p.  299. 


174  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

proper  to  be  kept  in  reserve  will  not  be  thought  excessive 
when  it  is  considered  that,  according  to  experience  thus  far 
in  the  war,  123,000  men  must  be  annually  recruited  to  main 
tain  a  force  of  500,000  in  the  field  in  full  strength. 

And  H.  W.  Bellows,  W.  H.  Van  Buren,  C.  R.  Agnew, 
Wolcott  Gibbs,  George  F.  Strong,  Frederick  Law  Olm- 
sted,  conclude  in  these  words :  "  We  finally  beg  to 
observe  that  the  effective  military  force  which  a  nation 
is  able  to  sustain  in  the  field,  not  that  which  it  can  raise 
under  the  spasmodic  excitement  of  emergencies,  is  the 
measure  of  the  respect  and  consideration  it  is  likely  to 
receive  abroad  as  well  as  at  home."  1 

It  would  be  interesting  to  follow  in  further  detail  the 
operations  of  this  great  social  and  beneficent  institution, 
did  our  limits  and  the  larger  functions  of  our  work  allow 
it.  Figures  can  only  show  the  bare  facts  involved.  There 
was  contributed  to  the  work  as  reported  May  1,  1866, 
$4,962,014.26.2  The  value  of  supplies  in  addition  was 
estimated  at  fifteen  millions  of  dollars.  The  attitude  of 
the  War  Department  was  never  avowedly  hostile;  it 
was  rather  negligent  and  indifferent.  The  Commission 
necessarily  irritated  certain  high  officials,  but  that  irri 
tation  was  a  healthy  stimulant.3  "  Nothing  can  be 
clearer  than  that  the  great  reforms  in  the  Medical  Ser 
vice  of  the  Army  would  never  have  originated  in  official 
quarters."  It  afforded  the  greatest  opportunity  then 
known  for  woman  to  bring  her  great  moral  influence 
to  bear  directly  on  the  issues  of  modern  life.  War  can 
never  be  the  field  for  love ;  but  the  inevitable  horrors 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  300. 

2  Hist.  U.  S.  Sanitary  Commission,  p.  488. 
s  Ibid.,  pp.  510,  513,  514. 


STATE   SUPPORT  175 

of  war  may  be  somewhat  mitigated  by  the  mission  and 
ministrations  of  woman. 

The  present  writer  has  referred  to  his  own  experi 
ence  in  the  field,  especially  in  the  sickening  winter  of 
McClellan's  preparation  and  inaction ;  then  in  the 
weary,  nugatory  campaign  on  the  Peninsula,  including 
the  vaulting  over  White  Oak  Bottom  to  the  James  River. 
Forty-three  years  of  varied  experience  have  not  changed 
the  impression  derived  from  the  plain  facts  so  graphically 
set  forth  in  these  old  records.  The  vivid  sayings  of  the 
Commission  prove  that  the  main  difficulties  of  the  situ 
ation  were  comprehended  by  a  few  men  then,  just  as 
clearly  as  they  are  perceived  now,  after  the  generations 
responsible  for  these  awful  lapses  in  government  rest  in 
death.  The  capital  could  not  comprehend  the  people. 
Lincoln  with  all  his  political  acumen  seemed  to  falter 
when  these  great  exigencies,  these  critical  occasions, 
called  for  his  executive  action  —  for  the  exercise  of  his 
kingly  prerogative.  As  we  shall  see,  one  or  two  years 
later1  friends  and  foes  in  the  parties  called  him  tyrant 
and  military  despot  when  he  had  put  forth  the  executive 
arm  in  the  necessary  work  of  freeing  the  slaves.  At 
the  moment  we  are  considering,  the  Emancipation  Pro 
clamation  was  incubating  in  his  portfolio,  was  gathering 
vital  force  in  the  minds  of  the  cabinet  for  its  final 
exposition.  But  the  main  perception,  the  leadership  of 
the  whole  people,  the  incisive  courage  which  would  have 
prostrated  the  Seymours,  Hendrickses,  and  their  kind, 
under  the  tramp  of  the  regularly  drilled  legions  of  the 
North, —  this  initiative  was  lacking  in  the  politicians 
who  were  trimming  ship  at  Washington. 

1  Infra,  p.  233. 


176  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Andrew  and  Curtin,  the  steady  Morgan  and  the 
invincible  Morton,  with  their  fellows,  labored  at  their 
posts,  while  their  vigorous  counsel  to  the  administration 
passed  unheeded  and  was  ineffective.  The  great  social 
as  well  as  political  forces,  indicated  rather  than  described 
in  this  chapter,  —  family,  church,  and  local  State,  —  the 
enlightened  benevolence  and  energy  embodied  in  the 
Sanitary  Commission,  and  the  like, — all  these  corporate 
forces  and  institutions  kept  steadily  at  work,  and  at  last 
they  prevailed.  What  a  saving  of  blood  and  treasure, 
of  agony  and  endurance  in  these  struggling  peoples, 
both  North  and  South,  would  have  been  made  if  the 
resources  of  the  Northern  States  as  States  could  have 
been  a  little  better  applied  in  the  years  1861  and  1862  ! 


CHAPTER  V 

FEDERAL    AND    STATE   INTEREFERNCE 

IT  was  inevitable  in  the  whirlwind  of  secession  that 
the  great  States  directed  by  the  governors  —  who 
became  inversely  satraps  of  the  people  —  should  clash 
and  conflict  more  or  less  with  the  national  authority 
concentrated  in  Washington.  This  central  administra 
tion  was  conducting  a  nation,  not  yet  developed  in  its 
governmental  functions,  through  the  operations  of  a 
great  war,  occasioned  by  the  threatened  disruption  of 
the  central  government  itself.  New  methods  were  to  be 
forged  out  which  must  be  sustained  and  concurred  in 
by  the  people,  until  through  their  representatives  in 
Congress  they  could  place  the  executive  on  a  firm  legis 
lative  basis.  Meanwhile  some  conflicts  between  the  ex 
ecutive  of  the  whole  and  the  various  executives  of  the 
parts  are  exceedingly  interesting.  There  are  so  many 
possible  scions  of  governmental  stock  springing  from 
an  Anglo-Saxon  community,  developed  by  American 
life,  that  these  features  of  the  contest,  especially  in  the 
first  years,  are  worthy  of  attention.  Independent  state 
action  by  the  record  begins  early ;  and  there  was  much 
accomplished  in  this  direction  which  never  could  be 
set  down  formally.  In  the  instance  we  shall  cite,  the 
interference  was  of  the  most  wholesome  kind. 

Governor  Yates  of  Illinois  reported  to  the  War  De 
partment  1  that  arrangements  had  been  made  at  Cincin- 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  113. 


178  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

nati  and  in  Indiana  to  stop  supplying  provisions  and 
articles  of  commerce  to  the  South.  The  commerce  of 
the  river  passing  Cairo  was  even  more  important,  and 
there  being  as  yet  no  United  States  muster  of  the  Illi 
nois  troops,  the  governor  was  obliged  to  direct  his  own 
officer  "to  seize  munitions  of  war  passing  that  point," 
though  he  did  not  assume  the  responsibility  of  stopping 
commercial  intercourse. 

President  Lincoln  declared  commercial  intercourse 
with  the  Confederacy  unlawful  under  the  authority  of 
Congress,  and  the  merchandise  subject  to  confiscation ; 
but  there  was  considerable  smuggling  throughout  the 
war,1  and  the  commanding  generals  on  both  sides  some 
times  blinked  at  it  for  various  reasons. 

May  4,  Morton,  in  a  vigorous  letter  to  the  President,2 
opened  a  new  issue  in  this  direction,  which  might  have 
induced  large  consequences  for  good  or  ill  if  the  ad 
ministration  had  ventured  so  far  in  a  stringent  policy 
against  the  doubtful  States.  The  suggestion  would  have 

1  Cf.  Rhodes,  vol.  iii,  546-552,  for  the  internal  condition  of  the  Con 
federacy  caused  by  the  general  suspension  of  commerce. 

2  "  Many  of  the  citizens  of  Indiana  have  large  supplies  of  provisions, 
hay,  etc.,  which  they  desire  to  sell  and  ship  to  the  South,  and  many  of 
them  are  now  carrying  on  a  brisk  trade  with  Kentucky,  from  whence 
these  articles  are  sent  South.   The  mass  of  our  people  are  greatly  opposed 
to  this  trade,  and  in  many  instances  have  interfered  and  prevented  it, 
partly  by  force.   It  is  possible,  may  be  probable,  that  .Kentucky  will  main 
tain  substantially  a  neutral  position,  which  is  the  most  that  their  so-called 
Union  men  pretend  to  hope  for.   For  all  purposes  of  trade,  that  is  as  fatal 
to  us  as  though  we  were  at  war  with  them,  more  especially  as  the  sym 
pathies  of  Kentucky  are  all  with  the  South.   While  I  am  very  anxious 
not  to  unnecessarily  multiply  our  enemies,  will  it  not  be  well  to  cut  off 
all  trade  with  the  States  which  refuse  to  fill  your  call  for  volunteers  ? 
The  true  Union  men  of  those  States  will  not  object,  I  am  sure,  and  the 
traitors  cannot.    I  desire  your  attention  to  this  matter  that  you  may  cause 
such  advice  and  instructions." —  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  158. 


FEDERAL  AND  STATE  INTERFERENCE    179 

cut  off  all  trade  with  the  States  refusing  their  quotas  of 
volunteers.  Probably  the  particular  action  suggested 
and  its  general  influence  on  the  whole  policy  of  the 
administration  were  alike  distasteful  to  the  President  at 
this  time.  His  mind  did  not  run  in  that  direction,  and 
his  executive  ideas  did  not  naturally  force  any  one  to 
the  ringbolt.  Whether  the  more  forcible  policy  agree 
able  to  the  Mortons  and  Stevenses  would  have  been 
more  successful  at  this  stage  of  the  revolt  is  mere  specu 
lation. 

I  dilate  on  this  theme,  partly  to  indicate  the  line  of 
separation  in-  my  criticism  between  the  things  that  might 
have  been  done  and  the  things  which  should  have  been 
done.  Matters  of  administration,  and  those  of  great 
governmental  policy,  which  would  change  the  whole 
direction  of  the  nation,  are  for  distinct  and  separate 
treatment,  as  I  regard  them.  The  widening  of  the  gulf, 
as  by  compulsion  of  the  border  States,  or  by  emancipa 
tion,  are  topics  differing  in  kind  and  absolutely  from 
the  conduct  of  campaigns,  or  the  greater  conduct  which 
marshaled,  or  ought  to  have  marshaled,  the  enormous 
resources  of  the  North  to  immediate  victory. 

Among  the  powerful  social  agencies  I  have  treated 
elsewhere,  which  directly  supported  the  cause  of  the 
Union,  none  was  more  influential  and  effective  than  the 
Union  Defense  Committee  of  the  city  of  New  York.  It 
furnished  a  nucleus  for  local  patriotism  and  a  ready 
pivot  for  national  action,  before  the  work  of  the  depart 
ments  and  the  State  could  be  arranged  and  adjusted. 
When  the  bankers  promptly  loaned  to  the  United  States, 
and  the  Treasury  immediately  placed  two  millions  at  the 
disposal  of  the  committee,  the  city  was  taking  money 


180  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

from  one  friendly  pocket  and  putting  it  into  the  other. 
Forces  so  productive  of  governmental  energy  could  not 
operate  for  long  without  conflicting  with  the  regular 
and  established  functions  of  the  body  politic,  whether 
at  Washington  or  at  Albany. 

Accordingly  conflict  soon  began.  April  22,  Major- 
General  Wool,  commanding  the  Department  of  the  East, 
after  consulting  the  governor,  had  been  to  New  York 
and  had  lent  himself  to  the  plan  of  the  committee  "  to 
save  the  capital."  May  9,1  he  reported  to  the  War  De 
partment  all  his  operations,  as  they  had  been  miscon 
ceived  and  censured,  clearing  himself  from  misfeasance. 
"  It  is  due  to  myself  to  say  that  I  made  no  contract  of 
any  kind  whatever  for  the  committee  or  in  behalf  of  the 
government." 

Mr.  Bryce  said  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  discuss 
any  of  our  systems  of  administration  on  their  own  merits, 
for  the  Americans  had  such  facility  they  could  succeed 
with  the  worst  method.  The  above  is  a  fair  illustration. 
Here  were  at  least  three  great  powers  working  on  the 
same  problem,  drawing  succor  from  the  same  sources, 
and  in  competition  more  or  less  with  each  other.  The 
War  Department  was  over  all ;  the  State  of  New  York 
possessed  the  men  needed  for  the  occasion.  Major- 
General  Wool,  detailed  from  the  War  Department,  virtu 
ally  represented  the  national  administration  and  half 
clothed  the  Union  Defense  Committee  with  authority  to 
work  outside  and  even  beyond  the  legitimate  preroga 
tive  of  the  State  of  New  York. 

May  15,  the  trouble  culminated,  for  Secretary  Cam 
eron  wired  Governor  Morgan  that  there  is  "misunder- 

i  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  79. 


FEDERAL   AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        181 

standing"  and  he  could  accept  only  twenty-eight  regi 
ments  instead  of  thirty-eight.  In  reply  Governor  Mor 
gan  ably  stated  the  position  of  the  State  as  a  power, 
which  is  invincible.  The  legislature  had  authorized  the 
enlistment  and  equipment  of  the  thirty-eight  regiments, 
and  the  governor  had  obtained  actual  acceptance  of 
them  from  the  War  Department  through  the  attorney- 
general  of  the  State.  The  present  ruling  of  the  depart 
ment  would  oblige  the  State  to  lose  the  expense  of 
equipping  ten  regiments  or  break  its  faith  in  contracts, 
but  the  State  did  not  propose  to  acquiesce  in  the  beat 
ing  administered  to  it,  and  now  the  inward  and  moving 
impulses  came  to  the  surface.1 

I  beg  further  to  suggest  that  although  the  voluntary  ex 
ertions  of  unofficial  persons  and  bodies  may  evince  commend 
able  patriotism,  yet  their  intervention  between  constituted 
authorities  leads  to  irregularity,  uncertainty,  and  inextricable 
confusion.  The  interference  of  private  and  unofficial  persons, 
claiming  to  act  under  some  kind  of  order  from  the  General 
Government,  with  the  movement  of  troops  of  this  State  has 
already  been  productive  of  mischief,  and  the  offer  by  like  per 
sons  of  troops  from  this  State  to  the  General  Government  has, 
I  presume,  been  the  source  of  misunderstanding.  This  State 
will  insist  upon  the  regiments  raised  by  its  legally  constituted 
authorities  being  received  by  the  General  Government,  without 
regard  to  any  you  may  receive  tendered  by  individuals  claim 
ing  to  come  from  this  State,  some  of  whose  offers  are  reported 
to  have  been  accepted  by  the  United  States. 

He  sent  his  Judge- Advocate-General,  Anthon,  May  17,2 
to  the  War  Department  and  to  General  Scott  to  adjust 
the  matter. 

Now  appeared  the  representative  of  another  element 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  204-206.          2  Ibid.,  p.  211. 


182  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

in  the  people,  neither  military  nor  legitimately  civic  in 
character  ;  and  this  element  in  other  places  and  in  vari 
ous  forms  will  bring  much  interest  to  this  division  of 
our  studies.  In  the  new  order  being  established,  a  por 
tion  of  society  was  thrown  out  of  its  old  political  rela 
tions  and  found  it  difficult  to  catch  the  new  movement, 
whether  directed  from  Washington  or  controlled  by  the 
Kepublican  officials  of  the  States,  more  or  less  partisan 
in  their  inclinations.  There  was  an  immense  force  in 
the  process  of  volunteer-enlistment  which  was  Demo 
cratic  and  "  worldly,"  as  distinguished  from  the  Puri 
tanic  idea  of  righteousness  that  had  entered  so  largely 
into  the  Anti-slavery  and  Republican  agitation.  Where 
there  was  sufficient  tact  in  the  Republican  officials  this 
element  was  duly  welcomed  and  utilized,  but  it  was  not 
always  so. 

Daniel  E.  Sickles  was  a  type  of  these  patriots  who 
had  changed  heart  suddenly  and  properly,  as  the  guns 
sounded  in  the  attack  on  Sumter.  His  previous  position 
had  been  well  understood ;  his  open  sympathy  with  the 
South  had  been  only  too  apparent.1  He  was  a  brave 
soldier  of  fortune  —  in  a  good  sense  —  and  a  man  of 
great  force  of  character  and  power  of  will  who  was  to 
play  a  prominent  part  as  general,  even  commanding  our 
left  wing  at  Gettysburg.  He  had  represented  the  tur 
bulent  Democracy  of  New  York  city  in  Congress.  The 
President  —  excellent  in  such  manoeuvres  —  naturally 
opened  himself  to  a  citizen  so  potent  and  representing 

1  December  10, 1860,  he  said  on  the  floor  of  Congress:  "  In  the  event 
of  secession  in  the  South,  New  York  city  would  free  herself  from  the 
hated  Republican  government  of  New  York,  and  throw  open  her  ports  to 
free  commerce."  —  Cited,  Burgess,  Civil  War  and  the  Constitution,  vol.  i, 
147. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        183 

political  forces  that  had  not  acted  hitherto  with  the 
neighboring  Republican  officials.  May  18,1  Secretary 
Cameron,  by  direction  of  the  President,  wired  both  Gov 
ernor  Morgan  and  Chairman  Hamilton  Fish  of  the  Union 
Defense  Committee  that  General  Sickles's  brigade  of 
five  regiments  would  be  accepted  and  included  in  the 
fourteen  regiments  coming  from  the  committee.  On 
the  same  day  Simeon  Draper  wired 2  for  the  committee 
that  there  is  no  such  brigade  known  as  that  of  "Mr. 
Sickles.  Probably  the  action  of  the  department  is  based 
upon  some  future  organization  of  a  brigade."  May  21, 
Sickles  wired :  "  All  right  with  U.  D.  Committee  and 
Governor." 3  May  22,  Acting  Brigadier-General  Sickles 
wired  General  Scott:  "My  brigade  awaits  his  orders."4 
The  politician-general  evidently  confided,  with  Mr.  Mi- 
cawber,  in  things  "  to  turn  up,"  for  on  the  26th  Colonel 
Franklin,  representing  the  War  Department  in  New 
York,  thought  the  few  men  gathered  ought  to  be  dis 
banded.  "He  [Sickles]  requires  two  or  three  days' 
notice  to  bring  his  men  together.  I  have  no  idea  he 
can  raise  them."  5  June  27,  Secretary  Cameron  wired 
curtly,  "  If  the  five  regiments  [of  Sickles]  are  not  ready 
within  three  days  they  cannot  be  received."  6  But  the 
irrepressible  "  Mr.  Sickles "  could  stretch  three  days 
into  a  month,  and  probably  Bull  Run  had  extended  the 
patience  of  the  department.  For  July  23,7  one  regiment 
was  off  actually,  with  two  more  to  follow  next  day. 

Returning  to  the  larger  difficulty  between  the  State 
and  the  powerful  association  of  the  Union  Defense 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  215.  2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  223.  «  Ibid.,  p.  227.  6  Ibid.,  p.  236. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  299.  7  Ibid.,  p.  344. 


184  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Committee,  Colonel  Franklin  had  been  busy  in  nego 
tiating  an  accommodation.  May  27,  by  agreement,  he 
had  reduced  by  six  the  whole  thirty-eight  regiments 
proffered  from  the  State,  but  reported,1  "  nevertheless, 
much  confusion  and  clashing  caused  by  the  adverse 
opinions  and  interests  of  those  engaged  in  raising  and 
equipping  these  regiments."  He  thought  the  whole 
difficulty  would  have  been  avoided  by  the  presence  of 
a  capable  representative  of  high  rank  from  the  War 
Department,  and  he  recommended  Colonel  (afterward 
General)  Keyes,  for  future  service  in  the  post.  In 
another  dispatch  of  the  same  date  "  the  difficulty  be 
tween  the  governor  and  the  Defense  Committee  is 
only  partially  healed ; " 2  but  on  the  28th  he  reported, 
"  Things  are  now  harmonious  between  them."  Such 
were  some  of  the  amenities  of  recruiting  in  a  great 
war. 

A  much  more  serious  matter  must  now  be  enter 
tained,  for  it  affected  the  organization  of  the  Union 
in  its  vital  parts.  It  may  be  best  to  approach  the  main 
question  in  the  order  of  events  which  led  up  to  the 
difference,  which  might  have  been  a  conflict,  between 
the  powers  of  the  general  government  and  those  of 
the  States.  May  21,3  Governor  Morgan  wrote  Secre 
tary  Cameron,  reiterating  that  Major-Generals  Dix  and 
Wadsworth  had  been  appointed  to  command  the  first 
seventeen  regiments  of  volunteers  called  out  for  three 
years.  He  asked  for  authority  to  appoint  two  additional 
major-generals  and  four  brigadiers.  May  24,4  Secretary 
Cameron  replied :  — 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  237.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  238,  241. 

a  Ibid.,  p.  223.  4  Ibid.,  p.  233. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        185 

This  Department  does  not  at  this  time  desire  the  appoint 
ment  of  additional  major  or  brigadier  generals  by  governors 
of  States.  I  inclose  a  copy  of  Orders  No.  15,  by  reference 
to  which  you  will  perceive  that  these  officers  are  appointed  by 
the  President  to  command  the  second  quota  of  your  troops. 

None  are  so  blind  as  those  who  will  not  see,  for  on 
the  28th  the  governor  reiterated  his  appointment  of 
Generals  Dix  and  Wadsworth :  — 

Of  the  character  of  these  two  gentlemen  it  is  quite  need 
less  for  me  to  speak.  They  are  too  well  known  to  you  to 
require  that.  .  .  .  For  reasons  which  I  trust  are  without  foun 
dation,  Generals  Dix  and  Wadsworth  are  somewhat  appre 
hensive  that  they  may  not  be  recognized  at  Washington. 
But  believing  as  I  do  that  they  will  render  eminent  service 
to  the  country,  that  their  acceptance  would  be  in  strict  con 
formity  with  the  requisition  already  referred  to  from  your 
department,  and  in  conformity  with  the  expectations  of  the 
people  of  this  State,  who  have  furnished  forty-six  regiments 
to  the  war,  beside  eleven  sent  in  April  to  defend  Washington, 
I  confidently  expect  a  favorable  acknowledgment.1 

Secretary  Cameron  acknowledged,  June  3,  inclosing 
Order  15  again,  and  highly  complimenting  Messrs. 
Dix  and  Wadsworth.  "  Yet  to  have  suspended  the 
order  in  this  case  would  have  required  the  President  to 
surrender  the  appointments  to  the  state  authorities  in 
nearly  or  quite  every  other  case."2 

The  personal  difficulty  was  abrogated  and  recon 
ciled  afterward  by  the  appointment  of  Messrs.  Dix  and 
Wadsworth  to  be  major-generals.  But  the  principle 
involved  was  too  large  to  be  yielded  up  by  the  admin 
istration,  and  New  York  struggled  hard  before  she 
gave  up  the  control  of  her  militia  that  it  might  be 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  241.  *  /jy  t>  p<  246. 


186    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

amalgamated  with  the  volunteers  in  an  army.1  The 
variance  between  the  military  powers  or  organization 
of  the  State  and  of  the  national  government  now  had 
to  be  adjusted  and  accommodated.  May  25,  Governor 
Morgan  requested  Lieutenant-Governor  Campbell  to  visit 
Washington  and  lay  the  matter  formally  before  the 
Secretary  of  War,  bearing  the  claim  of  the  Board  of 
State  Officers  "  to  have  the  proportionate  number  of 
general  officers  appointed  or  elected  by  the  state  au 
thorities  of  this  State."2  After  due  interviews,  on  the 
4th  of  June  the  lieutenant-governor  addressed  the  sec 
retary  that  the  negotiations  might  be  recorded.  After 
reciting  the  circumstances,  he  stated :  — 

You  announced  the  irrevocable  determination  of  the  United 
States  to  appoint  the  general  officers  for  the  forces  furnished 
by  the  government  of  New  York,  and  to  refuse  to  receive 
those  forces  in  the  event  that  such  determination  should  not 
be  acceded  to.  I  deem  it  my  duty  respectfully  but  firmly  to 
protest  against  this  determination.  It  imposes  on  the  Board 
of  State  Officers,  unless  they  submit  to  it,  the  necessity  of 
violating  the  laws  and  constitution  of  the  State  of  New  York, 
which  have  been  framed  in  conformity  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  It  destroys  and  dishonors  the  distinctive 
character  of  the  militia  of  the  States,  which  is  adapted  to  the 
habits  and  endeared  to  the  minds  of  the  people.8 

The  New  York  militia  law,  submitted  together  with 
the  Board's  report  and  the  protest,  made  all  the  officers 
elective :  captains,  subalterns,  and  non-commissioned  by 
ballot  of  the  privates ;  field  and  general  officers  by  bal- 

1  "  The  essential  characteristics  of  an  army,  by  which  it  is  distinguished 
from  other  assemblages  of  armed  men,  are  its  national  character  —  that 
is,  its  representing  more  or  less  the  will  and  the  power  of  the  nation  or 
its  rulers,  and  its  organization."  —  Encyc.  Brit. 

*  0.  R.t  Series  III,  vol.  i,  235.  3  Ibid.,  p.  249. 


FEDERAL   AND   STATE   INTERFERENCE        187 

lot  of  the  commissioned  officers.1  This  instance  of  "  par 
ticularism  "  was  stoutly  contested,  and  the  case  of  New 
York  was  ably  and  amply  argued  by  its  officials.  The 
Board  set  forth  to  Governor  Morgan  the  "  extraor 
dinary  collision  between  the  general  and  state  govern 
ments,"2  stating  that  the  President  had  called  out  the 
militia  — 

under  a  specific  grant  of  power  in  the  Constitution  .  .  . 
Congress  shall  have  power  to  "  provide  for  organizing,  arm 
ing,  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and  for  governing  such  part 
of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  reserving  to  the  States  respectively  the  appointment 
of  the  officers."  .  .  .  There  was  deep  and  prophetic  jealousy 
of  military  power  which  was  embodied  in  these  provisions  of 
the  Constitution.  The  military  arm  was  subjected  to  the  para 
mount  direction  of  the  national  authority,  but  the  right  arm, 
whose  million  sinews  are  strung  in  the  militia  alone,  was 
guarded  by  rooting  it  in  the  local  pride  and  spirit  and  sub 
ordinate  sovereignty  of  the  States.  ...  It  will  not  do  to 
say  that  the  President  has  only  taken  the  responsibility  of  a 
series  of  acts  without  authority  of  law,  trusting  for  his  justi 
fication  to  the  public  exigencies  and  peril,  and  to  the  sanc 
tion  of  Congress,  by  public  law,  when  it  shall  assemble  in 
July.3  .  .  .  We  call  on  the  Executive  Council  of  this  State 
to  persevere  in  a  firm  and  respectful  maintenance  of  its  right 
ful  authority  over  its  militia,  and  on  our  members  of  Con 
gress  to  unite  in  holding  the  national  administration  to  a 
strict  conformity  in  this  regard  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
Constitution. 

"  Subordinate  sovereignty  "  of  the  States  sounds  like 
special  pleading ;  and  probably  the  law  officers  of  the 

*  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  251.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  252-254. 

3  By  Acts  July  22,  25,  the  President  was  authorized  to  call  out  vol 
unteers  and  to  appoint  their  general  officers,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Senate. 


188  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

United  States  properly  distinguished  between  militia 
called  out  on  an  emergency  and  volunteers  for  three 
years,  in  a  tremendous  war  involving  the  national  exist 
ence.  But  the  state  officials  on  the  whole  argued  well  for 
their  conviction  ;  there  being  some  ground  for  their 
technical  case  from  the  state-militia  point  of  view.  Yet 
it  was  an  absurd  proposition  in  essential  government.  A 
great  army  commanded  by  major-generals  elected  by  bal 
lots  of  soldiers  or  others  would  be  an  incomprehensible 
machine.  The  methods  of  military  and  political  proced 
ure  differ  absolutely.  General  Meade,  when  command 
ing  the  Fifth  Corps  A.  P.,  prohibited  some  gathering 
of  privates  initiated  by  circulars  from  home.  Properly, 
he  would  have  no  "  town  meetings  "  in  the  field. 

New  York  was  a  great  commonwealth,  but  not  being 
large  enough  to  discern  this  overwhelming  principle  of 
government,  she  was  deprived  of  her  ideas  of  military 
organization  as  a  curb  gathering  or  town  meeting  would 
have  been.  I  have  criticised  the  President  for  many  de 
fects  in  administration,1  and  ought  to  emphasize  this 
wise  and  energetic  use  of  his  reserved  prerogatives  on 
a  very  important  occasion.  It  was  in  the  '  littles  mak 
ing  a  mickle '  wherein  he  often  erred.  But  practically, 
he  never  failed  when  the  mickle  reaching  downward  to 
the  people  was  presented  to  him  in  due  proportion. 
Bear  in  mind  that  this  vigorous  procedure  with  a  coop 
erating  yet  subordinate  state  as  large  as  a  European 

1  Petty  manoeuvres  sometimes  occupied  the  President  too  much.  In 
the  large  features  of  executive  action,  where  his  prerogative  would  act 
effectively  upon  the  people,  he  was  a  great  ruler.  In  his  free  revelations 
to  Swett,  he  said,  "  I  may  not  have  made  as  good  a  President  as  some 
other  men,  but  I  believe  I  have  kept  these  discordant  elements  together 
as  well  as  any  one  could."  —  Herndon,  Life  of  Lincoln,  vol.  iii,  533. 


FEDERAL  AND  STATE  INTERFERENCE    189 

principality  was  early  in  the  struggle.  The  substantial 
though  informal  powers  of  a  dictator  were  not  conferred 
upon  him  until  through  the  Acts  of  Congress  1  in  the 
following  July  and  August.  According  to  the  constitu 
tional  lawyers  of  New  York,  he  was  using  dictatorial 
powers  in  May,  when  they  were  disputing  "  subordinate 
sovereignty  "  with  him.  The  inevitable  pressure  of  the 
rebellion  compelled  an  early  use  of  dictatorial  functions ; 
their  wise  use  by  the  President  was  recognized  immedi 
ately  by  the  people,  and  through  Congress  they  granted 
him  the  largest  power  of  the  kingly  function  admis 
sible  under  the  forms  of  representative  government. 
The  incident  adduced  from  the  State  of  New  York  in 
itself  justifies  the  selection  of  topics  indicated  in  the  title 
of  this  chapter ;  for  the  wise  and  far-seeing  action  of 
President  Lincoln  in  such  matters  kept  the  wheels 
of  administration  in  motion,  and  finally  established  the 
full  power  of  the  Union. 

In  the  main  matter  of  practical  interference,  between 
the  Federal  head,  the  chief  of  the  Department  of  War, 
and  the  governors  of  the  several  States,  there  was  no 
possible  check  so  long  as  the  nature  of  the  men  occu 
pying  the  positions  at  Washington  remained  the  same. 
For  Governor  Andrew  read  Governor  Curtin's  letter  to 
the  President  exposing  the  interference  of  the  War  De 
partment  with  regular  state-recruiting.  Massachusetts 
had  suffered  in  the  same  way.  Secretary  Cameron  assured 
Governor  Andrew  that  the  trouble  should  be  stopped. 
Andrew  congratulated  Curtin  that  "this  source  of 
trouble  is  dried  up  at  the  fountain  head."2 

1  Burgess,  The  Constitution  in  the  Civil  War,  vol.  i,  230,  232. 

2  Schouler,  Mass.,  p.  229. 


190  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

The  following  events  in  Indiana  involve  considerable 
discord  as  well  as  interference  in  state  government. 
May  21, 1861,  Schuyler  Colfax  wired  Secretary  Cameron, 
"  Shall  be  in  Washington  Thursday  night  with  offer  of 
our  six  regiments  of  three-months'  soldiers  for  the  whole 
war."  1  The  six  colonels  wired  directly  to  the  President, 
who,  in  his  indorsement,  would  be  "  greatly  gratified  " 
if  the  secretary  would  accept  them.  May  22,  Governor 
Morton  wired  Hon.  David  Kilgore,  "  By  an  agreement 
gotten  up  with  two  or  three  colonels,  Colfax  has  gone 
on  to  tender  the  six  regiments  of  three-months'  men  for 
three  years.  This  should  only  be  done  properly  by  the 
governor.  The  attempt  is  to  supersede  me  with  the  men 
and  the  officers.  He  will  be  there  to-morrow  morning. 
Push  the  matter."2 

May  23,  Secretary  Cameron  wired  Governor  Morton 
that  the  three-years'  quota  was  four  regiments  and  no 
more.  "  You  can  select.  The  whole  matter  is  in  your 
hands."  3  Considering  the  secretary's  facile  ways,  we 
may  suppose  that  he  had  exchanged  winks  with  the 
President,  and  that  the  compliments  went  to  Colfax, 
while  the  executive  authority  went  to  Morton.  This  was 
one  of  the  President's  "littles"  which  go  to  a  mickle. 
Morton  reinforced  himself  on  the  main  question  by  get 
ting  the  support  of  the  governors  of  Ohio  and  Illinois 
with  General  McClellan,  —  then  at  Cincinnati,  —  who 
wired  advising  the  acceptance  of  the  six  regiments,  as 
they  were  "  in  fine  condition."  4  The  President  directly 
ordered  the  acceptance  of  the  regiments,  June  II.5 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  219,  220. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  226.  3  Ibid.,  p.  229. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  232.  5  Ibid.}  p.  263. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE   INTERFERENCE        191 

The  facile  ways  combined  of  the  President  and  secretary 
are  revealed  in  a  dispatch  to  Governor  Morton,  June  19, 
when  additional  regiments  are  accepted :  "  It  is,  how 
ever,  the  desire  of  the  President  that  these  regiments 
shall  be  made  up  and  taken  from  the  first,  second,  and 
third  congressional  districts  of  the  State,  and  this  order 
is  given  with  that  expectation." 

This  dispatch,  based  on  an  order  from  the  President 
to  the  secretary,  June  17,2  where  he  explains  that  the 
districts  named  include  "  my  own  old  boyhood  home," 
reveals  much  of  the  story  we  are  studying  and  interpret 
ing.3  In  those  days,  the  executive  of  a  great  republic, 
in  the  midst  of  rebellion,  should  have  had  something 
more  important  to  do  than  carefully  patronizing  con 
gressional  districts,  in  his  boyhood  home  or  anywhere 
else. 

We  may  well  consider  in  this  connection  the  serious 
controversy  between  Major-General  B.  F.  Butler  and 
Governor  Andrew.  The  active  "  war  governor "  of 
Massachusetts  always  rode  into  the  lists  of  controversy 
with  his  visor  up.  Careless  of  himself  in  every  way,  if 
he  could  strike  for  the  right  and  the  true,  as  he  con- 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol  i,  p.  279.  2  Ibid.,  p.  274. 

8  Morton  to  Cameron,  June  22  :  "I  am  embarrassed  by  the  appoint 
ment  by  the  President  of  colonels  for  three  regiments.  It  has  a  bad 
effect,  and  is  regarded  as  the  work  of  politicians  at  Washington  and  as 
an  indignity  to  the  executive  of  the  State,  who  has  all  the  responsibility 
of  raising  the  regiments." —  Ibid.,  p.  290. 

Again,  July  25,  Morton  was  obliged  to  wire  Secretary  Cameron,  "  I 
hope  the  War  Department  will  accept  of  regiments  only  through  me."  — 
Ibid.,  p.  350. 

November  25,  Curtin  remonstrated  to  Cameron,  "  I  was  no  little  sur 
prised  when  I  heard  of  your  verbal  order  changing  my  written  order, 
and  have  no  doubt  you  did  it  on  impressions  made  on  you  by  parties  in 
interest."  —  Ibid.,  p.  647, 


192  WAE  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

ceived  it,  ardently  and  vehemently,  he  laid  himself 
open  to  any  covert  attack  and  any  captious  misconcep 
tion.  While  his  eager  and  restless  conscientiousness  en 
deared  him  to  the  inmost  heart  of  the  people,  it  severed 
him  more  or  less  from  certain  constant  and  constituent 
elements  in  the  mass  of  the  people,  as  this  mass  surged 
up  to  sustain  and  impel  the  state.  The  state  is  a  body 
politic,  both  actual  and  moral ;  its  executive  must  bear 
all  and  forbear  all. 

As  the  military  historian  of  Massachusetts  shows,1 
Andrew  was  frank  and  candid  to  a  fault.  Concealing 
nothing  himself,  he  was  impatient  of  reserve  in  others. 
Over-conscientious,  he  was  thin-skinned  and  could  not 
bear  an  adverse  criticism,  however  unscrupulous  its 
motive. 

Francis  W.  Bird,  a  capable  man  of  affairs,  member 
of  the  executive  council,  and  close  worker  with  Andrew, 
says  that  he  was  always  his  own  master,  and  while  yield 
ing  to  men  "  superior  to  himself  in  practical  capacity,"2 
in  general  policy  he  was  original  and  was  himself.  Yet 
he  was  diffuse,  and  amplified  much  in  both  thought 
and  word,  wasting  energy  and  the  precious  moments  of 
that  crucial  time.  His  great  power  in  impromptu  speak 
ing  tempted,  while  it  aided,  him  in  an  utterance  too  free 
for  incisive  or  intense  expression.  Higginson  says  that 
he  made  the  worst  mistakes  in  the  selection  of  officers, 
"these  arising  almost  wholly  from  his  virtues."3  He 
could  "  not  despise  a  man,  poor,  ignorant,  or  black,"  but 
sometimes  forgot  that  this  sublime  sentiment  was  not 

1  Higginson,  Massachusetts  in  the  Army  and  Navy,  p.  5. 

2  Browne,  Sketch  of  Andrew,  p.  78. 

3  Massachusetts  in  the  Army  and  Navy. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        193 

transferable  in  the  act  of  government  to  some  applicant 
for  office,  and  might  put  the  wrong  man  into  place. 

In  amplifying  the  state  and  the  circumstance  of  those 
trying  occasions,  it  was  inevitable  that  a  man  of  exuber 
ant  nature  should  amplify  himself  officially.1  One  who 
knew  him  thoroughly  said  that  while  very  democratic 
and  absolutely  sympathetic  with  the  people,  he  enjoyed, 
not  the  conscious  pomp,  but  the  external  parade  incident 
to  official  life.  When  he  sported  the  military  cloak  and 
white  kid  gloves  at  a  Berkshire  review,  he  carried  all 
official  functions  of  the  executive  into  the  gratification 
of  the  moment.  His  wife  —  excellent  partner  of  his 
constant  toil  —  with  true  feminine  instinct  went  even 
farther  in  appreciating  official  elevation.  Although  of 
redundant  circulation,  and  conscious  of  the  consequent 
debility  that  ended  at  last  in  death,  he  was  cheerful 
from  day  to  day.  His  humor  and  merry  sense  of  fun 
made  every  opportunity  more  lively  for  himself  and  all 
around. 

In  these  minor  details  we  must  consider  the  times  of 
the  commonwealth.  Charles  Sumner  was  taboo  in  the 
higher  circles  of  society  in  Boston.  Early  in  his  official 
career  Governor  Andrew  with  his  wife  was  invited  out, 
by  some  people  of  fashion,  with  the  explanation,  "  For 
you  know,  you  are  about  the  only  people  who  are  will 
ing  to  meet  Mr.  Sumner."  These  trifles  throw  light  on 
the  situation  as  it  was  when  our  unfortunate  altercation 
occurred. 

Benjamin  F.  Butler  was  an  extraordinary  man,  pos- 

1  Lee  was  appointed  on  the  staff  early  in  January,  1861.  "  If  I,  a 
radical,  regarded  Governor  Andrew  with  distrust,  what  was  the  horror 
and  indignation  excited  in  the  hearts  of  conservatives  at  his  accession  to 
office.  —  Morse,  Henry  Lee,  p.  228. 


194  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

sessed  of  intelligence  and  acumen  equal  to  any  question 
that  could  be  solved  by  that  order  of  faculties.  What 
ever  his  knowledge  of  a  matter,  he  could  so  marshal  the 
information  he  had  that  he  impressed  himself  upon  the 
occasion.  When  examined  for  the  bar  his  reading  of 
text-books  was  inadequate  and  the  judge  doubted  his 
admission,  but  discussed  the  grounds  of  a  case  he  was 
then  trying,  and  Butler's  sagacity  impressed  him.  Next 
day  he  said,  "  Mr.  Clerk,  Mr.  Butler  was  examined  by 
me  for  admission  to  the  bar,  and  you  can  administer  the 
oath  and  enter  his  name.  It  is  due  to  him  to  say  that 
the  matter  of  my  ruling  came  up  in  the  course  of  his 
examination,  and  his  suggestions  led  me  to  examine  the 
matter  further,  and  change  my  ruling." 

His  audacity  was  never  surpassed,  but  that  faculty 
makes  an  uncertain  foundation.  Milton  says :  — 

"  In  a  cloudy  chair  ascending  rides 
Audacious,  but  that  chair  soon  failing,  meets 
A  vast  vacuitie." 

In  certain  rare  contingencies  audacity  counts  in  a 
soldier,  but  it  is  not  the  equivalent  of  courage.  His 
historian  and  panegyrist,  Parton,2  said,  "  Courage,  will, 
firmness,  nerve,  —  call  it  what  you  will,  —  Gen.  Butler 
has  it."  Was  it  so  ?  Courage  is  a  moral  energy  which 
braves  danger  or  endures  evil  with  constancy.  In  the 
collision  of  those  grinding  forces  that  lifted  Grant  to 
higher  effort,  mere  will  collapses  as  the  hollow  bark 
crumbles  in  the  shock  of  icebergs.  And  while  courage 
is  born  in  the  deepest  action  of  the  intellect,  it  is  not 
nourished  by  mere  acumen  or  quickness  of  mind.  A 
soldier  should  know  men  and  things,  but  the  arts  of  the 

1  Butler's  Book,  vol.  i,  77.  2  Butler  at  New  Orleans,  p.  627. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        195 

forum  are  nowhere  more  obtrusive  than  in  the  applica 
tion  of  tactics  or  the  higher  combinations  of  strategy. 
Perhaps  Butler's  chief  defect  as  a  soldier  was  in  the  ex 
cess  of  administrative  faculties.  Tremendous  energy, 
capacious  memory,  meddlesome  instinct  invaded  every 
department  under  him  and  emasculated  the  general  who 
should  have  been  above  all  while  in  all. 

A  French  poet  says,  "  Audacity  and  contempt  are 
treacherous  guides."  If  Butler  believed  in  himself,  he 
certainly  despised  the  convictions  and  motives  of  most 
honorable  men.  The  philosophers  say  that  moral  evil 
originates  in  the  will  of  man,  who  could  not  have  been 
otherwise  capable  of  moral  good ;  a  power  to  do  right 
being,  of  necessity,  a  power  to  do  wrong.  If  the  two- 
blade-of-grass  altruist  be  a  great  benefactor,  surely 
Butler  promoted  that  good  which  proceeds  from  evil. 

After  all,  it  is  not  easy  to  comprehend  such  a  char 
acter.  When  one  has  leveled  the  view  to  observe  the 
course  of  such  fertile  intelligence  and  headlong  ambi 
tion,  the  conclusion  is  not  absolute  and  the  view  is  not 
clear ;  a  turn  of  the  kaleidoscope  reveals  a  man  affec 
tionate,  gracious  in  intercourse,  most  loyal  to  his  friends 
and  to  the  common  duties  of  life.  Verily,  the  conditions 
surrounding  all  of  us  are  more  generous  than  any  one 
of  us,  and  humanity  carries  the  individual  to  humane 
results,  whatever  be  that  individual's  immediate  notion. 

General  Butler's  military  aspirations  and  their  results 
are  well  known.  A  statement  in  Nicolay  and  Hay's  Life 
of  Lincoln 1  is  significant :  "  His  [Butler's]  high  admin 
istrative  abilities  soon  demonstrated  their  usefulness  in 
his  new  field  at  Fortress  Monroe,  though  one  of  his 

1  Vol.  iv,  309. 


196  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

early  military  expeditions  met  a  discouraging  defeat." 
This  conveys  the  truth  by  what  it  says,  and  even  more 
by  what  it  leaves  unsaid.  Perhaps  his  early  victories  in 
substituting  aptness  for  knowledge  —  as  in  his  admis 
sion  to  the  bar  —  had  somewhat  confused  his  estimate 
of  the  military  art.  He  says  of  volunteers,  "  Of  course 
we  were  not  as  good  as  regulars  in  the  opinion  of  the 
United  States  officers ;  that  was  impossible.  Their  mili 
tary  movements  were  mechanical ;  ours  were  voluntary. 
We  went  through  our  drill  because  we  loved  it ;  they 
went  through  theirs  because  they  were  made  to  do  it." 
And  he  never  forgot  that  he  was  for  a  few  days  en 
camped  at  Concord  in  I860,  with  six  thousand  men,  "  a 
larger  body  of  troops  than  even  General  Scott  had  seen 
together." 2  He  seemed  to  lose  his  robust  sagacity  in 
imagining  that  there  was  a  peculiar  essence  in  success 
ful  legal  and  political  art  which  might  move  armies 
and  win  battles.  On  his  way  to  relieve  the  agony  of  the 
nation  in  the  isolation  of  the  capital,  he  could  play 
politics  with  a  possible  slave  insurrection  in  Maryland, 
—  an  erratic  plunge  which  stirred  the  moral  sense  of 
Massachusetts  to  its  inmost  depths. 

At  Fortress  Monroe  he  made  perhaps  the  greatest 
hit  of  his  remarkable  career,  in  his  epigram  of  "  con 
traband"  applied  to  escaping  slaves.3  But  a  trained 
soldier  was  soon  appointed  to  succeed  him,  and  he  went 
home  recognized  if  not  appreciated ;  for  he  says  with 
customary  naivete*,  "  I  think  I  at  last  came  to  know 
what  hero  worship  meant."4  He  was  seeking  oppor- 

1  Butler's  Book,  vol.  i,  124.  2  Ibid.,  p.  127. 

3  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  263.    Letter,  M.  R.  Casey,  March  9,  1891. 

4  Butler's  Book,  vol.  i,  294. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        197 

tunity  for  his  restless  energies,  and  he  found  it,  as  he 
states,  in  the  insufficient  condition  of  the  recruiting  ser 
vice.  "  Republican  governors  enlisted  their  Republican 
neighbors  and  associates,  and  then,  to  eke  out  their 
companies  so  that  they  could  be  put  at  the  head  of  them, 
they  recruited  all  the  scallawags  there  were  in  the  neigh 
borhood."  l 

This  melancholy  view  of  the  early  volunteers  and  the 
loyal  governors  does  not  correspond  with  the  utterance 
of  other  distinguished  Democrats.  Benjamin  F.  Hallett 
made  a  patriotic  speech  at  a  flag-raising  and  indorsed 
it,  May  1,  1861,  to  Governor  Andrew,  «  With  Mr.  Hal 
lett' s  respects  for  the  great  administrative  talent  you 
have  shown  in  this  terrible  crisis  to  our  country."2 

Major-General  Butler  impressed  himself  as  usual  upon 
the  administration  at  Washington,  and  obtained  from 
Secretary  Cameron  the  following  order,  September  10, 
1861 :  "  M.  G.  B.  F.  Butler  is  hereby  authorized  to 
raise,  organize,  arm,  uniform,  and  equip  a  volunteer 
force  for  the  war,  in  the  New  England  States,  not  ex 
ceeding  six  regiments." 3 

Complaints  against  direct  recruiting  by  the  War  De 
partment  had  been  made  previously  in  other  States.  The 
Massachusetts  State  agent  at  Washington,  C.  H.  Dalton, 
had  wired  Governor  Andrew,  August  28,  in  the  case  of 
Wardwell,  that  he  was  "  authorized  to  raise  a  regiment. 
Cameron  orders  him  to  report  to  you,  obeying  your 
instructions.  Secretary  promises  no  more  such  irregu 
larities."  4  Governor  Andrew  had  sent  two  officers  to 
Washington  to  represent  to  the  President  the  embar- 

1  Butler's  Book,  vol.  i,  295.  2  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  169,  43. 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  815.        4  Ibid.,  p.  812. 


198     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

rassment  of  these  proceedings.  Secretary  Cameron  ex 
pressed,  as  reported,  September  6,1  his  great  obligations 
to  Massachusetts  and  to  the  governor,  "for  the  energy, 
economy,  and  honesty  with  which  military  affairs  had 
been  conducted."  On  the  5th,  the  President  had  con 
curred  in  the  promise  that  no  more  independent  permis 
sions  for  recruiting  should  be  issued.  He  said  :  — 

Such  independent  permissions  as  had  hitherto  been  issued 
had  been  extorted  by  the  pressure  of  certain  persons,  who,  if 
if  they  had  been  refused,  would  have  accused  the  government 
of  rejecting  the  services  of  so  many  thousands  of  imaginary 
men  —  a  pressure,  of  the  persistency  of  which  no  person  not 
subjected  to  it  could  conceive.  He  said  that  perhaps  he  had 
been  in  error  in  granting  such  independent  permissions  at  all, 
even  under  this  pressure,  but  that  certainly  it  had  not  been 
intended  to  do  any  person  or  any  State  a  wrong.2 

These  affairs  were  especially  complicated  in  Massa 
chusetts  at  this  moment  by  the  engagements,  both  of 
the  War  Department 3  and  of  Governor  Andrew,  to  fur 
nish  troops  for  the  command  of  General  T.  W.  Sherman, 
afterward  transferred  to  General  Burn  side  and  con 
ducted  into  North  Carolina.  Great  pressure  was  applied 
from  Washington  to  get  off  the  regiments  for  Sherman. 
In  course  came  this  letter  from  Andrew  to  the  Presi 
dent,  which  is  an  evidence  of  those  troublous  times  and 
embodies  incidents  of  the  kind  that  made  them  more 
troublous.  Unlike  most  of  the  governor's  communica 
tions,  it  was  brief,  scrawled  on  the  executive  note  paper, 
addressed  only  to  "  My  Dear  Sir." 4  It  stated,  "  We  are 
raising  five  new  regiments,  all  of  which  I  mean  Sher- 

1  O.  R.  Series,  III,  vol.  i,  813,  814.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  814. 

3  Schouler,  Massachusetts  in  the  Civil  War,  pp.  254-260. 

4  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  143,  7. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE   INTERFERENCE        199 

man  shall  have,  if  you  will  get  an  order  from  the  War 
Department."  Returned,  indorsed,  "Respectfully  sub 
mitted  to  the  War  Department.  A.  Lincoln."  "  Sept. 
10,  1861.  Let  this  be  done.  Simon  Cameron,  Secretary 
of  War."  "  I  send  the  order  you  desire.  Wm.  H. 
Seward."  Here  were  three  great  departments  of  the 
government  speeding  work,  which  the  government  was 
embarrassing  in  other  directions  by  interfering  with 
recruiting  and  the  movement  of  organized  regiments. 

On  September  16,  the  War  Department  issued  Order 
No.  78,  "  All  persons  having  received  authority  from 
the  War  Department  to  raise  volunteer  regiments,  bat 
teries,  or  companies  in  the  loyal  States  are,  with  their 
commands,  hereby  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  gov 
ernors  of  those  States."  1  There  was  much  telegraphing 
and  complimenting  from  Secretary  Cameron,  and  on  the 
23d  he  wired  Andrew,  "  Select  the  regiments  yourself 
for  Sherman  and  supply  him  first." 2  Andrew  writes 
the  secretary  on  the  24th,  that  he  is  much  perplexed  by 
"contradictory  orders  and  assurances  issuing  from  your 
department  respecting  the  disposition  of  regiments  now 
organizing  in  this  State.  .  .  .  Notwithstanding  (Order 
No.  78),  Colonel  Wilson  (with  the  22d  Massachusetts) 
has  to-day  received  orders  from  you  to  report  to  Gen 
eral  Butler."  But  General  Butler,  it  is  evident  "to  me, 
desires  naturally  to  secure  to  his  own  command,  accord 
ing  as  best  he  may,  all  the  force  he  can,  even  to  the 
prejudice  of  what  General  Sherman  has  a  positive  right 
to  expect  from  Massachusetts."3  Secretary  Cameron 
wrote  fully  on  the  27th,4  accepting  Andrew's  proposi- 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  817.  2  Ibid.,  p.  819. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  820.  <  Ibid.,  p.  821. 


200  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

tions,  promising  to  carry  them  out  and  complimenting 
him  highly.  As  General  Schouler l  says,  "  Explicit 
enough  ;  and  yet  the  same  system  of  cross  purposes 
was  kept  up  for  some  time  at  Washington  to  the  insuf 
ferable  annoyance  of  the  governor,  complicating  and 
retarding  recruiting,  and  delaying  the  completion  of 
the  regiments." 

October  1,  the  War  Department  designated  a  sepa 
rate  military  department  of  the  six  New  England  States, 
"  Headquarters,  Boston,  Maj.  Gen.  B.  F.  Butler,  U.  S. 
Volunteer  Service,  while  engaged  in  recruiting  his  divi 
sion  will  command." 2 

General  Butler  had  two  important  interviews  with 
Governor  Andrew.  These  closed  their  personal  inter 
course,  and  their  import  bears  on  all  subsequent  nego 
tiation.  The  precise  dates  are  not  given,  but  they  were 
previous  to  October  5.  There  was  an  amicable  confer 
ence  concerning  the  assignment  of  Colonel  Jones's  and 
an  Irish  regiment.  The  general  says  :  — 

"  As  soon  as  I  got  my  camp  established  I  called  upon  Gov 
ernor  Andrew  again,  and  informed  him  that  upon  reflection 
I  preferred  not  to  have  the  second  regiment  made  up  of  re 
cruits  as  they  would  be  recruited  by  the  state  officials ;  that 
I  preferred  a  regiment  of  Democrats,  every  officer  to  be  a 
Democrat,  and  especially  the  colonel.  .  .  .  Jonas  H.  French 
will  make  as  good  an  officer  as  any  one  I  know."  "  Why,"  said 
the  governor,  "  French  helped  break  up  a  John  Brown  meet 
ing."  "Do  you  know  anything  against  him?"  "That  is 
enough  ;  I  do  not  want  anybody  to  enter  the  war  for  the 
Union  who  holds  such  sentiments."  3 

Some  consequences  of  these  events  will  appear  later  on. 

1  Massachusetts  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  259. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  822.  «  Butler's  Book,  vol.  i,  307. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE         201 

October  5,  General  Butler  addressed  a  long  letter  to 
Andrew,  "  Commander-in-Chief ,"  l  reciting  his  position, 
to  which  he  affirmed,  "  your  assent  was  given."  Com 
plained  that  "  the  recruiting  officers  have  been  making 
publications  injurious  to  me  and  the  recruiting  service, 
so  that  it  becomes  necessary  to  know  what  exactly  is 
understood  between  us."  Asked  for  a  general  order 
confirming  his  (Butler's)  authority.  Concluding  :  — 

I  trust  these  suggestions  and  this  course,  which  will  allow 
those  patriotic  persons  who  have  done  me  the  honor  to  inform 
me  of  their  desire  to  enlist  in  the  service  of  their  country,  to 
serve  under  my  command  in  preference  to  another,  the  oppor 
tunity  of  so  enlisting,  while  others  of  different  preferences 
will  have  an  opportunity  to  gratify  their  desires,  and  both 
classes  will  thus  be  brought  at  once  into  the  field  where  they 
are  so  much  needed. 

Aside  from  any  differences  incident  to  the  peculiar 
conditions  imposed  from  Washington,  Andrew  differed 
absolutely  from  Butler  in  his  view  of  the  state  of  the 
recruiting  service.  He  thought  it  was  being  overdone, 
and  according  to  the  general  instructions  of  the  War 
Department  he  was  still  in  control  of  recruiting. 

At  9.30  P.  M.,  October  5,  after  the  governor  had 
spent  the  day  in  camp  at  Readville,  he  begins  a  letter2 
of  more  than  fifteen  hundred  words  to  General  Butler 
in  reply  to  that  cited  above :  — 

I  did  not  at  any  time  say  that  while  we  were  already  rais 
ing  so  many  regiments  in  Massachusetts  I  could  consent  to  an 
embarrassment  of  the  service  by  additional  competition  for 
recruits.  .  .  .  Now,  with  the  utmost  respect  for  the  Depart 
ment  of  War,  and  for  yourself  personally,  and  with  the  most 
loyal  sentiment  of  obedience,  I  mean  to  continue  to  do  just 
i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  823.  »  Ibid.,  p.  825. 


202  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

what  I  have  from  the  first  persistently  done,  and  that  is,  to 
hold  with  an  iron  hand  and  an  unswerving  purpose  all  the 
powers  which,  by  the  laws,  pertain  to  me  officially  in  my  own 
grasp,  yielding  the  most  implicit  obedience  in  all  things  to 
those  having  the  right  to  direct  me.  .  .  .  Nor  is  it  permitted 
by  law,  to  the  President  himself,  even  were  he  disposed,  to 
interfere  in  the  premises.  ...  I  shall,  therefore,  do  exactly 
by  you  as  I  have  done  by  General  Sherman  and  General 
Burnside.  .  .  .  Nor  can  I  permit,  so  far  as  it  lies  with  me  to 
decide,  any  officers  of  the  United  States  to  raise  troops  as 
Massachusetts  volunteers  within  this  Commonwealth  except 
for  recruitment  of  existing  regiments,  or  subject  to  the  condi 
tions  indicated. 

This  correspondence  did  not  change  Butler's  action, 
for  he  opened  camps  for  independent  recruiting  at  Pitts- 
field  and  Lowell.  He  asked  for  a  personal  interview  on 
the  8th.1  The  governor,  through  Colonel  Browne,  re 
plied,  declining  "  for  no  reason  whatsoever  personal  to 
yourself,"  but  that  he  is  engaged.  "  Therefore,  unless 
the  subject  upon  which  an  interview  is  desired  is  of 
such  a  character  as  to  absolutely  require  immediate  at 
tention,  he  would  prefer  at  this  moment  that  it  should 
be  placed  in  writing,2  especially  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  there  appears  by  your  letter  of  5th  instant  to  be  a 
difference  of  memory  respecting  the  oral  conversa 
tion  referred  to."3  We  must  consider  these  statements 
concerning  recruiting  and  the  enlistment  of  "those 
patriotic  persons  desiring  to  serve  under  my  [Butler's] 
command,"  concerning  refusal  to  appoint  a  disturber  of 
a  John  Brown  meeting  and  differences  of  memory  — 
all  together.  We  must  not  forget  that  General  Butler 

1   0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  829.  2  Italics  are  mine. 

3  0.  R.t  Series  III,  vol.  i,  830. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE   INTERFERENCE        203  ' 

deliberately  called  Governor  Andrew  a  "  one-idea'd  Abo 
litionist."  * 

The  general  nursed  his  grievances  without  replying 
directly  to  Andrew's  broad  statement,  October  5,  of 
his  position  until  the  12th,  when  he  broke  out  in  an 
extraordinary  communication  of  some  eight  hundred 
words.  Both  contestants  might  have  learned  of  General 
Grant  the  art  of  expression  in  time  of  war.  We  can 
imagine  the  sharp-eyed  attorney  in  the  place  of  a  general, 
buckling  up  his  uniform  and  girding  himself,  to  harass 
the  patriotic  and  ardent,  the  confiding  Andrew. 

This  letter 2  begins,  "  Will  '  His  Excellency '  assign 
.  .  .  the  officers  to  be  selected  by  General  Butler,  but 
commissioned  by  '  His  Excellency,'  with,  of  course,  a 
veto  power  upon  what  may  be  deemed  an  improper 
selection  ?  As  these  officers  are  to  go  with  General  But 
ler,  would  ' His  Excellency '"  —  continuing  until  " His 
Excellency  "  is  repeated  fourteen  times  with  similar  em 
phasis.  The  apologist,  Parton,  denies  the  general's  re 
sponsibility  for  the  quotation  marks  over  "  His  Excel 
lency."  He  claims,  on  the  authority  of  Colonel  Strong,3 
that  a  subordinate  affixed  these,  thus  transmuting  the 
general's  amiable  purpose  into  "  an  intentional  and 
elaborate  affront."  This  conflicts  with  the  general's 
own  statement  made  December  28 :4  "In  the  matter  of 
address  in  quotation  I  but  copied  the  address  assumed 
by  one  of  the  numerous  military  secretaries.  .  .  .  After 
using  it  once  in  the  letter  alluded  to,  I  carefully  used 
the  title  of  the  constitution,  and  marked  it  in  quotation 

1  Butler's  Book,  vol.  i,  318.  2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  831. 

3  Parton,  Butler  in  New  Orleans,  p.  184. 
*  O.R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  853. 


204    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

to  call  attention  to  the  difference."  These  explanations 
stand  for  what  they  are  worth  in  considering  the  merits 
of  this  controversy.  Such  a  letter  should  not  have 
troubled  any  one  outside  the  court  of  the  Old  Bailey, 
but  it  did  trouble  Andrew,  and  the  trouble  rankled. 
At  this  period,1  the  dispute  seems  to  have  carried  the 
pettifogging  spirit  into  the  depths  of  bureaucracy. 

Attorney-General  Foster  declared  that  Butler's  irreg 
ular  recruits  could  not  receive  "State-aid."  December 
19  and  20,  a  sharp  correspondence2  issued  between 
George  C.  Strong,  chief  of  staff,  and  Governor  Andrew. 
The  former  claimed  General  Butler  to  be  "  Your  Excel 
lency's  coordinate ; "  the  governor  replied,  "  With  the 
single  exception  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
no  officer  or  person,  whether  State  or  national,  civil  or 
military,  .  .  .  can  be  recognized  as  the  '  coordinate '  of 
the  Governor  of  the  Commonwealth  in  official  dignity  or 
rank."  In  the  same  letter  Andrew,  through  Secretary 
Browne,  refers  to  Butler's  communication  of  October 
12,  as  "  a  studious,  indirect,  insinuating,  but  not  less 
significant,  intentional  act  of  impoliteness  toward  a 
magistrate  whose  only  offense  was  fidelity  to  his  duty." 

The  heaviest  club  in  the  altercation,  on  the  whole, 
was  in  Andrew's  hand,  and  it  worried  his  antagonist 
exceedingly.  The  governor  alone  could  commission  regi 
mental  officers,  and  he  simply  would  not.  In  answer  to 
the  President's  personal  appeal  toward  the  last,  he  stated 
his  willingness  to  act,  but  claims  "  To  that  end  Major- 
General  Butler  should  be  directed  to  report  in  accord 
ance  with  the  General  Orders,  No.  78,  and  otherwise  to 

1  Schouler,  Massachusetts  in  the  Civil  War,  pp.  266-270. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  847-849. 


FEDERAL  AND  STATE  INTERFERENCE        205 

comply  with  the  provisions  of  that  order,  which  as  yet 
he  has  entirely  neglected  and  disobeyed." l 

As  to  methods  of  obtaining  the  best  officers,  whether 
Democratic  or  Republican,  a  diametrical  difference  of 
opinion  prevailed  between  Governor  Andrew  and  Gen 
eral  Butler.  In  submitting  the  whole  correspondence  to 
Senators  Sumner  and  Wilson,  the  governor  stated  offi 
cially,  "  The  whole  course  of  proceeding  under  Major- 
General  Butler  in  this  Commonwealth  seems  to  have  been 
designed  and  adapted  simply  to  afford  means  to  persons 
of  bad  character  to  make  money  unscrupulously,  and  to 
encourage  men  whose  unfitness  had  excluded  them  from 
any  appointment  by  me  to  the  voluntary  military  ser 
vice."  2 

General  Schouler's 3  summary  is  :  — 

General  Butler  continued  independent  recruiting  until  two 
regiments  of  infantry,  three  companies  of  cavalry,  and  a  com 
pany  of  light  artillery  were  raised  by  him  in  Massachusetts, 
notwithstanding  the  law  gave  to  the  governor  the  exclusive 
right  to  organize  regiments,  and  to  commission  the  officers. 
The  controversy  lasted  four  months.  .  .  .  The  troops  were 
sent  from  the  State  without  commissioned  officers,  without 
rolls  being  deposited  in  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  and 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Executive. 

War  consists  in  deeds,  and  this  recruiting  was  a  small 
result,  regarded  purely  from  General  Butler's  point  of 
view.  The  governor  expressed  to  Secretary  Cameron4 
the  conditions  forced  upon  him :  "  Why  is  power  given 
to  him  [Butler]  thus  to  interfere  with  me  and  distract 

1  Letter  to  President,  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  863. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  865. 

3  Massachusetts  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  275. 
«  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  828,  829. 


206  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

and  confuse  the  system  under  which  my  operations  are 
conducted?  ...  I  am  more  troubled  by  this  disturbing 
interposition  than  I  have  been  by  all  the  toils  and  re 
sponsibilities  of  the  year."  If  the  governor  clung  to  his 
personal  prerogatives  somewhat  tenaciously,  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  the  noisy  patriot,  uniformed  as  a  general, 
assimilated  very  readily  the  delights  of  "hero-worship," ] 
described  in  his  memoir. 

On  the  llth  of  January,  1862,  A.  Lincoln  appealed 
to  the  governor  in  the  following  telegram,  and  shortly 
after  the  Department  of  New  England  was  dissolved :  "  I 
will  be  greatly  obliged  if  you  will  arrange  somehow  with 
General  Butler  to  officer  his  two  unofficered  regiments."2 
We  can  read  between  the  lines  that  long-suffering  en 
durance  that  so  endeared  the  President  to  our  much 
enduring  people. 

Governor  Andrew  arraigned  the  administration  in 
positive  terms  for  allowing  General  Butler  to  interfere 
with  recruiting  in  the  State  of  Massachusetts,  and  the 
allegation  was  never  answered.  January  11,  1862,  in 
his  letter  to  the  President,  he  said :  — 

Major-General  Butler's  proceedings  in  Massachusetts  in 
respect  to  recruitment  have  been  altogether  lawless,  in  viola 
tion,  especially  of  General  Orders  No.  78,  of  the  War  De 
partment,  of  the  series  of  1861,  and  have  been  conducted  with 
both  official  and  personal  contempt  toward  the  government  of 
this  Commonwealth.  This  has  been  permitted  by  the  General 
Government,  notwithstanding  representations  of  the  facts  to 
the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  and  to  the  Secretary  of 
War.3 

1  Butler's  Book,  vol.  i,  294.  *  Q.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  862. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  862. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        207 

It  is  well  to  bring  out  and  consider  the  larger  ele 
ments,  whether  of  mind  or  character,  in  the  historical 
personage.  Those  nearest  John  A.  Andrew,  in  his  try 
ing  experience,  esteemed  him  highly.  General  Schouler 1 
says  of  him :  "  The  greatest,  the  wisest,  and  noblest  of 
Massachusetts  governors,  he  possessed  transcendent 
genius  as  an  executive  officer,  when  those  qualities 
could  best  be  exercised." 

It  is  more  difficult  to  put  Butler,  the  great  advocate, 
the  audacious  attorney,  into  an  epigram.  He  converted 
the  fleeing  person  into  contraband  property  with  won 
drous  prescience,  and  thus  helped  to  solve  the  most 
critical  question  of  the  war.  He  smote  rebellious  New 
Orleans  with  inflexible  justice,  and  brought  order  out 
of  chaos.  His  military  career  can  be  hardly  separated 
from  the  whole  patriotic  effort  of  the  Northern  people, 
that  bent  every  force  to  the  greatest  social  and  political 
problem  of  modern  history. 

The  noble  Sixth  Regiment  of  Massachusetts  precipi 
tated  the  North  upon  the  South.  The  military  heart  of 
the  nation  —  in  awful  suspense  —  did  not  begin  to  beat 
until  great  New  York,  magnificent  Massachusetts,  and 
little  Rhode  Island  together  marched  up  Pennsylvania 
Avenue. 

In  that  splendid  column  Brigadier-General  Benjamin 
F.  Butler,  though  not  present,  was  not  absent.  His 
name  and  his  services  are  an  integral  part  of  the  Union 
of  the  States. 

This  whole  controversy,  interesting  in  itself,  is  yet 
more  important  as  bearing  upon  the  whole  conduct  of 
the  war.  It  shows  the  mistaken  course  of  the  adminis- 

1  Massachusetts  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  670. 


208  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

tration  in  attempting  to  overdo  the  business  of  recruit 
ing  at  times  and  by  spasmodic  efforts.  The  national 
authorities  interfered  with  proper  official  methods  in 
the  States,  generally  making  mischief  thereby.  Then 
they  capriciously  stopped  the  recruiting  of  volunteers 
on  occasions  when  it  should  have  proceeded  continu 
ously. 

"Bureau  "  has  a  meaning  in  our  country,  as  including 
"  certain  subdivisions  of  some  of  the  executive  depart 
ments,"  which  differs  from  its  meaning  in  Europe.  In 
all  these  bureaucratic  movements  and  divagations  of  man 
agement,  nothing  is  more  curious  than  the  action  and 
influence  of  Mr.  Seward.  "  Where  the  heart  is  right, 
there  is  true  patriotism,"  said  the  philosopher ;  and  he 
was  a  patriot,  but  his  heart  was  a  factor  which  never 
neglected  Mr.  Seward.  We  must  consider  his  constant 
attitude  in  the  direction  of  affairs,  if  we  would  see  within 
and  get  at  the  true  nature  of  the  various  negotiations 
between  the  federal  and  state  executives,  in  which  he 
was  concerned.  In  the  significant  declaration  to  his  wife 
already  noted,  he  chafes  under  the  suspicions  and  inter 
ference  of  those  who  would  prevent  his  proposed  ac 
tions,  and  "  see  that  I  do  not  too  much  for  my  country, 
lest  some  advantage  may  revert  indirectly  to  my  own 
fame."  l  This  was  early  in  the  rebellion ;  a  year  later 
he  is  saying  to  his  daughter  that  he  is  working  hard  at 
the  War  Department,  and  "  to  aggravate  my  cares,  mis 
chievous  persons  got  in  there  and  tried  to  sow  the  seeds 
of  disunion  between  members  of  the  cabinet  and  self, 
and  I  have  had  to  meet  and  counteract  their  intrigues."2 
The  first  instance  was  under  Cameron,  the  second  under 

1  Seward  at  Washington,  1846-61,  p.  575.         2  Ibid.,  1861-72,  p.  98. 


FEDERAL  AND  STATE  INTERFERENCE        209 

Stanton.  The  Secretary  of  State  occupied  a  position, 
nominally  the  leading  one,  in  an  executive  cabinet 
which  knew  no  prime  minister.  The  leader  had  the 
direction  of  foreign  affairs,  usually  the  most  important 
business  of  the  administration.  Now,  the  War  Depart 
ment  was  surely  the  greatest  post,  followed  closely  by 
the  Treasury.  The  nominal  leader  of  the  cabinet  had 
long  been  the  favorite,  and  finally  was  the  disappointed 
candidate  of  the  party  behind  the  administration.  Now 
he  was  under  a  chief  inclined  to  over-management  of 
executive  affairs ;  and  he  was  mussing  about  the  de 
partments,  negotiating  with  the  state  governments,  try 
ing  to  help  matters,  when  his  own  transactions  were  not 
spoiled  by  the  "intrigues"  of  others.1  It  was  a  delicate 
situation. 

September  25,  1861, 2  Governor  Morgan  writes  to 
Hon.  William  H.  Seward:  "The  great  interest  mani 
fested  by  you  in  regard  to  our  state  quotas  induces  me 
to  ask  your  attention  to  the  following  requests."  The 
Secretary  of  War  did  not  separate  the  honorable  per 
sonage  from  the  Secretary  of  State  and  nominal  leader 
of  the  cabinet.  He  replies  tartly  to  the  indirect  com 
munication  :  — 

Your  letter  of  the  25th  instant,  addressed  to  the  Secretary 
of  State,  was  handed  to  me  this  morning.  Allow  me  respect 
fully  to  suggest  that  hereafter  when  your  Excellency  has 
business  to  transact,  connected  with  this  department,  our 
intercourse  will  be  much  facilitated  if  you  will  address  your 
communications  directly  to  me.  I  am  very  desirous  of  meet- 

1  July  27,  1861,  W.  H.  Seward  was  wiring  John  C.  Fremont,  person 
ally,  "  What  disposition  was  made  by  you  of  the  arms  which  you  pur 
chased  in  Europe  ?  "  —  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  355. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  540. 


210    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

ing  the  wishes  of  the  governor  of  the  State  of  New  York  by 
every  means  in  the  power  of  the  department.1 

What  could  be  more  proper  functionally  ?  The  sin 
cere  and  straightforward  Cameron  —  as  a  secretary  and 
in  his  public  capacity  —  abhorred  the  habits  of  petty 
intrigue  and  dissimulation. 

The  candid  governor  of  New  York,  who  meant  what 
he  said,  in  personal  or  official  correspondence,  loses  no 
time. 

In  reference  to  my  letter  to  Governor  Seward  [the  honorable 
and  the  secretary  now  becomes  governor],  I  beg  to  say  that 
in  communicating  with  him  nothing  was  further  from  my 
thoughts  than  an  interference  with  your  prerogatives  or  a  dis 
regard  of  your  just  authority.  His  personal  knowledge  of 
affairs  in  this  State  and  his  lively  interest  in  all  that  relates 
to  it  induced  me  in  this,  as  on  several  previous  occasions,  to 
invite  his  solicitation  in  obtaining  from  the  President  or  your 
self  such  authority  as  seemed  to  me  to  be  important  in  carrying 
out  the  purposes  of  the  government.  I  fully  appreciate  the  dif 
ficulties  experienced  by  the  government  in  obtaining  suitable 
arms.  ...  I  do  not  desire,  however,  to  put  this  in  a  form  of 
complaint,  but  to  urge  it  as  a  fact,  and  to  ask  that  it  have  your 
favorable  consideration  when  opportunity  will  permit. 2 

"  Influence  "  was  not  easily  strangled  and  destroyed. 
Governor  Morgan  was  obliged  to  wire,  October  2, 1861 : 
"  It  would  appear  that  certain  regiments  of  the  State  of 
New  York  expect  to  obtain  their  commissions  direct 
from  the  United  States.  I  sincerely  trust  this  will  not 
be  the  case.  They  can  have  their  commissions  from  me, 
and  have  been  so  notified  from  time  to  time."  !  Secre 
tary  Cameron  replied  promptly  that  all  New  York  com 
missions  would  be  referred  properly  to  the  governor. 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  644.         2  Ibid.,  p.  552.        *  Ibid.,  p.  557. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        211 

Authority  was  asked  from  the  War  Department  to  raise 
a  brigade  of  Catholics  in  New  York  State.  This  was 
properly  referred  as  under  "the  exclusive  control  of 
governors  of  States."  It  was  probable,  however,  that 
such  a  brigade  "  could  be  kept  together."  1 

The  irregularities  in  mustering  and  accepting  early 
regiments,  especially  in  the  Sickles  brigade,2  bred  con 
stant  troubles  for  the  state  authorities.  As  late  as  March 
27,  1862,  Governor  Morgan,  in  a  very  interesting  com 
munication,3  was  obliged  to  remonstrate  to  Secretary 
Stanton  that  "  certain  regiments  "  from  New  York  re 
fused  to  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the  governor  in 
commissioning  and  filling  vacancies.  The  matter  was 
not  confined  to  the  Sickles  contingent,  and  some  regi 
ments  claimed  militia  instead  of  volunteer  commissions. 
But  in  the  Sickles  brigade  the  "  commissions  for  an 
entire  regiment  were  destroyed  and  not  allowed  to 
reach"  the  appointees.  The  governor  cites  the  authority 
of  Congress.  "If,  then,  through  the  efforts  of  designing 
officers,  this  authority  is  resisted,  it  is  obvious  that  such 
officers  will  assume  to  exercise  these  functions  them 
selves,  and  be  enabled  to  elevate  improper  persons  to 
important  and  responsible  positions."  He  alludes  to  the 
secretary's  "  prompt  and  gratifying  "  course  in  correct 
ing  irregularities,  and  looks  forward  to  his  concurrence. 

In  the  summer  of  1862,  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh 
and  McClellan's  engagements  with  Lee  before  Rich 
mond,  which  resulted  in  changing  his  base  to  the  James 
River,  there  was  a  serious  crisis  at  Washington.  The 
President  met  this  with  his  usual  calm  judgment,  and 

1  O.R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  178. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  183.  3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  953. 


212  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

called  on  Mr.  Seward  for  help  in  the  executive  manage 
ment.  June  28,  he  addressed  a  formal  letter  to  him, 
recounting  the  situation  and  closing  in  these  words :  — 

I  expect  to  maintain  this  contest  until  successful,  or  until 
I  die,  or  am  conquered,  or  my  term  expires,  or  Congress  or 
the  country  forsake  me ;  and  I  would  publicly  appeal  to  the 
country  for  this  new  force  were  it  not  that  I  fear  a  general 
panic  and  stampede  would  follow,  so  hard  is  it  to  have  a  thing 
understood  as  it  really  is.1 

It  was  just  the  occasion  for  the  nimble  man  of  Auburn, 
who  wired  for  Governor  Morgan  and  Thurlow  Weed  to 
meet  him  next  day  at  the  Astor  House.  On  the  30th 
he  sent  to  Secretary  Stanton  a  sketch  of  a  proposed 
memorial  from  the  loyal  governors,  asking  the  privilege 
of  furnishing  more  men  ;  likewise  a  form  of  proclama 
tion  from  the  President  calling  for  150,000  men,  and 
"  fully  concurring  in  the  wisdom  of  the  views  expressed 
to  me  in  so  patriotic  a  manner  by  the  governors  of  the 

States  of ."2  Stanton  wired  that  the  President  had 

gone  "  to  the  country  very  tired,"  but  that  he  was  send 
ing  the  document  to  him.  The  President  approved, 
suggesting  200,000  men,  and  the  call  was  finally  made 
for  300,000  men.  July  1,  Mr.  Seward  wired,  "  The  gov 
ernors  respond,  and  the  Union  Committee  approve 
earnestly  and  unanimously." 3  He  went  over  to  Boston, 
sending  the  earnest  and  "satisfactory  response"  of 
Governor  Andrew.  It  was  his  intention  to  go  to  Cleve 
land,  but  other  affairs  recalled  him  to  Washington. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  never  at  fault  in  estimating  the  sen 
timent  of  the  people  in  mass  ;  nor  did  he  err  in  the  best 
ways  of  reaching  it  and  developing  it  for  national  action. 
1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  180.  *  Ibid.,  p  182.  '•  Ibid.,  p.  187. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE   INTERFERENCE        213 

In  bringing  the  power  of  his  office  to  bear  on  individual 
men,  he  was  not  always  so  happy.  These  negotiations 
through  Mr.  Seward  were  conducted  very  judiciously 
and  were  entirely  wholesome  in  their  effect.  The  delicate 
nature  of  such  interference  with  proper  departmental 
organization  appears  in  a  letter  of  the  adjutant-general 
of  Massachusetts  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  July  7:1 
"  We  were  honored  with  the  visit  from  yourself  and 
General  Buckingham."  Then  desirable  changes  in  re 
cruiting  are  recited,  to  be  communicated  to  the  general ; 
and*  concluding,  "  Only  give  me  a  little  margin  and 
keep  us  as  much  as  possible  under  state  authority."  But 
Governor  Andrew  breaks  out,  July  26,  to  the  War 
Department,  with  all  his  force  and  fervor,  bewailing  the 
jar  and  creaking  of  national  and  state  machinery. 

Doing  our  utmost  recruiting  the  old  regiments,  but  blocked 
constantly  by  circumlocution.  I  am  powerless,  but  believed 
by  everybody  responsible.  If  I  can  appoint  mustering  officers, 
and  can  do  all  things  needful  and  allowable  under  Army  Reg 
ulations  to  be  done  by  any  one,  I  will  strike  heavy  and  quick. 
Do  give  me  plenary  powers,  and  not  leave  me  obliged  to  call 
on  anybody,  but  enable  me  to  appoint  all  needful  officers  for 
carrying  on  the  recruitment.  Men  from  Berkshire  can't  wait 
for  officer  in  Boston,  who  assumes  that  he  alone  can  muster 
for  regiments  already  in  service. 

(Also)  "  So  prays  Wm.  Schouler,  A.  G." 2 
Secretary   Stan  ton  answers  in    another   connection, 
August  28,  for  poor  but  very  necessary  red  tape :  — 

If  all    the  States  were  like  Massachusetts   and  all  gov 
ernors  like  hers,  transportation  and  everything  else  might  be 
left  to  state  authorities.    It  must  be  done  to  all  or  none. 
Experience  of  last  year  produced  too  many  frightful  evils  to 
1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  209.  2  Ibid.,  p.  256. 


214    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

renew  the  experiment.  If  the  disbursing  officers  in  one  State 
trouble  you  so  much,  I  have  eighteen  times  as  much  trouble. 
We  must  both,  therefore,  patiently  endure  what  we  cannot 
remedy.  The  rules  will,  however,  be  changed  or  modified  as 
far  as  possible  to  cure  the  evils  you  suffer  under.1 

Neither  of  these  stalwart  patriots  was  a  model  of 
patience.  Certainly,  such  endurance,  tempered  in  the 
heat  of  those  conflicts,  is  worthy  of  all  praise  from  the 
generations  to  come. 

As  finally  completed  in  August,  this  was  the  last 
great  movement  for  mustering  volunteers.  While  troops 
were  easily  obtained  for  short  terms  on  the  emergency, 
the  enlistments  for  three  years  dragged  heavily.  Many 
of  the  governors  reported  the  difficulties2  in  responding 
to  this  call  for  troops,  so  carefully  arranged  and  placed 
before  the  people.  The  voluntary  efforts  of  States  and 
individuals  were  soon  to  be  replaced  by  the  stern  re 
quisitions  of  a  national  draft.  The  experience  of  the 
Confederacy  was  not  different. 

The  vigorous  governor  of  Indiana  often  made  his 
impress  on  the  War  Department ;  if  not  always  reason 
able  and  considerate,  he  was  at  least  forcible.  July  26, 
he  addresses  Assistant  Secretary  Watson  : 3  — 

I  am  painfully  surprised  by  the  spirit  of  your  two  dis 
patches  received  this  morning.  From  the  doubts  and  hesita 
tion  expressed  by  your  inquiries  I  should  infer  that  the 
requisitions  made  in  behalf  of  the  State  are  regarded  in  the 
light  of  favors,  to  be  strictly  scrutinized  and  granted,  if  at  all, 
with  hesitation.  I  cannot  organize  artillery  companies  with 
out  being  able  to  assure  them  that  they  will  get  guns,  nor  can 
they  drill  without  guns. 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  480.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  201-206. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  253,  254. 


FEDERAL   AND  STATE  INTERFERENCE        215 
The  assistant  secretary  replies  at  length  and  tartly  :  — 

If  you  had  not  misapprehended  the  spirit  of  my  dis 
patches,  you  would  have  seen  no  reason  for  being  surprised. 
.  .  .  Indiana  and  every  other  State  shall  have  her  full  dis 
tributive  share.  Does  this  authorize  your  inference  that  the 
requisitions  made  in  behalf  of  the  State  of  Indiana  are  to  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  favors,  to  be  strictly  scrutinized  and 
granted,  if  at  all,  with  hesitation  ? 

Governor  Morton  half  recants :  "  The  dispatch  in 
regard  to  artillery  was  drawn  by  my  secretary,  and  I  do 
not  know  the  precise  words.  We  claim  nothing  for  the 
cannon  we  let  the  government  have.  They  were  re 
ferred  to  to  show  that  none  were  left  in  the  State." 
At  the  same  time  he  shows  his  precarious  position 
with  the  border  counties  of  Kentucky  leaning  strongly 
toward  secession. 

The  painful  pressure  of  events  is  revealed  again, 
August  13,1  in  this  agonized  cry  to  Stanton :  — 

Your  dispatch  of  this  date  is  received.  I  regret  that  sug 
gestions  respectfully  made  in  relation  to  the  wants  and  con 
ditions  of  the  public  service  in  Indiana  should  be  regarded  in 
the  light  of  complaints  and  dissatisfaction.  I  give  you  credit 
for  doing  what  you  can  for  the  cause,  and  claim'  the  same  for 
myself  in  my  limited  position.  If  the  government  under 
stands  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Indiana,  of  course  informa 
tion  from  me  is  not  required. 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  case  of  New  York,  many  in 
teresting  questions  arose  respecting  the  organization 
and  first  conduct  of  militia  and  volunteers,  as  the 
forces  of  the  States  were  gradually  brought  under  the 
control  and  management  of  the  administration.  In  this 

o 
1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  376. 


216    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

direction  Attorney  -  General  Bates  sent  an  elaborate 
opinion  to  the  War  Department,  June  16,  1862.  The 
governor  of  Kansas  had  innocently  but  illegally  re 
moved  Colonel  Weer  from  the  command  of  a  regiment 
of  volunteers,  in  order  that  it  might  be  consolidated 
with  another  regiment.  Secretary  Stanton  revoked  the 
governor's  order,  and  reinstated  Colonel  Weer.  Attor 
ney-General  Bates  confirmed  the  secretary's  action  and 
forcibly  reviewed  the  whole  question  :  — 

Giving  to  the  constitutional  reservations  in  favor  of  the 
States  the  most  liberal  construction  which  can  be  claimed  for 
them,  they  confer  no  right  on  the  state  authorities  to  disturb 
the  organization  of  militia  or  volunteer  regiments  in  the 
national  service,  or  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  control 
which  the  President,  under  the  national  constitution  and  laws, 
shall  exercise  over  them.1 

He  disposed  of  notions  sometimes  prevailing  in  those 
days,  that  any  State  or  official  of  a  State  could  bring 
the  national  government  under  a  particular  obligation  ; 
patriotism  was  for  the  whole  :  — 

The  governors  of  the  loyal  States  have,  both  personally  and 
officially,  rendered  most  valuable  and  effective  service  to  the 
national  government.  .  .  .  But  these  labors  are  in  aid  of 
the  government  and  with  its  approbation.  They  are  per 
formed  not  because  it  is  a  legal  duty  imposed  by  Congress, 
or,  in  many  instances,  even  by  their  respective  States,  but 
under  the  impulse  of  a  generous  humanity  and  patriotism.2 

These  matters  excited  much  interest  in  Massachu 
setts,  as  is  shown  by  the  Executive  Files.3  Governor 
Andrew  had  managed  with  scrupulous  care  in  his  re 
lations  with  the  administration.  In  a  case  of  charges 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  151.  2  Ibid.,  p.  151. 

3  Vol.  152,  p.  48  ;  vol.  144,  p.  113. 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        217 

preferred  against  Colonel  Robert  Williams  and  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  H.  B.  Sargent,  1st  Mass.  Cavalry,  his 
attorney-general,  Dwight  Foster,  had  reported,  "  Your 
Excellency  has  no  jurisdiction."  1  As  early  as  July  27, 
1861,  some  seventy  men  of  the  Clinton  company  of  the 
15th  Mass,  had  claimed  the  right  to  "  refuse  to  serve 
except  under  officers  of  their  own  election,"  2  having 
complied  with  the  conditions  under  which  they  took 
their  oath.  Andrew  indorsed  :  "  No  person  any  author 
ity  to  make  any  such  promise,  my  behalf.  Bound  to 
add  any  refusal  to  do  duty  would  subject  the  guilty  to 
consequences  from  which  I  could  not  save  them."  Prac 
tically,  he  intended  to  leave  the  company  to  its  own 
officers,  having  no  objection  to  them. 

This  interaction  of  federal  and  state  authority  is 
interesting  ground,  and  many  incidents  bear  upon  it. 
In  disputing  over  the  recruiting  in  Massachusetts,  Gen 
eral  Butler,  in  reporting  to  the  adjutant-general,  tried 
to  maintain  that  the  United  States  should  override  the 
States  absolutely.  "  Will  you  recruit  your  men  under 
your  own  authority,  or  will  you  allow  the  authority  to 
be  wrested  from  you  by  the  States  ? " 3  Governor 
Andrew,  December  20,  1861,  brought  forward  the 
proper  distinction  between  the  military  functions  of  the 
President  and  the  civic  function  of  any  federal  official 
in  a  State. 

In  our  federative  system,  of  which  system  the  President  is 
the  sole  head,  without  any  coordinate,  and  in  which  the  States 
composing  it  are  as  essential  to  its  constitutional  life  as  are 
the  people  themselves,  each  respective  governor  being  the 

1  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  15,  November  22,  1861. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  11.  8  0.  R.,  Series,  III,  vol.  i,  655. 


218  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

official  head  of  his  own  State,  without  any  coordinate  within 
his  jurisdiction  saving  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
who  is  the  federal  head  and  official  superior  of  all  magis 
trates  and  officers.1 

The  President  was  the  supreme  military  authority  in 
a  State ;  but  that  authority  could  not  be  delegated  to 
affect  the  people  of  that  State.  Soldiers  were  to  be  en 
listed  by  the  States  and  commanded  by  the  President 
as  commander-in-chief,  or  by  his  subordinate  officers. 
But  the  people  of  a  State  were  under  the  control  of 
their  own  elected  civic  officials. 

When  General  Pope  was  defeated  in  August,  some 
enthusiasm  for  recruiting  was  created  anew,2  and  the 
old  spirit  was  revived,  especially  in  the  Eastern  States, 
to  send  forward  men  to  fill  the  depleted  armies.  En 
rollment  for  the  draft  had  been  ordered,  but  August  8 
Andrew  addresses  the  President  directly,  begging  with 
all  his  force  to  be  encouraged  in  recruiting  instead  of 
being  obliged  to  resort  to  the  dreaded  conscription.  If 
he  might  have  a  call  for  nine  months'  militia,  "  We  can 
answer  the  call  in  great  part  without  draft  by  sending 
militia  regiments  already  organized  and  being  filled  up 
and  by  recruiting  others.  The  iron  is  hot ;  strike  quick. 
Drafting  is  mechanical.  The  impulse  of  patriotism  is 
vital  and  dynamic."  3 

If  the  President  could  not  accede  to  the  general 
principle,  he  tried  his  best  to  forward  matters  in  detail 
when  Andrew  could  not  get  off  his  regiments,  owing 
to  the  delay  of  disbursing  officers.  He  wired,  August  12 : 

1  0.  R.y  Series  III,  vol.  i,  847. 

2  Benjamin  Harrison  volunteered  this  summer.  —  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i, 
184. 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  327. 


FEDERAL  AND  STATE   INTERFERENCE        219 

Please  say  to  these  gentlemen  that  if  they  do  not  work 
quickly  I  will  make  quick  work  with  them.  In  the  name  of 
all  that  is  reasonable,  how  long  does  it  take  to  pay  a  couple 
of  regiments  ?  We  were  never  more  in  need  of  the  arrival  of 
regiments  than  now  —  even  to-day.1 

Andrew  was  not  convinced  on  the  main  question,  and 
wired  Secretary  Stanton,  August  17  :  — 

I  wish  I  could  see  you,  but  can't  leave.  Pray  don't  think 
of  actually  drafting.  We  can  raise  troops  faster  than  they 
can  be  provided  for.  Draft  will  disturb  everything ;  raise 
thousand  questions ;  will  make  a  mere  paper  army,  unorgan 
ized,  ineffectual,  discontented,  valueless  —  flocks  of  green 
men,  green  officers,  conscripts.  Call  on  me  for  militia  quota 
by  regiments ;  give  till  October  I.2 

This  dispatch  reveals  the  man  as  clearly  and  forcibly 
as  anything  on  record.  He  was  heated  to  the  fusing 
point,  and  everything  not  absolutely  important  was 
burned  away.  He  had  not  even  time  or  thought  for  his 
beloved  rhetoric  and  amplifying  words.  If  not  so  good 
an  orator  as  Demosthenes,  he  was  a  better  actor  and 
agent  of  affairs.  As  Stanton  declared  in  another  con 
nection,  if  all  the  governors  and  all  the  States  had  been 
like  Massachusetts,  drafts  would  not  have  been  neces 
sary. 

While  it  is  easy  to  scan  these  particular  movements 
for  recruiting  at  this  time,  we  cannot  so  readily  com 
prehend  and  explain  the  larger  governmental  forces  at 
work  beneath  the  surface,  and  which  were  gradually 
bringing  the  administration  to  a  more  commanding 
position  in  its  conduct  of  the  war  and  of  the  affairs  of 
state.  It  was  being  forced  irresistibly  to  put  forth  its 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  363.  2  Ibid.,  p.  401. 


220    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL   AND  STATE 

whole  power  and  to  lay  hold  of  every  citizen  of  the 
loyal  States  capable  of  bearing  arms.  The  President 
interested  himself  eagerly  in  this  movement  for  filling 
the  lists  of  volunteers.  He  sent  a  dispatch  to  all  the 
loyal  governors,  calling  for  prompt  and  accurate  infor 
mation  of  the  most  minute  character.  "About  what 
day  the  first  new  regiment  can  move  from  you,  what 
the  second,  and  so  on."  1  He  sent  his  secretary,  Nicolay, 
to  Indianapolis,  where  he  conversed  freely  with  Gov 
ernor  Morton  and  others  connected  with  the  state  gov 
ernment,  July  29, 1862.  Nicolay  reported,  "  Recruiting 
for  the  new  call  is  progressing  quite  satisfactorily." 
There  were  some  difficulties  of  detail.  The  governor 
wired  two  days  later  that  recruiting  for  old  and  new 
regiments  at  once  clashed.  "  The  two  systems  come 
in  conflict  and  mutually  defeat  each  other."  3  The  War 
Department  could  only  reply  that  any  violent  change 
"  would  be  fatal." 

But  the  storm  was  gathering  which  was  to  nullify 
voluntary  enlistment.  Governor  Wilson  of  Iowa  re 
ported  :  — 

Men  in  this  and  surrounding  counties  are  daily  in  the  habit 
of  denouncing  the  government,  the  war,  and  all  engaged  in  it, 
and  are  doing  all  they  can  to  prevent  enlistments.  This  should 
be  stopped,  so  far  as  relates  to  enlistments,  in  some  way.  The 
government  needs  men,  and  that  as  soon  as  possible.  But 
with  an  organized  determination  on  the  part  of  a  very  con 
siderable  number  of  men  in  each  county,  the  work  of  enlist 
ment  must  go  on  slowly.4 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  265.  2  Ibid.,  p.  283. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  287.  And  Governor  Tod  of  Ohio  said,  p.  269,  "  Recruiting 
officers  for  the  new  regiments  have  their  commissions  to  earn;  those  of 
the  old  have  theirs  in  their  pockets." 

*  Ibid.,  p.  266. 


FEDERAL  AND  STATE   INTERFERENCE        221 

As  above  indicated,  there  were  causes  influencing  the 
course  of  recruiting  at  this  time  larger  than  any  indi 
vidual  could  control  or  direct,  even  if  that  individual 
had  been  a  Caesar  or  a  Napoleon.  In  the  early  days  of 
July,  Governor  Curtin  had  made  certain  suggestions  to 
the  President  directly,  concerning  the  recruiting  for 
this  call.  .Secretary  Stanton  answered,  "It  is  designed 
to  leave  the  matter  as  far  as  possible  in  the  hands  of  the 
respective  governors  until  the  troops  are  mustered  into 
service."  l  This  is  a  fair  record.  Matters  could  not  be 
more  properly  directed  in  an  orderly  round  of  govern 
ment.  But  Governor  Morgan  answered  the  particular 
inquiries  of  the  President,  July  28 :  — 

I  feel  pretty  well  as  to  the  motion  of  things  in  most  parts 
of  the  State.  I  hope  to  commence  sending  you  regiments  in 
about  two  weeks.  ...  I  am  doing  all  in  my  power  to  forward 
enlistments  in  the  old  regiments;  but,  as  you  are  aware, 
recruiting  for  these  since  January  has  not  been  under  the 
control  of  the  governors  of  States.2  It  is  not  rapid.3 

Morgan  was  not  a  difficult   man   or  rigid    official. 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  205. 

2  Subsequent  to  this,  August  24,  1862,  Secretary  Stanton  requested 
John  A.  Stevens  to  act  as  a  special  commissioner  of  the  War  Department 
in  filling  the  old  regiments  of  New  York.   It  was  done  formally,  but  it 
was  a  direct  interference. 

"  It  is  the  desire  of  the  department  in  this,  as  in  all  other  cases,  to  act 
in  concert  with  the  state  authorities,  and  it  therefore  requests  that  a 
conference  with  them  be  had  by  you,  and  report."  —  0.  R.,  Series  III, 
vol.  ii,  452. 

s  Ibid.,  p.  269.  And  Thurlow  Weed  wired  the  War  Department,  Au 
gust  15:  "Our  people  are  responding  to  the  call  for  troops  with  alacrity 
and  enthusiasm.  Governor  Morgan  can  organize  his  whole  quota  of  the 
call  for  600,000  even  earlier  than  you  can  have  them  by  draft,  if  allowed 
to  proceed  as  indicated  in  his  dispatch  of  yesterday.  The  popular  feeling 
is  at  high  war  heat.  It  has  cost  much  to  get  this  steam  up.  Pray  do  not 
require  the  governor  to  « blow  it  off.'  "  —  Ibid.,  p.  393. 


222  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Perhaps  he  was  the  best  plain  executive  officer  of  the 
four  we  have  been  treating.  He  could  not  govern,  in 
the  sense  that  Morton  and  Andrew  could  forelay  state 
action,  or  Curtin  could  carry  a  whole  people  through 
his  innate  energy.  But  no  one  better  directed  the 
legitimate  forces  of  the  State  by  official  prerogative 
than  did  Morgan.  He  dealt  wisely  with  the  great  influ 
ence  of  Seward,  with  the  power  of  the  Union  Defense 
Committee,  which  generally  helped  but  sometimes  em- 
barassed  him,  and  brought  out  of  it  all  the  best  results 
of  straightforward  executive  action.  His  statement  — 
not  querulous  but  frank  —  reveals  the  difficult  situation 
of  the  loyal  governors  at  that  moment.  In  fact,  they 
had  been  greater  as  war  ministers  than  as  governors  of 
their  respective  States.  The  tremendous  interplay  of 
federal  and  state  power  had  precipitated  on  these 
heads  of  States  such  responsibility  as  no  government 
had  ever  witnessed.  These  men  were  the  direct  expo 
nents  of  the  people  in  the  early  stages  of  the  rebellion. 
They  put  into  action  and  accomplished  fact  the  popular 
desire,  and  registered  the  popular  mandate. 

Now,  the  inevitable  course  of  great  governmental 
business  was  consolidating  the  power  of  the  federal 
administration,  and  was  endowing  a  ministry  of  its  own. 
The  war  governors,  important  agents  as  they  con 
tinued  to  be  in  the  conduct  of  these  large  affairs,  were 
now  ceasing  to  be  the  direct  representative  ministers 
of  the  people.  Congress  also  was  becoming  a  larger 
relative  factor,  as  its  legislative  powers  were  needed  in 
their  own  sphere,  as  well  as  to  enlarge  and  enforce 
executive  action.  The  first  legislation  of  Congress  in 
1861  had  been  a  sanction  rather  than  a  mandate.  The 


FEDERAL  AND   STATE  INTERFERENCE        223 

desperate  logic  of  events  had  dictated  the  slow  course 
of  law.  But  the  proper  scope  of  the  legislative  branch 
of  the  government  reasserted  itself,  and  moreover 
tended  to  absorb  matters  which  were  properly  executive 
in  function.  Committees  on  conduct  of  the  war  were 
powerful,  and  the  partisans  of  particular  general  officers 
were  busy  at  the  capitol. 

We  are  studying  these  events  chiefly  as  they  affect 
federal  and  state  action,  and  there  remains  to  be  noted 
the  greatest  factor  of  all  in  developing  our  topic  at 
this  period.  The  personal  character  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  helped  to  mould  events  and  to  stimulate  the 
present  inevitable  tendencies  of  administration.  Where 
there  was  a  truly  great  war  minister,  there  could  not  be 
many  war  governors,  as  they  entered  into  federal  pro 
cedure.  The  greater  must  include  the  less,  and  Edwin 
M.  Stanton  became  a  more  inclusive  and  compelling 
force  as  armies  increased  and  the  war  complicated  itself. 
His  personal  characteristics l  should  be  considered  in 
interpreting  these  events. 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  102. 


CHAPTER   VI 

PARTY    ESTRANGEMENT 

AN  observer  at  any  time  since  1862  would  hardly 
believe  that  the  political  parties  of  the  United 
States  were  ever  abrogated  or  fused  into  one.  But 
the  acute  and  experienced  Seward  said  on  the  passage 
of  the  act,  April  24,  1862,  suppressing  the  African 
slave  trade  without  a  dissenting  voice  in  the  Senate: 
"  The  Democrats  have  disappeared !  This  is  the  greatest 
act  of  the  administration."  1  Such  calm  prevailed  on 
the  political  surface  of  the  North  at  this  period,  one 
year  of  rebellion  having  elapsed  and  the  policy  of  the 
administration,  as  described,  not  yet  having  been  found 
wanting.  How  superficial  was  this  appearance  and  the 
observation  of  the  time  is  revealed  in  the  report  of 
Governor  Morton  of  Indiana,  June  25,  1862  :  — 

There  is  a  secret  political  organization  in  Indiana,  esti 
mated  and  claimed  to  be  10,000  strong,  the  leading  objects  of 
which  are  to  embarrass  all  efforts  to  recruit  men  for  the  mili 
tary  service  of  the  United  States,  to  embitter  public  sentiment 
and  manufacture  public  opinion  against  the  levying  and  col 
lection  of  taxes  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  present  war, 
and  generally  to  create  distrust  in  and  bad  feeling  toward 
the  government  and  its  recognized  and  legally  constituted 
authorities.  ...  is  in  operation  in  every  county  in  the  State. 
Its  members  are  bound  by  oaths,  and  their  meetings  are 
guarded  by  armed  men.  ...  I  deem  it  of  vital  importance 
1  Pierce,  Sumner,  vol.  iv,  68. 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  225 

that  immediate,  vigorous,  and  effective  steps  be  taken  to  break 
up  these  unlawful  and  dangerous  combinations,  and  to  correct 
the  evils  complained  of.1 

The  campaigns  of  the  administration  during  the 
summer  failed,  or  were  "  drawn  "  in  their  effects  on 
the  war.  They  miscarried,  not  through  defect  of  this 
or  that  general,  or  council  of  war,  but  through  lack  of 
that  administrative  strategy  which  brings  a  superior 
force  against  an  enemy  at  every  encounter.  When  a 
general  made  requisition  upon  Chatham  for  a  regiment 
he  sent  two.  The  Emancipation  Proclamation,  that 
necessary  and  profoundly  courageous  act  of  Lincoln, 
for  the  moment  had  divided  the  North  and  further 
alienated  the  South.  The  stringent  treatment  of  per 
sons  and  limitation  of  liberty,  considered  necessary  by 
Morton  and  others  struggling  with  the  immediate  issues 
raised  by  disloyal  citizens, — these  methods  administered 
by  arrogant  officials  and  urged  by  violent  agitators  like 
Thaddeus  Stevens  had  alarmed  a  certain  conservative 
though  loyal  element  in  the  North.  The  customary  and 
perhaps  inevitable  corruption  in  the  departments  con 
ducting  a  great  war  was  severely  criticised  by  those  who 
sought  disloyal  ends  through  apparently  loyal  means. 
Not  one  but  all  these  causes  combined  to  convert  inertia 
into  action,  and  to  rear  a  great  party  of  opposition  to 
the  administration  as  it  was  conducting  the  war  for 
the  Union.  Its  most  seductive  outcry  was  formulated 
by  Horatio  Seymour : 2  "  The  Constitution  as  it  is,  the 
Union  as  it  was." 

The  administration  was  severely  condemned  at  the 

1  0.  R.,  Series,  III,  vol.  ii,  176. 

2  Cf .  Message,  January  7, 1863,  p.  32. 


226  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

fall  elections  in  1862.  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsyl 
vania,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  all  Lincoln 
States  in  1860,  —  excepting  New  Jersey  by  a  small  ma 
jority,  —  declared  against  the  party  in  power.  The 
Democrats  gained  largely  in  the  House  of  Representa 
tives,  and  would  have  controlled  it  had  not  New  Eng 
land,  Michigan,  Iowa,  California,  and  the  border  slave 
States  supported  the  administration.  This  revival  of 
the  Democracy  suggests  many  interesting  questions. 

The  citizen  —  the  political  individual  —  does  not 
choose  deliberately  and  act  for  himself  in  most  contin 
gencies  of  government.  He  is  obliged  to  fall  into  some 
of  the  great  categories  of  representation,  under  any 
form  of  government ;  to  follow,  where  he  would  lead,  if 
it  were  possible  to  bring  his  active  intelligence  to  bear 
directly  on  the  problems  of  state.  He  cannot  be  his 
own  leader,  he  must  be  the  inevitable  victim  of  success.1 

New  shibboleths  directed  along  the  old  lines  of  party 
zeal2  renewed  the  allegiance  of  Democrats,  whether  loyal 
or  disloyal,  or  even  treasonable  according  to  Morton. 
The  fierce  spirit  of  the  time  designated  these  modified 
Democrats,  especially  in  the  West, to  be  "Copperheads," 
as  first  described  October  1,  1862.3  The  term,  a  "  syno 
nym  of  hidden  danger  and  secret  hostility,"  embodied 
both  hatred  and  the  suffering  of  loyal  citizens. 

Under  the  widening  modern  suffrage,  sovereignty  had 

1  Emerson  says  :  "  They  follow  success  and  not  skill.  Therefore  as  soon 
as  the  success  stops  and  the  admirable  man  blunders,  they  quit  him  .  .  . 
and  they  transfer  the  repute  of  judgment  to  the  next  prosperous  person 
who  has  not  yet  blundered." 

3  Cf.  ante,  p.  9,  and  Ostrogorski,  Democracy  and  Political  Parties,  vol. 
ii,  607. 

»  Rhodes,  U.  S.,  vol.  iv,  224  n. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  227 

become  latent  in  every  individual  voter ;  but  he  could 
not  go  alone  and  act  independently,  in  any  new  and 
large  development  of  the  state.  Like  a  homesick  child, 
he  fell  into  the  old  party  grooves,  wherever  they  might 
be  tending  ;  even  if  toward  the  destruction  of  the  state 
itself.  The  mind  of  the  recalcitrant  voter  of  1862  did 
not  carry  so  far.  He  was  mystified  and  perplexed  by 
the  enlarged  scope  of  the  citizen,  and  the  multiplied 
duties  forced  upon  him.  According  to  their  own  avowal, 
the  single  issue  of  rebellion  appeared  to  Seymour  in  the 
East,  to  Vallandigham  and  Hendricks  in  the  West,  to 
be  as  malignant  as  ever.  But  they  forgot  that  rebellion 
hews  its  own  way  and  makes  its  own  illegitimate  paths. 
The  administration  had  been  at  fault  in  not  extending 
itself  to  grapple  with  the  rebellion.  But  any  possible 
administration  would  have  injured  the  Copperhead, 
waiting  to  strike  at  the  necessary  prosecutor  of  the 
rebellion  as  it  was.  Yet  we  must  keep  in  mind  that 
the  recalcitrant  voter  of  1862,  as  we  have  termed  him, 
was  not  a  conscious  traitor.  The  plain  duty  of  the 
citizen,  the  spirit  of  the  people  —  as  embodied  in  the 
career  of  Abraham  Lincoln  —  was  a  conception  too 
elevated  and  ethereal  for  the  average  follower  of  a  party. 
He  lent  a  willing  ear  to  the  Copperhead,  and  through  an 
error  of  belief  he  betrayed  the  cause  in  actual  practice. 
The  great  States  of  New  York  and  Pennsylvania,  as 
well  as  the  Middle  West,  had  felt  the  swaying  under 
currents  of  these  hostile  forces  during  this  summer. 
The  popular  mind  was  moving,  influenced  by  the  vari 
ous  motives  we  have  stated,  toward  the  great  revival 
of  party  action,  which  was  to  give  the  Democracy  a 
new  political  foothold  in  the  autumnal  elections.  Con- 


228    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

tin  gent  to  this  fermenting  agitation,  the  loyal  gov 
ernors  originated  a  new  method  of  rallying  public 
sentiment,  through  a  "  conference  "  held  at  Altoona, 
Pa.,  September  24.  A  close  observer  and  actor  in 
many  important  events  of  this  period,  John  Russell 
Young,  considered  this  "  conference,  next  to  the  Procla 
mation  of  Emancipation,  the  most  decisive  civil  event 
of  the  war.  It  roused  the  latent  fires  of  the  Union."  l 
This  is  strictly  true,  though  the  larger  issue  eclipsed 
the  smaller  one  so  completely  that  the  momentous 
bearing  of  the  action  of  the  governors  cannot  be  fully 
recognized  in  the  fading  light  of  history.  We  must 
not  be  hypercritical  in  construing  the  action  of  such 
patriots  as  Curtin,  Andrew,  and  Morton,  who  felt  the 
pressure  of  the  discordant  elements  beneath,  and  acted 
accordingly.  Perhaps  the  conference  was  the  best  po 
litical  means  attainable  for  carrying  the  loyal  state 
organizations  through  the  powerful  undercurrents  of 
this  trying  navigation  ;  nevertheless,  it  was  a  dangerous 
undertaking  in  the  development  of  state  government 
within  the  obligations  of  the  Union.  The  movement 
was  constantly  denounced  by  the  opposition,  and  was 
used  in  New  York  especially  to  carry  the  people  and 
thereby  the  State  into  opposition  to  the  Union  as  a 
whole,  and  to  the  true  administration  of  the  Union  by 
its  properly  constituted  authorities.  The  story  of  these 
transactions  embodies  the  title  of  this  chapter  and  shows 
that  the  marvelous  awakening  of  1861  had  lapsed  into 
a  political  semi-consciousness  of  the  people,  where  their 
"  altered  hearts  were  estranged." 

Governor  Morgan  could  say  in  his  official  report  to 

1  Egle,  Life  of  Curtin,  p.  329. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  229 

the  Empire  State,  January  7,  1862,1  "  from  her  im 
perial  resources  vast  supplies  have  been  drawn  for  the 
war."  One  year  later  the  governor  of  the  same  State, 
Horatio  Seymour,  said  : 2  "  While  the  War  Department 
sets  aside  the  authority  of  the  Judiciary  and  overrides 
the  laws  of  the  States,  the  governors  of  States  meet  to 
shape  the  policy  of  the  general  government."  The 
people  are  the  only  censors  of  their  governors,  said 
Jefferson ;  and  herein  the  duly  elected  governor  of  the 
largest  State  in  the  Union  censured  the  action  of  the 
partial  representatives  of  the  people  who  had  assembled 
at  Altoona. 

Governor  Curtin  first  suggested  this  meeting.  The 
first  step  recorded 3  was  in  a  consultation  with  Secretary 
Seward  at  New  York.  Mr.  Seward  "  brightened  at  the 
thought,"  and  telegraphed  to  Lincoln,  who  approved 
the  project.  Governor  E.  D.  Morgan,  representing  New 
York  State,  declined  to  act  in  the  matter.  According 
to  John  Russell  Young,4  the  warm-hearted  son  of  Penn 
sylvania  "  saw  that  what  the  government  needed  even 
more  than  material  aid  was  the  moral  reinforcement 
that  would  come  from  an  expression  of  confidence  on 
the  part  of  the  governors  of  the  loyal  States."  5 

John  A.  Andrew  was  in  one  of  those  sulky  moods 
when  his  ebullient  patriotism  could  not  comprehend 
the  whole  governmental  problem  as  President  Lincoln 
held  it  in  his  larger  grasp.  He  wrote  Gurowski  on  the 
receipt  of  Curtin's  proposal,  September  6  :  "  I  am  sadly 

1  Message,  p.  2.  2  Message,  p.  20. 

8  Egle,  Life  of  Curtin,  pp.  308,  309.          *  Ibid.,  p.  306. 

5  The  delicate  nature  of  the  proceedings  may  be  inferred  from  the 
fact  that  no  formal  record  was  kept.  There  was  no  formal  organization 
and  no  secretary.  —  Ibid.,  p.  307. 


230    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

but  firmly  .trying  to  help  organize  some  movement  if 
possible  to  save  the  President  from  the  infamy  of  ruin 
ing  his  country."  * 

On  the  10th?  Andrew's  close  friend,  Francis  P. 
Blair,  wrote  him : 2  "If  we  are  victors  (in  the  coming 
conflict  between  McClellan  and  Lee)  the  electric  flash 
that  announces  the  fact  will  strike  .  .  .  the  fetters  off 
every  slave  on  this  continent.  It  is  success  in  the  deci 
sive  battle  that  is  to  do  this,  —  not  proclamations." 

Dates  are  important,  and  on  the  13th  Governor  Tod 
of  Ohio  wired  Secretary  Stanton,  "  Governors  Curtin 
and  Yates  have  invited  a  meeting  of  the  loyal  gov 
ernors,  to' which  I  have  of  course  assented.  Have  you 
any  suggestions  to  make  ?  " 3  Stanton  replied  that  he  had 
no  suggestions,  and  hoped  "the  counsels  may  be  wise 
and  productive  of  good."  The  recorded  events  by  no 
means  convey  the  whole  significance  of  the  vital  cur 
rents  moving  beneath  their  surface.  The  Proclamation 
of  Emancipation,  issued  just  before  the  meeting,  Septem 
ber  24,  at  Altoona,  took  away  one  of  the  chief  causes 
of  immediate  agitation.  The  governors  conferred,  and 
appointed  Curtin  and  Andrew  a  committee  to  draft  an 
address  from  the  meeting  "  held  to  take  measures  for 
the  more  active  support  of  the  government."  The  elo 
quence  of  these  statesmen  and  politicians  could  not  be 
an  "  overflow  of  powerful  feelings  upon  an  occasion 
fitted  to  excite  them."  They  mildly  adjusted  themselves 
to  the  new  conditions  of  patriotic  action.  "  In  submis 
sion  to  the  laws  which  may  have  been  or  which  may  be 
duly  enacted,  and  to  the  lawful  orders  of  the  President, 

1  Pearson,  Life  of  Andrew,  vol.  ii,  48.  2  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  543,  544. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  231 

cooperating  always  in  our  own  spheres  with  the  national 
government,  we  mean/'  etc.  .  .  .  "To  have  continued 
indefinitely  the  most  efficient  cause,  support  and  stay  of 
the  rebellion,  would  have  been  in  our  judgment  unjust 
to  the  loyal  people.  .  .  .  The  decision  of  the  President 
to  strike  at  the  root  of  the  rebellion  will  lend  new  vigor 
to  the  efforts  and  new  life  and  hope  to  the  hearts  of 
the  people."  1 

The  document  was  signed  by  twelve  governors,  in 
cluding  Morton,  who  acted  through  a  representative. 
The  most  conspicuous  name  in  absence  was  that  of 
Edwin  D.  Morgan  of  New  York.  It  was  read  by  Gov 
ernor  Andrew  to  President  Lincoln  at  the  White  House, 
in  the  presence  of  the  most  of  the  signers.  They  then 
conferred  freely  on  the  situation,  and  tried  to  worry  the 
President  into  a  dismissal  of  McClellan. 

We  must  treat  Andrew  "  tenderly,"  to  use  his  own 
noble  language  in  speaking  of  the  first  victims  of  the 
war.  While  this  great "  war  governor"  had  many  of  the 
large  faculties  of  judgment,  —  generally  well  exercised 
in  the  public  service,  —  his  emotions  often  controlled 
his  action.  He  opened  his  heart  to  his  confidential  sec 
retary,  Browne,  from  Philadelphia,  on  the  22d,  in  char 
acteristic  manner.  "  The  proclamation  by  the  President 
is  out.  It  is  a  poor  document,  but  a  mighty  act,  slow,  but 
grand  and  sublime  after  all  ...  Go  in  for  WAR.  .  .  . 
Tell  Claflin,  Sumner,  Wilson,"  etc., "  now,  NOW,  NOW." 2 

Perhaps  no  situation  in  these  difficult  times  involved 
more  perilous  issues,3  as  the  elections  were  to  show  in 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  583.         2  Browne,  Life  of  Andrew,  p.  74. 

3  Mallory  of  Kentucky  said  in  the  House  of  Representatives  that  it 
was  "a  meeting  of  the  factious  governors"  at  Altoona.  —  Egle,  Curtin, 
p.  324. 


232  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

accomplished  fact.  Yet  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  not  a 
disinterested  but  a  capable  and  discriminating  observer, 
told  Colonel  McClure  long  after  that  great  principles 
were  upheld  at  Altoona.  "  But  for  that  conference  the 
North  would  have  been  demoralized  by  the  Emancipa 
tion  Proclamation  and  the  failures  of  the  Union  army, 
and  that  peace  would  have  come  on  some  compromise." ! 
We  have  noted  how  the  victorious  Seymour2  used 
the  conference  as  a  subtle  argument  while  asserting  the 
state  sovereignty  of  New  York,  or  a  substantial  form 
of  disunion.  On  the  other  hand,  Iowa  was  one  of  the 
few  Western  communities  not  swept  from  its  Union 
anchorage,  and  which  kept  true  in  the  elections.  Sen 
ator  Grimes  said :  "  We  took  the  bull  by  the  horns  and 
made  the  proclamation  an  issue.  I  traversed  the  State 
for  four  weeks,  speaking  every  day,  and  the  more  rad 
ical  I  was  the  more  acceptable  I  was.  The  politicians 
are  a  vast  distance  behind  the  people  in  sentiment."  3 
This  does  not  account  for  New  York,  but  it  indicates 
what  might  have  been  accomplished  through  a  larger 
political  faith.  Vessels  carry  ballast  to  guard  against 
the  accidents  of  navigation,  notr  for  progressive  pur 
poses.  In  the  old  times,  steamers  had  a  load  on  wheels, 
which  stalwart  sailors  dragged  back  and  forth  to  coun 
teract  the  list  toward  starboard  or  port.  If  caught  on 
the  wrong  side  they  increased  the  risk,  if  halting 
in  the  centre  they  were  nullified.  Governor  Morgan 
was  a  patriot,  a  large-minded  man  of  affairs,  who 
carried  New  York  through  the  crisis  of  1861  by  his 
wisdom  and  energy.  He  was  not  at  Altoona.  The  aver- 

1  Pearson,  Life  of  Andrew ',  vol.  ii,  53  n. 

2  Ante,  p.  225.    '  8  Rhodes,  vol  iv,  166. 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  233 

age  citizens  whom  he  represented  were  caught  on  the 
conservative  centre,  while  Seymour,  with  more  genius 
and  more  daring  for  mischief,  precipitated  the  list  of 
the  massive  State  toward  that  function  of  sovereignty 
which  would  end  in  practical  disunion.  New  York  has 
been  too  often  governed  by  such  neutralizing  influences 
to  avail  of  her  full  relative  power  in  the  United  States. 

That  this  is  a  fair  estimate  of  the  conditions  prevail 
ing  in  the  mind  of  the  North  may  be  inferred  from 
another  line  of  facts.  Benjamin  R.  Curtis,  endowed  with 
the  most  serene  judicial  intellect  since  John  Marshall, 
had  been  a  loyal  Republican,  vigorously  supporting  the 
administration.  October  26,  1862,  he  published  a  pam 
phlet  on  "  Executive  Power."  After  reciting  the  facts, 
he  pronounced  of  the  President :  "He  has  superadded  to 
his  rights  as  commander  the  powers  of  a  usurper,  and 
that  is  military  despotism." 

If  any  one  could  have  persuaded  the  North  that 
Lincoln  was  a  military  despot,  the  cool  and  patriotic 
Curtis  could  have  done  it.  The  utterance  created  a  mere 
ripple  on  public  opinion.  As  law  it  was  interesting ;  but 
in  the  moving  springs  of  the  time,  in  the  profound 
causes  which  make  law,  it  had  little  effect. 

There  was  partial  disintegration  of  the  loyal  hosts  in 
Pennsylvania,  but  the  culmination  of  mischief,  rendered 
possible  by  party  agitation,  was  reached  in  Indiana. 
After  the  fall  elections,  the  legislature  was  controlled 
absolutely  by  the  Democratic  party,  and  it  almost 
brought  about  a  dissolution  of  the  functions  of  govern 
ment  in  the  spring  of  1863.  Governor  Oliver  P.  Morton 
was  left  alone  virtually,  and  through  his  able  and  adroit 

1  Cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  170. 


234  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

use  of  prerogative  he  kept  the  State  steadily  at  work 
for  the  Union.  The  whole  matter  was  a  wonderful  epi 
sode  in  representative  government,  where  the  elements 
of  disorder  were  subjected  and  forced  into  an  active 
support  of  order.  Morton  set  forth  the  tendencies  of 
the  time  when  he  anathematized  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
certain  newspapers  of  Indiana  and  Ohio  in  the  early 
summer  of  1862.  "  They  are  doing  incalculable  injury 
to  the  Union  cause,  not,  it  is  true,  openly  and  in  plain 
terms,  but  by  invidious,  malignant,  and  vituperative  at 
tacks  upon  Union  men,  by  their  continued  apologies 
for  the  crimes  committed  by  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion, 
and  by  their  failure  to  condemn  their  cause  and  con 
duct."  This  sort  of  disputation  educated  the  Copper 
heads2  of  the  time.  The  imperial  aspirations  of  the 
"  great  West  "  —  as  it  was  called  in  the  mid-nineteenth 
century  —  were  a  constant  factor  in  the  growth  of  the 
republic.  The  machinations  of  Aaron  Burr,  the  Louisi 
ana  Purchase,  the  assimilation  of  Texas,  the  conquest 
of  California,  all  pointed  one  way ;  all  inspired  the  con 
scious  Western  American  at  every  turn  of  affairs.  The 
control  of  the  Father  of  Waters,  the  immense  commercial 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  176. 

2  The  practical  issue  embodied  in  the  term  is  clearly  indicated  in  its 
use  after  the  war  by  John  Sherman  in  a  letter  to  Secretary  Stanton  con 
cerning  General    Sherman's   unfortunate  mistake  in   the    surrender   of 
Johnston.    "  I  do  not  wish  General  Sherman  to  be  unjustly  dealt  with, 
and  I  know  that  you  will  not  permit  it,  and  especially  I  do  not  want  him 
driven  into  fellowship  with  the  Copperheads.    His  military  services  have 
been  too  valuable  to  the  country  to  be  stained  by  any  such  fellowship." 
—  Gorham,  Stanton,  vol.  ii,  196. 

Here  was  a  consummate  politician  and  broad  statesman  dealing  with 
his  brother's  inmost  interests  on  the  one  hand  and  great  national  interests 
on  the  other.  The  innate  nature  of  a  Copperhead  might  include  half-de 
veloped  treason,  or  virtue  gone  astray. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  235 

future  of  the  Mississippi  valley,  forecasted  the  citizen 
and  inflamed  his  civic  imagination.  In  this  autumn  a 
genuine  fear  pervaded  the  Northwest  that  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  might  succeed  and  might  dominate  the 
Mississippi.  It  affected  in  kind  and  according  to  con 
viction  the  patriots  of  the  Union  and  the  partisan 
clients  of  state  sovereignty.  Events  thickened.  A  capa 
ble,  patriotic  —  though  mediocre  —  general  like  Buell 
inevitably  must  be  crushed,  when  denounced  by  the  able 
and  energetic  Morton,  backed  by  the  governors  of  Ohio 
and  Illinois.  Late  in  October,  Morton  urged  the  Pre 
sident  to  counteract  the  dangerous  disaffection  prevail 
ing  in  the  Northwest  by  a  vigorous  campaign  to  drive 
the  rebels  from  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi.1 
His  friends  claim  that  his  zeal  induced  the  movements 
which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Vicksburg. 

Thomas  A.  Hendricks  sufficiently  indicated  the  cu 
rious  errancy  of  the  Democrats  of  Indiana  by  a  tirade 
delivered  in  their  convention :  "  If  the  failure  and  folly 
and  wickedness  of  the  party  in  power  render  a  Union 
impossible,  then  the  mighty  Northwest  must  take  care 
of  herself."2 

As  above  stated,  the  legislature  attempted  to  ignore 
the  governor,  and  claimed  to  reject  his  official  message. 
A  member  moved  to  adopt  the  "  exalted  and  patriotic 
sentiments  "  3  in  the  message  of  Governor  Seymour  of 
New  York.  This  was  not  adopted,  but  it  indicates  the 
temper  of  the  body.  These  factious  courses  by  partisans 
were  taken  after  the  practical  grievances  through  arbi 
trary  arrest — justly  condemned  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  and 

1  Foulke,  Life  of  Morton,  vol.  i,  208. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  173.  3  Ibid.,  p.  217. 


236    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

Illionis  —  had  been  remedied.  Despotic  power  construed 
by  Judge  Curtis,  as  against  the  emancipation  of  negroes, 
never  seriously  troubled  the  Northern  mind.  Arbitrary 
power,  as  advocated  by  Stevens  and  exercised  by  Stan- 
ton,  to  take  an  old  man  like  Olds  of  Ohio  from  his  home 
in  the  night  and  put  him  in  Fort  Lafayette,  was  some 
thing  nearer  home  that  touched  the  heart  of  the  Amer 
ican  citizen.  But  the  mistakes  of  arbitrary  arrest  were 
atoned  for  in  General  Order  No.  193,1  which  practically 
released  ah1  political  prisoners. 

In  the  spring  of  1863,  the  partial  sovereignty  of  the 
State  of  Indiana  was  in  being,  but  it  was  exercised  in  a 
strange  manner.  Maine  says :  "  Sovereignty  has  the  pos 
session  of  irresistible  force,  not  necessarily  exerted,  but 
capable  of  being  exerted."  Our  States  had  not  complete 
sovereignty,  but  certain  attributes  thereof  which  were 
never  lost.  These  subtle  powers,  latent  in  all  civilized 
communities,  were  utilized  most  skillfully  by  Governor 
Morton  2  at  this  time.  The  legislature  had  adjourned 
without  making  appropriations.  For  two  years  the  gov 
ernor  had  carried  on  the  administration  of  the  State 
by  his  own  personal  energy,  raising  money  without  tax 
ation,  and  disbursing  it  through  his  own  bureaus.  If  he 
should  assemble  the  legislature  again,  it  would  not 
make  appropriations  except  with  the  passage  of  a  mili 
tary  bill  depriving  the  governor  of  all  control  of  the 
forces  of  the  State.  April  18, 1863,  Morton  established 
a  bureau  of  finance  with  his  own  secretary.  He  collected 
arsenal  and  other  funds  from  the  general  government, 
and  borrowed  money  from  the  citizens  and  counties. 

1  O.  R.,  Series  II,  vol.  iv,  746.  And  cf.  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  223. 

2  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  253-255. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  237 

The  debts  he  had  contracted  for  arms  were  assumed  by 
the  general  government,  which  took  the  arms.  For  the 
time,  Morton  was  the  State. 

All  this  was  a  most  interesting  experiment  in  scien 
tific  tyranny.  Great  causes  are  required  for  great  re 
sults.  It  has  been  said,  a  tyrant  must  really  interest  and 
interest  prodigiously  a  sufficient  number  of  subordinate 
tyrants  in  the  duration  of  his  power.  But  Morton  repre 
sented  the  loyal  element  of  the  State  of  Indiana.  The 
nominal  tyranny  he  was  exercising  in  their  behalf  had 
its  objective,  not  in  any  desire  or  profit  of  governor  or 
citizens,  but  in  the  salvation  of  the  whole  Union. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Speaker  Grow  recorded 
his  observations  of  the  temper  of  the  people  of  the 
State  of  New  York  in  May,  1861.  They  feared  that  the 
administration  would  not  invade  Virginia  to  maintain 
the  integrity  of  the  Union.  That  issue  of  inadequate  ad 
ministration  might  be  indicative  of  others  to  come.  Mr. 
Grow  said  with  sagacious  forecast,  that  if  the  adminis 
tration  proved  inefficient  "  you  will  be  as  powerless  in 
thirty  days  as  you  are  now  powerful.  I  saw  many  of 
the  solid  men  in  New  York,  and  they  have  embarked 
their  all  in  this  contest,  provided  the  administration 
will  prosecute  to  the  bitter  end,  if  need  be." 

These  burning  words  fitly  represent  the  energies  of 
the  people,  eager  to  subdue  the  alien  spirit  of  secession. 
Such  potent  energies,  if  turned  awry  and  balked  of 
their  first  purpose,  were  not  to  become  mere  neutrals  in 
the  contest  controlling  the  whole  nation.  The  spirits  of 
health  become  the  demons  of  disease  if  perverted  in 
the  body  politic  and  sickened  by  a  false  regimen.  Trea- 

1  Ante,  p.  71. 


238  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

son  was  the  betrayal  of  the  Union.  Any  attack  on  the 
government  or  any  obstruction  of  its  defenses  was  abso 
lute  treason  in  the  belief  of  the  practical  majority  of 
the  Northern  people.  The  Copperhead  was  not  a  traitor ; 
he  was  worse  than  the  avowed  enemies  of  the  republic 
who  offered  battle  against  it.  This  corrupting  principle 
was  nobly  denounced  by  John  A.  Dix :  — 

Those,  therefore,  who  array  themselves  against  it  (the 
enrollment  and  draft)  are  obnoxious  to  a  far  severer  censure 
than  the  ambitious  or  misguided  men  who  are  striving  to  sub 
vert  the  government,  for  the  latter  are  acting  by  color  of 
sanction  under  legislatures  and  conventions  of  the  people  in 
the  States  they  represent.  Among  us  resistance  to  the  law  by 
those  who  claim  and  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  government 
has  no  semblance  of  justification,  and  becomes  the  very  black 
est  of  political  crimes  not  only  because  it  is  revolt  against  the 
constituted  authorities  of  the  country,  but  because  it  would 
be  practically  striking  a  blow  for  treason.1 

This  was  addressed  directly  to  Governor  Seymour  in 
the  crucial  times  of  the  draft  riots.  It  belongs  here, 
for  it  shows  the  singular  aberration  of  mind  incurred 
by  midway  patriots  of  the  Seymour  type,  blundering 
after  state  sovereignty  in  the  interest  of  the  Democratic 
party.  It  is  a  paradox  that  "  striking  a  practical  blow 
for  treason  "  from  a  safe  covert,  maintained  by  loyal 
men  against  red-handed  traitors  without,  is  worse  than 
treason  itself.  Yet  popular  intuition  never  errs  in  such 
contingencies,  and  the  term  Copperhead  embodies  the 
fierce  practical  hatred  which  such  practices  excited.  Yet 
the  superficial  forms  of  political  or  diplomatic  inter 
course  can  never  be  disregarded,  and  the  worst  citizen 
has  rights  which  the  pirate  loses. 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  653. 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  239 

Perhaps  the  greatest  controversial  mistake  made  by 
the  loyal  Republicans  was  in  the  frequent  efforts  to 
prove  that  the  Democratic  opposition  was  treason  in 
essence.  Democrats  as  patriotic  and  respectable  as  Au 
gust  Belmont  would  not  commit  treason.  They  were 
deceived  and  mistook  their  civic  responsibility  under  the 
conduct  of  leaders  like  Seymour  and  Vallandigham,  who 
were  attempting  to  handle  the  pitchy  tools  of  treason 
under  the  forms  of  constitutional  opposition.  Vallandig- 
ham  said  in  the  House  of  Representatives :  "  Can  this 
war  continue  ?  Whence  the  money  to  carry  it  on  ? 
Where  the  men  ?  Can  you  borrow  ?  From  whom  ?  Can 
you  tax  more  ?  .  .  .  I  beg  pardon  ;  but  I  trust  I  am 
not  '  discouraging  enlistments/  If  I  am,  then  first  arrest 
Lincoln,  Stanton,  and  Halleck."  * 

Horatio  Seymour  did  not  take  the  same  frank  and 
outspoken  course  in  opposition.  According  to  the  gal 
lant  Dix  he  did  worse  virtually.  There  is  no  more  in 
comprehensible  personality  in  our  history.  He  was  not 
a  vulgar  partisan.  In  1860  it  was  said  of  him,  "  Sey 
mour  is  to-day  the  unquestioned  leader  of  the  Democracy 
of  the  State.  Nor  is  his  leadership  won  by  the  manage 
ment  of  politicians  or  retained  by  the  packing  of  con 
ventions."  2 

And  it  is  assumed  by  present  historians  that  he  was 
cultivated,  sincere,  and  even  patriotic.  But  this  does 
not  tell  the  whole  story.  He  was  not  a  traitor,  still  less 
was  he  loyal,  because  he  could  not  render  himself  wholly 
and  solely  to  the  cause  of  the  Union.  Nor  could  he 
speak  out  like  Vallandigham.  For  his  will  could  not 

1  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  226. 

2  Savage,  Living  Representative  Men,  p.  438. 


240  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

determine  in  the  things  which  he  conceived  as  depend 
ing  or  which  might  depend  on  his  determination.  Val- 
landigham's  course  ended  at  last  in  prison.  And  how 
ever  Mr.  Lincoln's  crude  executive  ways  might  have 
failed  in  the  "  arbitrary  arrests  "  of  1862,  he  made  no 
mistake  in  confining  Vallandigham  finally.  People  then 
had  come  to  perceive  with  Dix  that  there  are  things 
worse  than  treason  under  a  constitutional  government. 
In  this  dilemma  Seymour  dropped  back  into  a  very 
musty  and  stale  state  sovereignty.1  Like  a  dreamer  be 
fogged  by  his  own  creations  he  passed  off  into  a  delusion 
that  something  better  than  Union  could  be  made  out 
of  three  or  more  disunions.2 

The  embers  of  state  sovereignty,  smothered  in  1861, 
were  kindled  again  by  adverse  currents  emanating  from 
the  untoward  course  of  public  affairs.  When  charged 
with  treason,  the  Copperhead  retorted  with  Vallandig 
ham  that  the  radicals  of  the  North  had  been  even  more 

1  "  The  sovereignties  of  the  States,  except  as  they  are  limited  by  the 
Constitution,  can  never  be  given  up.    Without  them  our  government  can 
not  stand."  —  Seymour,  Message,  1862,  p.  21.     "  We  must  restore  the 
Union  as  it  was  before  the  war.    The  assertion  that  this  war  was  the  un 
avoidable  result  of  slavery  is  not  erroneous,  but  it  has  led  to  a  disastrous 
policy  in  its  prosecution."  —  Ibid.,  p.  32.     The  logical  insight  of  Morton 
pierced  these  sophistries  as  with  a  needle.    A  Democrat  descended  from 
Andrew  Jackson,  he  was  an  American  through  and  through.    He  said  at 
Cambridge  City,  July  4,  "There  are  two  theories  in  collision  in  this 
bloody  contest.  On  one  hand  it  is  held  that  there  is  no  such  people  as  the 
American  nation,  but  that  there  are  thirty-four  independent  States  which 
have  made  a  compact  from  which  they  can  withdraw  at  pleasure.     The 
other  theory  is  that  we  are  a  unit,  one  and  indivisible."  —  Foulke,  Morton, 
vol.  i,  249. 

2  "  While  the  North  cannot  hold  the  Southern  States  in  subjection  with 
out  destroying  the  principles  of  our  government,  the  great  Central  and 
Western  States  can  control  the  two   extremes."  —  Seymour,  Message, 
1862,  p.  34. 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  241 

treasonable.  History,  as  it  reveals  the  wayward  errors 
of  those  trying  times,  finds  very  poor  leaders  among 
both  Republicans  and  Democrats.  Greeley,  the  child 
of  the  Northern  radicals,  openly  advocated  mediation 
through  a  European  power,  and  corresponded  with  Val- 
landigham  to  that  effect.  In  private  he  told  Raymond 
of  the  "  Times  "  that  he  meant  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
close.  "  You  '11  see  that  I  '11  drive  Lincoln  into  it." 1 
Greeley  was  a  greater  fool  than  Seymour  or  Vallandig- 
ham,  for  he  created  his  "  fool's  paradise  "  out  of  his  im 
mediate  surroundings.  In  this  crucial  time  the  folly  of 
a  feeble  leader  fraternized  with  the  crime  of  an  ardent 
traitor.  We  must  analyze  these  warring  disputants  to 
get  at  the  sources  of  f  eeling  which  impelled  the  citizens 
r  and  carried  them  into  such  mischievous  partisan  courses. 
The  divided  public  sentiment  of  the  North  found  expres 
sion  through  the  Democratic  party  in  political  action, 
which  was  legitimate  in  form,  according  to  the  super-  ) 
ficial  aspect  of  constitutional  opposition.  But  the  inev 
itable  effect  of  this  erratic  action  in  the  States  was  to 
waste  more  and  more  of  their  blood  and  treasure  in  the 
necessary  war  for  the  Union. 

These  matters  are  worth  close  study,  for  they  reveal 
the  springs  of  government,  the  sources  of  the  highest 
civilization,  the  necessary  growth  of  a  complex  polity. 
The  body  politic  in  a  modern  republic  is  one  stupendous 
whole,  organic,  articulated,  carrying  life  or  death  in  its 
unified  movement  into  all  its  parts.  In  this  sense  the 
States  misled  by  Seymour  were  not  commonwealths 
holding  single  communities  of  interest,  but  organs  of 
one  great  and  stupendous  body,  impelled  by  one  nerve 

1  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  222. 


242    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

current,  nourished  by  one  political  circulation,  which 
might  carry  buoyant  health  through  all  the  parts,  or  if 
fevered,  sickened,  and  inflamed,  might  poison  any  part 
to  the  destruction  of  the  whole. 

There  were  arrests  which  were  despotic  and  those 
which  were  not.  Lincoln  and  Stanton  had  atoned  for 
their  despotic  mistakes  by  releasing  the  political  pris 
oners  after  the  autumnal  elections  in  1862.  But  other 
and  necessary  arrests  were  to  come.  Burke  considered 
that  to  be  arbitrary  proceeding  which  might  be  con 
ducted  "  by  the  private  opinions  or  feeling  of  the  man 
who  attempts  to  regulate."  We  shall  be  obliged  to 
apply  this  canon  carefully.  General  Burnside  was  in 
command  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  and  April 
13,  1863,1  he  issued  the  famous  General  Order  No. 
38,  proclaiming :  "  Treason,  expressed  or  implied,  will 
not  be  tolerated  in  this  department."  Vallandigham, 
emitting  the  venom  of  a  Copperhead  at  a  Democratic 
mass  meeting,  was  arrested  afterward  for  violating  this 
order.  Brought  before  a  military  commission,  the  United 
States  Circuit  Court  refused  him  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus, 
and  he  could  only  protest  against  the  proceedings. 
The  commission  sentenced  him  to  close  confinement 
during  the  war,  and  President  Lincoln  commuted  this 

1  Cf .  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  235-237.  Congress  passed  an  act  March  3,  1863, 
limiting  the  powers  of  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  of  War  in  dealing 
with  "state  and  political  prisoners,"  all  proper  and  wholesome.  The 
technical  argument  leaned  toward  the  Copperheads  ;  but  in  the  view 
of  the  present  writer  the  practical  outcome  of  these  matters  was  little 
affected  by  strict  law.  The  Copperheads  must  have  a  licking,  and  they 
got  it.  To  argue  that  they  erred  because  some  arrests  transcended  law 
is  to  misconceive  blindly  the  nature  of  the  Copperhead.  The  people  — 
just  judges  in  such  matters  —  showed  by  their  vote  in  the  autumn  that 
they  comprehended  the  issue  in  its  full  force. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  243 

to  banishment  into  the  Southern  Confederacy.  In  his 
passage  it  was  necessary  to  guard  him  from  the  fury 
of  loyal  soldiers,  but  no  guards  were  needed  when  he 
invaded  the  hospitable  quarters  of  the  rebels. 

Much  learned  discussion  has  been  devoted  to  this 
particular  incident,  and  the  matured  opinions  of  the 
courts  were  declared  against  this  and  similar  proceed 
ings.  The  great  and  moving  necessities  of  administra 
tion  will  endure,  nevertheless.  Our  civic  laws  may  and 
must  be  imperfect  substitutes  for  eternal  laws;  but 
however  well  adjusted,  they  will  yield  to  crucial  neces 
sity  whenever  the  moving  cause  is  sufficient.  When  the 
cause  issues  from  the  spirit  of  a  people,  it  will  -prevail, 
even  if  law  proper  suffers  for  the  time.  The  rules  of 
navigation  never  steered  a  ship,  nor  did  internal  gravi 
tation  ever  move  a  planet;  the  cause  over  and  in  all 
directed  the  movement.  When  the  necessity  passes,  the 
law,  not  broken,  but  impaired,  will  be  restored.1 

The  military  progress  of  the  summer  was  excellent, 
and  ought  to  have  been  overwhelming.  Grant  swept 
aside  scholastic,  tactical  traditions,  swung  his  base  into 
the  air,  seized  Vicksburg,  and  opened  the  Mississippi; 
an  immense  material  victory  over  the  rebels,  and  a 
prodigious  counter-check  to  the  opposition  of  Peace 

1  This  incident  is  treated  by  Mr.  Rhodes  (U.  S.,  vol.  iv,  246-253)  with 
his  usual  candor,  and  with  ample  material.  His  view  of  the  President's 
cause,  however,  seems  quite  inadequate.  1  was  fortunate  in  getting  direct 
testimony  from  a  competent  witness  —  Hon.  George  S.  Boutwell.  To  the 
question,  "  Did  the  Union  cause  suffer  by  the  blunder  in  arresting  Val- 
landigham?  "  he  answered,  "  No.  Those  fellows  were  cowed  somewhat  by 
Vallandigham's  arrest,  and  I  do  not  think  it  was  a  mistake."  And  "  Was 
not  the  President's  conduct  in  the  affair  admirable  ?  "  He  said,  "  Yes,  in 
writing  he  was  supreme.  He  must  have  been  a  very  successful  lawyer. 
Wonderful  power  of  statement." 


244  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Democrats  in  the  Northwest.  Under  great  difficulties, 
Meade,  an  admirable  general  of  the  second  class,  de 
feated  Lee  at  Gettysburg.  He  might  have  crushed  him. 
But  the  second-class  general  calls  the  noxious  council 
of  war,  and  Meade' s  did  not  fail  to  spoil  the  possible 
result.  Lee  got  off,  and  his  army  survived  for  nearly 
two  years  more  of  bloody  strife.  Hardly  anything  is 
more  pathetic  than  Lincoln's  suffering  in  the  agony  of 
this  crisis.1  In  what  he  said,  and  even  more  in  what  he 
did  not  say  to  Meade,  we  recognize  the  majesty  of  the 
man.  The  local  elections  in  the  fall,  especially  in  Ohio, 
brought  to  the  bar  of  popular  opinion  these  issues, 
which  had  been  precipitated  by  Burnside  in  his  brusque 
but  useful  Order  No.  38.  Vallandigham,  "  the  pensive 
exile  bending  with  his  woe,"  was  unanimously  nomi 
nated  for  governor.  Every  possible  partisan  energy 
was  exerted  to  mislead  and  carry  the  populace  for  this 
wolf  clad  in  the  garments  of  liberty  and  freedom  of 
citizenship.  The  people  in  their  might  arose  to  meet 
the  highest  functions  of  the  citizen.  Farmers  brought 
their  wives  to  the  mass  meetings,  and  listened  by  the 
hour  to  thorough  practical  discussions  of  free  govern 
ment  and  the  needs  of  the  Union.  Julian,  a  vigorous 
agitator,  proposed  to  stop  after  speaking  four  hours  in 
a  drizzling  rain.  "  Go  on,"  said  a  farmer  ;  "  we  '11  hear 
you ;  it 's  past  milking-time,  anyhow."  These  stalwart 
descendants  from  1776  were  convinced  that  whatever 
legal  quiddities  might  exact,  their  political  action  would 
cast  a  vote  for  or  against  Jefferson  Davis.  Never  was 
the  dictum  of  Thomas  Jefferson  more  clearly  demon 
strated  that  the  people  are  the  best  "  censors  of  their 

1  Diary  in  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  278. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  245 

own  governors."  The  result  amazed  both  Union  men 
and  Democrats  and  was  a  "testimony  of  the  silent, 
unobtrusive  voters  who  are  sure  to  come  out  when  the 
sentiment  of  the  people  is  really  aroused."  Brough 
was  elected  over  Vallandigham  by  a  majority  above 
101,000.  Kather  more  than  two  voters  went  for  the 
administration  and  continuance  of  the  war  to  one 
against  it.  When  we  consider  the  tremendous  influ 
ence  of  party  affiliation,  which  misled  many  Democrats 
who  were  not  Copperheads,  we  recognize  in  the  result 
a  splendid  vindication  of  representative  government. 

The  peculiar  Copperhead  reaction  was  felt  more  or 
less  in  all  the  States.  In  Pennsylvania,  it  was  "  immea 
surably  strengthened  "  2  by  the  removal  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vanian  McClellan,  and  his  supercession  by  Burnside. 
Even  a  majority  of  the  Democrats  had  welcomed  eman 
cipation,  but  a  blow  at  state  pride  could  not  be  en 
dured. 

Doubtless  in  the  assured  calm  of  1866  the  Supreme 
Court  could  make  better  law,  as  in  the  Milligan  case, 
than  Lincoln  or  any  president  could  have  made  in  a 
crisis  of  the  rebellion  ;  but  the  best  laws  have  always 
been  silent  in  such  crucial  times.  The  angry  sore  in 
the  body  politic  that  the  Copperheads  had  poisoned 
inevitably  had  to  be  brought  to  a  head  and  punctured ; 
if  not  by  the  sword,  by  a  kindred  surgical  operation. 
The  surgeon's  knife  never  moves  in  the  course  of 
nature.  It  violently  arrests  disease  in  the  interest  of 
a  larger  health,  which  must  possess  the  body  politic  as 
well  as  the  human  body,  if  life  is  to  prevail  over  death. 

We  have  been  describing  purely  political  evolution. 

i  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  414.  2  Repplier,  Philadelphia,  p.  364. 


246  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

By  another  process,  significant  of  these  times,  the 
people  of  Ohio  and  Indiana  were  aroused  this  summer 
in  their  patriotic  might.  Morgan,  the  rebel  chieftain, 
as  well  as  some  timid  Republicans  at  home,  had  been 
led  to  believe  that  the  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle 
and  the  Order  of  American  Knights  in  Ohio  and  Indi 
ana  would  join  him,  if  he  actually  raised  the  standard 
of  rebellion  on  loyal  soil.  Their  talk  tended  that  way. 
These  secret  orders  were  the  resultant  of  the  hidden 
conspiracies  of  the  previous  year  we  have  described  in 
Governor  Morton's  words.1  But  when  Morgan  made 
his  raid,  the  actual  present  enemy  could  not  impel 
even  a  Copperhead  to  fight,  and  the  people  arose  to 
expel  him  with  the  same  unanimity  manifested  when 
they  rallied  against  the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter.2  Con 
flict  and  invasion  had  at  last  vindicated  Morton's  lucid 
exposition  of  the  tyrannous  necessity  of  party,  pro 
claimed  in  his  message  in  the  spring  of  1861 :  "  The 
issue  is  forced  upon  us  and  must  be  accepted.  Every 
man  must  take  his  position  upon  the  one  side  or  the 
other.  In  time  of  war  there  is  no  ground  upon  which  a 
third  party  can  stand."  3 

This  profound  development  of  public  sentiment, 
separating  wheat  from  chaff,  as  it  did  this  year,  was 
closely  observed  by  Mr.  Lincoln.  No  ruler  ever  knew 
his  people  more  thoroughly,  or  better  adapted  his  word 
and  inevitable  act  to  their  mood  and  varying  expres 
sion.  He  put  himself  on  record  in  a  remarkable  letter, 
addressed  to  a  meeting  in  Illinois,  August  26,  1863 ,4 
While  the  man  Lincoln  was  a  Republican,  a  partisan, 

1  Ante,  p.  224.  2  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  284. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  118.  *  0.  R.t  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  731-734. 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  247 

and  most  adroit  politician,  he  never  forgot  that  the 
ruler  was  leader  of  the  whole  people,  and  their  necessary 
executive  head.  In  this  regard  the  opening  sentences 
are  significant. 

The  meeting  is  to  be  of  all  those  who  maintain  uncondi 
tional  devotion  to  the  Union ;  and  I  am  sure  my  old  political 
friends  will  thank  me  for  tendering,  as  I  do,  the  nation's 
gratitude  to  those  other  noble  men,  whom  no  partisan  malice, 
or  partisan  hope,  can  make  false  to  the  nation's  life.  .  .  . 
There  are  those  who  are  dissatisfied  with  me.  To  such  I 
would  say :  you  desire  peace ;  and  you  blame  me  that  we  do 
not  have  it.  But  how  can  we  attain  it  ?  There  are  but  three 
conceivable  ways.  First,  to  suppress  the  rebellion  by  force  of 
arms.  This  I  am  trying  to  do.  Are  you  for  it  ?  If  you  are, 
so  far  we  are  agreed.  If  you  are  not  for  it,  a  second  way  is 
to  give  up  the  Union.  I  am  against  this.  Are  you  for  it  ?  If 
you  are,  you  should  say  so  plainly.  If  you  are  not  for  force, 
nor  yet  for  dissolution,  there  only  remains  some  imaginable 
compromise  ...  in  what  way  can  that  compromise  be  used 
to  keep  Lee's  army  out  of  Pennsylvania.  No  paper  compro 
mise,  to  which  the  controllers  of  Lee's  army  are  not  agreed, 
can,  at  all,  affect  that  army.  .  .  .  You  dislike  the  Emancipa 
tion  Proclamation  ;  and  perhaps  would  have  it  retracted.  You 
say  it  is  unconstitutional.  I  think  differently.  ...  I  issued 
the  proclamation  on  purpose  to  aid  you  in  saving  the  Union. 
Whenever  you  shall  have  conquered  all  resistance  to  the 
Union,  if  I  shall  urge  you  to  continue  fighting,  it  will  be  an 
apt  time,  then,  for  you  to  declare  you  will  not  fight  to  free 
negroes.  Some  of  them  seem  willing  to  fight  for  you ;  but 
no  matter.  .  .  .  Why  should  they  do  anything  for  us,  if  we 
will  do  nothing  for  them  ?  If  they  stake  their  lives  for  us, 
they  must  be  prompted  by  the  strongest  motive  —  even  the 
promise  of  freedom.  And  the  promise  being  made  must  be 
kept.  .  .  .  Peace  does  not  appear  so  distant  as  it  did.  I  hope 
it  will  come  soon.  .  .  .  And  then  there  will  be  some  black 


248    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

men  who  can  remember  that,  with  silent  tongue,  and  clenched 
teeth,  and  steady  eye,  and  well-poised  bayonet,  they  have 
helped  mankind  on  to  this  great  consummation ;  while,  I 
fear,  there  will  be  some  white  ones,  unable  to  forget  that, 
with  malignant  heart  and  deceitful  speech,  they  have  strove 
to  hinder  it. 

We  are  taught  that  in  the  epical  days  a  hero  mani 
fested  himself  by  great  and  uncommon  deeds.  Was 
Milton  more  sublime  when  portraying  his  angels  and 
devils  than  this  simple  American  when  lifted  to  the 
presidency  and  pleading  for  the  poor  black  man  now 
aroused  to  heroic  acts  ?  Was  any  demon  of  Satan's  troop 
worse  branded  than  the  Copperhead  white  as  he  stands 
and  soils  these  lines  in  contrast  with  the  black  f  reedman 
and  soldier?  Such  simple  justice,  set  forth  with  pro 
found  and  sagacious  insight  into  the  ways  of  humanity, 
struck  home  to  the  convictions  of  the  average  citizen. 
The  great  electoral  victories  in  the  States  we  have 
treated  above  were  foreshadowed  in  these  admirable 
statements  of  Mr.  Lincoln. 

I  make  this  long  citation  for  its  masterly  exposition 
of  the  immediate  situation,  for  its  firm  grasp  of  the 
issues  of  the  summer  of  1863,  but  even  more  for  its 
lucid  explanation  of  the  whole  vital  question  in  dispute. 
An  arbiter  goes  to  see,  and  having  penetrated  the  ques 
tion  at  issue,  decision  is  awarded.  War  is  the  greatest 
of  arbiters.  It  brings  events  to  conclusion,  to  an  inevit 
able  decree. 

All  this  Mr.  Lincoln  embodies  in  the  simplest  and 
most  direct  form.  Revolt,  rebellion,  slaughter,  emanci 
pation  have  induced  and  they  exhibit  three  ways  out, 
and  only  three, — force,  to  restore  Union ;  dissolution,  to 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  249 

establish  secession  ;  compromise, forcible  enough  to  keep 
Lee's  army  out  of  Pennsylvania.  Thereto,  the  compro 
mise  must  be  not  a  mere  paper  promise,  but  an  agree 
ment  convincing  and  binding  the  leaders  of  Lee's  army. 
Such  compromise  was  impossible.  Emancipation  was  ir 
retrievable,  for  it  issued  from  the  great  arbiter,  war  itself, 
being  a  word  not  spoken,  tftit  acted. 

The  tremendous  categories  embraced  the  foundations 
of  every  possible  government  and  included  the  duty  of 
all  citizens.  Their  inevitable  logic  should  have  swept 
away  the  grounds  of  party  difference  throughout  the 
North.  They  applied  as  well  to  indifferent  or  recalcitrant 
Republicans  as  to  lukewarm  Democrats  or  malignant 
Copperheads. 

As  we  shall  soon  treat  another  sort  of  partisan  dis 
affection,  not  occasioned  by  Copperheads,  we  may  pause 
in  the  beginning  of  1864  and  look  at  the  contemporary 
portraits  of  the  President,  showing  the  regard  of  friendly 
critics  from  various  points  of  view.  In  this  connection 
we  will  consider  citizens  and  not  politicians.  Motley 
said  from  Vienna :  "  My  respect  for  the  character  of 
the  President  increases  every  day."  Lowell  wrote  : 2 
"  History  will  rank  Mr.  Lincoln  among  the  most  pru 
dent  of  statesmen  and  the  most  successful  of  rulers.  If 
we  wish  to  appreciate  him,  we  have  only  to  conceive  the 
inevitable  chaos  in  which  we  should  now  be  weltering 
had  a  weak  man  or  an  unwise  one  been  chosen  in  his 
stead."  The  wise  and  discriminating  Asa  Gray  affirms 
that  "  homely,  honest,  ungainly  Lincoln  is  the  repre 
sentative  man  of  the  country."  3 

1  Motley,  Letters,  vol.  ii,  146. 

2  North  American  Review,  January,  1864.         3  Gray,  Letters,  vol.  ii,  623. 


250  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Richard  H.  Dana  wrote  May  4,  1864,  from  inter 
views  :  — 

The  cabinet  is  at  sixes  and  sevens.  They  (excepting  Sew- 
ard)  say  dreadful  things  of  one  another.  I  cannot  describe 
the  President,  it  is  impossible.  He  was  sobered  in  his  talk, 
told  no  extreme  stories,  said  some  good  things  and  some  help 
lessly  natural  and  nai've  things.  You  can't  help  feeling  an  in 
terest  in  him,  a  sympathy  and  a  kind  of  pity  ;  feeling,  too, 
that  he  has  some  qualities  of  great  value,  yet  fearing  that  his 
weak  points  may  wreck  him  or  wreck  something.  His  life 
seems  a  series  of  wise,  sound  conclusions,  slowly  reached, 
oddly  worked  out,  on  great  questions,  with  constant  failures 
in  administration  of  details  and  dealings  with  individuals.1 

These  men  fairly  represented  the  culture  of  our  re 
public,  which  had  been  supposed  to  be  least  satisfied  by 
the  elevation  of  the  homely  and  rugged  man  of  the 
West.  We  shall  investigate  directly  the  kind  of  men 
within  the  ranks  of  the  Republican  party  who  opposed 
his  renomination  and  intrigued  against  his  reelection. 
The  hidden  dangers  of  Copperhead  opposition  were  to 
be  surpassed  for  the  moment  in  practical  consequences 
by  the  variance  of  Republican  leaders,  who  from  one 
and  another  cause  —  as  indicated  above  by  Dana  — 
embarrassed  the  political  campaign  of  1864. 

Meanwhile  the  "tyrant"  Lincoln2  was  only  too  glad 
to  escape  the  depressing  military  responsibility  which 
had  weighed  down  the  commander-in-chief  from  the  day 
of  his  inauguration.  The  President  had  been  a  soldier 
from  necessity ;  a  better  one,  as  history  reveals,  than 

1  Adams,  Dana,  vol.  ii,  273,  274. 

2  He  followed  that  he  might  lead.   About  this  time  he  wrote,  "  I  claim 
not  to  have  controlled  events,  but  confess  plainly  that  events  have  con 
trolled  me."  —  Complete  Works,  vol.  ii,  509. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  251 

was  thought  at  the  time.  Scott,  McClellan,  Halleck, 
Pope,  had  failed  in  subduing  the  rebellion,  with  the 
commander-in-chief  supporting  and  never  interfering 
except  in  dire  emergencies.  Congress  revived  the  grade 
of  lieutenant-general,  expecting  the  appointment  of 
U.  S.  Grant.  The  President  gladly  commissioned  him, 
and  he  took  command,  March  9,  to  "  fight  it  out." 

The  chief  fountain  of  opposition  to  the  succession  of 
Abraham  Lincoln  sprung  from  Secretary  Chase,  who 
had  many  qualities  befitting  a  leader  and  a  statesman, 
but  who  lacked  greatness.  Senator  Hendricks  of  Indiana 
had  made  a  vicious  partisan  attack  on  the  secretary, 
March  11,  for  his  management  of  finance,  which  was 
unmerited,  for  he  had  served  the  country  well  in  this 
regard.  In  the  larger  field,  his  own  ambition  overleaped 
itself  and  he  thought "  a  man  of  differing  qualities  from 
those  the  President  has  will  be  needed  for  the  next  four 
years."  1  The  President's  faults  in  administration  were 
many,  but  his  conduct  of  his  own  self,  when  there  might 
be  conflict  with  other  selves,  was  brilliant  and  magnani 
mous  beyond  all  encomium.  In  no  case  does  this  appear 
more  vividly  than  in  his  whole  intercourse  with  Chase.'2 

When  Mr.  Chase,  the  politician,  had  satisfied  himself 
that  he  had  no  chance  for  himself,  he  fell  into  the  move 
ment  for  renominating  Lincoln.  The  meteoric  Greeley, 
an  erring  comet  in  every  crisis  of  these  times,  thought 
Fremont  or  Butler  preferable  to  Lincoln.3  But  the 
patriotic  politician  of  Massachusetts,  Henry  Wilson, 
was  "most  loud  and  bitter.  His  open  assaults  were 
amazing." 4  Thaddeus  Stevens,  the  radical  leader  of  the 

*  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  457.  2  Cf.  ibid.,  pp.  459,  460,  480. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  461.  4  Ibid.,  p.  463  n. 


252    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

House  of  Representatives,  a  stronger  man  than  these, 
said  even  after  Lincoln's  reelection,  that  a  majority  of 
the  loyal  people  would  have  chosen  General  Butler  to 
be  President,1  if  allowed.  Absurd  ;  but  it  was  Stevens's 
absurdity.  These  revelations  are  melancholy  in  view  of 
subsequent  events.  Popular  government  is  the  best  gov 
ernment  ;  but  popular  leaders  cannot  lead  in  a  crisis ; 
the  people  lead  and  the  politicians  follow.  Lincoln's 
invincible  confidence  in  the  people  and  their  correspond 
ing  faith  in  him  saved  the  state. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  renominated  almost  unanimously, 
June  7,  at  Baltimore,  four  days  after  the  severe  reverses 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Cold  Harbor,  Va.  A 
great  misfortune  befell  in  the  nomination,  also  nearly 
unanimous,  of  Andrew  Johnson,  a  war  Democrat  of  Ten 
nessee.  As  was  said  at  the  time  :  "  We  were  accustomed 
to  turning  down  our  own  men  for  Democrats  who  were 
not  so  good,  but  who  were  better  than  the  majority  of 
their  party." 2 

This  suggests  the  whole  matter  —  very  difficult  in  ac 
tual  practice  —  of  party  management  in  the  conduct  of 
war  and  government.  Governor  Morton,  who  was  a  strict 
partisan,  early  laid  aside  all  party  spirit,  appointing  De 
mocrats  to  places,  when  his  Republican  allies  strongly 
objected.  "  Democrats  must  take  part  in  the  struggle  as 
well  as  Republicans  and  receive  equally  fair  treatment." : 
After  experience,  he  said  of  all  appointments  :  "  I  tried 
to  please  everybody  and  his  friends,  but  I  soon  found 
that  would  not  do.  I  found  that  out  almost  immediately, 

1  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  p.  462. 

2  Cited,  ibid.,  p.  470. 

3  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  150,  153. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  253 

and  I  then  determined  that  I  would  follow  the  dictates 
of  my  own  judgment  without  fear  or  favor." 

Ostrogorki,  a  disinterested  and  philosophical  observer, 
remarks  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  "  eminent  qualities  "  could 
not  subvert  party  policy.  "  He  could  not  appoint  Re 
publicans  and  Democrats  to  office  indiscriminately." 

A  very  peculiar  and  instructive  dispute  involving 
national  control,  state-rights,  and  the  coordinate  powers 
of  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  government 
culminated  in  the  Wade-Davis  manifesto,  August  5, "  a 
bitter  attack  on  the  President."  It  embodied  the  mali 
cious  undercurrent  of  opposition  to  Lincoln  within  the 
Republican  ranks,  even  after  his  nomination,  and  used 
the  political  occasion  of  a  bill  vetoed  by  pocket  merely 
as  an  opportunity.  The  bill  provided  for  the  reorgani 
zation  of  a  state  in  rebellion  with  a  prohibition  of  slav 
ery.  The  President,  supported  by  his  cabinet,  claimed 
that  Congress  had  "  no  constitutional  power  over  slav 
ery  in  the  States."  When  reminded  that  he  had  con 
trolled  it  in  his  own  action,  he  replied  that  he  could,  "in 
an  emergency,  do  things  on  military  grounds  which 
cannot  be  done  constitutionally  by  Congress."  The 
radical  leaders  seemed  to  have  forgotten  the  kingly  sur 
vival  in  the  executive  and  to  have  imagined  that  Con 
gress  had  evolved  into  an  exaggerated  "  town-meeting." 
The  paper  manifesto  of  the  bolting  leaders  termed  the 
President's  course2  "  a  grave  executive  usurpation.  .  .  . 

1  Ostrogorki,  Democracy  and  Political  Parties,  vol.  ii,  113, 115.    Lincoln's 
final  wisdom  was  so  thoroughly  proven  that  even  his  "  bad  "  appointments 
must  be  judged  cautiously.    Julian  objected  in  a  certain  case,  only  to  draw 
out,  "  There  is  much  force  in  what  you  say;   but  in  the  balancing  of 
matters  I  guess  I  shall  have  to  appoint  him." 

2  An  amusing  illustration  of  the  inflexible  courage  and  practical  humor 


254    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

He  must  understand  that  our  support  is  of  a  cause  and 
not  of  a  man ;  that  the  authority  of  Congress  is  para 
mount  and  must  be  respected." 1 

All  this  and  similar  culminated  in  a  private  call  from 
New  York  city  for  a  new  convention  in  Cincinnati, 
September  28,  to  nominate  a  new  Republican  candidate 
for  President.  Greeley,  Chase,  Winter  Davis,  D.  S. 
Dickinson,  Governor  Andrew,  directly,  others  partially, 
supported  this  movement.2  The  proposed  convention  did 
not  meet.  The  Democrats  reviled  Lincoln  the  "  tyrant " 
oppressing  his  individual  subjects.  The  little  congres 
sional  magnates 3  reproached  him,  as  usurping  their  pe 
culiar  functions  of  government.  Lust  of  power  might 
and  would  corrupt  the  best  man.  Power  for  Abraham 
Lincoln  was  not  an  intoxication  of  the  individual  will ; 
it  was  the  domination  of  every  personality,  including  his 
own,  for  the  actual  good  of  the  state.  Mistakes  in  such 
crucial  times  are  inevitable,  but  the  high  exercise  of  all 
the  popular  prerogatives,  concentrated  in  one  person, 
must  not  be  confounded  with  the  doings  of  an  old-fash 
ioned  half-civilized  tyrant.  To  call  Lincoln  a  tyrant  or 
usurper  was  mere  detraction,  as  the  people  discovered 
and  vindicated  at  the  polls  in  November. 

of  Lincoln  was  current  at  the  time.  His  intimates  asked  if  he  was  not 
troubled  by  the  mamBuvres  of  Wade  &  Co.  "  It  reminds  me  of  a  story. 
A  boy  excited  by  what  he  had  seen  through  a  microscope  said  to  his  father 
who  was  eating  cheese,  '  Do  you  know  you  take  in  thousands,  perhaps  mil 
lions  of  little  animals  at  every  bite  ?  '  But  the  father  answered,  *  I  can 
stand  it  if  they  can,'  "  and  the  victim  continued  eating  as  quietly  as  if  he 
were  the  victor. 

1  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  487. 

2  Cf.  i6trf.,p.618. 

3  Wade  had  long  sneered  at  the  President,  claiming  that  Congress 
should  not  wait  for  the  "  royal  pleasure."  —  Globe,  1862,  p.  3375. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  255 

Greeley,  Thurlow  Weed,  Raymond,  and  many  other 
leaders  said  in  August  that  Lincoln's  defeat  was  certain. 
The  dire  obf  uscation  of  the  Republican  leaders 1  is  finally 
summed  up,  September  21,  in  a  private  letter  from  a 
prominent  radical :  — 

.  .  .  The  apparent  certainty  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  defeat.  All 
this  is  changed.  The  outrage  on  the  nation  perpetrated  at 
Chicago,  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  the  success  of  the  cause  in  Ver 
mont  and  Maine,  render  that  impossible  and  unreasonable 
which  then  seemed  our  only  safety.  We  must  now  place  our 
selves  in  the  van  of  the  fight.2 

All  this  in  a  month,  through  a  mere  change  of  the 
point  of  view.3  Was  there  ever  more  complete  confes 
sion  that  people  cannot  comprehend  the  causes  and 
true  meaning  of  events  as  they  occur?  The  occasion  of 
this  mighty  change  was  not  its  cause.  The  cause  of 
change  was  in  the  patriotic  insight  of  the  Northern 
people,  aroused  to  new  consciousness  and  always  trust 
ful  of  the  people's  servant,  Lincoln.  The  same  water, 
deep  in  the  trough  of  the  sea,  in  a  moment  becomes 
the  towering  crest  of  the  wave.  Farragut's  victory  at 

1  Cf.  McClure,  Our  Presidents,  p.  183.   "  Chase,  Wade,  H.  W.  Davis, 
Greeley  were  bitterly  opposed  to  Lincoln's  renomination.     In   addition, 
Sumner  was  not  heartily  for  him ;  Stevens  was  earnestly  opposed,  and  the 
extreme  radical  wing  of  the  party  was  aggressive  in  its  hostility.    Lincoln's 
strength  was  with  the  people." 

2  Cited,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  528  n. 

3  September  7  Governor  Andrew  proposed  to  Governor  Yates  that  he, 
Brough,  Morton,  and  any  Western  governors  should  meet  him  at  Wash 
ington  to  talk  over  "  the  present  attitude  of  our  public  affairs  with  the 
President."   Nothing  came  of  this  apparently.    "  I  would  spurn  the  bare 
suggestion  of  ceasing  hostilities  now,  and  the  very  thought  of  dealing  with 
the  rebel  chiefs  with  peace  ;  but  I  would  seize  the  occasion  for  an  appeal 
to  all  the  people  both  North  and  South."    His  motive  was  to  influence 
the  coming  election.  —  Schouler,  Mass,  in  the  Civil  War,  pp.  575,  576. 


256  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Mobile,  Sherman's  capture  of  Atlanta  only  concentrated 
expression  of  the  deep  and  powerful  sentiment  inherent 
in  the  people ;  the  victories  then  produced  an  effect 
beyond  the  ken  of  superficial  politicians  that  manifested 
itself  in  an  overwhelming  rush  to  reelect  the  well-tried 
leader,  Abraham  Lincoln. 

We  have  narrated  this  interesting  aberration  of  party 
conduct  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war ;  but  it  should 
not  divert  us  from  the  main  topic  of  party  estrange 
ment.  The  Republican  opposition  to  Lincoln  greatly 
increased  the  difficulty  of  moving  forward  the  burden 
of  the  state ;  yet  it  did  not,  like  the  Democratic  resist 
ance,  attempt  to  change  course  and  carry  the  govern 
ment  into  the  sloughs  and  morasses  of  peace  and  failure. 

The  Democratic  convention  met  at  Chicago,  August 
29,  and  easily  nominated  General  McClellan  for  the 
presidency.  Horatio  Seymour1  presided  and  Vallandig- 
ham  made  the  substance  of  the  platform.  The  famous 
Copperhead  had  returned  home  from  banishment,  con 
temptuously  overlooked  by  the  executive.  His  con 
demnation  and  practical  release  served  the  cause  of 
order  and  good  government  equally  well.  He  forced 
the  weak-kneed  Democrats  to  "  explicitly  declare  that 
after  four  years  of  failure  to  restore  the  Union  by  the 
experiment  of  war  .  .  .  convention  of  the  States  that 
.  .  .  peace  may  be  restored  on  the  basis  of  the  Federal 
Union  of  the  States." 2 

1  He  declared  in  his  speech  :  "  This  administration  cannot  now  save  this 
Union  if  it  would.    It  has  by  its  proclamations,  by  vindictive  legislation, 
by  displays  of  hate  and  passion,  placed  obstacles  in  its  own  pathway, 
which  it  cannot  overcome,  and  has  hampered  its  own  freedom  of  action 
by  unconstitutional  acts."  —  Thomas,  Die.  Biography. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  ix,  254. 


PARTY  ESTRANGEMENT  257 

At  first  McClellan  and  Pendleton  was  a  popular  ticket, 
for  the  hesitating  people  did  not  perceive  what  it  all 
meant.  The  Republicans,  as  above  stated,  hastily  got 
into  line  ;  and  with  their  customary  polemical  skill  con 
strued  the  manifesto  of  the  Democracy  for  instant  com 
prehension.  As  they  put  it,  the  Democrats  said,  "  The 
war  is  a  failure."  This  statement  might  or  might  not 
be  true  ;  but  it  was  purely  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  in 
terpreted  by  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Farragut.  That  the 
misfortunes  of  the  war  should  be  used  virtually  to 
turn  the  Union  over  to  rebels  and  traitors  was  a  time 
serving  proposition  quickly  repudiated  by  the  average 
voter.  That  the  controversial  pause  should  be  improved 
by  calling  Union-saving  conventions  after  the  manner 
of  1860  —  ignoring  the  momentous  fact  that  thousands 
of  slaves  had  been  freed  and  armed  —  was  a  scheme  so 
ridiculous  that  it  was  soon  thrashed  out  in  the  breezy 
common  sense  of  an  election  canvass.  "Blood  and 
Iron"  do  not  reason  after  the  fashion  of  the  Demo 
cratic  convention.  That  men  of  the  intellectual  capa 
city  of  Horatio  Seymour  and  Robert  C.  Winthrop 
should  have  been  muddled  thus  by  events  is  a  curiosity 
of  history. 

Seymour  and  the  old  Whigs  arraigned  the  inevitable 
contractors  and  profit-makers  with  their  supporters  in 
the  Eepublican  party,  as  if  these  birds  of  prey  made  the 
war,  instead  of  the  rebels  who  raised  the  standard  of 
the  Confederacy  and  the  Copperheads  who  malignantly 
supported  the  rebellion.  From  these  larger  activities 
the  petty  followers  descended  to  slander.  The  "  New 
York  World,"  a  would-be  respectable  journal,  asserted 
" '  Honest  Old  Abe '  has  few  honest  men  to  defend 


258    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

his  honesty/' l  —  a  slander  so  foul  that  the  paper  almost 
shrivels  under  the  words. 

The  people  who  had  been  so  depressed  in  August 
met  in  November  and  pronounced  their  verdict  on  their 
rulers,  and  upon  the  agitators  who  would  have  sub 
verted  those  rulers.  Education,  the  intellectual  enlight 
enment  of  the  individual  man,  is  not  easy ;  how  much 
more  difficult  the  effective  instruction  of  the  civic  body 
politic.  When  we  concede  that  party  and  "  extra-con 
stitutional  organization  " 2  in  our  country  enters  into 
every  process  of  political  action  from  the  choice  of  a 
constable  to  the  election  of  a  president,3  the  repudiation 
of  the  Democracy  by  the  people  at  this  time  was  mar 
velous.  Party  dogmas  in  this  intense  political  atmos 
phere  have  the  binding  force  of  "  creeds."  4  Well  might 
the  sage  of  Concord  say  :  "  Seldom  was  so  much  staked 
on  a  popular  vote.  I  suppose  never  in  history." 5 

Lincoln  won  212  electoral  votes,  McClellan  21,  and 
there  was  a  popular  majority  for  the  Republicans  of 
494,567. 6  In  the  comparative  figures  given  below,  there 

N.  Y.  World,  September  22,  23  ;  October  1,  1864. 

Ostrogorki,  Democracy  and  Pol.  P.,  vol.  ii,  540. 

Ford,  American  Politics,  p.  302. 

Cf.  ante,  p.  11. 

Cabot,  Emerson,  p.  609.  "  Thomas  Hill  Green  used  to  say  that  the 
whole  future  of  humanity  was  involved  in  the  triumph  of  the  federal 
arms."  —  Bryce,  Contemporary  Biography,  p.  90. 

6  It  will  be  interesting  to  compare  the  votes  of  the  States  we  are  study 
ing,  in  the  elections  of  1860  and  of  1864  :  — 

I860.  1861. 

Lincoln.    Douglas.  Breckinridge.  Bell.  Lincoln.  McClellan. 

Massachusetts,    106,533         34,372      5,939        22,331  Massachusetts,  126,742       48,745 

New  York,  362,646       312,510  New  York,  386,726  361,986 

Pennsylvania,     268,030         16,765    178,871       12,776  Pennsylvania,  296,389  276,308 

Indiana,  139,033       115,509      12,295         5,306  Indiana,  150,422  130,233 

These  figures  are  taken  from  McClure,  Our  Presidents,  pp.  175,  193. 
The  comparison  is  very  suggestive.  Roughly  McClellan's  vote  in  Mas- 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  259 

will  be  found  more  political  problems  than  we  have 
space  to  expound. 

The  development  in  Massachusetts  was  the  natural 
outcome  of  the  whole  political  situation  in  these  years. 
Indiana  showed  a  wonderful  education  of  its  whole 
people  in  the  great  principles  underlying  this  contest, 
as  they  were  represented  and  vindicated  by  Oliver  P. 
Morton.  Senator  Grimes' s  significant  words  l  of  Iowa  in 
1863  should  be  remembered  in  this  connection.  Penn 
sylvania  has  been  noticed  already.  But  New  York  !  It 
is  fair  to  consider  all  the  circumstances  and  condition 
of  events  treated  in  this  chapter,  which  puzzled  the 
Democrat  and  affiliated  him  with  the  Copperhead. 
Nevertheless  the  facts  stand.  The  "Empire"  State 
absorbed  the  noxious  personality  of  Seymour  and  his 
fellows  and  cast  some  360,000  votes  in  indorsement. 

A  tremendous  consequence  of  this  election  was  in  the 
return  of  enough  Unionist  members  to  the  House  of 
Representatives  to  give  the  requisite  majority  for  a  two 
thirds  constitutional  amendment,  and  to  effect  the  abo 
lition  of  slavery. 

This  course  of  events,  from  the  summer  of  1862  to 
the  autumn  of  1864,  is  more  interesting,  if  possible, 
than  the  first  period  of  rebellion  and  war.  The  great 
forces  of  the  nation  were  grasped  by  the  administration 
at  Washington  and  managed  for  the  restoration  of  the 

sachusetts  equals  the  whole  opposition  of  1860,  less  two  fifths  of  the 
Douglas  vote.  In  Indiana,  where  the  Copperheads  did  their  worst,  the 
opposition  of  1860  was  actually  diminished.  In  both  New  York  and  Penn 
sylvania,  McClellan  gained  heavily  over  Lincoln's  opponents  in  1860.  A 
portion  of  the  result  in  Pennsylvania  may  be  ascribed  to  McClellan's 
personal  popularity  in  his  own  State. 
1  Cf.  ante,  p.  232. 


260  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Union.  At  the  same  time,  a  certain  mutinous  spirit, 
latent  in  the  North,  sometimes  by  secret  association,  as 
in  the  West,  always  and  everywhere  by  treacherous  ef 
fort  sought  to  embarrass  the  administration  in  its  pro 
secution  of  the  war.  These  embarrassments  culminated 
in  the  condemnation  and  banishment  of  Vallandigham 
on  the  one  hand.  In  other  respects,  an  undisguised 
opposition  under  the  forms  of  constitutional  right  was 
established  by  Seymour  and  his  kind.  Either  and  all 
these  forces  naturally  sought  the  Democratic  party  for 
an  outlet  and  instrument  of  the  mutinous  forces  threat 
ening  the  regular  administration.  They  used  arbitrary 
arrests,  emancipation,  corruption  in  contracts,  for  dis 
playing  their  constitutional  and  legal  garments,  as 
fashion-figures  are  used  in  the  shops. 

Seymour  and  the  moss-grown  antiquaries  reverted  to 
the  old  types  of  state  sovereignty1  in  constructing 
any  form  of  opposition  to  the  Union  enforced  by  arms. 
Their  political  comprehension  was  well  portrayed  in  the 
couplet :  — 

"  pale  antiquaries  pore 
Th'  inscription  value,  but  the  rust  adore." 

The  adoration  of  political  conservatives  of  this  period 
for  the  civic  rust  and  mould  of  previous  generations  is 
as  ludicrous  as  it  is  painful.  The  practical  political  out 
come  of  this  sort  of  leadership,  when  rendered  into 
action  by  the  common  citizen,  was  manifested  in  resist 
ance  to  the  draft. 

Lincoln  was  freely  anathematized  as  a  "  tyrant,"  who 
usurped  the  nation's  rights,  by  these  Pecksniffian  pa 
triots.  Morton  actually  did  the  work  of  a  tyrant  at  this 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  240. 


PARTY   ESTRANGEMENT  261 

time,  when  leading  the  State  of  Indiana  in  the  way  its 
people  wished,  but  where  a  momentary  fickle  majority 
of  Democrats,  possessed  of  the  legislative  machinery, 
would  have  repudiated  his  action.  Not  since  the  early 
Greek  kingdoms  has  more  wholesome  tyranny  been  ex 
ercised  by  a  people's  representative  in  the  interest  of  a 
people.  Names  do  not  always  convey  things.  Morton 
did  these  things  without  sovereignty,  while  Seymour  was 
laboring  to  explain  to  the  "Empire"  State  in  what 
sovereignty  consisted,  for  its  millions  of  people.  In 
1863,  the  more  salient  of  these  exciting  forces  were 
marked  out,  contested,  and  subdued  by  great  popular 
victories  in  the  Western  elections. 

An  extraordinary  political  tremor  affected  the  body 
politic,  in  the  revolt  within  the  Republican  party  against 
Lincoln's  leadership  that  occurred  early  in  1864.  Like 
all  misdirected  political  strategy,  it  proved  to  be  a 
boomerang.  Chase,  Wade,  Stevens,  Wilson,  and  the 
rest,  in  exalting  themselves  and  in  magnifying  their  own 
political  parts  to  depress  Lincoln,  finally  raised  the  plain 
man  of  the  West  to  a  higher  elevation,  and  into  the 
very  best  appreciation  of  the  American  people. 

The  presidential  campaign  against  the  Democrats  in 
1864  was  a  thorough  popular  course  of  instruction  in 
the  issues  of  government.  The  subtle  fallacies  of  Sey 
mour  and  Hendricks,  wrapped  in  the  smooth  garments 
of  party  representations  and  colored  by  party  phrase 
ology,  deluded  too  many  sincere  Democrats,  as  it  was. 
But,  on  the  whole,  the  people  comprehended  that  any 
assertion  of  state  sovereignty,  however  modified  and 
veiled,  while  other  States  were  in  armed  rebellion,  would 
certainly  end  in  some  form  of  resistance  to  the  law. 


262    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

And  with  General  Dix  they  perceived  that  to  be,  at  this 
juncture,  "  the  very  blackest  of  political  crimes."  1 

The  able,  candid,  masterful  words  of  Lincoln,2  uttered 
in  this  period,  that  "  force,  dissolution,  compromise  " 
were  the  only  sufficient  categories  to  convey  and  con 
trol  passing  events;  that  force,  having  been  under 
taken,  must  be  accompanied  and  completed  by  force ; 
that  force  in  its  imperative  straits  had  embraced  the 
black  man  enslaved,  then  had  rendered  him  into  the 
freedman  and  armed  patriot;  that  "white  ones  with 
malignant  heart  and  deceitful  speech  "  had  hindered, 
but  could  not  prevent,  this  triumphant  progress  of  hu 
manity,  —  these  positive  affirmations,  interpreted  aright 
and  converted  into  executive  action,  by  the  greatest 
statesman  of  the  time,  saved  the  United  States  in  1864 
from  dissolution  and  from  possible  anarchy. 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  238.  2  Cf.  ante,  p.  247. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE    PEOPLE    UNDER    COMPULSION 

THE  progress  of  our  discussion  moved  beyond  the 
succession  of  events,  through  the  necessity  of  as 
certaining  the  new  developments  of  party  organization, 
brought  about  by  the  efforts  for  suppressing  the  rebel 
lion.  We  have  been  occupied  mainly  with  the  relations 
of  the  administration  with  the  governments  of  the  States. 
We  are  now  coming  to  its  direct  contact  with  the  people 
of  those  States. 

The  Union  in  the  first  year,  or  thereabouts,  after  the 
election  of  Lincoln,  found  a  way  to  coerce  a  state.  In 
the  twenty  months  following,  more  or  less,  it  confronted 
another  problem,  whose  successful  issue  was  not  less  es 
sential  to  its  existence.  As  we  have  attempted  to  show, 
if  events  in  the  first  year  had  so  shaped  themselves, 
there  might  have  been  a  comparatively  easy  struggle, 
overcoming  the  Confederacy,  before  it  could  organize  its 
whole  strength  to  resist  the  forces  of  order  and  good 
government.  It  was  not  so  to  be  ;  and  after  volunteer 
ing  had  exhausted  the  ready  supply  of  men  available 
at  the  North,  the  administration  was  urged  eagerly,1 
by  its  loyal  supporters  in  the  summer  of  1862,  to  draft 
for  military  service.  It  proved,  after  some  disastrous 
troubles,  that  it  was  as  easy  to  compel  each  individual 
citizen  to  support  a  central  government  as  it  finally  was 

1   0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  pp.  212,  223,  422. 


264    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

to  show  that  each  State  must  support  that  government. 
This  was  not  a  new  discovery  or  application  of  govern 
mental  force.  The  fathers  of  the  republic  had  foreseen 
that,  to  make  it  a  competent  government,  it  might  be 
necessary  to  bring  every  citizen  capable  of  bearing  arms 
into  the  service  of  the  whole  people.1 

But  peace  had  been  so  general  in  the  happy  conditions 
of  the  isolated  republic,  so  long  continued,  excepting 
the  petty  Mexican  War,  that  the  individual  citizen  had 
come  to  believe  that  political  liberty  was  the  free  exer 
cise  of  his  individual  will.  How  could  there  be  a  theo 
retical  harness  for  body  and  limbs  which  had  never 
known  gall  or  pressure.  The  will  of  the  people  had 
been  exerted  magnificently  in  1861,  when  individual 
volunteers  had  been  carried  along  by  currents  of  en 
thusiasm,  which  exalted  and  possibly  substituted  them 
selves  for  the  exciting  force  of  individual  impulse. 

Now  the  situation  had  changed.  The  causes  of  con 
troversy  had  widened  and  deepened  until  the  whole 
organization  of  society  and  the  constitutional  founda 
tions  of  government  were  imperiled,  as  it  seemed  to 
some  timid  and  conscientious  citizens.  There  were  not 
wanting  fair-weather  preceptors  who  could  prove  that 
it  was  the  business  of  a  written  constitution,  not  to  save 
the  life  of  the  country,  but  to  save  the  least  of  its  own 
technical  details. 

These  differing  opinions  had  passed  beyond  the  sphere 
of  regular  political  action.  They  had  come  to  affect  the 
proper  allegiance  of  the  citizen  in  the  very  essence  of 

1  An  act  in  amendment  was  passed  in  1795,  to  call  forth  the  militia 
"  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  in 
vasions."  —  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  280. 


THE  PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  265 

his  connection  with  government  itself.  We  must  re 
member  that  rebels  North  and  rebels  South  were  crea 
tures  absolutely  different.  History  may  deal  with  one 
sort  as  mistaken  rebels  and  failing  revolutionists.  The 
other  sort  were  recreant  and  apostate  citizens.  Official 
position  and  representative  trust  only  increased  their 
proper  responsibility.  It  could  not  diminish  the  obliga 
tion  of  their  duty.  As  early  as  January  8, 1862,  Thomas 
A.  Hendricks  had  said  in  a  Democratic  convention  in 
Indiana,  "  Fanaticism,  bigotry,  and  sectional  hatred  are 
doing  the  work  of  evil  upon  a  great,  generous,  and 
noble  people.  ...  If  the  failure  and  folly  and  wicked 
ness  of  the  party  in  power  render  a  Union  impossible, 
then  the  mighty  Northwest  must  take  care  of  herself." a 
We  have  noted  the  effect  of  these  arguments  on  each 
individual  as  they  affected  recruiting  in  Iowa.2  July  9, 
Governor  Morton  and  his  state  officers  sent  a  memorial 
to  the  President  urging  the  "  vital  importance "  of  a 
law  for  enroUment  and  draft.  "  We  send  you  this  as 
the  result  of  our  conclusions  from  what  we  know  of  the 
condition  of  the  Northwest.  This  is  confidential." 3 

The  loyal  element  of  the  Northwest  had  set  forth  the 
simple  fact,  the  "  government  needs  men."  Then,  as 
always,  these  stalwart  patriots,  bred  from  all  the  blood 
and  bone  of  the  whole  American  stock,  embodied  the 
strongest  current  of  the  national  life.  Like  the  absorb 
ing  current  of  their  own  Mississippi,  their  national  de 
sire  flooded  every  source ;  and  would  burst  all  barriers 
in  its  way  to  the  gulf,  in  its  onward  course  toward 
national  power  and  prosperity. 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  173.  2  Cf.  ante,  p.  220. 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  212. 


266  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Traditions,  institutions,  improvised  organizations  — 
supporting  the  administration  —  had  failed  gradually 
in  developing  the  largest  possible  army.  The  essential 
characteristics  of  an  army,  in  the  European  sense,  are 
"  its  national  character — that  is  its  representing  more  or 
less  the  will  and  the  power  of  the  nation  or  its  rulers."  l 
In  America,  the  actual  foundation  of  the  army  must  be 
in  the  people,  "  the  mass  of  persons  inhabiting  a  place ; 
subjects  or  citizens,  as  distinguished  from  their  rulers 
or  from  men  of  rank  and  authority  in  any  profession  ; 
the  commonalty ;  the  populace  ;  usually  preceded  by 
the  definite  article." 2  Is  the  definition  sufficient  ? 

The  wisest  may  well  pause  and  study  the  significance 
of  the  word.  It  carries  within  its  etymological  structure 
a  whole  leaf  out  of  the  history  of  civilization,  an  em 
bodiment  of  political  progress.  In  the  early  days  of 
the  Roman  Republic,  being  included  with  the  Senate, 
it  formed  a  governing  class  entirely  distinct  from  the 
populace  or  plebeians.  In  those  primitive  times,  when 
coordinated  with  the  Senate  in  the  business  of  govern 
ment,  it  was  socially  and  politically  a  subordinate  aris 
tocracy.  From  this  strict  classification,  the  word  has 
gradually  widened  its  scope,  until  it  includes  all  the 
effective  members  of  the  American  body  politic.  In 
royal  governments,  kings  always  said,  "My  People." 
This  phrase  was  a  political  ideal  toward  which  the  actual 
socio-political  fact  has  constantly  tended. 

Do  not  imagine  that  this  historical  evolution  is  easily 
traced,  or  that  it  always  moves  in  plain,  direct  lines. 
Blackstone,  reflecting  the  movement  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  loosely  defines  people  in  two  senses.  The  first 

1  Encyclopedia  Britannica.  a  Century  Dictionary. 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  267 

includes  all  human  beings  in  a  country,  governors  or 
subjects,  male  or  female.  These  he  divides  again  into 
aliens  and  natural  born  subjects,  or  into  clergy  and  laity. 
The  second  definition  puts  king  and  parliament  into  one 
class,  while  all  other  members  of  English  society  are 
included  in  the  term  people.  These  classifications  have 
been  severely  criticised,  but  they  were  perhaps  the  best 
working  definitions  of  the  time  and  circumstance.  The 
subtle  evolution  of  the  word  is  fairly  reflected  in  a 
phrase  uttered  about  1825,  by  Viennet :  "  The  people 
is  now  proud  as  a  gentleman.  In  the  greatest  lord, 
it  would  see  only  a  man." 

We  shall  better  comprehend  the  great  political  signif 
icance  of  the  term,  if  we  separate  and  distinguish  the 
purely  social  part  of  the  meaning.  The  United  States 
was  formerly  classed,  by  capable  thinkers,  under  the 
aristocratic  forms  of  government.1  In  a  political  sense, 
our  country  has  almost  literally  realized  the  royal  phrase, 
"  my  people."  Excepting  the  South,  with  its  abnormal 
race  problem,  no  American  community  would  think  of 
excluding  from  the  people  as  a  political  society  any  one 
who  was  not  an  alien  or  a  criminal.  Socially,  the  word 
is  used  in  a  different  sense.  To  define  and  exclude  the 
rich,  we  say  "  common  people ;  "  or  we  say  rich  and 
poor  people  ;  or  people  of  a  city,  as  distinguished  from 
that  of  the  country.  Though  wealth  is  potent  in  Amer 
ica  in  many  ways,  rich  persons  have  no  political  recog 
nition. 

The  French  distinctions,  stated  so  forcibly  by  Viennet, 
could  not  have  the  same  significance  here.  If  we  con 
strue  them  in  the  broadest  sense,  to  embody  the  intan- 

1  Lewis,  Political  Terms,  p.  79. 


268  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

gible  results  of  wealth  and  culture,  —  a  fine  expression  of 
social  refinement,  —  yet  they  would  not  apply  in  Amer 
ican  society.  The  term  gentleman  has  often  been  re 
stricted  to  the  ways  of  a  particular  class;  then  to  an 
affectation  of  the  manners  of  that  class.  But  there  is  a 
larger  signification  of  the  noble  term,  in  which  all  would 
agree,  and  would  apply  it  to  universal  manners.  A  bare 
foot  boy,  yielding  the  privilege  of  the  pavement  to  a 
lady,  would  be  called  a  gentleman  by  every  one.  This 
is  the  popular  aspiration  for  the  ideal  embodied  in  the 
French  apothegm,  where  the  people  would  bring  itself 
to  the  imaginary  perfection  of  a  lord,  and  itself  realize 
and  put  forth  the  completed  man. 

People,  in  a  political  sense,  must  not  be  confounded 
with  the  electorate.  People  includes  men,  women,  and 
children,  and  it  means  the  basal  form,  the  raw  material 
of  the  whole  political  organism.  Voting  electors  are  the 
first  defined  political  or^an,  the  people  being  an  amor 
phous  political  substance.  If  we  consider  it  as  plasma, 
and  the  electorate  as  protoplasma,  then  representatives 
—  in  town,  county,  state,  or  national  government  —  are 
the  rudimentary  organs  and  expressions  of  the  popular 
will.  The  American  representative  has  gone  through 
various  forms  and  methods  of  responsibility,  but  he  has 
tended  toward  a  more  and  more  direct  obligation  to  his 
principal,  the  electorate.  An  American  politician  never 
says  "  my  patrons  "  or  "  my  fellows,"  he  always  addresses 
"  my  constituents."  There  have  been  many  aristo 
cratic  tendencies  in  different  parts  of  the  United  States, 
which  might  have  grown  into  oligarchy  under  favoring 
circumstances.  The  reason  of  the  contrary  drift,  and  the 
wholesome  democratic  growth  of  our  country,  is  to  be 


THE  PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  269 

found  in  the  ordered  autonomy  of  the  people.  The 
simple  personal  element,  the  innate  dignity  of  man,  has 
been  gradually  growing  and  expressing  itself  better  and 
better.  This  mastering  factor  of  personality  has  pre 
vailed  over  institutions  and  environment,  and  it  is  con 
stantly  renewed  from  the  people. 

So  forcible  an  illustration  out  of  our  own  time  of  the 
essential  power  of  man  in  politics  and  state-craft  is 
ready  to  our  hand  that  it  must  be  mentioned,  for  it 
will  accord  with  the  consciousness  of  every  one  and 
harmonize  with  his  aspiration.  Theodore  Roosevelt  was 
a  simple  man,  out  of  the  best  sort  of  people.  He  took 
politics  simply,  doing  the  nearest  duty  manfully.  Of 
ficial  position  adopted  him,  on  account  of  his  excellence ; 
for  the  bosses  not  merely  neglected  him,  they  despised 
him  and  his  whole  scheme  of  political  evolution.  He 
made  mistakes,  but  they  were  forgiven.  War  stimulated 
and  made  manifest  his  sterling  qualities ;  then  the  bosses 
of  his  native  State  made  him  governor.  Likewise  the 
greatest  bosses  made  him  second  officer  of  the  republic, 
to  secrete  him  neatly,  to  conceal  this  honest  scion  of 
the  people,  to  hold  him  out  of  the  political  current, 
which  might  carry  him  to  the  headship  of  the  nation. 
Circumstances  made  him  president;  then  he  outgener 
aled  the  bosses  at  their  own  game.  The  people,  out  of 
its  great  heart,  recognized  a  man,  and  made  him  chief 
by  a  magnificent  majority.  Secure  in  this  preponderat 
ing  representative  capacity,  he  led  the  nation  to  a  task 
considered  impossible  in  the  old  world.  He  arrested  two 
great  empires  —  battling  with  the  largest  armies  ever 
known  —  and  brought  them  to  confer  peaceably  at  a 
little  town  in  America.  When  conference  flagged,  his 


270  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

courageous  initiative  and  persistent  energy  entreated  the 
magnanimous  spirit  of  the  protagonists  into  the  ways  of 
reason,  and  finally  brought  peace  to  the  anxious  world. 
The  Tsar  of  Russia  congratulated  him  on  the  "  success 
ful  conclusion  owing  to  your  personal  efforts."  In  all 
the  wonderful  career  of  Roosevelt,  the  man  has  pre 
vailed. 

The  term  nation  has  a  certain  meaning  which  must 
be  considered  in  this  connection.  It  might  be  argued 
that  nation  is  coming  to  mean  in  these  days  a  type  of 
structure  instead  of  a  line  of  descent.  "Each  nation 
has  its  customs,  its  manners,  and  each  people  has  its 
government."  Lineage,  language,  historical  tradition, 
inherited  laws,  at  times  any  or  all  of  these  make  a  na 
tion.  In  this  sense,  we  ascend  from  the  family,  through 
the  tribe  and  horde,  into  a  nation.  Something  more 
than  this  makes  a  people.  The  office  of  king,  elective 
or  hereditary,  as  distinguished  from  a  tribal  chieftain, 
came  from  the  people. 

Nation  and  nationality  are  often  improperly  con 
founded  with  the  idea  of  the  state.  Helie  well  says: 
"  The  nation  is  the  moral  body,  independent  of  political 
revolutions,  because  it  is  constituted  by  inborn  qualities 
which  render  it  indissoluble.  The  state  is  the  '  people 
organized  into  a  political  body."  The  exigencies  of 
European  politics  do  not  allow  the  full  force  there 
of  this  definition.  As  examples  we  have  the  relations  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  the  German  and  of  Ireland  to 
the  British  Empire.  In  a  composite  government  and  a 
composite  society  like  the  United  States,  these  factors 
are  necessarily  merging  rapidly  into  one  new  order.  I 
give  below  a  large  definition  of  the  state.  It  suffices  now 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  271 

to  consider  in  this  relation  the  specific  analysis  of  Helie. 
The  South,  animated  by  the  will  of  the  moral  body, — 
impelled  by  slavery,  —  attempted  to  control  the  people 
organized  into  a  political  body,  which  was  the  United 
States.  The  attempt  failed,  for  the  whole  mastered  the 
parts. 

Various  causes  formed  the  European  nations  and 
states ;  one  overwhelming  political  cause  formed  the 
United  States.  This  controlling  political  factor  modified 
the  previous  traditional,  hereditary,  or  circumstantial 
causes  that  shaped  the  life  of  European  communities. 
In  Plato's  twofold  idea  of  the  state  —  i.  e.,  individuals 
leaning  together  for  the  satisfaction  of  many  differ 
ing  wants  —  stability  and  desire  were  balanced.  The 
despotic  form  of  state,  where  individuals  were  remorse 
lessly  sacrificed  to  stability,  was  passing  away  in  the 
more  enlightened  Grecian  time.  For  thorough  stability 
it  is  necessary  to  give  to  the  modern  state  or  political 
entity  much  of  the  personal  and  moral  quality  con 
stituted  in  the  nation-element,  as  it  is  rendered  in 
Helie' s  definition  I  have  cited.  Contrariwise,  when  a 
state  is  surely  grounded  politically,  it  can  allow  much 
latitude  to  personal  and  individual  freedom. 

We  shall  understand  our  own  peculiar  conditions  if 
we  study  separately  the  very  different  affairs  of  Europe. 
No  one  has  weighed  this  serious  problem  more  carefully 
than  the  thoughtful  Kenan,  or  set  it  forth  in  more  bril 
liant  expression.1  He  holds  it  a  great  error  to  confound 
race  with  nation  and  to  attribute  sovereignty  to  ethno 
graphic  or  rather  linguistic  groups.  France,  England, 
Germany,  and  Russia  will  be  for  hundreds  of  years 

1  Lalor,  Cyclopedia,  vol.  ii,  924. 


272  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

"  historic  individuals."  This,  as  will  be  perceived,  is  a 
modern  and  is  not  the  ancient  rendering  of  the  term  na 
tion.  The  Germanic  peoples,  in  the  period  fifth  to  tenth 
centuries,  did  not  change  the  races  of  France,  Italy,  or 
Spain,  but,  imposing  aristocratic  government  upon  them, 
they  made  a  "  fusion  of  the  peoples."  A  French  citizen 
may  be  a  Gaul,  Burgundian,  or  Visigoth,  or  all  of  these 
together.  The  essence  of  a  nation  is  that  individuals 
must  have  many  things  in  common,  "also  must  have 
forgotten  many  things."  In  this  sense  the  nation  is  the 
historic  result,  a  series  of  facts  all  tending  to  the  same 
end.  Dynastic  causes  may  prevail ;  they  are  not  abso 
lute,  as  we  see  in  Switzerland  and  in  the  United  States. 
Nation  is  not  based  on  race;  there  is  no  pure  race. 
Nor  upon  language ;  language  invites  to  union  but 
does  not  compel  it.  Languages  are  historic  formations 
that  "  give  little  indication  of  the  blood  of  those  who 
speak  them."  *  Religion,  which  once  comprehended  the 
very  existence  of  the  social  group,  is  not  the  key ;  nor 
is  community  of  interests  nor  geography.  A  nation,  ac 
cording  to  Kenan,  is  a  great  "  solidarity,"  constituted 
by  the  sentiment  proceeding  from  sacrifices  that  have 
been  made,  and  anticipating  those  the  community  is 
still  disposed  to  make.  It  supposes  a  past.  "  Man  is 
not  the  slave  of  his  race,  his  tongue,  his  religion,  or 
of  rivers  or  mountain  chains.  A  great  aggregation  of 
men,  of  sound  mind  and  warm  heart,  creates  a  moral 
conscience,  which  is  called  a  nation."  Another  French 
writer,  M.  Block,  has  said  that  nationality  is  an  impor- 

1  "  The  Poles  are  a  nation,  speak  one  language,  broadly  of  one  race, 
but  are  citizens  of  their  separate  states.  The  Swiss  are  a  nation,  citizens 
of  one  state,  but  they  speak  at  least  three  languages."  —  Wyndham. 


THE  PEOPLE   UNDER   COMPULSION  273 

taut  political  element,  not  necessarily  a  controlling  one. 
It  is  a  sentiment  of  doubtful  purity  and  "  does  not  flow 
generally  from  justice  or  personal  dignity,  but  from 
hatred  of  tbe  foreigner,  and  frequently  from  ignorance." 
Barbarisms  and  despotisms  often  nourish  powerful 
nationalities.  Authorities  generally  agree  that  it  is  a 
hindrance  rather  than  a  help  in  the  higher  course  of 
political  development,  which  is  coming  to  inspire  and 
regulate  civilization. 

We  may  now  define  people  in  its  largest  political 
significance.  It  includes  peoples,  nations  in  the  lineal 
sense,  and  races  in  one  amalgam.  This  is  a  new  sover 
eign  or  governmental  stuff.  It  may  make  kingdoms, 
empires,  or  republics,  according  to  the  nature  and  cir 
cumstantial  development  of  the  stuff.  Mr.  Roosevelt1 
has  shown  an  exact  socio-political  parallel  to  this 
genesis  and  evolution  of  a  political  people  in  his  study 
of  the  settlements  formed  on  the  Western  slopes  of 
the  Alleghanies.  The  Scotch-Irish  race  mingled  with 
English,  a  few  German,  Dutch,  and  Huguenot  French 
families  formed  the  social  fringe  of  the  Atlantic  •col 
onies  and  States.  This  pioneer  vanguard  of  civiliza 
tion  made  a  singularly  homogeneous  mass  of  back 
woodsmen.  Whatever  their  origin  or  previous  locality, 
they  were  all  alike  and  were  all  American  backwoods 
men  in  the  socio-political  work  which  had  fallen  to 
them.  To  hunt  bear  or  Indian,  to  plant  corn,  to  call 
a  county  meeting,  to  marry  their  children,  to  preach 
and  pray,  to  organize  courts  of  justice,  —  all  these 
varying  steps  in  civilized  life  became  their  daily  walk 
by  almost  preternatural  intuition.  The  people  moved 

1  Winning  of  the  West,  vol.  i. 


274    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

forward   with    one   purpose    and   generally    with   one 
method. 

While  the  process  was  more  dramatic  and  picturesque 
in  the  limited  opportunity  of  the  eighteenth  century,  it 
was  essentially  similar  in  the  nineteenth  century.  An 
equivalent  fusion  of  race  characteristics  and  previous 
experiences  has  been  proceeding  and  working  itself  out 
in  all  the  United  States.  This  elastic  backwoods  ele 
ment,  mingling  with  itself  citizens  from  the  old  At 
lantic  States  and  a  constant  stream  of  immigrants  from 
Europe,  has  settled  and  improved  our  section  of  this 
continent,  especially  the  portion  called  the  West  and 
Northwest.  Combining  blood,  hereditary  experience 
and  national  tendency,  it  has  formed  the  amalgam  of 
the  American  people  ;  and  as  President  Walker  pointed 
out,  has  made  the  formation  of  the  completed  Amer 
ican  character.  The  experience  of  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries,  colonial  settlement,  revolution,  and 
establishment  of  the  Union,  all  led  up  to  the  formation 
of  these  great  Western  communities,  on  a  new  basis  and 
through  a  new  ideal.  These  new  States  did  not  look  to 
the  American  past,  —  such  as  it  was,  —  to  the  historic 
consciousness  of  Atlantic  communities,  or  to  the  embers 
of  European  nationalities  and  races,  for  life  and  inspira 
tion  ;  the  new  States  looked  to  the  Union,  the  American 
mother  of  their  political  being.  The  Anglo- American 
George  Washington  of  1789  became  the  Western  Amer 
ican  Abraham  Lincoln  of  1861.  Thus,  though  we  may 
have  had  no  national  past  in  Kenan's  sense,  his  ideal 
of  a  nation  with  a  distinct  moral  purpose  has  been 
perhaps  more  fully  realized  here  than  anywhere  else  in 
the  world. 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  275 

We  have  treated  of  the  social  and  political  population, 
with  the  underlying  nation  grown  out  of  historic  causes 
and  more  or  less  sentimentally  developed.  This  process 
gave  us  the  American  people,  a  moving  political  amal 
gam,  living  with  a  moral  purpose  diffused  and  circu 
lating  through  the  States,  then  concentrating  and  cher 
ishing  its  ideal  in  the  heart  of  the  States  —  the  Union. 
We  must  now  consider  our  people  as  one  family,  in 
which  a  great  and  significant  admixture  of  blood  has 
been  made.  The  facts  of  this  historic  mixture  have 
constituted  a  problem  which  has  vexed  many  thinkers, 
and  has  brought  terror  and  blind  fears  to  the  hearts  of 
many  patriotic  Americans.  I  believe  this  race-problem 
can  be  solved  by  the  same  great  and  overruling  politi 
cal  principle  which  has  prevailed  in  our  history,  and 
especially  in  our  Civil  War. 

Any  study  of  races  and  the  progress  of  races  must 
regard  the  great  truth,  that  character  always  surpasses 
mere  intelligence  in  the  development  of  humanity.1  De 
clining  Rome  had  more  intelligence,  finer  minds,  and 
better  culture  than  the  Republic,  but  there  was  far  less 
of  character  and  that  virtue  which  builds  and  sustains 
communities.  The  Eastern  empire  —  the  most  cultured 
region  of  its  time  —  was  easily  overcome  by  Moham 
medan  barbarians,  ignorant  of  literature  and  art,  but 
possessing  the  faculties  fitted  both  for  conquest  and  for 
self-control. 

When  we  enter  the  advanced  period  of  a  civilization, 
intelligence  and  the  work  of  the  intellect  assume  a 
new  importance.  So  much  force  has  been  engendered 
through  the  progress  of  society  itself,  that  intelligence 

1  Le  Bon,  Les  Premieres  Civilisations,  p.  151. 


276  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

in  individuals  must  be  had  to  direct  and  move  forward 
the  great  mechanism  which  the  progress  of  society  has 
created.  Creative  and  not  mere  assimilating  intelligence 
then  becomes  the  directing  power  in  a  society  possess 
ing  the  dominant  energies  which  generations  of  char 
acter  have  accumulated. 

This  hasty  survey  indicates  some  features  of  the 
paths  trodden  by  the  great  races  or  types  of  mankind 
in  their  past  development.  Doubtless,  the  main  subdivi 
sions  of  the  Aryan  race,  like  the  Latin  and  Germanic, 
or  Celtic  and  Teutonic  branches,  were  fixed  long  ago  — 
at  an  early  period  in  the  great  business  of  race  mak 
ing.  Yet  it  is  an  essential  part  of  this  study  to  bring 
out  the  modifying  tendencies  which  have  characterized 
sub-races.  In  illustration  of  this  great  process,  we  can 
almost  see  the  Saxon  Englishman,  seeking  and  adopting 
those  social  conditions  that  tended  toward  self-govern 
ment.  His  Frankish  kinsman  implanted  his  gallant, 
chivalric  nature  in  the  very  bosom  of  the  Gaulish  Celts. 
The  Armorican  Celt  engrafted  his  loyal  chieftain- 
loving  self  upon  the  stronger,  deeper,  never  yielding 
Iberic  —  that  toughest  of  races,  so  far  as  we  know. 
The  Norseman  varied  from  the  great  Teutonic  stock  in 
a  way  and  fashion  peculiarly  his  own. 

These  races,  —  with  others,  —  acting  under  the  condi 
tions  of  feudal  society,  made  our  modern  Europeans, 
i.  e.,  the  men  of  England,  France,  Germany,  Ireland, 
etc.  The  Roman  culture,  through  government,  law,  and 
religion,  affected  them  all,  but  affected  them  in  very 
different  proportions.  As  I  have  indicated,  this  concur 
rent  movement  of  civilization  made  the  conditions  of  a 
breed  —  an  environment  which  moved  along  with  the 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  277 

race  movement  and  tendency.  It  was  a  social  and  po 
litical  breed,  and  the  resulting  progeny  was  transferred 
to  America.  The  English  Teutons  —  not  only  by  their 
numbers,  but  through  their  self-governing  capacity  — 
took  the  political  lead  in  the  new  colonies.  All  the 
larger  features  of  these  differing  races  came  into  action 
here  under  new  conditions.  The  positive  changes  of 
life  here  stimulated  the  strong  elements,  and  at  the 
same  time  tended  to  slough  off  the  weaker  elements  of 
race. 

We  are  to  remember  this  was  not  a  mere  welding  of 
the  race-metal,  a  new  arrangement  of  the  layers  of  the 
old  structure.  The  American  crucible,  driven  by  a  fierce 
political  heat,  was  reducing  these  old  organisms  into  a 
molten  stream,  a  new  form  of  life.  Race  itself,  the  root 
structure,  was  modified  and  worked  over  into  new  forms 
and  new  social  organisms.  The  elastic  nature  of  Amer 
ican  society  enabled  it  to  vary  the  plastic  races  into  new 
types  of  individuals  and  families.  For  example,  Andrew 
Jackson  was  an  Irishman,  but  what  biologist  or  philoso 
pher  can  identify  him  with  any  Celtic  stock  in  Europe  ? 
The  American  social  and  political  crucible  changed  the 
old  institutions  of  family  tribe  and  nobility,  intended 
to  perpetuate  power  in  classes.  In  consequence,  only 
the  strongest  individuals  survived  to  inherit  and  perpet 
uate  the  new  system.  Weak  scions,  depending  on  old 
institutions,  had  not  enough  vitality  to  project  them 
selves  into  the  new  social  life.  Accordingly  the  American 
race,  as  such,  was  being  bred  from  the  stronger  indi 
viduals  of  the  old  races. 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  positive  change  in  the 
American  state,  a  change  going  to  the  foundations  of 


278  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

society,  should  alter  many  conditions  of  heredity,  as 
they  had  existed.  The  revolution  was  a  political  change 
with  far-reaching  consequences.  Personal  organization, 
personal  force  embodied  in  the  state,  as  above  men 
tioned,  was  relegated  to  individual  citizens.  The  state, 
instead  of  representing  the  few,  had  become  the  pro 
perty  of  the  many.  Neither  property  nor  privilege  con 
trolled  the  state  now.  The  tribal  ascriptions  of  chief 
tains  became  the  inheritance  of  electors  and  voters.  All 
this  was  an  essential  political  development.  The  citizen 
was  now  a  constituent  of  the  political  power,  exerting 
political  force  —  as  distinguished  from  tribal,  aristo 
cratic,  or  theocratic  powers,  putting  forth  social  forces. 
From  the  new  political  conditions  there  came  new 
social  opportunities  and  new  energies.  The  individuals 
and  families  of  the  United  States  were  in  a  new  social 
atmosphere.  Whether  immigrants  were  English,  Irish, 
Dutch,  or  French,  their  children  took  a  new  bent  from 
the  life  surrounding  them.  The  evolution  of  individual 
and  family  life,  conflicting  with  as  well  as  assimilating 
to  social  conditions,  has  been  the  constant  theme  of 
drama,  romance,  and  novel.  Especially  in  Europe,  and 
in  local  districts  of  England,  has  the  struggle  of  individ 
ual  freedom  with  necessary  social  environment  been  de 
picted  in  fiction  truer  than  common  life.  Race  has  been 
the  main  stem  from  which  these  social  fibres  were  drawn 
out.  The  political  race  or  people  thus  brought  out  from 
the  liquefying  and  annealing  process  of  American  life 
has  moulded  the  nation  into  the  solid  structure  of  the 
state.  The  controlling  political  element  —  the  flavor, 
so  to  speak  —  of  the  racial  development  was  in  the  An 
glo-Germanic  tendency  toward  self-government.  The 


THE  PEOPLE  UNDER   COMPULSION  279 

impulse  of  the  individual  citizen  moved  from  his  own 
centre,  but  always  tended  toward  the  political  action 
and  conduct  of  his  fellows.  This  political  tendency, 
strangely  difficult  for  Latins  and  Celts,  became  easy 
enough  for  any  stock  of  Americans,  carried  into  new 
racial  grooves  by  the  movement  of  the  Anglo-Germans, 
including  the  Dutch.  The  political  race-tendency  was 
extended  by  its  new  opportunity,  then  reacted  upon 
this  opportunity  in  the  formation  of  the  American  state. 
Local  institutions  firmly  grounded  the  individual  citizen 
in  his  right  of  initiative  and  in  its  corresponding  re 
straint  of  self-control.  Thus  person,  family,  race,  nation 
were  fused  into  one  grand  political  current  —  the  peo 
ple.  The  people  took  on  a  majesty  more  than  human, 
and  less  than  divine.1 

We  have  been  dealing  chiefly  in  our  study  with  the 
larger  human  elements  of  the  people,  as  this  great 
passionate  body-politic  was  summoned  to  sustain,  the 
government  of  the  Union.  Now  we  must  take  up  the 
average,  and  include  the  lower  part  of  the  populace, 
which  in  any  long  tide  of  human  affairs  must  help  to 
govern  as  well  as  be  governed  in  working  out  its  destiny. 

August  4,  1862,  under  the  authority  of  Congress,2 
the  President  called  for  300,000  militia,  giving  the 

1  Siiice  this  was   written,  President  Roosevelt,  December,  1904,  has 
defined  an  American  eclectic  ideal  in  his  message  :  "  Good  Americanism 
is  a  matter  of  heart,  of  conscience,  of  lofty  aspiration,  of  sound  common 
sense,  but  not  of  birthplace  or  creed." 

2  "After  a  protracted  searching  and  animated  discussion,  extending 
through  nearly  the  whole  of  the  short  session,  of   the    Thirty-seventh 
Congress,  the  enrollment  act  was  passed^  and  became  a  law  by  which  the 
government  of  the   United   States   appealed  directly  to  the  nation  to 
create  large  armies  without  the  intervention  of  the  several  States."  — 
O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  v,  611. 


280  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

States  opportunity  to  fill  their  old  quotas  by  volunteer 
ing  until  August  15 -1  As  has  been  noted,  great  efforts 
were  made  to  escape  the  draft  in  the  East.  Vermont, 
Massachusetts,  and  Rhode  Island  nearly  filled  their 
quotas,  while  New  Jersey  exceeded  by  a  few.  New  York 
furnished  few  men,  and  the  West  substantially  none. 
August  9,  the  order  for  enrollment  and  draft  was  is 
sued.2  Applications  were  made  from  many  States  for 
postponement.  Orders  were  issued  to  all  the  governors, 
August  27,  that  the  department  could  not  postpone 
generally,  but  would  "  leave  the  responsibility  of  any 
delay  with  those  who  make  it."  3  New  York,  as  well  as 
others,  proceeded  rapidly  with  the  enrollment,  according 
to  the  circumstances  of  each;  and  all  the  governors 
sharpened  their  pencils  to  figure  closely  populations, 
quotas,  deficits,  etc.  Morton  expressed  the  feeling  of 
all:  — 

As  long  as  volunteers  were  called  for,  we  were  unwilling 
to  consider  quotas,  and  desired  no  limit  but  our  capacity  to 
furnish  men ;  but  the  idea  of  drafting  is  offensive  to  our 
people,  and  should  not  be  extended  so  as  to  require  us  to  fur 
nish  more  than  our  proportion  of  the  whole  number  called  for 
under  the  several  calls.  It  is  not  the  fault  of  our  people  that 
the  old  regiments  are  not  full.  Every  regiment  is  full  that 
has  had  recruiting  officers  here  for  the  past  three  weeks.4 

And  he  said,  August  31,  "  We  not  only  desire,  but 
will  insist,  on  furnishing  our  full  quota."5  Governor 
Curtin  reported6  a  large  number  of  volunteer  substi 
tutes  to  avoid  draft  in  their  locality.  He  was  obliged  to 
hasten  the  department  in  its  musters  to  "relieve  us 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  291.         2  Ibid.,  p.  333.        3  Ibid.,  p.  471. 
4  Ibid.,  p.  485.  6  Ibid.,  p.  495.  e  Ibid.,  p.  596. 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER   COMPULSION  281 

from  much  trouble  and  dissatisfaction.  We  must  treat 
the  draft  delicately  in  this  State."  1  He  was  none  too 
careful,  for  resistance  by  force  in  several  districts  was 
reported  October  22.2  But  the  serious  troubles  from 
resistance  did  not  come  until  the  following  summer.3 

The  actual  business  of  the  enrollment  and  draft  was 
begun  anew  after  the  Act,  March  3,  1863.  Colonel 
James  B.  Fry,  Asst.  Ad.  G.  U.  S.  A.,  a  most  able  and 
impartial  officer,  was  detailed  as  Provost-Marshal-Gen 
eral  of  the  United  States.4  He  asked  the  cooperation 
of  various  officials  in  the  States,  especially  Governor 
Curtin  and  Mayor  Opdyke  of  New  York  city.5  He  sug 
gested  a  definite  course  of  action,  especially  for  making 
up  deficiencies  under  the  various  calls  of  the  President 
for  troops,  before  making  a  "  regular  "  draft.  May  2, 
he  reported  a  full  balance-sheet  showing  the  excess  and 
deficiencies  of  the  several  States  in  filling  quotas.6  This 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  651. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  679,  and  Series  I,  vol.  xix,  pt.  ii,  p.  468.     Governor  Curtin 
called   on   General  Wool  at  Baltimore,  September  3,  for  assistance   in 
enforcing  enrollment.    The  general  reported  that  with  other  troubles  to 
the  War  Department  in  a  captious  manner  :  "  If  a  State  cannot  enforce 
its  own  laws  without  U.  S.  soldiers,  we  may  as  well  give  up  at  once. 
The  odium  ought  not  to  be  thrown  on  the  U.   S.   troops  ;  there  is  no 
necessity   for   so   doing."  —  Ibid.,   p.  509.    Quite  like  an  old-fashioned 
"  regular." 

8  In  his  report,  December  1,  the  Secretary  of  War  said  :  "  A  chief 
hope  of  those  who  set  the  rebellion  on  foot  was  for  aid  and  comfort  from 
disloyal  sympathizers  in  the  Northern  States,  whose  efforts  were  relied 
upon  to  divide  and  distract  the  people  of  the  North,  and  prevent  them 
from  putting  forth  their  whole  strength  to  preserve  the  national  exist 
ence.  The  call  for  volunteers  and  a  draft  of  the  militia  afforded  an  occa 
sion  for  disloyal  persons  to  accomplish  their  evil  purpose  by  discouraging 
enlistments  and  encouraging  opposition  to  the  war  and  the  draft  of  sol' 
diers  to  carry  it  on."  —  Ibid.,  p.  903. 

4  Ibid.,  vol.  iii,  74.  «  Ibid.,  pp.  166,  169. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  180,  185. 


282  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

is  a  very  curious  statement  of  the  results  of  the  great 
popular  demonstrations  of  1861—62.  The  localities  of 
these  figures  should  be  mentioned  with  bated  breath, 
for  many  circumstances  affected  the  operations,  which 
were  at  last  condensed  into  columns  of  figures.  Illinois 
was  far  ahead  of  all  her  sisters,  with  an  excess  of  40,000 
men.  New  York  had  a  small  surplus,  and  little  Rhode 
Island  exceeded  according  to  her  population.  As  in 
dicated  above,  we  should  not  inquire  too  curiously  why 
Massachusetts  and  Vermont  were  in  arrears. 

Governor  Seymour  had  been  in  office  in  New  York 
since  January,  and  he  was  asked  by  Secretary  Stanton, 
May  20,  to  "  visit  him  in  Washington  for  conference." 
He  postponed  acceptance,  as  he  was  "organizing  a 
vigorous  system  of  recruiting,  which  I  hope  will  do 
away  with  the  necessity  of  making  any  draft  in  New 
York."1 

Law  seems  to  be  fated  in  its  nature  to  excite  violence, 
and  a  very  few  criminals  can  convulse  a  whole  com 
munity  of  good  citizens.  June  11,  two  of  the  officers 
employed  in  making  the  enrollment  in  Indiana  were 
murdered  by  only  two  men  ambushed  in  a  wheat  field. 
The  enrollment  proceeded  quietly  in  the  "  subdistrict  in 
which  the  murder  was  committed,  the  people  affording 
every  facility  in  their  power  to  insure  its  speedy  com 
pletion."  2  There  were  many  cases  of  resistance  in 
Pennsylvania,  even  taking  the  "  shape  of  intimidation 
by  secret  incendiarism  and  attempted  assassination."3 
In  almost  all  the  districts  of  Pennsylvania  the  enroll 
ment  proceeded  "  slowly  and  regularly."  In  one  district 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  214.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  340,  347. 

»  Ibid.,  pp.  350-353. 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  283 

"  the  people  are  defiant  —  so  much  so  as  to  frighten  any 
who  feel  disposed  to  undertake  it.  ...  They  are  part 
of  an  organized  society  in  the  county  to  resist  the  con 
script  act."  l 

In  Indiana  the  outrages  ending  in  the  murders  of 
Rush  County  were  not  as  severely  rebuked  by  the  Demo 
crats  as  was  hoped  for.  "  The  Democratic  gentlemen 
fear  their  own  party  friends,  and,  I  think,  are  appre 
hensive  that  obedience  to  law  is  a  doctrine  to  preach 
which  might  impair  their  party  standing.  The  nomina 
tion  of  Yallandigham  in  Ohio  has,  I  think,  increased 
their  doubts."2  Men  drafted  and  failing  to  appear  were 
treated  as  deserters.  Writs  of  habeas  corpus,  claiming 
these  culprits  on  various  grounds,  were  applied  for  in 
New  York  State.3 

June  18,  another  murder  was  committed  in  Sullivan 
County,  Indiana.  General  Burnside  of  the  Department 
of  Ohio  advised  the  proclamation  of  martial  law  in  that 
county.  Hon.  Daniel  Voorhees,  representing  the  sev 
enth  district  in  Congress,  "  professes  to  greatly  desire  to 
avoid  the  effusion  of  blood,  and  pledged  himself  to  go 
immediately  to  Sullivan  County.  .  *  .  If  he  keeps  his 
promise,  I  have  no  doubt  the  enrollment  will  be  made 
without  resistance."4  Hon.  Schulyer  Colfax,  a  distin 
guished  Republican,  was  likewise  asked  to  stimulate  the 
"  efficiency  "  of  enrollment  in  his  district.  In  Sullivan 
County  a  resistance  was  organized  that  the  "  enroll 
ment  should  not  take  place."  They  were  drilling  and 
claimed  "  2000  already  armed  and  as  many  more  in 
Illinois,  who  will  come  to  their  assistance  when  neces- 

i  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vpl.  iii,  357.  2  IUd.,  p.  354. 

8  IUd.,  pp.  378-380.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  391-394. 


284  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

sary."  Governor  Morton  was  absent  from  home  when 
matters  threatened  most.  Marshal  Baker  reported,  June 
22,  that  the  enrollment  would  be  completed  without 
"  serious  conflict/' 1  though  he  thought  careful  prepara 
tion  should  be  made  against  resistance  when  the  actual 
draft  should  take  place.  The  draft  was  ordered  July  7, 
1863.2  Any  person  drafted  could  furnish  a  substitute, 
or  could  pay  the  government  three  hundred  dollars  to 
be  freed  from  the  draft.  Colonel  Fry  divided  the  loyal 
States  into  districts,  and  appointed  assistant  provost- 
marshals,  who  were  selected  with  great  care  in  concert 
with  the  governors  of  States.3 

In  Massachusetts  there  was  no  difficulty  in  the  enroll 
ment.  When  the  draft  was  ordered,  Governor  Andrew 
took  every  precaution  to  prevent  disturbance  in  the  cities. 
The  only  serious  disturbance  was  in  Boston,  July  14.4 
An  immense  throng  of  rioters  stoned  the  armory  in 
Cooper  Street,  and  tried  to  force  an  entrance.  The 
troops  fired,  and  several  rioters  were  killed,  which  vir 
tually  scattered  the  mob.  The  police  were  very  efficient, 
and  in  a  few  days  the  military  were  relieved  from  ser 
vice,  as  quiet  prevailed. 

If  we  would  comprehend  the  force  of  incidents  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  draft,  and  the  causes  of  the  riots 
consequent  in  New  York  city,  we  must  study  the  char 
acteristics  of  Horatio  Seymour,  governor  of  the  State. 
In  the  era  of  good  feeling  it  became  sometimes  the 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  397. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  467. 

8  "  The  law  made  it  the  duty  of  the  bureau  to  take,  but  did  not  make 
it  the  duty  of  any  one  to  give  the  names  of  those  liable  to  draft.  Every 
imaginable  artifice  was  adopted  to  deceive  and  defeat  the  enrolling  offi 
cers.  Open  violence  was  sometimes  met  with."  —  Ibid.,  vol.  v,  618. 

*  Schouler,  Mass.,  p.  479. 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  285 

fashion  to  treat  him  as  "  a  patriot,"  misguided  but  true 
in  his  affections  and  in  his  desire  to  sacrifice  himself 
in  his  country's  interest  as  he  conceived  it.  This  is  an 
absolute  contradiction.  I  have  been  particular  in  de 
scribing  the  incidents  which  occurred  in  other  States. 
These  affairs  showed  that  the  troubles  incident  to  the 
draft,  or  to  any  strong  measure  of  government,  could  be 
met,  and  were  met,  by  a  firm  exercise  of  governing 
powers  in  the  action  of  those  responsible  for  good  order. 
If  we  take  the  plain  statements  of  Governor  Sey 
mour's  message  on  entering  office,  January  7,  1863,  we 
perceive  a  new  kind  of  political  animal,  hardly  conceived 
of  by  Aristotle.  He  imagined  himself  to  be  not  a  mere 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  but  a  kind  of  subordi 
nate  sovereign  —  governor  of  New  York  State  —  bound 
to  work  out  a  policy  differing  from  the  then  policy  of 
the  Union,  or  from  any  policy  possible  for  the  govern 
ment  of  the  Union,  constituted  as  it  was  and  must  be 
for  years  to  come.  I  claim  that  this  was  the  most  super 
human  scold  ever  uttered,  but  as  proper  political  evolu 
tion  it  was  inconceivable.  Davis  and  Stephens,  with  the 
governor  of  South  Carolina,  —  under  the  curious  cate 
gories  of  Calhoun,  — had  found  a  way  to  enforce  their 
ideas  of  governing  the  United  States  at  the  cannon's 
mouth.  In  their  case  the  great  arbiter  of  politics  — 
force  —  was  trying  out  the  issues  of  government.  But 
there  was  no  such  issue  possible  for  the  peaceful 
Seymour.  In  his  conception,  New  York,  a  constituent 
State  of  the  loyal  Union,  —  participating  in  its  legisla 
tion,  —  should  undertake  to  maintain  by  its  own  dixit 
that  the  federal  laws  were  unconstitutional.  A  draft 
must  not  be  executed,  because  the  governor  of  a  partic- 


286    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

ular  State  considered  that  the  laws  authorizing  such 
draft  were  unconstitutional.  This  is  not  a  mere  theoret 
ical  view  of  a  pragmatical  situation.  The  people  is  our 
main  theme  in  this  connection,  and  the  people  must 
have  chieftains  and  champions.  The  color  of  the  one 
suffuses  the  other  in  this  real  situation. 

Governor  Seymour  considered  that  a  dissolution  of 
the  Union  was  inevitable,  and  in  the  interests  of  peace 
it  should  be  forwarded  by  him  through  the  exercise  of 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  State  of  New  York.  In 
his  first  message  he  begins,  the  constitutions  of  the 
United  States  and  of  New  York  are  "  equally  sacred." 
Each  is  "to  be  upheld1  in  its  respective  jurisdiction."2 
He  urges  "the  inequality  and  injustice"3  of  the  laws 
under  which  a  draft  was  proposed.  He  states  that  the 
causes  of  the  war  were  in  a  "pervading  disregard  of 
the  obligations  of  laws  and  constitutions  .  .  .  above 
all  in  the  local  prejudices,  which  have  grown  up  in  the 
Atlantic  States,  the  two  extremes  of  our  country.  .  .  . 
We  shall  weaken  the  rebellion ;  we  shall  unite  our  peo 
ple  ;  and  the  world  will  recognize  our  capacity  for 
self-government,  when  we  show  that  we  are  capable 
of  self-reform."4  Then  follow  glittering  generalities 
against  all  evils  of  government,  with  the  maxim,  it  is 

1  Robert  E.  Lee  said  before  the  Committee  of  Congress  on  Reconstruc 
tion,  February  17,  1866:  The  advocates  of  secession  considered  "  the  act 
of  the  State  (in  seceding)  as  legitimate,  that  they  were  merely  using  the 
reserved  right,  which  they  had  a  right  to  do."  —  Boutwell,  Sixty  Years  in 
Public  Affairs,  vol.  ii,  83.    This  view  of  Lee  and  his  associates  corre 
sponded  with  Seymour's.   This  "reserved  right"  in  the  local  State  was 
what  Seymour  was  trying  to  bring  out  in  New  York. 

2  Message,  p.  1.    Original  N.  Y.  Archives. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  11. 

«  Ibid.,  pp.  15,  16. 


THE  PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  287 

"worse  that  a  government  should  be  overturned  by 
corruption  than  by  violence."  l  We  "  must  restore  the 
Union  as  it  was  before  the  war."2  There  are  vague 
adjustments  of  political  and  other  interests  in  case  of 
"  division  of  our  Union  into  two  or  more  confederacies."3 
In  these  are  threats  against  New  England  and  the  smaller 
States.  Yet  his  conception  of  what  a  future  Union  — 
a  whole  or  the  dissolved  parts — was  to  be  is  as  uncertain 
as  his  executive  course  in  maintaining  law  proved  itself 
to  be.  "  Let  no  one  think  that  the  people,  who  have 
refused  to  yield  this  Union  to  rebellion  at  the  South, 
will  permit  its  restoration  to  be  prevented  by  fanaticism 
at  the  North." 4  In  this  particular  line  of  his  arguments 
the  Union  seemed  to  be  a  kind  of  sentimental  fetish,  like 
liberty  or  any  abstract  conception.  All  practicable  mea 
sures  for  restoration  of  the  Union  —  except  by  subjection 
of  the  armed  Confederacy  —  were  repudiated  virtually 
by  one  or  another  of  the  governor's  arguments. 

We  will  now  examine  several  reports  from  districts 
in  the  State,  which  manifest  the  feeling  among  the 
people,  whose  elected  chief  set  forth  his  personal  con 
victions  and  official  position  in  the  manner  related. 
These  reports  are  dated  a  day  or  two  after  the  riots  in 
New  York  city  and  elsewhere,  but  they  should  be  enter 
tained  now,  in  order  that  we  may  comprehend  the  actual 
situation  of  the  people  of  the  State,  in  so  far  as  the 
elective  majority  represented  them.  From  Albany  As 
sistant  Provost-Marshal-General  Townsend  says  :  — 

The  government  of  this  State  is  in  the  hands  of  individ 
uals  whose  party  has  not  manifested  at  all  times  a  cooperative 

1  Message,  p.  19.  2  Ibid.y  p.  32. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  37-39.  4  Ibid.,  p.  42. 


288    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

interest  in  the  measures  of  the  administration.  .  .  .  The  draft 
of  course  has  furnished  to  the  leaders  the  pretext  of  a  potent 
opposition  to  the  general  government.  It  is  sufficiently  ap 
parent  throughout  the  whole  of  this  division  that  this  oppo 
sition  is  deeply  seated  among  the  great  mass  of  the  people, 
whose  recklessness  of  consequences  is  wholly  unaccountable, 
excepting  upon  the  suspicion  that  it  rests  upon  the  security 
of  numbers.1 

He  states  that  the  local  militia  is  not  to  be  relied  upon, 
and  that  the  draft  cannot  be  enforced  without  "  a  suf 
ficiency  of  reliable  troops."  Marshal  Richardson  reports 
from  Utica  "a  very  large  portion  of  the  population, 
composed  of  the  working  and  lower  classes,  including 
of  course  nearly  all  of  the  Irish  and  German  element, 
are  aroused  to  a  dangerous  degree  in  opposition  to  the 
conscription  law.  It  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  there 
are  many  men  in  the  district  in  the  higher  walks  of  life 
who  secretly  aid  and  abet  the  ignorant  and  designing 
persons  who  are  combined  against  the  laws." 2 

There  was  u  desperate  and  powerful  organization," 
the  local  militia  could  not  be  depended  upon,  and  500 
troops  would  be  needed  to  enforce  the  draft. 

The  actual  draft  began,  July  7,  in  Rhode  Island,  and 
on  the  8th  in  Massachusetts,  proceeding  without  serious 
resistance  in  most  districts  throughout  the  country. 
July  13,  the  riots  in  New  York  city  began  and  lasted  for 
four  days.  The  results  are  well  known  : 3  a  loss  of  1000 
in  killed  and  wounded,  mostly  of  the  mob,  and  damage 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  p.  516.  2  Ibid.,  p.  528. 

8  "  His  (Seymour's)  terror  and  his  sympathy  with  the  mob  in  conflict 
with  his  convictions  of  public  duty  completely  unmanned  him."  He 
begged  of  his  "friends:"  "Wait  till  the  adjutant-general  returns  from 
Washington,  and  «  you  shall  be  satisfied.'  " —  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii, 
22.  James  T.  Brady,  a  prominent  Democrat,  wrote  Secretary  Stanton, 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER   COMPULSION  289 


to  private  property  roughly  estimated  at  l 
These  troubles  only  caused  temporary  interruption  to 
the  draft.  It  went  forward  throughout  the  country, 
and  while  it  brought  into  the  armies  comparatively 
few  recruits,  it  powerfully  stimulated  enlistments.2  The 
States  assisted  these  by  bounties,  and  considerable 
money  accrued  to  the  general  treasury,  in  payment  for 
substitutes. 

If  any  think  that  the  provost-marshals  cited,  and  the 
present  writer,  failed  or  fail  to  construe  aright  the  true 
situation  in  the  State  of  New  York,  let  them  look  into 
the  statement  of  a  competent  observer  on  the  spot  and 
to  the  manner  born.  John  Jay,  July  18,  said  to  Sec 
retary  Stanton  :  — 

The  restoration  of  order  in  the  city  is  about  being  accom 
plished  by  the  aid  of  Governor  Seymour,  Judge  McCunn,  and 
Archbishop  Hughes,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  leaders  of 
the  rebels  in  New  York.  The  riot  had  unexpectedly  assumed 
a  character  which  they  could  not  safely  indorse,  and  they  pro 
pose  to  stop  it  as  quickly  as  possible.  .  .  .  The  existing  riots 
were  not  contemplated  (in  a  secret  organization)  in  the  shape 
they  took,  and  have  interfered  with  the  original  plan.  .  .  . 
This  (the  plan)  is  the  last  great  card  of  the  rebellion,  and 
demands  careful  play  on  the  part  of  the  government,  so  that, 
without  any  surrender  of  the  rights  and  dignity  of  the  admin 
istration,  the  proposed  collision  shall  be  rendered  impossible. 
The  rebels  in  this  city  have  from  the  first  been  entirely  con- 

condemning  the  governor's  use  of  "  friends."  He  thought  the  riot  was 
the  result  of  premature  development  of  schemes  to  resist  the  draft.  — 
Gorham,  Stanton,  vol.  ii,  108. 

1  Cf.  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  321-330,  a  spirited  account  of  the  riots  in  New 
York  and  their  suppression.    I  differ  from  Mr.  Rhodes  absolutely  in  his 
estimate  of  Seymour  and  the  bearing  of  his  executive  acts. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  7. 


290    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

fident  of  their  final  success.  I  was  told  a  year  ago  by  one  of 
the  most  wealthy  and  fashionable  bankers  of  New  York  that 
this  administration  would  not  be  allowed  to  complete  its 
term ;  that  it  would  be  overthrown  by  an  armed  revolt  in  this 
city,  and  when  I  asked,  "  When  and  how  will  this  be  done?" 
he  said  sadly  and  solemnly  :  "  I  do  not  know  when  it  will  be 
done,  nor  how  it  will  be  done,  but  that  it  will  be  done  I  am 
as  certain  as  that  I  stand  here."  This  man  has  been  assisting 
Governor  Seymour  to  suppress  these  riots.  .  .  .  The  Copper 
heads  (not  counted  as  in  the  above  "  rebel  "  element)  count 
on  the  remarkable  reverence  of  the  American  people  for  the 
decisions  of  our  courts  as  insuring  them  an  immense  support 
from  alj  classes,  in  case  the  President  should  refuse  to  delay 
the  enforcement  of  the  draft  until  the  new  and  disputed 
points  were  decided.1 

Mr.  Jay'  recommended  temporizing  and  postponing 
further  enforcement  of  the  draft  until  decisions  of  the 
courts  could  be  had  maintaining  its  integrity.  Mean 
while  events  could  not  wait  for  an  entire  stoppage  of 
executive  action  to  wait  for  judicial  action.  A  citizen, 
E.  F.  Bullard,  reported  from  Saratoga  Springs  to  Hon. 
Henry  Wilson,  July  21 :  "  There  is  more  difficulty 
about  the  draft  in  this  State  than  the  authorities  at 
Washington  suspect.  Our  state  militia  is  mainly  offi 
cered  by  open  secessionists  recently  appointed  by  the 
governor.  They  will  lead  the  mob  in  these  counties. 
...  I  write  this  at  the  request  of  our  leading  men  in 
the  State."  2  The  communication  was  indorsed  by  two 
provost-marshals. 

General  Dix  had  been  summoned  and  placed  in  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  East.  July  30,  he  asked 
of  Governor  Seymour  direct  military  assistance :  — 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  540-542. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  553. 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER   COMPULSION  291 

I  am  very  anxious  that  there  should  be  perfect  harmony  of 
action  between  the  federal  government  and  that  of  the  State 
of  New  York,  and  if,  under  your  authority  to  see  the  laws 
faithfully  executed,  I  can  feel  assured  that  the  act  referred  to 
will  be  enforced,  I  need  not  ask  the  War  Department  to  put 
at  my  disposal  troops  in  the  service  of  the  United  States.1 

Meanwhile  Horatio  Seymour  had  been  going  through 
almost  every  phase  of  hesitation,  infirm  purpose,  and 
erratic  will,  possible  to  man.  Called  suddenly  from 
Long  Branch,  he  addressed  the  mob  from  the  steps  of 
the  City  Hah1  in  a  speech  which  his  friends  have  never 
been  able  to  explain,  nor  his  critics  to  understand.  He 
truckled  to  "  my  friends,"  the  mob,  and  yet  he  issued 
on  the  same  day  proper  proclamations,  sustaining  the 
cause  of  order.  Many  years  after  these  events,  Marshal 
Fry  collected  the  evidence,  and  calmly  set  forth  the 
whole  story  of  the  governor's  action  in  the  riots,  which 
has  not  been  contradicted,  and  which  merits  attention. 
He  cites  Governor  Seymour's  statement  to  a  correspond 
ent  of  the  "  New  York  Herald  " 2  that  "  the  riot  was 
caused  not  only  by  an  unjust  enrollment,  but  by  the 
way  the  draft  was  made."  And  it  was  begun  without 
notice  to  General  Wool  (then  commanding  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  East),  Mayor  Opdyke,  or  the  governor  of  the 
State.  These  statements  are  rebutted 3  by  the  notices 
sent  to  Governor  Seymour,  July  6,  10,  13.  Moreover, 
it  was  common  report  that  the  draft  began  in  Rhode 
Island  and  Massachusetts,  July  7,8.  The  "Herald" 
and  "  Times "  said  the  provost-marshals  "  threw  pru- 

1  0.  /?.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  592. 

2  Fry,  New  York  and  the  Conscription,  p.  2,  and  cf .  Nicolay  and  Hay, 
vol.  vii,  14. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  23. 


292  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

dence,  propriety,  and  common  sense  to  the  winds."1 
The  draft  was  conducted  in  New  York  and  Brooklyn 
by  Colonel  Robert  Nugent,  an  Irishman  and  war  Demo 
crat.  Nor  was  there  any  good  ground  that  the  nature 
of  the  enrollment  had  any  influence  in  producing  the 
riot.  "No  complaint  of  the  enrollment  was  received  by 
the  War  Department  from  Governor  Seymour  or  any 
one  else  until  the  riots  had  occurred."  2  The  excuse  was 
an  afterthought. 

It  is  true  that  the  draft  was  a  Republican  measure  in 
the  main,  as  all  positive  legislative  measures  were,  but 
it  was  in  no  sense  a  partisan  movement.  President  Lin 
coln,  in  a  letter  to  Count  A.  de  Gasparin,  said :  "  It  seems 
strange  even  to  me,  but  it  is  true  that  the  government 
is  now  pressed  to  this  course  (a  draft)  by  a  popular 
demand."  3  Senators  Richardson  and  McDougal,  Demo 
crats,  both  favored  a  draft,  the  latter  regretting  that 
"  when  this  war  was  first  organized  the  conscription 
rule  did  not  obtain." 

Governor  Seymour,  on  the  other  hand,  was  of  those 
"  who  were  against  the  wisdom  of  forcing  men  into  the 
army,  if  not  against  the  right  of  the  government  to  so 
do."  4  Marshal  Fry  cites  letters  from  Dix,  Diven,  and 
Canby,  officers  in  the  army,  to  show  that  the  governor's 
hostility  "  was  to  the  measure  itself  rather  than  to  the 
manner  of  its  execution."  5  The  testimony  of  an  eye 
witness,  Provost-Marshal  Townsend,  August  1,  should 
be  considered  here :  — 

1  The  situation  in  New  York  was  carefully  weighed  in  advance  by  the 
President  and  the  War  Department.   "  The  conclusions  were  that  no  ex 
ception  in  the  application  of  the  law  should  be  made  in  New  York."  — 
Fry,  New  York  and  the  Conscription,  p.  30. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  32.         •  Ibid.,  p.  10.         4  Ibid.,  p.  33.         6  Ibid.9  p.  35. 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  293 

I  have  not,  nor  have  I  had,  the  slightest  confidence  in  the 
state  authorities  in  regard  to  the  question  of  draft.  I  say  this 
unofficially  as  a  citizen,  because  I  have  no  other  evidence  to 
base  my  feeling  of  distrust  than  what  is  patent  to  everybody 
in  this  State,  and  I  suppose  equally  so  at  Washington,  and 
also  because  I  know  Governor  Seymour  personally.  .  .  .  He 
and  Fernando  Wood  are  identical  in  sentiment,  both  suffi 
ciently  daring  to  attempt  anything,  but  when  the  moment  for 
action  arrives,  too  cowardly  to  direct  and  execute.1 

Fry  states  positively  that  the  only  guarantee  to  be 
obtained  from  Governor  Seymour  was  that  there  should 
be  "  no  infractions  of  the  laws  of  the  State"  He  was 
asked  whether  he  would  "  aid  in  enforcing  a  law  of  the 
United  States.  He  gave  no  assurance  on  that  point." 

The  governor  authorized  the  statement  by  the  "  New 
York  Times  "  in  1879 :  "  The  draft  riots  of  1863  were 
put  down  mainly  by  the  boldness  and  skill  of  the  police 
department."  3 

The  efforts  do  not  appear  to  have  been  directed 
toward  any  improvement  of  matters  at  home.  They 
tended  toward  the  greatest  pressure  on  the  President 
to  suspend  the  draft  entirely  until  New  York  could' 
make  up  her  quotas  through  voluntary  enlistment.  It 
was  necessary  to  bring  out  the  foregoing  facts  —  under 
lying  the  social  and  political  conditions  of  New  York 
State  —  before  we  should  entertain  the  important  docu 
ments  to  follow.  August  1,  the  governor  wired  the 
President  for  delay  in  drafting,  until  he  could  send  for 
ward  his  appeal.  The  President  asked  how  long.  The 
remonstrance  and  appeal  was  dated  August  3,  though 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  608. 

2  Fry,  New  York  and  the  Conscription,  p.  43. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  68. 


294  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

the  President  did  not  receive  it  until  the  6th.1  It  is  a 
very  long  and  labored  plea  to  put  the  administration  in 
the  wrong  and  to  apologize  for  the  riot,  while  claiming 
credit  to  the  State  for  quelling  disorder  without  help 
from  without.  If  the  community  could  so  readily  quell 
the  trouble,  we  may  ask  why  it  was  not  guided  in  the 
right  direction  to  prevent  it  in  the  beginning :  — 

It  gives  a  gratifying  assurance  of  the  ability  of  the  greatest 
city  of  our  continent  to  maintain  order  in  its  midst,  under 
circumstances  so  disadvantageous,  against  an  uprising  so  un 
expected,  and  having  its  origin  in  questions  deeply  exciting 
to  the  minds  of  the  great  masses  of  its  population.2 

He  directly  charges  unfair  and  gross  mismanage 
ment  :  — 

The  provost-marshal  commenced  the  draft  without  consult 
ing  with  the  authorities  of  the  State  or  of  the  city.  .  .  .  Dis 
regard  for  law  and  the  disrespect  for  judicial  tribunals  pro 
duced  their  natural  results  of  robbery  and  arson,  accompanied 
by  murderous  outrages  upon  a  helpless  race ;  and  for  a  time 
the  very  existence  of  the  commercial  metropolis  of  our  coun 
try  was  threatened.3 

To  make  the  supposed  constitutional  aberrations  of 
Congress4  and  the  misconduct  of  provost-marshals  di 
rectly  responsible  for  the  murder  of  the  poor  negroes 
was  a  flight  of  fancy  worthy  of  Seymour.  Yet  to  obtain 
ground  for  such  a  grave  charge,  facts  should  be  essen- 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  666.         2  Ibid.,  p.  613.        •  Ibid.,  p.  613. 

4  Mr.  Lincoln  prepared,  though  he  did  not  publish,  an  elaborate  argu 
ment  for  the  draft  and  the  measures  enforcing  it.  It  was  directed  espe 
cially  toward  conscientious  loyal  Democrats.  The  manuscript  says :  "  They 
tell  us  the  law  is  unconstitutional.  It  is  the  first  instance,  I  believe,  in 
which  the  power  of  Congress  to  do  a  thing  has  been  questioned  in  a  case 
where  the  power  is  given  by  the  Constitution  in  express  terms."  —  Nico- 
lay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  51. 


THE  PEOPLE    UNDER  COMPULSION  295 

tial  even  to  a  romancer.  In  another  connection  the 
governor  says :  "  I  do  not  doubt  the  impartiality  of  Colo 
nel  Fry." 1  The  whole  charge  is  groundless  and  is  dis- 
proven  absolutely  by  Colonel  Fry,  as  we  have  noted.2 
The  idea  that  the  germ  of  discord  in  the  brain  of  the 
mob  originated  in  unfair  treatment  was  an  excusing 
afterthought  and  not  a  true  discovery. 

He  asks  that  the  draft  "  be  suspended  in  New  York," 
bringing  out  vaguely,  and  with  much  circumlocution, 
that  the  citizen  is  mainly  affected  by  the  fact  that  "the 
guilt  of  the  rebellion  consists  in  raising  an  armed  band 
against  constitutional  or  legal  obligations." 3  That  the 
citizen  believes  the  draft  to  be  unconstitutional  and  in 
some  way  must  be  "  protected  "  against  this  breach  of 
the  constitution.  And  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  much 
of  this  special  pleading  of  Seymour  bears  against  the 
inevitable  burdens  of  government,  administered  how 
ever  it  may  be.  All  of  this  is  to  force  the  administra 
tion  to  abandon  its  executive  functions,  while  its  armies 
are  battling  in  the  field,  and  to  submit  the  draft  laws 
to  the  courts  for  adjudication  :4  — 

The  refusal  of  governments  to  give  protection  excites  citi 
zens  to  disobedience.  The  successful  execution  of  the  con 
scription  act  depends  upon  the  settlement  by  judicial  tribunals 
of  its  constitutionality.5  With  such  decisions  in  its  favor,  it 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  615. 

2  Ante,  p.  292.  3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  617. 

4  Secretary  Stanton  wrote  Seymour  that  he  had  always  intended  to  sub- 
rait  the  conscription  law  to  judicial  interpretation,  whenever  a  "  case  " 
could  be  properly  brought.   Meanwhile  "the  executive  is  bound  in  its 
ministerial  measures  to  assume  the  law  to  be  constitutional."  —  Gorham, 
Stanton,  vol.  ii,  109. 

5  Two  decisions  in  the  U.  S.  Circuit  Court  in  Pennsylvania  and  Illinois 


296    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

will  have  a  hold  upon  the  public  respect  and  deference  which 
it  now  lacks.  A  refusal  to  submit  it  to  this  test  will  be  re 
garded  as  evidence  that  it  wants  legality  and  binding  force.1 

He  concludes  with  an  admirable,  general  statement  — 
sufficient  in  administrative  force,  if  all  citizens  were 
Seymours.  Unfortunately,  the  Bismarck  element  —  in 
volving  "  blood  and  iron  "  —  cannot  be  neglected  in 
time  of  war.  "  It  will  be  but  a  little  price  to  pay  for 
the  peace  of  the  public  mind ;  it  will  abate  nothing 
from  the  dignity,  nothing  from  the  sovereignty,  of  the 
nation  to  show  a  just  regard  for  the  majesty  of  the  laws 
and  a  paternal  interest  in  the  wishes  and  welfare  of  our 
citizens."2 

Mr.  Lincoln,  a  wise  contestant,  avoiding  all  meta- 
physic  or  eloquent  expression,  August  7,  one  day  after 
receiving  the  appeal,  answers  it  and  goes  to  the  root 
of  the  matter :  — 

I  cannot  consent  to  suspend  the  draft  in  New  York,  as  you 
request,  because,  among  other  reasons,  time  is  too  important. 
By  the  figures  you  send,  which  I  presume  are  correct,  the 
twelve  districts  represented  fall  into  two  classes  of  8  and  4 
respectively.  The  disparity  of  the  quotas  for  the  draft  in 
these  two  classes  is  certainly  very  striking,  being  the  differ 
ence  of  2200  in  one  class  and  4864  in  the  other.  ...  I  shall 
direct  the  draft  to  proceed  in  all  the  districts,  drawing,  how 
ever,  at  first,  from  each  of  the  four  districts,  to  wit,  the  sec 
ond,  fourth,  sixth,  and  eighth  only  2200,  being  the  average 
quota  of  the  other  class.  After  this  drawing,  these  four  dis 
tricts,  and  also  the  seventeenth  and  twenty -ninth,  shall  be 
carefully  reenrolled,  and,  if  you  please,  agents  of  yours  may 
witness  every  step  of  the  process.  ...  I  do  not  object  to 

finally  affirmed- the  constitutionality  of  the  law.    An  adverse  decision  in 
Pennsylvania  was  reversed  afterward.  —  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  13. 
1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  617.  2  Ibid.,  p.  619. 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  297 

abide  a  decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  on  the 
constitutionality  of  the  draft  law.  In  fact,  I  should  be  will 
ing  to  facilitate  the  obtaining  of  it,  but  I  cannot  consent  to 
lose  the  time  while  it  is  being  obtained.  We  are  contending 
with  an  enemy,  who,  as  I  understand,  drives  every  able-bodied 
man  he  can  reach  into  his  ranks,  very  much  as  a  butcher 
drives  bullocks  into  a  slaughter  pen.  No  time  is  wasted  ;  no 
argument  is  used.  This  produces  an  army  which  will  soon 
turn  upon  our  now  victorious  soldiers  already  in  the  field,  if 
they  are  not  sustained  by  recruits  as  they  should  be.  It  pro 
duces  an  army  with  a  rapidity  not  to  be  matched  on  our  side, 
if  we  first  waste  time  to  reexperiment  with  the  volunteer  sys 
tem  already  deemed  by  Congress,  and  palpably  in  fact,  so  far 
exhausted  as  to  be  inadequate  ;  and  then  more  time  to  obtain 
a  court  decision  as  to  whether  a  law  is  constitutional  which 
requires  a  part  of  those  not  now  in  the  service  to  go  to  the 
aid  of  those  who  are  already  in  it ;  and  still  more  to  deter 
mine  with  absolute  certainty  that  we  get  those  who  are  not  to 
go.  My  purpose  is  to  be  in  my  action  just  and  constitutional, 
and  yet  practical,  in  performing  the  important  duty  with 
which  I  am  charged  —  of  maintaining  the  unity  and  free  prin 
ciples  of  our  country.1 

Governor  Seymour  did  not  know  when  he  was  beaten.2 
Incapable  of  comprehension  and  conviction,  he  contin 
ued  to  declaim  against  "dishonest  perversion  of  the 
law."  His  position  was  on  shifting  sands,  and  must  be 
overwhelmed  inevitably  in  the  patriotic  currents  of 
popular  feeling,  even  though  he  represented  for  the 
moment  the  selfish  portion  of  the  community  ready  to 
avoid  military  service  by  any  expedient.  If  a  tithe  of 
Seymour's  assertions  had  been  true,  the  elections  of  the 

1  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  635.    August  11,  the  President  reviewed 
and  rebutted  the  technical  arguments  of  Judge- Advocate-General  Water- 
bury  which  complained  of  the  enrollment.  —  Ibid.,  p.  666. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  636,  639. 


298    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL   AND   STATE 

autumn  would  have  shown  it.  But  there  was  no  fur 
ther  substantial  resistance  to  the  draft.  Had  there 
been  such  actual  trespass  on  the  rights  of  the  Amer 
ican  citizen  as  Governor  Seymour  and  the  lawyers  of 
his  kind  deliberately  charged,  there  would  have  oc 
curred  a  sub-rebellion  more  ominous  than  the  Southern 
revolt. 

Abraham  Lincoln  often  manoeuvred  as  a  politician  for 
particular  ends ;  but  he  always  held  in  mind  the  great 
principles  underlying  the  state,  and  they  ever  carried 
him  in  unerring  course  to  the  successful  lead  of  the 
people.  This  business  of  compelling  the  people  against 
prepossession  in  a  new  political  direction  through  a 
draft  is  a  complete  illustration  of  the  greatness  of  the 
man  and  the  president.  It  was  a  very  difficult  situation 
everywhere;  the  difficulties  culminated  in  the  great 
State  of  New  York.  The  State  was  under  semi-hostile 
control  and  the  friends  of  the  Union  advised  compro 
mise.  Mr.  Jay  and  his  Republican  neighbors  had  good 
reason  for  dreading  the  veiled  secession-element  in  their 
State,  and  they  naturally  recommended  some  conces 
sion  to  obtain  an  advantage  over  these  half-alien  citi 
zens.  But  Abraham  Lincoln  knew  better.  He  best 
comprehended  the  great  governmental  issues  of  the 
occasion  as  they  underlay  the  life  of  the  State,  while 
he  guided  the  people  to  a  victorious  solution  of  the  im 
mediate  embarrassment.  He  prostrated  the  governor, 
and  overthrew  the  little  argument  brought  forward  — 
in  apology  for  half-hearted  support  of  the  administration 
—  by  his  masterly  conduct  of  detail  in  this  controversy. 
He  carefully  separated  the  practical  "  disparity  "  actu 
ally  incurred. through  mistakes  in  the  New  York  enroll- 


THE  PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  299 

ment.  The  districts  which  had  suffered  were  strictly 
discriminated  and  "  protected  "  from  the  consequence 
of  errors  which  had  passed. 

Seymour,  Fernando  Wood,  the  "  fashionable  banker  " 
of  Jay,  and  their  kind,  must  have  gnashed  teeth  in  rage, 
as  their  covert  assaults  on  the  necessary  administration 
of  the  Union  missed  effect.  It  was  the  grave  fault  of 
these  men,  and  not  a  mere  misfortune,  that  they  utterly 
failed  to  comprehend  Lincoln,  thinking  him  a  "weak 
though  well-meaning  man."  1  It  was  not  the  business 
of  a  citizen  of  New  York  —  much  less  of  the  governor 
of  the  State  —  to  make  critical  estimate  of  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States.  Their  duty  was  simple ; 
their  course  ought  to  have  been  to  pay  their  taxes  and 
to  serve  in  the  army  for  subduing  the  rebellion  and 
sustaining  the  Union.  Whether  Lincoln  was  grotesque 
or  elegant  was  not  germane  to  the  question.  Like  all 
statesmen  and  popular  leaders  who  neglect  the  main 
point  and  follow  side-issues,  they  wasted  strength,  lost 
touch  with  the  popular  movement,  and  almost  uncon 
sciously  found  themselves  across  the  main  current,  and 
contending  against  the  abounding  convictions  of  the 
American  people.  The  representative  of  the  West,  the 
newly  developed  citizen  of  a  Democratic  Republic,  dis 
tinguished  himself  throughout  this  controversy,  and 
stood  forth  in  magnificent  contrast  with  the  faltering 
Democrats  —  following  their  partisan  name  —  of  this 
great  Eastern  and  Middle  State. 

The  near  and  surest  view  and  the  best  judgment  of 
the  governor  was  in  his  own  community,  and  among 
neighbors  forced  to  operate  with  him  under  their  re- 
i  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  332. 


300    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

sponsibility  to  the  federal  government.1  General  Dix 
represented  the  administration,  and  was  obliged  to  call 
on  the  governor  of  the  State  to  discharge  his  duty  after 
the  President's  announcement.  August  8,  he  arraigned 
the  governor  in  severe  but  necessary  terms:  — 

Whatever  defects  the  act  authorizing  the  enrollment  and 
draft  may  have,  it  is  the  law  of  the  land,  framed  in  good  faith 
by  the  representatives  of  the  people,  and  it  must  be  presumed 
to  be  consistent  with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  until 
pronounced  in  conflict  with  them  by  competent  judicial  tri 
bunals.  Those,  therefore,  who  array  themselves  against  it  are 
obnoxious  to  far  severer  censure  than  the  ambitious  or  mis 
guided  men  who  are  striving  to  subvert  the  government,  for 
the  latter  are  acting  by  color  of  sanction  under  legislatures 
and  conventions  of  the  people  in  the  States  they  represent. 
Among  us,  resistance  to  the  law  by  those  who  claim  and 
enjoy  the  protection  of  the  government  has  no  semblance  of 
justification,  and  becomes  the  blackest  of  political  crimes. 
...  That  the  military  power  of  the  State  will,  in  case  of 
need,  be  employed  to  enforce  the  draft.  I  desire  to  receive 
the  assurance  because,  under  a  mixed  system  of  government 
like  ours,  it  is  best  that  resistance  to  the  law  should  be  put 
down  by  the  authority  of  the  State  in  which  it  occurs.2 

1  Colonel  Nugent  and  Captain  Erhardt,  provost-marshals,  had  an  in 
terview  with  Governor  Seymour,  October  16, 1863.   The  governor  recom 
mended  the  appointment  of  four  men  from  each  Congressional  district 
in  New  York  to  supervise  recruiting.    "  Without  hazarding  an  opinion 
on  the  motive  of  his  Excellency,  the  desire  that  the  government  should 
appoint  two  Union  men,  and  he  two,  seemed  to  indicate  too  strong  a 
disposition  to  draw  a  line  between  the  government,  seeking  to  protect  its 
integrity,  and  the  disloyal."   He  discussed  the  whole  enrollment  and  draft. 
"  The  conversation,  occupying  more  than  three  hours,  was  in  substance 
what  I  have  written,  yet  long  as  it  was,  little  was  said  to  justify  the  belief 
that  discrepancies  in  the  enrollment  were  the  cause  of  his  dissatisfaction, 
but  much  that  captiousness  was  the  secret  of  his  opposition  to  the  law." 
—  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  pp.  80-83. 

2  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  654. 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  301 

Seymour  either  knew  too  much  for  the  office  of  gov 
ernor  of  a  State  while  other  States  were  in  rebellion 
against  the  federal  power,  or  he  did  not  know  enough 
to  perform  his  simple  duty.  As  Marshal  Fry  reported/ 
he  could  not  be  induced  to  declare  that  he  would  sup 
port  a  federal  statute  with  the  military  power  of  the 
State.  August  12,  General  Dix  was  obliged  to  call  on 
the  War  Department  for  5000  more  troops.  "  That 
there  is  a  widespread  disaffection  in  this  city,  and  that 
opposition  to  the  draft  has  been  greatly  increased  by 
Governor  Seymour's  letters  cannot  be  doubted."2  He 
justly  said  that,  by  ample  preparation  on  the  part  of  the 
federal  authorities,  those  "  embittered  by  party  prejudice 
would  be  overawed,"  as  the  result  proved.  August  18, 
Dix3  wrote  the  governor  a  very  pungent  letter  acknow 
ledging  one  "  not  found."  In  this  last  document  it 
would  appear  that  the  governor  promised  to  put  down 
riotous  proceedings,  etc.,  "  as  infractions  of  the  laws  of 
this  State  "  (cited  from  Governor  Seymour).  Dix  con 
cludes  by  hoping  that  the  mere  presence  of  the  national 
forces  will  convince  "those  who  intend  to  uphold  the 
government,  as  well  as  those  who  are  seeking  to  sub 
vert  it,"  that  the  federal  authority  would  be  firmly 
maintained. 

Whatever  reluctant  concessions  toward  the  mainte 
nance  of  order  that  stalwart  official,  General  Dix,  extorted 
from  the  governor,  he  was  not  convinced  of  the  patriotic 
love  of  country  so  often  claimed  for  the  state  func 
tionary.  September  1,  he  reported  to  General  Halleck : 4 
"  The  course  of  Governor  Seymour  ought  to  be  more 

1  Ante,  p.  293.  2  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  673. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  690.  *  Ibid.,  p.  755. 


302     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

thoroughly  canvassed  and  exposed  than  it  has  been. 
.  .  .  He  was  elected  on  the  platform  of  a  '  more  vigor 
ous  prosecution  of  the  war; '  he  has  practically  put  him 
self  on  the  platform  'a  vigorous  prosecution  of  peace.' "  1 
General  Dix  not  only  spoke  out  of  his  manly  sense  of 
duty,  but  he  represented  fully  the  sentiment  of  the  loyal 
North.  Whatever  the  Democrats  thought  they  meant, 
when  they  canvassed  for  more  vigorous  prosecution  of 
the  war,  all  their  practical  efforts  looked  toward  peace. 
Meanwhile  these  backward  movements  embarrassed  the 
administration  in  the  immediate  and  absolutely  neces 
sary  conduct  of  the  war. 

The  President  at  no  time  assumed  any  petty  ascend 
ency  over  Seymour.  Long  before  these  incidents,  he 
had  written  him  a  grave  and  magnanimous  letter,  ask 
ing  to  be  "  better  acquainted  "  that  they  might  together 
maintain  the  "nation's  life  and  integrity."2  A  year 
later,  Governor  Andrew  wrote  a  long  letter  to  Seymour, 
asking  for  personal  acquaintance,  for  friendly  confer 
ence  to  help  "  conquer  a  peace."  3  There  was  no  result, 
apparently ;  the  record  shows  none.  It  was  within  my 
knowledge  that  other  eminent  Republicans  sought  ear- 

1  In  this  report  General  Dix  severely  criticises  in  detail  the  governor's 
official  acts  in  raising  troops.    He  then  gives  this  curious  bit  of  history. 
"  When  Madison  and  Monroe  proposed  a  draft,  it  was  attacked  by  the 
Federalists  in  Congress.    Among  others,  Morris  S.  Miller,  of  Utica,  with 
whose  family  Seymour  is  connected   (I  think  by  a   double   marriage), 
attacked  it  as  &  conscription,  as  unconstitutional,  etc.,  very  much  as  Sey 
mour  is  doing  now.    There  is  this  difference  —  Judge  Miller  was  resist 
ing  a  legislative  proposition  in  legitimate  debate,  whereas  Seymour  is 
resisting  the  law  of  the  land."  —  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  755. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  10. 

8  Schouler,  Mass,  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  591.  According  to  Lee,  Governor 
Seymour  called  on  Andrew,  who  said  "  he  seemed  very  sincere.  I  think  he 
is  carried  away  by  his  own  subtlety,  perhaps."  —  Morse,  Henry  Lee,  p.  237. 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  303 

nestly  to  bring  the  governor  into  moral  accord  with  the 
administration.1  It  was  not  in  him,  for  he  was  not 
large  enough  to  contain  the  noble  idea  of  Union,  which 
permeated  and  possessed  most  of  the  common  voters  of 
the  Northern  States. 

Horatio  Seymour,  though  extraordinary  and  not 
easily  comprehended,  was  not  an  anomalous  character. 
He  cast  many  broken  lights  across  a  mischievous  and 
disastrous  background,  which  is  permanent,  and  which 
must  be  indestructible  matter  of  history.  We  must 
sketch  the  ground  and  clarify  the  traits  of  character 
exhibited  upon  it,  according  to  the  best  knowledge  of 
our  own  day.  He  has  been  charged  with  "  inordinate 
ambition  "  by  some  who  ought  to  have  known  him  well ; 
but  there  was  never  a  greater  error  in  analyzing  char 
acter.  While  he  possessed  some  of  the  better  traits  of 
an  ambitious  demagogue,  he  was  too  much  refined,  in 
heredity  and  essence,  to  sink  to  the  level  of  a  vulgar 
populace.  And  something  more  kept  him  from  the 
great  ambition  which  controls  heroes,  for  he  had  not 
the  fibre  of  the  forcible  men  of  history.  When  we  con 
sider  some  of  his  daring  acts  in  attempting  to  obstruct 
the  necessary  course  of  the  national  administration,  this 
may  appear  at  first  sight  to  be  an  uncertain  statement. 
But  the  notion,  more  or  less  prevalent,  that  audacious 
daring  partakes  of  and  consists  in  courage,  is  totally 
wrong.  The  words  differ  essentially,  and  they  differ  in 
meaning.  In  one  derivative  language  daur  is  "  to 

1  Thurlow  Weed  reported  Lincoln  as  saying  that  if  Seymour  would 
wheel  the  Democracy  into  line  for  suppressing  the  rebellion,  then  he 
would  help  Seymour  to  become  his  successor  as  president.  Nicolay  and 
Hay  think  Weed  exaggerated,  but  are  sure  that  Lincoln  was  very  anxious 
to  be  supported  by  Seymour.  —  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  12. 


304    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

stun/'  in  another  dare  is  "  a  fool."  Courage  comes  out 
of  the  heart  of  heroes,  and  has  no  possible  variant 
meaning.  We  had  two  marked  illustrations  of  auda 
cious  daring  in  the  episodes  of  the  Civil  War.  The  sub 
ject  of  this  discussion  was  one.  General  Butler  of  most 
varied  fame  was  another.  On  the  other  hand,  the  calm 
courage,  coming  from  the  inmost  nature  of  our  people, 
was  fully  represented  in  the  persons  of  Abraham  Lin 
coln  and  Ulysses  S.  Grant. 

As  above  said,  Seymour  was  not  a  mere  factious  agi 
tator.  He  may  not  have  been  so  far  committed  to  the 
secret  intrigues  of  semi-secession  Democrats,  plotting 
"  to  bring  about  a  collision  between  the  national  gov 
ernment  and  the  government  of  the  State  of  New  York 
in  such  a  shape  that  they  can  only  rely  upon  the  coop 
eration  of  Governor  Seymour,"  l  as  Mr.  Jay  deliberately 
states.  Seymour  may  not  have  been  so  far  entangled 
as  these  words  indicate;  but  it  is  certain  that  he  was 
seriously  affected  by  these  meteoric  influences.  We 
cannot  award  him  judgment,  but  we  must  consider  that 
his  intellect  was  duly  perceptive.  There  was  some  rea 
son  for  his  discordant  acts  as  governor  from  day  to  day. 
The  cause  was  not  in  his  own  creative  reason,  but  in 
the  errant,  disturbing  forces  of  a  powerful  social  fac 
tion,  which  sent  his  wits  wool-gathering,  instead  of  into 
the  calm,  considered  action  of  a  statesman. 

Not  a  demagogue,  he  was  too  much  respected  and 
respectable,  too  much  fettered  by  morbid  conscience,  to 
become  inflamed  by  the  passions  of  that  sort  of  crea 
ture.  Rather,  he  was  moved  by  sentiment,  when  he 
ought  to  have  been  anchored  by  solid  thought.  His 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  541. 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER   COMPULSION  305 

imagination  worked  rapidly  toward  changing  the  im 
pending  order  of  things,  the  necessary,  hard  evolution 
of  political  circumstance ;  this  inevitable  course  he 
sought  to  alter  by  some  fancied  amendment,  he  knew 
not  what.  The  maundering  complaint,1  when  he  sums 
his  case  against  the  President,  after  decision  had  been 
rendered  and  the  die  had  fallen,  illustrates  this  mental 
condition. 

This  morbid  tendency  —  this  respectability,  not  medi 
ocre  but  endowed  with  talent  —  these  tendencies  may 
become  most  dangerous  in  the  crises  of  great  affairs,  as 
we  have  seen.  Such  tendencies  are  more  perilous  in 
lawyers  than  in  other  classes  of  men,  on  account  of 
their  great  opportunities  in  our  country.  A  good  lawyer 
cannot  be  a  poet.  An  active  but  incomplete  poetic 
faculty,  seeking  expression  in  new  creations  of  law, 
clothed  by  precedent,  can  work  almost  any  mischief 
through  the  legal  misconception.  A  legal  misconcep 
tion  —  enforced  by  party  discipline  —  can  work  the 
greatest  injury  in  the  development  of  political  practice, 
if  the  emergencies  of  great  affairs  give  it  opportunity. 
A  statesman,  who  thinks  after  formulas,  feels  in  the  old 
forms,  then  acts  as  if  creating  for  the  new  emergency, 
as  if  impelled  by  the  producing  power  of  the  present, 
does  infinite  harm.  He  conserves  not  the  old,  and  he 
spoils  the  new. 

1  "  However  much  I  may  differ  from  you  in  my  views  of  the  policy  of 
your  administration,  and  although  I  may,  unconsciously  to  myself,  be  in 
fluenced  by  party  prejudices,  I  can  never  forget  the  honor  of  my  country 
so  far  as  to  spare  any  effort  to  stop  proceedings  under  the  draft  in  this 
State  —  particularly  in  the  cities  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn  —  which  I 
feel  will  bring  disgrace,  not  only  upon  your  administration,  but  upon  the 
American  name."  —  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  636. 


306  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

General  Dix  set  forth  the  governor's  course  as  "  the 
blackest  of  political  crimes."  These  were  not  the  reck 
less  words  of  a  vaporing  publicist ;  they  were  the  mani 
festation  of  political  deeds,  interpreted  by  a  man  of 
action,  who  knew  whereof  he  spoke.  At  that  moment, 
Governor  Seymour  was  being  hammered  into  his  proper 
place,  forced  to  do  his  duty  as  governor  of  a  State  by 
the  immediate  presence  of  the  federal  troops.  The  State 
of  New  York  was  not  "  independent/'  as  he  constantly 
asserted,  but  it  was  a  constituent  part  of  the  American 
Union. 

These  plain  facts  of  historic  evolution  cannot  be  neg 
lected  or  condoned,  however  benevolent  the  student  and 
critic  may  be.  They  must  stand  out  in  dark  and  darker 
tints,  as  time  goes  on,  and  as  the  perilous  achievements  in 
these  periods  of  revolution  become  more  valuable.  Lee, 
Jackson,  Gordon,  and  the  like,  were  misguided  heroes, 
following  a  mistaken  course.  As  time  passes,  as  the  his 
torical  perspective  changes,  —  the  lesser  details  growing 
dim,  as  in  the  Wars  of  the  Roses  or  the  struggles  of 
Cromwell,  —  the  Muse  will  award  increasing  fame  to 
these  men  who  might  have  been  the  paladins  of  any 
time.  But  their  political  mistakes  were  founded  on 
deep  principles,  inherited  from  the  generation  educated 
by  Calhoun.  Whatever  their  constitutional  basis,  revolu 
tion,  "  blood  and  iron,"  might  have  established  these 
principles  as  the  basis  of  a  new  state.  No  such  issue 
can  be  possible  for  Seymour,  Hendricks,  Vallandigham, 
and  the  like.  Fame  will  worship  the  much  enduring 
heroes  of  the  Confederacy.  The  reverse  of  fame  must 
cling  to  those  dawdling  Northern  Democrats  who 

1  Ante,  p.  300. 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  307 

vainly  tried  to  build  a  new  party  out  of  their  country's 
agony,  and  to  cement  it  with  the  blood  of  their  fellow- 
men.  It  does  not  palliate  that  they  knew  not  what  they 
were  doing.  It  was  their  business  to  know,  through  and 
through,  what  must  be  the  effect  of  their  political  ac 
tion  while  their  brothers  were  sacrificing  life  in  battle. 

The  doing  of  the  contestants  in  war,  the  deeds  which 
establish  the  fame  and  preserve  the  memory  of  the  brave 
and  self-sacrificing,  must  not  be  confounded  with  deeds 
which  hampered  and  obstructed  the  necessary  progress 
of  that  war.  Homer  portrayed  the  craft  of  Ulysses,  the 
wisdom  of  Nestor,  as  hardly  inferior  to  the  glory  of 
Achilles.  The  sage  advisers  in  turn  bore  the  shock  of 
battle,  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Achilles.  The  coun 
cilors  were  not  ensconced  safely  at  home  ;  yet  less  were 
they  hindering  and  impeding  heroes  in  action. 

Seymour  and  his  party  in  New  York  were  not  alone 
or  peculiar  in  misconstruing  the  political  situation  at 
this  time.  A  strange  hallucination  —  a  historic  problem 
of  problems  —  possessed  the  "  Constitutional  Demo 
crats,"  as  they  fondly  called  themselves.  At  their  con 
vention  in  Massachusetts,  September  3, 1863,  they  said, 
"  We  most  earnestly  desire  peace."  l  Where  else  can  we 
find  such  a  phantasm,  possessing  men  of  the  homely 
sagacity  evinced. by  the  average  American  politician? 

1  Judge  Abbott  said:  "I  mean  to  be  true  to  the  Union  by,  through, 
under  the  constitution  —  nothing  more  nor  less."  Dr.  George  B.  Lor- 
ing  said:  "We  are  still  free,  sovereign, and  independent  States  under  the 
constitution.  Do  they  ask,  are  we  Peace  or  War  Democrats  ?  Tell  them 
we  are  Constitutional  Democrats.  This  administration  (of  the  U.  S.) 
will  pass  away  as  the  idle  wind."  Abbott  and  Loring,  both  candidates 
for  governor,  lost  the  convention  and  Paine,  an  old  Whig,  whose  demo 
cracy  was  not  so  pronounced,  was  nominated.  —  Schouler,  Mass,  in  the 
Civil  War,  pp.  498-500. 


308     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL   AND  STATE 

Apparently,  after  myriads  had  been  slaughtered  in  the 
field,  and  the  miseries  of  such  war  had  been  endured  at 
home,  these  maudlin  state-makers  conceived  that  the 
whole  disunited  States  might  return  to  the  Union- 
saving,  peace-making  methods  of  1860.  What  a  dog, 
and  what  a  vomit !  The  new  evolution  of  a  Democrat, 
who  should  be  neither  war  nor  peace,  but  a  "  constitu 
tional,"  had  formed  a  most  fantastic  image  in  their 
fevered  brain. 

In  Indiana  there  was  some  violence,  but  in  no  degree 
approaching  the  troubles  of  New  York  city.  Several 
lives  were  lost.  The  executive  was  loyal,  but  the  legis 
lature  was  entirely  controlled  by  the  Peace  Democracy. 
The  Emancipation  Proclamation  was  denounced,  and  a 
Northwestern  republic  was  bruited.  The  legislature 
claimed  to  reject  Governor  Morton's  message,  and  a 
member  offered  a  resolution,  which  was  not  passed,  that 
they  adopt  the  "  exalted  and  patriotic  sentiments  "  l  of 
Governor  Seymour's  message  in  New  York.  When  we 
consider  the  divided  government  in  Indiana,  and  the 
jarring  elements  working  beneath  the  surface,  the 
escape  from  extended  riot  and  bloodshed  is  remarkable. 
August  20,  Marshal  Baker  reported,  "  The  disloyal  ele 
ment  under  the  name  of  Democracy  are  holding  large 
mass-meetings  in  different  parts  of  the  State,  at  which 
the  people  are  urged  to  arm  and  drill,  which  they  are 
doing  in  many  places  in  large  numbers."  2  The  secret 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  pp.  213,  217. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  697.   He  inclosed  a  bill  for  an  "  Old-fash 
ioned  Barbecue."    "  The  watchword  given  on  the  bill  is,  I  am  assured, 
the  watchword  of  the  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle."   The  bill  reads, 
"  This  is  a  time  for  mutual  understanding  and  concerted  action  on  the 
part  of  the  friends  of  the  constitution  and  the  white  man's  liberty.    The 
watchword  of  the  day  will  be  '  United  we  stand  in  defiance  of  tyrants.' " 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  309 

organizations,  of  which  we  shall  hear  more,  put  forth 
their  new  shibboleth,  "  United  we  stand  in  defiance  of 
tyrants."  The  general  condition  of  the  Northwest 
brought  out  a  noble  letter  from  Abraham  Lincoln, 
which  we  have  cited  heretofore.1  We  cannot  give  it 
too  much  attention,  for  it  is  a  complete  epitome  of  the 
argument  from  facts  in  the  most  persuasive  form,  a 
thorough  and  logical  exposition  of  the  cause  of  the 
Union.  It  was  in  answer  to  an  invitation  to  a  meeting 
of  unconditional  Union  men  at  Springfield,  111. :  - 

Of  all  those  who  maintain  unconditional  devotion  to  the 
Union,  and  I  am  sure  my  old  political  friends  will  thank  me 
for  tendering,  as  I  do,  the  nation's  gratitude  to  those  other 
noble  men,  whom  no  partisan  malice,  or  partisan  hope,  can 
make  false  to  the  nation's  life.  .  .  .  Let  us  not  be  over  san 
guine  of  a  speedy  final  triumph.  Let  us  be  quite  sober.  Let 
us  diligently  apply  the  means,  never  doubting  that  a  just 
God,  in  His  own  good  time,  will  give  us  the  rightful  result.2 

In  Pennsylvania  the  turbulent  districts  were  kept  in 
order  by  stringent  military  control.  General  Couch, 
commanding  the  Department  of  the  Susquehanna,  gives 
a  lively  picture  of  the  attendant  difficulties.  "  The 
ignorant  miners  have  no  fear  of  God,  the  state  author 
ity,  or  the  devil.  The  Democratic  leaders  have  not  the 
power  of  burnt  flax  over  them  for  good.  A  strong  mili 
tary  power  under  the  general  government  alone  keeps 
matters  quiet."3  This  dilemma  was  integral  and  far 
beyond  regulation  by  political  or  partisan  development. 
For  once,  we  must  not  hold  the  Democratic  leaders 
responsible  for  the  faults  of  their  constituency. 

1  Ante,  p.  247. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  in,  vol.  iii,  pp.  731-734. 
a  Ibid.,  p.  629. 


310     WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

Quakers  were  excused  from  bearing  arms ;  but  there 
was  a  class  of  non-conformists  —  much  more  trouble 
some —  who  used  conscience  as  a  cloak  for  disloyalty. 
In  November,  at  Pottsville,  one  Hughes,  "  who  early  de 
sired  that  Pennsylvania  should  secede  and  join  herself 
with  the  South,  only  at  the  close  of  July  last  declared 
'  that  he  did  not  want  to  furnish  the  army  with  soldiers ; 
he  was  conscientiously  opposed  to  the  war,  and  would 
not  furnish  the  means  to  carry  it  on.'  "  * 

It  is  more  than  doubtful  whether  the  charge  of  secret 
machination,  often  made  against  the  rebels,  was  well 
grounded ;  but  there  was  so  much  plotting  in  the  cities 
and  on  the  Canadian  border,  that  loyal  men  suspected 
a  rebel  hand  wherever  plots  appeared.  Alarming  con 
spiracies  were  manifest  at  Mauch  Chunk,  and  were  re 
ported  to  the  President.2 

Generals  testified  that  the  men  drafted  into  service 
acquitted  "  themselves  well  and  made  good  soldiers." 
Secretary  Stanton  reported,  December  5,  1863,  "  At 
the  time  the  law  was  enacted  it  was  known  to  be  very 
imperfect,  many  intelligent  persons  considering  its  exe- 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  1006. 

2  "  Since  the  commencement  of  the  draft,  a  large  majority  of  the  coal 
operatives  have  been  law-defying,  opposing  the  national  government  in 
every  possible  way.   The  life  of  no  Union  man  is  secure  among  them, 
and  the  murder  of  such  a  citizen  is  almost  a  nightly  occurrence.   Our 
'  civil  authorities  '  here  seem  to  have  too  much  sympathy  for  these  men, 
and  they  know  it,  and  are  not  slow  to  take  advantage  of  it.   They  have 
closed  up  several  large  collieries,  and  threaten  that  all  must  suspend 
w.ork  until  the  national  government  suspends  the  operations  of  the  draft 
against  them.  .  .  .  This  is  a  part  of  the  rebel  programme."  —  0.  R., 
Series  III,  vol.  iii,  1009.    "  In  Pennsylvania  an  attempt  was  made  to  ob 
struct  the  draft  by  means  of  a  bill  in  chancery  ;  and  an  injunction  was 
granted  by  a  majority  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State,  which,  how 
ever,  was  not  obeyed."  —  Ibid.,  vol.  v,  630. 


THE   PEOPLE  UNDER  COMPULSION  311 

cution  wholly  impracticable,  while  few  dared  to  hope  for 
any  important  benefit.  The  law  has  been  enforced  in 
twelve  States.  It  has  brought  from  these  States  50,000 
soldiers,  and  has  raised  a  fund  of  over  $10,000,000 
for  procuring  substitutes.  With  all  its  imperfections  it 
is  demonstrated  that  the  act  can  be  made  an  efficient 
means  for  recruiting  our  armies  and  calling  out  the 
national  forces."  1  He  expressed  the  conflicting  views, 
concerning  the  clause  of  exemption  and  the  procuring 
of  substitutes ;  these  conflicts  have  never  been  recon 
ciled.  The  business  of  substitutes  immensely  stimulated 
the  payment  of  bounties  and  "  bounty- jumping  "  there 
after.  The  consequent  abuses  can  hardly  be  overstated. 

In  the  winter  of  1863—64  the  Confederacy  gathered 
its  remaining  strength  for  a  final  struggle.  Morton 
thought  the  administration  did  not  recognize  this  suf 
ficiently,  and  begged  it  to  call  for  more  troops,  saying, 
January  19,  "  A  terrible  conscription  is  putting  almost 
the  entire  male  population  of  the  rebel  States  in  the 
army." 2  In  February,  General  Dix  at  New  York  could 
perceive  that  "  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion  are  making 
the  most  desperate  efforts  to  bring  into  the  field  every 
man  capable  of  bearing  arms."  3 

February,  1864,  the  President  ordered  a  draft,  nomi 
nally  for  500,000  men,  which  by  deductions,  etc.,  actu 
ally  called  out  200,000.4 

There  were  secret  organizations  formed  throughout 
the  Northwest,  which  opposed  the  draft  with  all  their 
force.  Colonel  Baker,  March  5,5  reported  their  inten 
tion  "  to  revolt  against  the  government,"  and  that  they 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  1131.  2  Ibid.,  vol.  iv,  39. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  121.  *  2bid.,  p.  181.  6  Ibid.,  pp.  162,  163. 


312  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

would  even  attempt  "  the  assassination  of  the  governor 
of  this  State"  (Indiana).  There  was  less  open  demon 
stration  against  the  authorities  than  there  was  in  1863, 
but  it  was  "  better  organized  and  more  determined." 

There  seemed  to  be  different  purposes  prevailing 
west  and  east  of  the  Alleghanies,  according  to  General 
Dix.1  Secret  organizations  in  New  York  city  were  sus 
pected  by  the  provost-marshals  of  planning  resistance 
to  the  draft.  They  were  watched  by  detectives,  and 
the  general  concluded  that  their  purpose  was  "to  pro 
mote  the  election  of  General  McClellan  to  the  office  of 
president." 

In  conflict  with  soldiers,  blood  was  shed  in  Indiana 
July  20,  and  Captain  Thompson2  reported  large  num 
bers  with  as  many  as  200  malcontents  riding  together 
at  one  time,  shouting  for  Vallandigham  and  Jeff  Davis, 
and  threatening  "the  most  terrible  consequences  to 
every  man  connected  in  any  way  with  the  government." 

J.  Holt,  for  the  Bureau  of  Military  Justice,  person 
ally  investigated  the  ramifications  of  these  treasonable 
associations  in  the  Northwest,  and  gave,  August  5,3  a 
graphic  account  of  their  doings.  "  The  Sons  of  Liberty 
may  be  regarded  as  a  successor  to  the  Knights  of  the 
Golden  Circle,  with  a  very  large  increment  of  malig 
nity  and  practical  treason."  They  used  every  strata 
gem,  getting  public  appointments  to  betray  official 
secrets  and  inculcating  "the  assassination  of  United 
States  officers."  Eight  of  these  were  murdered  secretly 
in  two  weeks  in  Missouri.  The  order  existed  "  alike  in  the 
North  and  in  the  South,"  being  numerous  in  Indiana, 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iv,  483. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  529.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  578,  579. 


THE  PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  313 

Illinois,  Missouri,  Ohio,  Kentucky,  and  New  York.  The 
facts  he  discovered  "  unveil  a  conspiracy  as  atrocious  as 
that  of  Catiline."  Governor  Seymour  and  his  friends 
were  not  guilty  of  planning  such  treachery  as  the  mur 
derers  of  Missouri  practiced.  This  was  proven  by  Gen 
eral  Dix  and  his  police,  but  it  is  significant  that  such 
foul  birds  gathered  about  the  political  activities  of  the 
Democrats. 

Major-General  Heintzelman,  commanding  the  North 
ern  Department,  August  9,1  advised  the  arrest  of  the 
leaders  of  these  associations  in  Indiana  and  Illinois. 
As  late  as  October  2  there  was  a  rising  of  500  men  in 
Indiana2  to  resist  the  draft,  "taking  horses,  arms,  and 
money  from  citizens  and  home  guards." 

Governor  Curtin  inquired  if  ministers  of  the  Gospel 
could  be  excused  from  service  when  drafted,  and  Fry 
answered  that  they  would  be  detailed  for  "charitable 
and  benevolent  duties." 3  The  Protestant  Episcopal 
Church  in  the  diocese  of  Western  New  York  passed 
resolutions  September  3,  and  petitioned  the  President 
as  commander-in-chief,  that  the  clergy  when  drafted 
might  be  assigned  "as  chaplains,  or  to  duty  in  hos 
pitals,  or  in  the  care  of  f  reedmen,  or  in  such  clerkships 
or  other  special  duties,"  etc. 

Among  the  most  curious  and  suggestive  manifesta 
tions  for  government  of  the  people  by  the  people  were 
the  outcries  for  and  against  the  postponement  of  the 
draft  in  various  sections.  Apparently  the  differing 
temperaments  of  individual  citizens  came  out  to  in 
fluence  their  views  of  the  situation,  and  to  warp  their 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iv,  1286.  2  Ibid.,  p.  752.  * 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  682,  688.  4  Ibid.,  pp.  692-694. 


314  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

political  diagnosis  and  judgment  of  the  exigencies  of 
the  occasion.  A  local  cloud  of  hostility  would  become 
in  their  imagination  a  fearful  storm  of  national  wrath, 
unless  their  own  particular  district  should  be  relieved 
for  a  few  days  from  the  pressure  of  the  national  duty. 

As  often  happened,  when  he  participated  in  domestic 
affairs,  Mr.  Seward  blundered.  He  stated  at  Auburn, 
September  13,  that  there  would  be  no  draft.  This  re 
duced  recruiting  materially,  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
was  obliged  to  inform  Generals  Grant  and  Sherman  that 
the  "  declaration  was  unauthorized  and  most  unhappy." l 
September  8,  the  Union  League  of  Illinois  begged  the 
President  to  postpone  the  draft  for  thirty  days  "  as  a 
matter  of  the  greatest  political  importance."  2  On  the 
27th,  the  mayor  of  Philadelphia  and  Morton  McMichael 
asked  Secretary  Stanton  to  postpone  for  only  two 
weeks.3 

On  the  other  hand,  John  A.  Kasson,  having  traveled 
from  Massachusetts  to  Iowa,  urged  a  prompt  levy  of 
the  draft.  "  The  country  now  wants  rigid,  straightfor 
ward,  prudent,  but  decisive  leadership."4  Governor 
Doolittle  of  Wisconsin  called  for  enforcement  in  trum 
pet-tones.  "  While  pending,  all  fear  it ;  when  over,  all 
who  are  drafted  and  go  will  be  cured  of  their  reluc 
tance,  and  it  is  the  best  medicine  in  the  world  for  sickly 
patriotism,  and  has  been  known  to  cure  even  copper- 
headism."  5  Riley,  a  special  agent  sent  through  Illinois 
and  Indiana  by  Marshal  Fry,  advocated  prompt  execu 
tion,  October  8.6  The  alert  and  plucky  James  G.  Elaine 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iv,  713.  2  Ibid.,  p.  701. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  746,  747.  4  Ibid.,  p.  680. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  715.  «  Ibid.,  p.  757. 


THE  PEOPLE  UNDER   COMPULSION  315 

struck  hard,  as  might  have  been  expected.  "  The 
dreaded  draft  is  now  going  on  all  over  the  country,  and 
I  'm  glad  of  it.  Like  the  old  ladies'  tea  party,  '  it  will  be 
good  to  have  it  over  with.'  ...  If  it  goes  on  in  the 
slow  process,  it  will  about  ruin  us  in  the  October  elec 
tions  of  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio,  whereas  if  the  quick 
process  were  adopted,  we  should  have  fifteen  or  eigh 
teen  unembarrassed  days  for  marshaling  our  political 
forces  in  those  States,  and  would  close  with  a  'blaze  of 
glory  and  a  big  victory.' ' 

Governor  Doolittle  and  Mr.  Elaine  voiced  the  loyal 
consciousness,  as  it  brought  itself  to  the  support  of  the 
Union,  after  some  three  years  of  wearisome  endurance. 
All  were  not  patriotic ;  and  as  Governor  Doolittle  sug 
gests,  the  varying  grades  of  patriotism  —  even  to  that 
of  the  inconsistent  Copperhead  —  were  stimulated  and 
renovated  by  the  draft. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  in  discussing  the  merits  of  the 
draft  in  1863,2  did  not  overrate  the  reluctance  of  the 
whole  country  in  accepting  the  conscription,  for  a  large 
majority  of  citizens  at  first  regarded  it  as  "  arbitrary 
and  unjust."  3  Yet  after  the  bureau  had  extended  the 
enrollment  and  conscription  throughout  the  country,  its 
officers  could  say  that  it  brought  the  administration 
and  people  nearer  together  in  prosecuting  the  war  for 
the  Union.4  It  was  a  severe  but  necessary  process  in 
the  education  of  the  people  to  the  support  of  a  well- 
founded  and  powerful  government.  The  administration, 
by  direct  demand  on  the  resources  of  the  nation,  showed 
the  necessity  of  the  occasion ;  the  people  responded, 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iv,  742.  2  Ibid.,  vol.  iii,  1131. 

8  Ibid.  vol.  v,  723.  4  Ibid.,  p.  601. 


316  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

though  at  first  reluctantly,  to  the  imperative  need. 
There  was  a  certain  mutual  confidence  created,  which, 
though  constrained  in  the  beginning,  became  a  natural 
and  proper  bond  between  government  and  people.  The 
necessary  effort  of  government  —  compulsory  on  the 
representative  rulers,  when  extended  to  the  citizens 
through  the  draft  —  was  brought  home  to  each  individ 
ual,  and  became  his  own  particular  business. 

The  enrollment  showed1  that  besides  1,000,516  men 
actually  in  the  field,  April  30,  1865,  there  were  at  home 
2,245,063  men.  The  marvelous  fact  was  revealed  that, 
notwithstanding  losses,  there  were  more  men  properly 
subject  to  draft  in  the  loyal  States  at  the  close  of  the 
rebellion 2  than  there  were  at  its  beginning.  Immigra 
tion  had  repaired  the  waste,  while  industrial  invention 
and  improvement  had  largely  increased  the  product  of 
each  man  at  home. 

Far  different  was  the  condition  of  the  revolted  States, 
as  it  was  shown  in  the  report  of  their  Bureau  of  Con 
scription  at  Kichmond,  April  30,  1864.3  Complaining 
of  lack  of  means,  it  had  used  every  effort  to  investigate 
the  whole  "  society  or  civil  economy  "  within  its  reach. 
The  conclusion  was  that  "fresh  material  for  the  armies " 
was  no  longer  to  be  had.  "  Necessity  demands  the  in 
vention  of  devices  for  keeping  in  the  ranks  the  men 
now  borne  on  the  rolls."  Appeal  might  be  made  to  the 
States  for  volunteers,  but  conscription  from  the  general 
population  must  cease  with  the  year  1864. 

On  the  whole,  our  draft  was  a  great  act  of  admin- 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  v, 

2  Ibid. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  695. 


THE   PEOPLE   UNDER  COMPULSION  317 

istration,  executed  as  well  as  possible/  under  the  prac 
tical  conditions  prevailing  at  the  time.  The  involuntary 
recruiting,  indirectly  compelled  by  the  conscription, 
and  substituted  for  the  first  spontaneous  efforts  of  the 
States,  practically  reinforced  the  armies.  The  great 
State  of  New  York  —  badly  led  and  influenced  as  it 
was  by  some  recalcitrant  citizens  —  blundered  and  op 
posed  5  but  it  could  not  stop  the  progress  of  the  draft. 
Nothing  is  more  significant,  as  revealing  the  counter 
currents  of  opinion  and  action  than  some  results  in 
loyal  Pennsylvania.  A  majority  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  State  established  technical  objections,  and  en 
joined  against  the  practical  execution  of  the  law.2  But 
the  citizens  would  not  obey  and  stop  the  enforcement 
of  the  conscription.  The  great,  legitimate  power  of  the 
Union  was  overwhelming  in  this  function  as  it  was  in 
others,  and  it  could  not  be  controlled  and  thwarted  by 
a  petty  array  of  legal  quibbles. 

A  volume  might  well  be  devoted  to  the  relations  of 
militia,  volunteers,  and  regular  soldiers  in  the  States 
and  in  the  federal  Union.  Family  and  home  are  the 
final  outcome  of  a  state ;  but  the  individual  soldier 
must  be  the  actual  representative  of  these  corner-stones 
of  society.  China,  refined  by  ancient  culture,  thought 
a  state  could  dispense  with  brutal  warfare  and  rest 
itself  on  educated  intelligence.  Such  a  state  soon  had 
to  surrender  to  men  capable  of  bearing  arms.  The 
loyal  interaction  of  its  fighting  elements  made  feudal 

1  A  committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  Messrs.  Speed,  Dela- 
field,  and  Foster,  investigated  the  work  of  Provost-Marshal  Fry.   They 
reported  that  they  "find  it  has  been  done  with  fairness."  —  Nicolay  and 
Hay,  vol.  vii,  9. 

2  Ante,  p.  295. 


318  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

society  possible,  and  every  solid  state  of  the  time 
brought  a  good  military  organization  into  being.  In 
the  Kevolution  George  the  Third,  and  in  the  Civil  War 
the  Union,  discovered  that  the  soldier  was  the  substan 
tial  essence  of  the  citizen.  In  the  rebellion  the  Union, 
as  well  as  the  Confederacy,  relied  on  voluntary  military 
service,  before  the  conscription  rallied  every  citizen  to 
support  the  government.  This  inbred  reliance  on  vol 
untary  military  service  was  worked  to  support  the  ad 
ministration  at  the  North,  then  reversed  by  antagonistic 
partisans  to  oppose  the  enforcement  of  a  draft. 

Many  decades  passed  before  our  military  experience 
was  worked  out  into  a  better  administration  of  the  army, 
and  especially  into  a  better  organization  of  the  citizen 
soldiery.  The  Spanish  war  found  us  unready,  and  the 
century  had  turned  before  the  skill  of  regular  officers 
and  the  personal  element  in  the  citizen  could  cooperate 
in  bringing  out  the  military  strength  of  the  particular 
States.  At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1904,  the  new  army 
levied  by  Congress  consisted  of  107,422  enlisted  men 
and  9120  commissioned  officers  "exactly  like  regular 
troops."  l  Each  governor  of  a  State  or  Territory  could 
procure  a  regular  officer  of  high  rank  to  advise  him  in 
military  affairs.  This  act  provided  a  great  and  effective 
reinforcement  of  the  regular  army,  quite  unlike  the  old- 
fashioned  "  militia,"  except  in  its  high  loyalty  and  self 
hood.  The  United  States  could  call  out  these  troops  at 
any  time  for  a  service  of  four  months. 

1  Rene  Bache,  Providence  Journal,  January  31,  1904. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

GOVERNMENT 

IT  seemed  natural,  when  affairs  began  their  course 
at  Washington,  on  the  inauguration  of  Lincoln,  to 
speak  of  the  directing  power  as  prosecuting  the  busi 
ness  of  administration.  Events  crowded  upon  the  new 
officials,  and  they  were  forced  to  minister  to  them  as 
speedily  as  possible,  often  without  precedent.  This  sort 
of  designation  corresponded  to  the  technical  terms 
established  by  due  authority.  Said  Hamilton  :  "  The  ad 
ministration  of  government,  in  its  largest  sense,  com 
prehends  all  the  operations  of  the  body  politic,  .  .  . 
but  in  its  most  usual,  and  perhaps  its  most  precise,  sig 
nification,  it  is  limited  to  executive  details."  Of  gov 
ernment  in  the  strict  use  of  the  term,  there  was  little  at 
the  capital  in  the  early  days  of  the  rebellion.  Affairs 
of  state  no  sooner  came  than  they  went.  The  President 
was  severely  criticised,  especially  by  Mr.  Seward  out  of 
his  fancied  omniscience,  that  he  had  not  a  policy  of  di 
rection  and  control,  during  March  and  early  April,  when 
the  rebellion  was  at  work,  and  open  revolt  was  culminat 
ing.  All  that  was  changed  after  the  attack  on  Sumter. 
The  rebels  took  the  move,  precipitating  the  game.  Dur 
ing  the  winter  season  the  North,  in  combination  with  the 
border  States,  had  vainly  tried  to  anticipate  and  avoid 
this  imminent  and  deadly  breach  by  some  sort  of  con 
cession.  Rebellion,  the  fracture  and  antithesis  of  gov- 


320     WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

eminent,  assumed  control  of  the  affairs  of  state,  espe 
cially  in  the  Cotton  States.  It  was  perhaps  the  highest 
and  wisest  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  faculties  that  he  was  not 
moved  to  direct  and  control  too  soon.  The  South  had 
been  long  protesting  against  the  extra-constitutional 
use  of  the  powers  of  Congress  —  as  they  conceived  it 
—  in  placing  any  limit  on  the  extension  of  slavery.  By 
disruption,  in  a  moment,  they  put  more  power  into  the 
legislative  and  executive  functions  of  the  government, 
more  opportunity,  than  practical  statesmen  had  ever  con 
ceived  to  be  possible.  The  President  called  for  troops ; 
they  sprang  to  arms  as  eagerly  as  Roderick  Dhu's  own 
henchmen  and  clansmen.  Buchanan's  calculating  and 
alien-hearted  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  left  the 
finances  of  the  Union  in  as  poor  condition  as  those  of 
a  church  mouse.  But  money  poured  forth  freely  from 
every  source  of  supply  in  the  loyal  States. 

Affairs  of  state  multiplied  and  complicated.  The  occa 
sion  must  be  administered,  if  not  in  the  best  way,  at  least 
speedily,  or  the  delay  would  generate  another  occasion 
more  imperious  than  the  first.  The  legislature  assisted 
loyally,  and  a  virtual  dictatorship  was  conferred  on  the 
plain  man  of  the  prairies. 

We  have  set  forth  the  course  of  events,  especially  as 
it  involved  the  interplay  of  federal  and  state  action. 
It  was  unavoidable  that,  if  the  rebellion  should  not  be 
subdued  presently,  a  larger  and  more  efficient  govern 
ment1  would  be  evolved  out  of  the  circumstances  of 


1  According  to  Lieber,  Political  Ethics,  vol.  i,  238,  the  state  is  the 
jural  or  political  society,  which  the  whole  community  constitutes.  The 
government  is  the  instrument  through  which  the  political  society  acts, 
when  it  does  not  act  directly. 


GOVERNMENT  321 

the  rebellion.  After  the  great  forces  of  the  States  — 
the  individual  commonwealths  —  had  been  'developed 
and  concentrated,  so  that  they  merged  in  the  larger 
federal  functions,  there  must  be  adequate  direction  and 
government,  something  more  than  the  mere  administra 
tion  of  affairs  from  day  to  day.  As  the  bounds  of  the 
struggle  extended,  and  the  great  civic  foundations  of  the 
republic  began  to  be  disturbed,  a  larger  policy  became 
inevitable.  Then  the  whole  people  were  brought  under 
direct  legislative  and  executive  control  by  the  draft, 
and  the  government  of  the  nation  was  consolidated  at 
Washington.  I  propose  to  treat  some  of  the  larger 
questions,  which  grew  out  of  the  issues  developed  after 
the  second  year  of  the  war. 

The  paramount  directing  power  must  always  be  in 
the  command  of  the  forces  of  a  state.  King  or  consul, 
the  head  of  a  state  who  did  not  fully  command  its 
armies  on  land  and  its  navies  on  the  sea  would  be  no 
better  than  a  headless  monarch.  In  initiating  legis 
lation  our  President  has  very  little  direct  power,  and 
that  is  in  the  form  of  influence.  He  can  recommend 
forcibly,  but  the  fountain  of  law  is  in  Congress.  Be 
tween  the  military  responsibility  and  this  negative, 
civic  sphere  of  action,  there  came  in  the  middle  course 
of  the  Civil  War  one  of  the  greatest  opportunities  of 
change  in  the  social  and  political  destiny  of  a  state, 
known  to  history.  The  absolute  Tsar  of  all  the  Kussias 
had  not  more  actual  power  in  freeing  the  serfs  of  his 
empire  than  Abraham  Lincoln  exercised  when  he  put 
forth  the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation  in  the  begin 
ning  of  the  year  1863.  Strange  fate !  The  rebels  had 
brought  about  this  opportunity ;  had  brought  into 


322  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

their  own  homes  the  destruction  of  their  property  and 
the  freedom  of  their  slaves,  by  a  process  just  as  inevit 
able  as  had  induced  the  coercion  of  the  individual 
States  when  they  fired  on  Sumter.  Such  civic  agi 
tators  as  Greeley  considered  a  State  to  be  invincible, 
and  not  to  be  coerced,  in  the  winter  of  1860-61. 
When  Lincoln  was  inaugurated,  hardly  any  one  out 
side  Garrison's  scanty  band  of  abolitionists  thought 
that  negro  slaves  could  be  controlled  or  freed  by  the 
national  government.  Such  generative  political  force 
arises  from  the  Jovian  element — the  omnipotent  and 
irrevocable  powers  of  government  —  never  precisely 
formulated  and  never  formally  withheld  from  a  fully  en 
dowed  sovereign,  since  the  ideal  imagined  and  sketched 
in  the  life  of  Olympus  prevailed  among  mankind. 

This  military  decree  of  emancipation  was  a  special 
instance  of  personal  government  based  on  the  extraor 
dinary  confidence  of  the  people  in  the  man  of  their 
choice,  even  though  he  might  be  separated  from  them, 
and  withheld  from  direct  cognition  at  times,  by  poli 
ticians  and  managers  of  the  machine.  As  we  have 
noted,1  generals  in  the  field  had  attempted  to  break 
into  this  central  prerogative,  and  to  cut  out  with  the 
sword  bits  of  imperial  control  in  their  sincere  desire  to 
befriend  the  negro.  These  incidents  are  so  interesting 
in  the  history  of  actual  government  that  we  should 
consider  carefully  the  case  of  Major-General  Hunter, 
who  had  strong  political  support.  May  9,  1862,  he 
issued  a  general  order :  "  The  persons  in  Georgia, 
Florida,  and  South  Carolina,  heretofore  held  as  slaves, 
are  therefore  forever  free." 2 

1  Ante,  p.  106.  2  Q.  R.,  Series  III,  vol  ii,  42» 


GOVERNMENT  323 

As  soon  as  the  news  came,  May  19,  before  official 
information,  the  President  nullified  the  proclamation  in 
the  most  positive  terms.1 

I  further  make  known  that  whether  it  be  competent  for 
me,  as  Commander-iu-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  to  de 
clare  the  slaves  of  any  State  or  States  free,2  and  whether  at 
any  time,  in  any  case,  it  shall  have  become  a  necessity  indis 
pensable  to  the  maintenance  of  the  government  to  exercise 
such  supposed  power,  are  questions  which  under  my  respon 
sibility  I  reserve  to  myself,  and  which  I  cannot  feel  justified 
in  leaving  to  the  decision  of  commanders  in  the  field.  These 
are  totally  different  questions  from  those  of  police  regulations 
in  the  armies  and  camps." 

He  then  cites  the  resolution  recommended  by  him  to 
Congress  and  passed  by  large  majorities  in  March. 
This  act  provided  for  pecuniary  aid  to  any  State  which 
would  adopt  "a  gradual  abolishment  of  slavery."  He 
now  makes  the  most  pathetic  appeal  to  all  States  which 
hold  slaves  to  "  embrace  "  this  offer.  "  This  proposal 
makes  common  cause  for  a  common  object,  casting  no 
reproaches  upon  any.  So  much  good  has  not  been 
done  by  one  effort  in  all  past  time  as  in  the  providence 
of  God  it  is  now  your  high  privilege  to  do."  The  great 
issues  of  government  were  never  more  judiciously 
handled  and  pondered,  and  never  expressed  in  nobler 
form.  It  was  this  masterly  conduct  of  the  largest 
affairs  which  lifted  the  politician  Lincoln  out  of  the 
ruts  of  expediency,  brought  the  statesman  into  freest 

1  O.R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  43. 

2  So  early  as  November  15,  1861,  George  Bancroft  suggested  to  the 
President  that  the  "  war  shall  effect  an  increase  of  free  States."     Mr. 
Lincoln  replied,  "  with  which  I  must  deal  in  all  due  caution  and  with  the 
best  judgment  I  can  bring  to  it."  —  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  vol.  ii,  90. 


324    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

communication  with  the  people,  and  moved  the  popular 
heart  to  trust  the  man  Lincoln. 

Secretary  Chase  addressed  a  letter,  June  24,  to  Major- 
General  Butler  commanding  at  New  Orleans,  and  who 
was  in  the  position  of  those  commanders  whom  the 
President  so  forcibly  meant  to  restrain.  The  secretary 
evidently  believed  that  the  matter  should  be  treated  as 
mere  administration,  as  a  momentary  military  necessity 
of  police  control,  and  not  from  the  larger  point  of  view 
taken  by  the  President.  As  subsequent  events  showed 
in  the  divided  state  of  mind  at  the  North,  the  manage- 

'  O 

ment  of  slavery  in  these  half-conquered  districts  in 
volved  some  of  the  very  largest  issues  of  government 
which  could  engage  the  attention  of  rulers. 

The  secretary  said,  "In  my  judgment,  the  military 
order  of  Hunter  should  have  been  sustained.  The 
President,  who  is  as  sound  in  head  as  he  is  excellent  in 
heart,  thought  otherwise,  and  I,  as  in  duty  bound, 
submit  my  judgment  to  his.  The  language  of  the 
President's  proclamation,  however,  shows  that  his  mind 
is  not  finally  decided."  1 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  174.  The  influential  position  of  Mr.  Chase, 
both  in  the  cabinet  and  in  his  representation  of  the  Anti-Slavery  party  of 
the  North,  gives  interest  to  his  whole  expression  to  Butler  concerning 
this  matter.  "  Until  long  after  Sumter,  I  clung  to  my  old  ideas  of  non 
interference  with  slavery  within  state  limits  of  (sic)  the  national  gov 
ernment.  But  the  Civil  War  was  protracted  far  beyond  my  anticipation, 
and  with  the  postponement  of  decisive  results  came  increased  bitterness 
and  intensified  alienation  of  nearly  the  entire  white  population  of  the 
slave  States.  With  this  state  of  facts  came  the  conviction  to  my  mind 
that  the  restoration  of  the  old  Union  with  slavery  untouched,  except  by 
the  mere  weakening  effects  of  the  war,  was  impossible.  .  .  .  Meanwhile, 
my  dear  general,  I  trust  you  will  so  proceed  as  you  begun.  Let  it  be 
understood  that  you  are  no  pro-slavery  man.  Let  all  be  done  that  can 
be  done  for  the  loyal  people  of  whatever  condition  or  complexion." 


GOVERNMENT  325 

An  interesting  phase  of  the  progress  of  emancipation 
is  revealed  in  Massachusetts,  and  in  the  action  of  Gov 
ernor  Andrew.  In  treating  the  matter  precipitated  by 
General  Hunter,  he  made  the  greatest  mistake  of  his 
lifetime,  as  he  placed  himself  for  the  moment  in  pseudo- 
opposition  to  the  national  government.  There  was  a 
scare  at  Washington,  and  as  usual  they  wired  Andrew 
for  an  instant  dispatch  of  troops.  On  the  day  that  the 
President's  proclamation  just  cited  was  issued,  Andrew 
answered  hastily  and  in  heat,  not  declining  but  hesitat 
ing  as  to  whether  he  could  furnish  the  men. 

Our  young  men  are  all  preoccupied  by  other  views.  .  .  . 
The  people  felt  that  the  South  would  use  their  negro  slaves 
against  them,  both  as  laborers  and  fighting  men,  while  they 
themselves  must  never  "  fire  at  the  magazine."  I  think  they 
will  feel  that  the  draft  is  heavy  on  their  patriotism.  But  if 
the  President  will  sustain  General  Hunter,  recognize  all  men, 
even  black  men,  as  legally  capable  of  that  loyalty  the  blacks 
are  waiting  to  manifest,  and  let  them  fight,  with  God  and 
human  nature  on  their  side,  the  roads  will  swarm,  if  need  be, 
with  multitudes  whom  New  England  would  pour  out  to  obey 
the  call."  * 

Such  inconsistent  patriotism  could  not  long  occupy 
John  A.  Andrew,  and  in  four  days  he  was  working  as 
vigorously  as  ever  "  in  advance  of  directions  "  to  for 
ward  the  men.  We  must  consider  these  incidents  that 
we  may  understand  the  growth  of  opinion  favoring 
emancipation,  which  consolidated  the  loyal  majority  at 
the  North,  while  it  tended  to  irritate  and  increase  the 
alien  or  Copperhead  element.  So  recently  as  October 
1,  1861,  the  Republican  convention  at  Worcester 2  "  did 

1  0.  R.  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  45. 

2  Schouler,  Mass,  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  248. 


326     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

not  favor  the  abolition  of,  or  the  interference  with 
slavery."  Resolutions  in  that  direction  were  lost,  and 
the  respectable  "Boston  Advertiser"  said  the  convention 
refused  to  indorse  "  the  fatal  doctrines  of  Mr.  Sumner." 

When  we  compare  this  feeling  of  Massachusetts 
with  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Chase  at  this  time,  as  expressed 
to  General  Butler,  the  necessary  progress  of  emancipa 
tion  in  the  public  mind  is  most  remarkable.  In  another 
direction,  this  situation  emphasizes  the  practical  ineffi 
ciency  of  the  administration  in  1861-62.  While  the 
whole  question  of  slavery  was  in  abeyance,  then  if 
they  had  used  vigorously  the  force  offered  by  the  North 
unanimously,  they  might  have  done  any  and  everything. 

These  opinions  of  Governor  Andrew  in  favor  of  im 
mediate  emancipation  were  circulated  among  the  gov 
ernors  of  the  New  England  States,  and  doubtless  took 
effect  in  the  informal  conference  held  at  the  Com 
mencement  of  Brown  University  in  June.  This  occa 
sion  was  preliminary  to  the  meeting  at  Altoona,  Pa.,  in 
September. 

All  this  agitation  came  to  the  surface  in  the  confer 
ence  of  the  loyal  governors  at  Altoona,  Pa.,  in  Septem 
ber.  It  does  not  appear  that  Morton  of  Indiana  was 
much  interested  by  the  call,  though  he  sent  a  represent 
ative  who  acted  for  him.  Governor  Curtin  made  the 
first  formal  suggestion  for  such  a  meeting  to  Mr. 
Seward  at  New  York.1  "  He  brightened  at  the  thought " 
and  wired  the  President,  who  approved.  Curtin  wrote 
the  address  and  Andrew  read  it  to  the  President  when 
the  conference  closed  and  nearly  all  the  governors 
went  to  Washington.  Without  doubt,  the  political  and 

1  Egle,  Curtin,  p.  309. 


GOVERNMENT  327 

practical  effect  of  the  conference  was  weakened  and 
scattered  by  the  actual  issue  of  the  Proclamation  of 
Emancipation  at  the  very  moment  when  it  assembled. 
According  to  Blair  of  Michigan,  the  attempt  to  induce 
the  President  to  remove  McClellan,  immediately  after 
Antietam,  failed  on  account  of  difference  of  opinion 
among  the  governors. 

This  positive  action  of  the  Northern  States,  in  so  far 
as  they  had  loyal  administrators,  was  a  strong,  moral 
reinforcement  of  the  national  government.  The  inward 
state  of  public  opinion  on  those  delicate  questions  is 
shown  in  one  of  Governor  Andrew's  free  revelations  to 
his  constituency.1  Directly  after  the  conference,  Daniel 
Henshaw  wrote  and  charged  him  as  trying  for  the  dis 
missal  of  General  McClellan.  The  governor  replied 
that  he  went  to  the  meeting  on  the  invitation  of  the 
governors  of  Ohio,  Virginia,  and  Pennsylvania.  He 
then  discussed  in  very  sarcastic  terms  the  conduct  of 
Hon.  Joel  Parker  and  others  in  criticising  the  execu 
tive.  The  governor  alleged  that  the  conservative  gov 
ernors  were  greatly  pleased  at  the  prospect  of  supporting 
the  President  at  Altoona.  After  the  proclamation  was 
published  they  got  more  than  was  bargained  for.  Now 
he  states  the  truth, —  first,  he  read  the  President's  Pro 
clamation  on  the  morning  of  the  23d,  and  was  as  much 
surprised 2  as  Judge  Parker,  though  he  was  more  pleased, 
probably  ;  second,  he  did  not  formally  and  directly,  nor 
indirectly,  move  for  dismissing  General  McClellan  or 
other  officers  from  the  army  or  navy.  Again, —  first, 

1  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  127,  p.  153,  Oct.  22,  1862. 

2  Andrew  had  written  Secretary  Stanton,  August  28,  "  God  only  knows 
whether  the  President  will  ever  burst  his  bonds  of  Border-Stateisra  and 
McClellan."  —  Schouler,  Mass,  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  366. 


328     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL   AND   STATE 

he  denies  the  moral  right  of  gentlemen  to  carry  on 
political  controversies  by  penetrating  private  circles  or 
promulging  private  conversations ;  second,  the  gentle 
men  in  question  need  not  have  sent  "  a  third  person  to 
find  out  what  I  said  at  Altoona."  He  concludes  in  a  long 
and  eloquent  protest  against  the  tendency  "  to  obtrude 
matters  mainly  personal  upon  the  attention  of  the 
people.  ...  It  interests  no  public  man,  civil  or  mili 
tary,  nor  demands  the  thought  of  a  loyal  human  being 
among  us."  l  All  of  which  seems  to  be  good  govern 
ment,  as  we  consider  it,  after  some  forty  years  of  calm 
interval. 

In  the  early  part  of  1862,  the  radical  Republican 
leaders,  as  we  have  seen,  had  striven  in  every  way  to 
force  the  hand  of  the  executive  and  bring  about  eman 
cipation.  So  far  the  President  had  been  content  to 
administer,  and  not  to  govern.  In  such  an  emergency, 
it  would  seem  that  counsel  and  encouraging  support 
should  come  from  the  cooperating  departments  of  the 
administration.  But  our  cabinet  is  a  body  for  admin 
istration  strictly,  a  staff  of  officers  for  delegated  duties.2 
There  is  no  copartnership  in  the  executive. 

We  may  note  in  this  connection  the  position  and 
relative  influence  in  the  cabinet  of  Secretary  Chase. 
Among  the  many  pregnant  events  in  the  administration 
of  affairs  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  hardly  any  are 

1  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  127,  p.  153. 

2  "In  the  United  States,  the  cabinet  is  a  collective  popular  name  for 
the  heads  of  the  eight  executive  departments.   They  have  as  a  body  no 
legal  functions,  but  by  custom  meet  the  President  at  stated  times  for  con 
sultation.    They  are  appointed  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate, 
and  are  removable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  President."  —  Century  Dic 
tionary. 


GOVERNMENT  329 

more  suggestive  than  those  issuing  from  the  acts  of 
Seward  and  Chase.  Chieftains  in  the  Republican  party, 
well  experienced  in  public  business,  the  country  expected 
much  from  them ;  and  for  themselves,  these  statesmen 
expected  more  to  come  in  the  opportunities  of  the  new 
administration.  Mr.  Seward  tried  his  hand  early  1  at 
exploiting  the  new  and  raw  President,  and  became  ever 
after  a  loyal  and  most  useful  supporter  of  his  chief. 
His  great  facility  in  affairs,  his  agreeable  readiness  in 
adapting  himself  and  his  views  to  the  slow-moving  Lin 
coln,  made  his  practical  assistance  most  valuable  in 
working  out  the  incidents  of  presidential  action.  What 
ever  Mr.  Seward's  expectant  ambition  might  have  been 
at  the  start,  —  and  we  have  shown  from  his  intimate 
correspondence  that  it  was  considerable,  —  he  soon 
adapted  himself  cheerfully  to  sustain  the  leading  role 
of  the  President,  and  supported  him  faithfully. 

Far  different  was  the  outcome  of  Mr.  Chase's  action. 
He  gave  efficient  service  to  the  country,  and  might  have 
given  greater,  if  he  had  been  content  with  his  proper 
sphere  of  influence,  and  had  supported  his  superior  offi 
cer  with  a  single  heart  in  the  loyal  manner  initiated  by 
the  great  Secretary  of  State.  Both  the  secretaries  dif 
fered  from  the  head  of  the  government  in  habit  of  mind, 
and  yet  more  in  culture  and  experience.  But  the  dif 
ferent  character  of  Salmon  P.  Chase  caused  much  the 
greatest  disparity  in  the  resulting  action  of  the  two 
men.  Mr.  Chase,  sedate,  pompous,  accomplished,  never 
forgot  his  personal  ambition,  nor  the  possible  opportu 
nities  opening  to  promote  it.  Afterward,  when  he 
dragged  the  ermine  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 

i  Ante,  p.  54. 


330  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

States  through  the  mire  of  party  politics,  as  he  sought 
the  Democratic  nomination  for  the  Presidency  in  1868, 
he  revealed  the  passing  motives  of  the  aspiring  politi 
cian  in  the  Treasury  Department.  He  persisted  in  pat 
ronage  of,  and  constant  communication  with,  generals 
in  the  field,1  apart  from  the  regular  and  proper  informa 
tion  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  without  the  know 
ledge  of  his  brother  members  of  the  cabinet.  He 
grasped  the  financial  situation 2  better  than  his  cowork- 
ers,  and  his  efforts  were  effective  in  sustaining  the 
Treasury.  Great  though  he  was,  and  greater  as  he 
thought  he  ought  to  be,  he  was  continually  imposed 
upon  by  the  wretched  political  followers,  who  were 
always  tempting  him  to  the  presidency.  He  was  at  the 
mercy  of  "  the  knaves  and  fools  in  whom  he  confided,"3 
according  to  his  biographer.  Yet  he  assumed,  uncon 
sciously  perhaps,  that  he  was  the  natural  head  of  the 
nation,  notwithstanding  that  he  was  very  deficient  in 
commanding  courage 4  at  the  serious  crises  of  affairs. 

Mr.  Chase's  peevish  criticisms  of  the  President's  man 
agement  and  procedure  are  best  revealed  and  met  in 
Lincoln's  own  sincere  and  calm  utterance.  When  offi 
cials  were  exclaiming  that  the  secretary's  resignation 

1  Hart,  Salmon  P.  Chase,  pp.  295,  297.   As  new  officers  came  forward 
in  1862  and  1863,  "  Chase  made  it  a  point  to  get  into  relations   with 
them." 

2  Out  of  his  large  experience  in  the  Internal  Revenue  System,  Mr. 
Boutwell  could  say,  "  Mr.  Chase's  mental  processes  were  slow,  but  time 
being  given,  he  had  the  capacity  to  form  sound  opinions."  —  Boutwell, 
Sixty  Years,  vol.  i,  304. 

8  Warden,  Chase,  p.  621. 

4  Governor  Boutwell  from  his  immediate  observation  told  me:  "After 
Bull  Run,  every  one  was  frightened  but  Lincoln.  He  was  never  so.  Im 
perturbable,  he  never  showed  fear.  Nor  did  Stanton  afterward.  But  then 
Chase  and  all  were  scared." 


GOVERNMENT  331 

from  the  Treasury,  June  29, 1864,  would  cause  a  finan 
cial  panic,  he  said  :  — 

Chase  thinks  he  has  become  indispensable  to  the  country ; 
that  his  intimate  friends  know  it,  and  he  cannot  comprehend 
why  the  country  does  not  understand  it.  He  also  thinks  he 
ought  to  be  president ;  he  has  no  doubt  whatever  about  that. 
It  is  inconceivable  to  him  why  people  have  not  found  it  out ; 
why  they  don't  as  one  man  rise  up  and  say  so.  He  is  an  able 
financier  ...  he  is  a  great  statesman,  and,  at  the  bottom,  a 
patriot.  Ordinarily  he  discharges  a  public  trust,  the  duties  of 
a  public  office,  with  great  ability  —  with  greater  ability  than 
any  man  I  know.  Mind,  I  say  ordinarily,  but  he  has  become 
irritable,  uncomfortable,  so  that  he  is  never  perfectly  happy 
unless  he  is  thoroughly  miserable,  and  able  to  make  every 
body  else  just  as  uncomfortable  as  he  is  himself.  He  knows 
that  the  nomination  of  Field  would  displease  the  Unionists 
of  New  York,  would  delight  our  enemies,  and  injure  our 
friends.  He  knows  that  I  could  not  make  it  without  seri 
ously  offending  the  strongest  supporters  of  the  government 
in  New  York,  and  that  the  nomination  would  not  strengthen 
him  anywhere  or  with  anybody.  Yet  he  resigns  because  I 
will  not  make  it.  He  is  either  determined  to  annoy  me,  or 
that  I  shall  pat  him  on  the  shoulder,  and  coax  him  to  stay. 
I  don't  think  I  ought  to  do  it.  I  will  not  do  it.  I  will  take 
him  at  his  word.1 

Remembering  that  after  these  occurrences  Mr.  Chase 
was  forced  by  his  conscience  or  by  circumstance  to  urge 
warmly  the  reelection  of  Lincoln  in  the  canvass,  we 
perceive  that  the  man  from  Illinois  comprehended  the 
situation  much  more  clearly  than  the  stately  and  pol 
ished  politician  from  Ohio. 

In  considering  what  Mr.  Lincoln  did,  we  shall  enter 
into  the  occasion,  and  comprehend  it  more  fully,  if  we 

1  Chittenden,  Rec.  of  Lincoln,  p.  379. 


332  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

know  from  what  he  escaped ;  in  other  words,  what  able 
contemporaries  believed  should  have  been  done  through 
constituting  anew  the  methods  of  the  administration. 
In  the  matter  of  working  out  the  business  of  govern 
ment  through  cooperation  of  the  cabinet  as  a  whole, 
Mr.  Chase  has  recorded  his  views  fully  and  clearly :  * 
"  It  seems  to  me  that  the  President  and  cabinet  ought  to 
be  well  advised  of  all  matters  vital  to  the  military  and 
civil  administration;  but  each  one  of  us  turns  his  own 
machine,  with  almost  no  comparison  of  views  or  consulta 
tion  of  any  kind.  It  seems  to  me  all  wrong,  and  I  have 
tried  very  hard  to  have  it  otherwise  —  unavailing."2 

He  remarks  that  the  President  had  a  poor  faculty 
for  organization  of  executive  action. 

Two  serious  objections  obtained  against  this  plan, 
attractive  as  it  appeared  on  the  surface.  The  chief 
weakness  in  republican  governments  is  in  their  divided 
responsibility  and  in  the  lack  of  that  forcible  action 
which  a  more  absolute  executive  maintains.  The  talk  of 
a  board  always  tends  toward  hesitating  delay  and  to  the 
loss  of  opportunity.  In  the  great  operations  of  our  Civil 
War,  a  cabinet  embracing  great  men  and  allowing  them 
freedom  of  action  through  departments  escaped  the 
worst  consequences  of  this  disability.  And  in  spite  of 
the  President's  manifest  lack  of  organizing  power,  he 
generally  had  the  marvelous  faculty  of  doing  the  right 
thing  when  the  occasion  forced  him  to  act.3 

1  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.   Seward  opposed  regular  meetings  of  the 
cabinet,  and  had  his  way  in  the  early  days  of  the  administration.  —  Tar- 
bell,  Lincoln,  vol.  ii,  27. 

2  Hart,  Salmon  P.  Chase,  p.  293. 

3  "  Mr.  Lincoln  treated  every  one  of  them  (the  cabinet)  with  unvary 
ing  candor,  respect,  and  kindness;  but,  though  several  of  them  were  men 


GOVERNMENT      ,  333 

The  greater  objection  was  in  the  character  of  Chase 
himself  and  of  all  similar  statesmen.  If  Chase  could 
have  subordinated  his  ambition  and  his  cherished  hopes 
to  the  good  of  the  Union  as  completely  as  Abraham 
Lincoln  did,  it  might  have  helped,  if  the  cabinet  could 
have  worked  as  one  man,  to  push  the  administration  of 
daily  affairs.  That  was  impossible.  Knowing  Chase  as 
we  know  him  now,  in  the  light  of  history  and  of  his 
own  revelations,  it  would  seem  to  have  been  better  that 
he  was  kept  in  his  own  department  and  in  doing  his 
own  especial  and  proper  work.  In  other  words,  instead 
of  creating  a  group  of  little  presidents,  working  into 
the  affairs  of  government  through  the  cabinet,  it  was 
better  as  it  was.  Abraham  Lincoln  "  assumed  "  the  re 
sponsibility  of  full  action  at  the  crucial  moment,  better 
than  any  facile  Seward,  or  scheming  Chase,  or  fiery 
Stan  ton  could  have  inspired  or  dictated  that  action.  To 
this  complexion  we  come  at  last,  —  government  is  in 
man,  and  the  rough  child  of  the  prairie  was  the  man  of 
them  all. 

And  the  President  counted  little  on  the  assistance 
of  the  more  progressive  governors  of  the  States.  After 
brooding  over  the  proclamation  for  months,  after  giving 
moral  warning  to  the  loyal  slaveholders  in  the  border 
States,  he  brought  it  before  the  board  of  his  official 
advisers.  Then  he  did  not  ask  their  opinion  in  the  mat 
ter  of  government,  but  upon  a  simple  detail  of  adminis 
tration.  Specifying  his  own  decision,  he  desired  their 

of  extraordinary  force  and  self-assertion,  —  this  was  true  especially  of 
Mr.  Seward,  Mr.  Chase,  and  Mr.  Stanton,  —  and  though  there  was  no 
thing  of  selfhood  or  domination  in  his  manner  toward  them,  it  was 
always  plain  that  he  was  the  master  and  they  the  subordinates."  —  C.  A. 
Dana,  Recollections  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  171. 


334    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

advice  as  to  the  proper  time  of  making  it  known,  as  to 
the  occasion  for  putting  forth  the  decree,  which  was  to 
become  effective  January  1, 1863.  And  he  followed  the 
judicious  suggestion  to  make  the  occasion  after  a  vic 
tory,  which,  in  the  course  of  events,  occurred  at  Antie- 
tam.  The  all-important  decision,  the  governing  power 
of  the  decree,  was  his  own  act,  out  of  his  matured  con 
sciousness.  Lincoln  was  the  centre  of  opposing  as  well 
as  forwarding  influence.  He  had  to  consider  not  only 
Curtin  and  Andrew,  but  unwilling  Republicans  like 
Blair,  and  persistent  opponents  like  Seymour.  The  im 
pelling  force  of  the  act,  the  magnificent  courage  of  the 
occasion  was  in  Lincoln.1  And  he  was  disappointed  by 
the  immediate  result,  for  he  expected  increase  in  the 
recruiting.  In  the  closest  intimacy  he  wrote :  "  The 

1  To  appreciate  the  heavy  responsibility  incurred  and  discharged  by 
Lincoln,  we  only  have  to  refer  to  the  reception  of  the  proclamation  in 
England  and  expression  of  the  time.  The  opinion  of  controlling  minds  is 
given  with  serene  candor  by  Dr.  Martineau  in  letters  to  a  friend  in  Massa 
chusetts,  lately  published.  English  opinion  was  inexplicable  then,  and  is 
incomprehensible  now. 

"  Apr.  14,  1863.  A  war  which  aims  at  impossible  objects  —  be  they  ever 
so  intrinsically  good  —  is  self-condemned.  We  believe  Slavery  to  be  truly, 
as  you  say,  the  cause  of  the  struggle:  we  do  not  believe  it  to  be  the  stake 
at  issue.  On  the  contrary,  we  regard  the  division  between  North  and 
South  as  the  one  gleam  of  hope  that  has  opened  on  the  sad  history  of  the 
colored  race  in  America."  .  % 

"  July  8,  1863.  The  removal  of  Slavery  is,  in  their  opinion,  no  proper 
object  of  a  war;  and  is,  on  the  other  hand,  far  too  serious  and  responsible  a 
change  to  be  resorted  to  incidentally,  as  a  mere  instrument  of  war.  It  is 
preeminently  a  work  of  peace  needing  deliberation,  time,  and  organized 
vigilance  and  control ;  and  to  inaugurate  it  in  the  heat  and  haste  of  con 
flict,  to  impose  it  as  a  military  penalty,  to  identify  it  with  confiscation  and 
attainder,  is  to  do  all  that  is  possible  to  make  it  hateful  and  hopeless. 
This,  at  least,  is  the  view  taken,  so  far  as  I  can  observe,  by  all  the  most 
experienced  and  high-minded  men  of  affairs,  including  the  anti-slavery 
leaders  themselves." —  Trans.  Colonial  Soc.  of  Mass.,  vol.  vi,  428,  434. 


GOVERNMENT  335 

North  responds  to  the  proclamation  sufficiently  in  breath, 
but  breath  alone  kills  no  rebels.1 

In  his  message,  December  1,  he  fulfilled  his  pledge  to 
strive  for  compensated  emancipation.  He  refers  to  the 
great  announcement,  "  All  persons  held  as  slaves  within 
any  State  or  designated  part  of  a  State,  the  people 
whereof  shall  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United 
States,  shall  be  then,  thenceforward,  and  forever  free."  2 
He  affirms,3  "  A  nation  may  be  said  to  consist  of  its  ter 
ritory,  its  people,  and  its  laws.  The  territory  is  the  only 
part  which  is  of  certain  durability.  .  .  .  Physically 
speaking,  we  cannot  separate."  He  argues  at  length, 
and  forcibly,  the  great  prospective  increase  of  popu 
lation  in  the  whole  United  States,  and  the  physical  im 
possibility  of  giving  the  large  interior  districts — -so 
prolific  in  every  resource  —  outlets  to  the  ocean,  except 
through  continuous  territory  and  united  government. 

While  it  cannot  be  foreseen  how  much  one  huge  example 
of  secession,  breeding  lesser  ones  indefinitely,  would  retard 
population,  civilization,  and  prosperity,  no  one  can  doubt  that 
the  extent  of  it  would  be  very  great  and  injurious.  The  pro 
posed  emancipation  would  shorten  the  war,  perpetuate  peace, 
insure  this  increase  of  population,  and,  proportionately,  the 
wealth  of  the  country.4. 

He  recommends  a  definite  plan  for  compensating  loyal 
slave-owners,  possibly  to  include  colonization.  This  was 
not  to  exclude  any  military  or  forcible  measures,  but  to 
reinforce  and  strengthen  them.  His  responsibility 5  as 

1  Lincoln,  Complete  Works.,  vol.  ii,  242. 

2  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii*  584. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  890.  *  lbid.t  p.  895. 

6  Mr.  Wilson  recognizes  the  profound  change  wrought  by  the  procla 
mation.  "  When  it  came  it  was  no  law,  but  only  his  deliberate  declaration 


336    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

the  head  of  the  government l  is  amply  set  forth  in  this 
noble  paragraph :  — 

I  do  not  forget  the  gravity  which  should  characterize  a 
paper  addressed  to  the  Congress  of  the  nation  by  the  Chief 
Magistrate  of  the  nation.  Nor  do  I  forget  that  some  of  you 
are  my  seniors ;  nor  that  many  of  you  have  more  experience 
than  I  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs.  Yet  I  trust  that  in 
view  of  the  great  responsibility  resting  upon  me,  you  will 
perceive  no  want  of  respect  to  yourselves  in  any  undue  ear 
nestness  I  may  seem  to  display.2 

Emancipation  closed  one  of  the  greatest  ethical 
movements  the  world  has  ever  known,  in  that  it  substi 
tuted  itself  for  the  abolition  sought  by  so  many  brave 
spirits  a  generation  earlier.  As  Whittier  stated  posi 
tively  for  that  party,3  "  it  cannot  be  said  that  we  did 
it."  These  earnest  persons  builded  better  than  they 
knew.  They  influenced  the  state  but  little,  in  all  their 

of  policy,  for  himself  and  for  his  party;  and  changed,  as  he  meant  that  it 
should  change,  the  whole  air  of  the  struggle,  and  of  politics  as  well."  — 
History  of  the  American  People,  vol.  iv,  232. 

1  April  4,  1864,  Mr.  Lincoln  wrote:  "Right  or  wrong,  I  assumed  this 
ground.  ...  I  could  not  feel  that,  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  I  had  even 
tried  to  preserve  the  Constitution,  if,  to  save  slavery  or  any  minor  matter, 
I  should  permit  the  wreck  of  government,  country,  and  Constitution  alto 
gether." —  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  vol.  ii,  508. 

2  O.R.y  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  p.  897. 

8  Whitter  wrote  Lydia  Maria  Child  in  1875:  "The  emancipation  that 
cajne  by  military  necessity  and  enforced  by  bayonets  was  not  the  emanci 
pation  for  which  we  worked  and  prayed.  But,  like  the  apostle,  I  am  glad 
the  gospel  of  Freedom  was  preached,  even  if  by  strife  and  emulation. 
It  cannot  be  said  that  we  did  it;  we  indeed  had  no  triumph.  But  the 
work  itself  was  a  success."  —  Higginson,  Whittier,  p.  90.  Whittier  was 
the  embodiment  of  the  ethical  resistance  to  slavery.  Not  even  Garrison 
represented  so  thoroughly  the  inward  spirit  of  abolition  as  did  Whit 
tier.  This  spirit  made  Garrisons,  as  the  great  agitator  made  Mortons, 
Andrews,  and  Curtins;  but  that  belongs  to  another  phase  of  the  question. 


GOVERNMENT  337 

agitation;  but  they  moulded  men  and  women  into  new 
creatures,  who  in  the  Sanitary  Commission  and  on  the 
field  of  battle  made  a  new  state,  as  has  been  shown. 
Blood  and  iron  are  not  agreeable  agents  of  civilization, 
but  they  are  the  means  by  which  the  great  movements 
of  mankind  are  worked  out.1 

The  President  bore  the  heaviest  burden,  but  some  of 
the  governors  successfully  met  exigencies  which  would 
have  crushed  ordinary  men.  The  conduct  of  the  State 
of  Indiana  for  some  two  years  by  Oliver  P.  Morton  was 
an  essay  in  the  art  of  government  which  must  be  famous 
always.  The  legislature  assembling  in  January,  1863, 
was  controlled  absolutely  by  the  Peace  Democrats,  who 
had  elected  their  "  state  ticket "  also.  The  governor 
reported  to  Secretary  Stanton  that  it  was  intended  to 
pass  a  resolution  acknowledging  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy  and  urging  the  States  of  the  Northwest  "  to  dis 
solve  all  constitutional  relations  with  the  New  England 
States."  2 

The  legislature  adjourned  in  the  spring,  without 
making  appropriations,  and  having  made  every  positive 
effort  to  embarrass  the  executive.  It  would  have  been 
useless  to  call  it  together  again,  for  it  would  not  appro 
priate  except  after  securing  assent  to  a  military  bill  which 
would  have  deprived  Governor  Morton  of  all  control 
of  the  forces  of  the  State.  The  Democratic  politicians 
little  knew  the  power  and  resource  of  the  man  with 
whom  they  were  dealing.  As  it  proved,  the  old  power 
of  tyrants  might  yet  be  revived  for  the  public  good. 

1  Cf.  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  215.   He  sums  the  conduct  of  emancipation  by 
the  President.    It  was  necessary,  wisely  done  ;  and,  on  the  whole,  could 
not  have  been  better  timed. 

2  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  4. 


338  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

April  18,  the  governor  established  a  bureau  of  finance 
with  his  own  financial  secretary,  collected  the  arsenal 
and  other  funds  from  the  national  government,  bor 
rowed  money  from  individual  citizens  and  from  coun 
ties.  The  national  government  assumed  the  state  debt 
for  arms  and  took  the  property.  But  some  unique 
methods  of  finance  were  planned  at  Washington,  though 
they  were  not  carried  into  effect  owing  to  more  favoring 
circumstances. 

Indiana  then  owed  $160,000  for  interest,  and  $90,000 
incurred  for  military  operations.  Stanton  persuaded 
President  Lincoln  to  make  an  advance  from  an  appro 
priation  of  two  millions  made  by  Congress  for  supply 
ing  arms  to  loyal  States  and  for  organizing  citizens 
against  domestic  insurrection.  June  18,  the  President 
issued  an  order  for  the  money.  It  was  not  used  as 
anticipated,  funds  for  the  interest  being  furnished  by 
bankers  in  New  York.  The  money  was  used  afterward 
for  the  expense  of  repelling  Morgan's  raid  into  Indiana. 
In  the  course  of  the  negotiations  Morton  said  to  Stan- 
ton,1  "  If  the  cause  fails,  we  shall  both  be  covered  with 
prosecutions;  "  and  Stanton  replied,  "  If  the  cause  fails, 
I  do  not  wish  to  live." 

It  avails  not  to  charge  that  the  opposition  in  the 
Northwest  grew  out  of  arbitrary  arrests  or  any  misdi 
rection  of  the  functions  of  government.  Whether  the 
arrests  were  wise  measures  of  administration  or  not,  they 
were  an  effect  and  not  a  cause.  The  campaign  of  the 
Peace  Democrats  was  a  deliberate  effort  to  turn  back 
the  loyal  North,  to  substitute  some  ill-digested  compro 
mise  and  the  probable  recognition  of  the  Southern 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  261. 


GOVERNMENT  339 

Confederacy  for  support  of  the  Union.  June  18,  1862, 
Governor  Morton  reported  confidentially  to  Secretary 
Stanton,1  as  "  deeply  concerning  "  both  the  State  and 
general  government,  the  existence  of  a  secret  political 
association  in  Indiana,  estimated  and  claimed  to  be  ten 
thousand  strong,  bound  to  oppose  all  recruiting,  to  em 
bitter  public  sentiment,  and  "generally  to  create  dis 
trust  in  and  bad  feeling  toward  the  government  and 
its  recognized  and  legally  constituted  authorities."  The 
newspapers  supported  by  it  were  of  more  than  doubtful 
loyalty.  The  "  Sentinel "  was  as  "  thoroughly  opposed 
to  our  government  as  the  '  Charleston  Mercury '  or 
6  Richmond  Enquirer.' ' '  They  considered  the  Legal-ten 
der  Act  to  be  unconstitutional,  and  that  "  the  responsi 
bility  of  the  war  rests  wholly  upon  the  North."  They 
charged  repeatedly  that  "the  sole  aim  and  object  is  to 
interfere  with  Southern  rights  by  securing  the  abolition 
of  slavery."  In  the  midst  of  this  half -concealed  treason, 
the  governor  believed  the  time  to  be  "  the  most  critical 
period  since  the  commencement  of  the  present  war." 
He  asked  for  at  least  ten  thousand  stand  of  arms  to 
equip  militia,  "  under  the  law  creating  the  ( Indiana 
Legion.' " 

This  was  not  Anglo-Saxon  political  opposition ;  dif 
ference  of  opinion  seeking  to  change  government  within 
legitimate  limits.  Treason  is  betrayal,  and  this  agitation 
sought  to  create  a  revolution  within  a  rebellion.  Jesse 
D.  Bright,  a  senator  of  the  United  States  from  Indiana, 
expelled  January  29,  1862,  may  serve  as  an  authority 
for  construing  Northern  opinion,  as  viewed  by  this 
revolutionary  element.  He  defined  three  parties  in  the 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  176,  177. 


340    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

North.1  1.  Abolitionists,  who  would  invade  the  South, 
free  slaves,  etc.,  called  the  Sumner  type.  2.  Those  op 
posed  to  abolition,  but  who  would  invade  and  free  negroes 
as  a  military  necessity,  represented  by  Senator  Sherman. 
3.  Those  opposed  to  invasion  of  the  South,2  favoring 
war  for  defense  only,  and  the  furnishing  of  men  and 
means  to  keep  off  invasion  of  the  loyal  states.  Loyal 
men  termed  this  class  three  "  Copperheads."  Mr.  Wood- 
burn  finds  a  middle  class,  between  the  War  Demo 
crats  and  the  Copperheads,  who  were  fond  of  calling 
themselves  "Constitutional-Union  Democrats."3  These 
were  men  who  insisted  that  opposition  to  the  civil  and 
political  measures  of  the  administration 4  did  not  con 
stitute  opposition  to  the  war.  Probably  their  constitu 
tional  basis  was  quite  similar  to  that  of  Governor 
Seymour. 

Whatever  minor  differences  might  range  between 
the  Constitutional-Union  position  and  that  of  the  radi 
cal  Copperheads,  the  men  controlling  the  Democrats 
held  forcible  opinions  which  could  not  be  reconciled 
with  any  practical,  possible  government  of  the  Union 
at  this  time.  Rebellion  and  revolution  know  no  middle 
ground.  Accordingly  the  Democratic  party  resolved  in 
1862  that  "  in  considering  terms  of  settlement  we  will 
look  only  to  the  welfare,  peace,  and  safety  of  the  white 
race  without  reference  to  the  effect  that  settlement  may 

1  Woodburn,  Party  Politics    in   the  Civil   War,  American  Historical 
Association,  1902,  vol.  i,  231. 

2  Many  associations  in  1863  passed  resolutions  against  the  "  abolition 
war  "  and  in  favor  of  peace.  —  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  382. 

Contrariwise,  many  soldiers  in  the  field  sent  the  strongest  resolutions 
sustaining  the  administration  and  rebuking  opposition.  —  Woodburn, 
p.  231. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  232.  4  Ibid.,  p.  229. 


GOVERNMENT  341 

have  upon  the  condition  of  the  African." 1  Doubtless 
this  sentiment  came  not  only  from  the  conditions  of  the 
war,  but  from  a  strong  antecedent  tendency,  the  social 
and  political  heredity  of  the  Southern  immigrant  in 
Indiana.  Like  begets  like,  even  in  opposition.  George 
W.  Julian  and  the  radical  Republican  leaders  would 
have  made  no  compromise  with  nominal  Union-loving 
Democrats.  They  advocated  the  sending  of  outspoken 
Copperheads  across  the  lines,  into  the  Confederacy.2 

Secession  and  rebellion  did  not  constitute  crime  in 
the  view  of  the  fully  developed  Copperhead,3  and  he 
certainly  belonged  morally  in  some  territory  where 
secession  was  a  virtue  and  not  a  political  fault.  The 
"  Sentinel "  indorsed  the  statement  of  Harrison  H. 
Dodd  :  "  I  would  stop  the  war  if  it  were  in  my  power 
to-morrow,  upon  the  basis  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
States,  as  contradistinguished  from  a  centralized  power, 
sufficient  to  reduce  the  States  to  Territories,  by  any 
process  and  for  any  purpose."  4  The  same  journal  had 
proclaimed,  a  year  before,  that  it  was  ready  to  throw  over 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States  for  that  of  Mont 
gomery,  as  being  decidedly  better.  Such  insurrectionary 
doctrines  could  not  be  expressed  and  contained  within 
the  political  forms  practiced  by  any  civilized  govern 
ment.  In  1864  J.  J.  Bingham,  chairman  of  the  Demo 
cratic  State  Central  Committee,  published  an  address  to 

1  Woodburn,  p.  235. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  243. 

8  Governor  Stone  of  Iowa  shows  the  practical  and  political  position  of 
the  Copperhead.  "  Several  counties  and  townships  are  behind  on  all  for 
mer  calls  because  they  are  Copperheads.  This  embarrasses  me."  —  Ibid., 
p.  284. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  240. 


342     AVAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

the  people  of  Indiana,1  apprehending  "  attempts  by  those 
in  authority  to  interfere  by  military  power  with  the  free 
dom  of  elections."  And  he  recommended  citizens  to 
"  cooperate  in  open  and  lawful  organizations  for  protec 
tion  and  preservation  of  order."  Governor  Morton2 
counterwarned  all  "  to  keep  aloof  from  all  military 
bodies  contemplating  resistance  to  federal  or  state 
authority." 

These  political  convulsions  —  compelled  at  last  to  stop 
short  of  open  war  and  resistance  to  constituted  author 
ity — were  inspired  and  maintained  by  the  Knights  of 
the  Golden  Circle,  the  Sons  of  Liberty,  and  other  secret 
orders.3  They  were  a  significant  contrast  to  the  numer 
ous  open  associations  like  the  Sanitary  Commission, 
which  brought  the  social  force  of  their  communities  to 
support  the  cause  of  the  Union.  The  one  sort  was  open- 
hearted  and  benignant,  helping  the  cause  of  order,  while 
the  other,  secret,  dark,  and  treacherous,  would  have 
dealt  death  to  the  Union.  It  was  a  desperate  and  vain 
attempt  to  build  up  a  new  kind  of  independent  state, 
amid  the  crash  of  rebellion  and  the  tumult  of  bloody 
war.  Such  as  they  were,  these  socio-political  bodies 
brought  the  power  of  association  and  affiliated  organi 
zation  to  the  rearing  of  a  bastard  state  sovereignty. 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  356. 

2  The  people  rendered  their  verdict  in  November,  1864,  by  reelecting 
the  governor  by  a  double  majority.   In  the  words  of  the  Wdbash  Express : 
"  No  other  man  could  have  done  more  —  who  could  have  accomplished  so 
much  ?    This  great  change  in  popular  opinion  is  owing  more  to  the  mas 
terly  manner  with  which  he  handled  the  thrilling  issues  of  the  day,  than 
to  anything  else."  —  Ibid.,  p.  365. 

8  The  District  Court  at  Indianapolis  reported  that  the  Knights  num 
bered  15,000.  Signals  of  the  order  were  recognized  by  Confederate  pris 
oners.  —  Ibid.,  p.  381. 


GOVERNMENT  343 

The  numbers  of  the  secret  partisans  emboldened  them 
to  plan  a  general  rising  under  cover  of  a  Democratic 
mass  meeting,  projected  at  Indianapolis,  August  16, 
1864.1  These  movements  were  aided  directly  by  Da  vis's 
commissioners  of  "peace,"  Thompson,  Clay,  and  Hoi- 
combe.2  Thompson  spent  about  half  a  million  for  arms, 
etc.  The  general  plan  was  to  rise  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illi 
nois,  and  Missouri,  to  overthrow  the  state  governments, 
to  release  the  Confederate  prisoners,  and  to  organize  a 
Northwestern  confederacy,  —  big  job  for  a  treasonable 
conspiracy ;  but  these  restless  politicians,  seeking  to  be 
statesmen,  undertook  it  cheerfully.  The  plan  was  dis 
covered  and  nipped  in  the  bud.  Afterward  arms  were 
seized  in  Indianapolis,  with  the  ritual  of  the  Sons  of 
Liberty,  etc.  This  broke  the  power  of  the  order,  for  it 
could  live  and  breathe  only  in  secrecy. 

These  subterranean  operations  were  ferreted  out  by 
the  sleepless  enterprise  of  Morton,  aided  by  the  skill  of 
General  Carrington  and  his  detectives.3  It  is  so  difficult 
for  Americans  to  imagine  and  comprehend  this  kind  of 
treason  and  stratagem  that  the  plain  citizens  of  Indiana 
could  not  believe  before  the  explosion  that  such  treach 
ery  was  working  beneath  and  around  them.  An  old 
friend  of  Morton's  protested  that  no  such  secret  order 
existed.  The  governor  crushed  his  skepticism  by  simply 
reading  a  stenographic  report  of  a  speech  denouncing 
Morton,  delivered  in  a  conclave  the  night  before. 

The  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle  were  merged  in 
the  larger  order  of  American  Knights,  or  "  Sons  of 
Liberty."  4  The  movement  for  organization  culminated 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  375.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  399-402. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  405-407.  «  Ante,  p.  342. 


344  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

in  a  convention  at  New  York,  February  22, 1864.  Val- 
landigham  was  elected  supreme  commander.  In  the 
ritual  these  pregnant  words  were  embodied :  "  The  gov 
ernment  designated  6  United  States  of  America '  has  no 
sovereignty,  because  that  is  an  attribute  belonging  to 
the  people  in  their  respective  state  organizations,  and 
with  which  they  have  not  endowed  that  government  as 
their  common  agent."  l 

This  stated  in  regular  form  the  doctrine  previously 
and  openly  avowed  by  H.  H.  Dodd  in  Indiana.2  The 
concealed  treason  finally  manifested  itself  in  these  at 
tempts  at  rebellion  and  open  resistance  against  state 
and  federal  authority.  Such  resistance  could  result  only 
in  arrests,  whether  "  arbitrary  "  or  other.  We  can  reason 
calmly  now  on  the  methods  adopted,  and  condemn  the 
mistakes.  But  Morton  had  to  act  then,  to  move  at  once, 
like  a  man  who  seizes  the  first  vessel  capable  of  convey 
ing  water,  when  he  must  put  out  a  fire.  Dodd  and  other 
Sons  of  Liberty  were  tried  by  a  military  commission, 
assembled  September  22,  1864.  Some  were  condemned 
to  death,  but  Judge  David  Davis  convinced  Governor 
Morton  that  the  commission  was  illegal,  and  he  finally 
induced  President  Johnson  to  commute  the  sentence 
to  imprisonment,  which  was  more  substantial  justice 
probably. 

Yet  Morton,  though  compelled  to  adopt  the  sternest 
executive  policy,  —  justifiable  under  the  forms  of  civil 
government, — was  a  just  and  honorable  citizen,  seeking 
to  bring  order  out  of  a  seditious  time.  When  Lincoln 
was  assassinated,  a  great  meeting  was  assembled  to 
express  the  mournful  feeling  of  the  community.  Mc- 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  393.  2  Ante,  p.  341. 


GOVERNMENT  345 

Donald,  a  Democrat,  said  that  he  never  had  personal 
differences  with  Morton,  and  hereafter  he  would  have  no 
political  differences.  Hendricks,the  embodiment  of  Cop- 
perheadism,  arose  to  speak  in  the  "  uncontrollable  fury  " 
of  the  multitude.  Men  rushed  with  weapons,  shouting, 
"  Kill  him  !  Don't  let  the  traitor  speak ! "  Morton  raised 
his  hand,  and  with  "  his  terrible  eye  and  ringing  voice," 
says  the  biographer  of  Hendricks,  "commanded  and 
besought  and  quelled  the  crowd."  l  In  political  develop 
ment  he  was  a  type  of  those  Western  men  whom  the 
aggressive  movements  of  slavery  educated  to  become 
the  final  destroyers  of  the  institution.  Abraham  Lincoln 
was  a  Whig  of  Kentuckian  descent.  Morton  was  a  con 
servative  Democrat,  who  became  at  last  a  strong  advo 
cate  of  the  fifteenth  amendment  to  the  constitution ; 
Hoosier-born,  he  was  now  "  born  again."  It  was  said 
that  his  political  course  corresponded  roughly  with  the 
steady  advance  of  the  Republican  party,  first  "  free  ter 
ritories,"  then  "  emancipation,"  finally  "  enfranchise 
ment."  2  This  progressive  political  "  pillar  of  fire,"  this 
largeness  of  idea,  made  him  "  splendidly  inconsistent." 
He  led  not  only  the  people,  but  the  strongest  and  ablest 
leaders  of  the  people.  When  Secretary  Stanton's  resig 
nation  was  bruited,  late  in  1862,3  he  wired :  "  I  believe 
that  your  duty  to  your  country  and  the  best  interests 
of  the  nation  require  you  to  retain  your  position."  His 
sympathetic  and  militant  brother-patriot  answered :  "  I 
shall  never  desert  my  post.  Of  this  you  may  be  sure." 
When  he  was  stricken  by  disease,  Salmon  P.  Chase  and 
Edwin  M.  Stanton  agreed  that  "  no  governor  had  ren- 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  439.  2  fbid.,  p.  452. 

3  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  953,  954. 


346    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

dered  such  services  or  displayed  such  courage  or  ability 
in  administration." *  These  labors  would  have  prostrated 
most  men  of  strength,  and  they  laid  this  paladin  low, 
only  to  rise  again.  He  bore  his  full  burden  until  Octo 
ber  10,  1865,  when  he  was  stricken  by  paralysis,  and 
never  walked  again  without  aid.  In  almost  constant 
physical  suffering  until  his  death,  in  1877,  these  unto 
ward  circumstances  seemed  to  increase  rather  than  dimin 
ish  the  power  of  his  intellect  and  the  force  of  his  will. 

Naturally,  he  went  to  the  Senate  of  the  United  States, 
and  I  well  remember  him  as  he  addressed  that  body, 
leaning  on  a  peculiar  iron  frame  for  support.  A  keen 
observer,  who  knew  closely  most  of  the  great  men  of 
the  period,  said  to  me,  "  There  is  something  Websterian 
in  that  brow."  With  a  large  head  and  high  forehead, 
dark  searching  eyes,  voice  not  loud  but  deep,  natu 
rally  powerful  and  commanding  in  presence,  though 
infirm  then,  he  was  active  thought  and  will  incarnate.2 
•A  voracious  reader,  quickly  sucking  the  life  from  books, 
industrious,  devoted  to  his  family  and  writing  his  wife 
daily  when  absent,  caring  for  soldiers  in  the  field  as  if 
they  were  his  children,  he  was  a  strong  hater  and  was 
feared  by  his  enemies.  Like  many  great  leaders  of  men, 
he  had  no  definite  creed.  The  "Evidences  of  Chris 
tianity,"  read  in  his  youth,  were  too  strong  for  his  ten 
der  faith  and  kicked  backward,  like  an  overloaded  gun. 
He  believed  in  immortality  and  a  religion  of  love.  With 
every  opportunity  for  acquiring  riches,  he  died  possess 
ing  a  moderate  independence.  His  proud  nature  despised 
corruption  in  any  form. 

A  mighty  force  impelling  him  to  steadfast,  onward, 

1  Foulke,  Morton,  vol.  i,  456.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  507-532. 


GOVERNMENT  347 

political  progress  was  in  his  confidence  in  the  Union. 
He  never  doubted  that,  as  constituted,  it  contained 
within  itself  the  means  for  its  own  preservation,  and 
all  powers  necessary  to  ward  off  attack.  Such  serene 
faith  in  the  largest  powers  of  government  carried  him 
in  a  higher  atmosphere,  more  perspicuous  and  lucid 
than  the  doubts  of  common  men.  He  consulted  nobody ; 
but  gathered  his  facts  and  digested  them,  then  fixed 
his  purpose  "  within  his  own  mind."  And  this  mind 
rose  above  circumstance  and  environment.  Adverse 
conditions,  which  depressed  others,  inspired  him  to 
greater  effort.  His  persistent  will  was  bold,  and  it  went 
onward.  Intense  were  his  ambition  and  love  of  power ; 
but  he  used  these  faculties  for  the  good  of  the  people. 
He  was  literally  a  public  servant.  Julian  knew  the 
whole  business,  and  in  his  history  of  Indiana  he  called 
this  career  "  The  Reign  of  Oliver  P.  Morton."  He 
made  himself  master  of  the  Democratic  party,  includ 
ing  its  rebel  element,  and  controlled  his  own  party  at 
the  same  time. 

Perhaps  no  administrator  —  whether  king,  general,  or 
governing  orator  —  ever  threw  himself  more  absolutely 
and  without  reserve  into  his  work.  When  arguing  a 
cause,  or  acting  as  the  head  of  his  people,  he  knew 
nothing  of  self  or  selfish  purpose.  The  end,  the  coun 
try's  need,  the  indomitable  compulsion  of  affairs  mis 
called  "  destiny "  drove  him  to  the  unavoidable  act, 
the  impulse  of  genius. 

The  matter  of  arbitrary  arrests  —  especially  as  con 
ducted  by  Stanton  and  Morton  —  will  be  interesting 
and  important,  as  history  moves  on.  While  it  may  be 
impossible  to  formulate  a  right  of  control  and  seizure 


348  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

of  the  person  under  a  free  government,  which  can  sat 
isfy  enlightened  jurists,  it  is  equally  certain  that  no 
government  can  be  carried  through  privy  conspiracy, 
treason,  and  rebellion,  without  using  some  methods  of  a 
despotism.  Civilization  has  spent  its  best  strength  in 
limiting  and  binding  executive  power.  All  this  has 
been  done  by  willing  citizens,  contributing  themselves 
to  the  state,  for  common  service  with  the  executive. 
When  the  individual  citizen  revolts  and  seeks  to  destroy 
the  state,  his  relation  with  the  executive  changes  abso 
lutely  and  of  necessity.  The  executive  cannot  be  bound 
in  the  interest  of  a  person  whose  will  would  subvert 
the  state. 

The  arbitrary  executive  simply  substitutes  his  own 
will  in  action  for  a  properly  constituted  power  issuing 
from  the  ordinary  civic  source.1  But  the  exigency  is 
extraordinary,  demanding  immediate  executive  action. 
Though  the  means  are  absolute,  it  does  not  follow  that 
the  end  created  will  be  despotic  and  tyrannical.  Judge 
Parker  of  Massachusetts  said  the  President  is  a  "  mon 
arch.  His  is  an  absolute,  irresponsible,  uncontrollable 
government;  a  perfect  military  despotism."2  Judge 
Curtis  argued  to  the  same  effect.  But  was  it  "  despot 
ism  "  ?  The  people  did  not  so  conclude,  after  due  de 
liberation.  It  was  the  work  not  of  a  despot,  but  of 
"  Honest  old  Abe,"  trying  in  the  interest  of  his  con 
stituents  to  get  through  a  bad  predicament.  He  was 

1  Mr.  Wilson  remarks  that  the  President  had  exercised  the  full  pre 
rogatives  of  the  executive  in  suspending  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act  when 
necessary.  "  Congress  now  gave  him  (in  May  1863)  explicit  authority  to 
set  aside  the  rights  of  individuals  whenever  it  seemed  necessary  to  safe- 
gard  the  Union."  —  History  of  the  American  People,  vol.  iv,  236. 

3  Cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  169. 


GOVERNMENT  349 

far  from  "  irresponsible,"  and  only  acting  firmly  under 
a  sense  of  his  responsibility  to  the  people.  Here  we 
should  consider  what  kind  of  political  entity  is  consti 
tuted  by  our  people.  Our  polity  was  English  by  hered 
ity  ;  quite  as  English  in  development.  Let  us  go  back 
to  1789  and  find  out  in  what  manner  the  sovereign 
people  got  under  way  in  America. 

The  people  —  reservoir,  deep-current,  and  ground- 
swell  of  sovereignty  —  the  people  were  recognized  in 
1789  for  the  first  time  since  the  days  when  the  horde 
elected  chieftains  or  accepted  laws.  The  great  work  of 
civilization  had  created  certain  governmental  organs  of 
state,  assemblies,  representatives,  barons,  counties,  mu 
nicipalities,  and  guilds ;  these  were  massive  bulwarks  and 
bastions  between  governors  and  the  governed.  English 
government  was  based  on  orders  and  classes,  not  upon 
the  nation  as  a  whole.  Crown  and  parliament,  lords 
and  commons  —  the  common  men  being  knights  of 
shires  or  burgesses  of  towns  —  ruled  England.  In 
America,  town-meeting  and  county,  constable  and  sher 
iff,  legislatures  and  governors  of  states,  —  these  latter 
being  little  descendants  of  kings,  according  to  Mr. 
Freeman,  —  these  historic  organs  stood  between  the 
people  of  1789  and  the  coming  central  power,  desider 
ated  and  craved,  yet  feared  lest  it  might  prove  more 
oppressive  than  the  royal  power  they  had  just  escaped. 

A  great  general  principle  in  federal  government  was 
now  enunciated.  In  the  words  of  a  thorough  student 
of  institutions,  it  was  "the  most  important  and  far- 
reaching  political  principle  to  which  our  career  as  a 
nation  has  given  birth."  l  Curiously  it  came  from  New 

1  Taylor,  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution,  vol.  i,  65. 


350    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

England  ;  for  our  district  has  given  few  general  ideas 
to  the  Union,  though  it  has  contributed  excellent  spe 
cial  principles.  The  Websters — Pelatiah  and  Noah  — 
published  tracts  advocating  that  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  should  not  only  enact  laws,  but  should 
execute  them  through  its  own  officers,  upon  the  persons 
of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Not  only  states 
but  individuals  should  be  directly  responsible  to  the 
supreme  power —  the  apex  of  the  popular  pyramid. 
The  idea  once  proclaimed  speedily  enforced  its  own 
adoption.  The  historic  organs  of  state,  as  described 
above,  were  corporations,  in  substance  if  not  in  form. 
A  state  government,  a  sheriff  of  a  county,  was  a  shell 
outside  which  the  imperial  government  must  stay, —  so 
long  as  the  shell  was  incorporate,  —  and  staying  wait 
for  its  rights  until  this  direct  service  of  writs,  etc., 
brought  the  federal  authority  home  to  the  people.  A 
strong  presidential  executive,  a  survival  of  kingship, 
necessarily  followed  the  same  idea.  "  The  community 
of  all,  not  a  society  of  the  better  "  —  we  repeat  —  has 
been  the  practical  ideal  of  the  American  state.  The 
people,  through  the  onset  and  advent  of  federal  action, 
have  become  an  essential  part  of  the  most  thoroughly 
imperial  system  yet  established  in  political  development. 
The  least  and  the  lowest  are  constantly  being  swept 
from  stagnant  social  eddies  by  the  great  stream  of 
politics,  and  carried  into  responsible  offices  of  the  state. 
The  process  is  full  of  danger;  yet  it  rarely  fails  of  tol 
erable  success,  and  often  achieves  brilliant  results. 
Man  —  the  child  and  image  of  God  —  is  the  basis  of 
our  state,  and  man  returns  and  repays  the  generous 
confidence  that  society  has  given  him. 


GOVERNMENT  351 

The  people,  this  mass  of  humanity  and  community  of 
all,  —  articulated  into  organs  and  political  functions,  — 
found  their  natural  executive  in  Abraham  Lincoln.  To 
cah1  that  man  a  monarch  and  despot  showed  a  jurist 
intoxicated  with  the  musty  fumes  of  legal  lore ;  inebri 
ate  with  texts  and  unfitted  for  the  necessary  deeds  of 
any  desperate  time.  And  the  simple,  uninstructed,  but 
not  ignorant  people  knew  it.  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  another 
connection,  stated  exactly  how  he  recognized  the  power 
of  the  compelling  situation,  and  his  conscientious  sense 
of  the  duty  imposed.  He  said  to  Horatio  Seymour,  the 
type  of  these  hesitating  counselors  and  worshipers  of 
precedent:  "  My  purpose  is  to  be  in  my  action  just  and 
constitutional,  and  yet  practical,  in  performing  the  im 
portant  duty  with  which  I  am  charged." 

The  rebellion  was  the  impelling  power  of  action  and 
not  the  self -moving  arbitrary  will  of  the  executive  — 
whether  federal  or  state  —  when  a  traitor  had  forfeited 
his  personal  liberty,  and  was  outlawed  in  presence  of 
the  state.  It  was  because  the  rebels  knew  so  well  that 
James  Buchanan  in  his  nature  could  not  put  forth  the 
executive  arm  as  Andrew  Jackson  would  have  done  that 
the  rebellion  took  its  way  without  let  or  hindrance  in 
the  beginning.  Virginia  never  could  have  been  dragged 
at  the  chariot  wheels  of  South  Carolina  if  there  had 
been  an  arbiter  in  the  White  House  instead  of  an  incom 
petent  timid  seeker  after  precedents  like  Buchanan. 

We  should  not  condemn  the  jurists  without  reserve, 
for  good  men  of  action,  strong  supporters  of  the  exec 
utive  objected  to  the  methods,  if  not  the  principle.2 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  636. 

2  Governor  Andrew  was  opposed  to  the  "  power  of  arbitrary  arrest  so 


352     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Governor  Curtin,  in  a  message  to  the  Pennsylvania 
legislature,  recommended  an  Act  of  Congress  providing 
for  trial  of  "persons  charged  with  such  offenses  in 
the  loyal  and  undisturbed  States,  so  that  the  guilty 
may  justly  suffer  and  the  innocent  be  relieved."  l 

Congress  converted  "arbitrary"  into  legitimate  ex 
ecutive  power,  by  passing  an  act  approved  March  3, 
1863,  authorizing  the  President  to  suspend  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  and  requiring  the  Secretaries  of  State 
and  War  to  furnish  lists  of  political  prisoners  to  the 
courts  for  trial.  It  was  claimed  that  these  provisions 
for  trial  were  never  carried  out,  showing  that,  as  I  have 
stated,  it  is  not  easy  to  formulate  laws  which  can  actu 
ally  control  the  necessity  of  the  trial.  September  15, 
in  the  face  of  the  coming  elections,  the  President  was 
obliged  to  issue  a  proclamation  suspending  the  writ 
throughout  the  United  States.  His  manifesto  was  super 
vised  by  Secretary  Chase,2  an  opponent  of  arbitrary  ar 
rests,  and  doubtless  was  the  best  form  of  using  prompt 
executive  authority  which  could  be  made  practicable. 
My  object  in  this  discussion  has  been,  not  to  trespass 
on  the  province  of  jurists,  but  to  set  forth  the  compel 
ling  circumstances  which  actual  necessity  and  the  con 
sequent  use  of  these  abnormal  methods  of  government 
have  created  for  conscientious  officials. 

Some  insight  in  studying  the  difficulties  of  these 
officials  may  be  gained  if  we  compare  the  necessary 
principles  of  war  with  the  established  custom  of  peace. 
The  times  were  out  of  joint,  and  the  varying  conditions 

loosely  exercised  in  the  loyal  States  by  the  federal  "  Secretaries  of  State 
and  of  War."  —  Browne,  Andrew,  p.  113. 

1  Cited  by  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  236. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  417. 


GOVERNMENT  353 

of  the  States  required  different  methods  of  administra 
tion.  Governor  Andrew  could  discuss  constitutional 
procedure  with  Judge  Parker,  having  enormous  major 
ities  at  his  back;  but  Morton,  holding  only  the  tattered 
rags  of  his  gubernatorial  mantle,  must  act  against  men 
secretly  armed  for  overthrowing  the  civic  government. 
John  Sherman,  a  statesman  who  opposed  arrests,  wrote 
his  brother,  November  16,  1862 :l  "No  doubt  the 
wanton  and  unnecessary  use  of  power  to  arrest  without 
trial  and  the  ill-timed  proclamation  contributed  to  the 
general  result  [of  the  elections]."  Sherman  was  a  patriot 
and  a  bright  example  of  the  temporizing  Republican. 
But  it  will  be  observed  that  he  liked  the  Proclamation 
of  Emancipation  no  better  than  the  arrest  of  secret  seces 
sionists —  persons  who  aided  the  rebellion  in  the  way 
which  might  most  damage  the  Union.  Treason,  directly 
aided  by  the  Confederacy,2  was  working  to  undermine 
federal  and  state  authority  so  that  Seward  and  Stan- 
ton,  and  afterward  Morton,  felt  obliged  to  strike  at 
secret  treason  in  any  way  they  could  control. 

To  revert  to  the  military  analogy,  the  arbitrary  arrest 
in  civic  life  was  the  offensive-defensive  so  desiderated 
by  strategists  in  its  most  stringent  form.  It  brought 
instant  force  to  bear  on  the  occasion,  as  General  Sher 
man  contended  for  a  timely  use  of  the  direct  assault, 
instead  of  constant,  cautious  manoeuvring.  Some  critics 
condemn  direct  assaults  on  the  field,  but  General  Sher 
man,  more  than  a  critic,  was  a  man  of  genius,  possess 
ing  all  the  resources  of  strategy  and  tactics.  Hear  his 
opinion  of  Grant's  bloody  reverses  in  the  campaign  of 
the  Wilderness:  — 

*  Sherman,  Letters,  p.  167.  2  Ante,  p.  343. 


354    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

If  General  Grant  can  sustain  the  confidence,  the  spirit, 
the  pluck  of  his  army,  and  impress  the  Virginians  with  the 
knowledge  that  the  Yankees  can  and  will  fight  them  fair  and 
square,  he  will  do  more  good  than  to  capture  Richmond  on 
any  strategic  advantage.  This  moral  result  must  precede  all 
mere  advantages  of  strategic  movements,  and  this  is  what 
Grant  is  doing.  Out  here  the  enemy  knows  we  can  and  will 
fight  like  the  devil,  therefore  he  manoeuvres  for  advantage  of 
ground.1 

Fear  is  a  tremendous  motive  and  moral  factor  among 
mankind.  Will  it  ever  cease  to  be  so?  Executive  or 
ruler,  judge  or  general,  must  always  reckon  it  as  a  la 
tent  but  imperative  factor  among  rebels  and  criminals, 
as  well  as  soldiers  and  honest  citizens. 

The  subterranean  movements  of  the  Knights  of  the 
Golden  Circle  and  other  treasonable  conspirators  natu 
rally  produced  changes  within  the  Democracy  proper. 
The  radical  few  opposing  the  draft  and  initiating  trea 
son  impelled  the  serious  and  patriotic  members  of  the 
party  to  an  efficient  support  of  the  administration. 
There  was  a  lull  in  political  development  in  the  spring 
of  1863;  which  was  proven  by  subsequent  events  to 
have  been  deceptive  in  its  hopeful  aspect.  August  Bel- 
mont  wrote  Rothschild  that  "  the  few  peace-at-any-price 
men  "  were  silenced  altogether.  And  Stunner  could  say 
the  "  Democracy  is  insisting  upon  the  most  strenuous 
support  of  the  war." 2  These  differing  characters,  ob 
serving  the  current  of  public  affairs  from  very  different 
points  of  view,  were  both  impelled  to  a  more  sanguine 
estimate  than  the  facts  warranted.  For  some  of  the 
most  potent  facts,  as  we  have  seen,  were  concealed  from 

1  0.  R.,  vol.  xxxviii,  part  iv,  294. 

2  Citations,  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  243. 


GOVERNMENT  355 

their  view,  and  hardly  could  have  been  anticipated 
from  previous  knowledge  of  the  American  people.  Yet 
the  open  conduct  of  the  Democracy  improved  in  1863. 
There  was  no  factious  opposition  in  Congress,  and  John 
Sherman  could  say  to  his  brother  in  November :  "  The 
war  was  never  more  popular  than  at  this  moment." 
That  keen  observer,  James  Russell  Lowell,  could  record 
that  "  the  progress  of  years  has  outstripped  the  expecta 
tion  of  the  most  sanguine,  and  that  of  our  arms,  great 
as  it  undoubtedly  is,  is  trifling  in  comparison  with  the 
advance  of  opinion." 1 

The  general  movement  of  the  national  finances  be 
longs  to  history  proper,  but  one  aspect  of  finance  enters 
into  our  study.  The  States,  through  their  representatives 
in  Congress,  opposed  the  organization  of  the  National 
Banking  System  at  the  start,  and  thus  embarrassed  the 
Treasury  for  some  two  years. 

The  business  of  the  United  States  was  carried  on  in 
1861,  virtually  by  $200,000,000,  of  state  bank  notes, 
based  on  a  sufficient  reserve  of  specie.  This  specie  was 
not  evenly  distributed,  but  was  held  in  the  moneyed  cen 
tres.  There  was  no  system  of  mutual  support  among 
the  banks,  and  no  adequate  provisions  for  control  of 
circulation  or  speedy  redemption.  It  was  estimated 
that  there  were  seven  thousand  kinds  and  denomina 
tions  of  notes,  not  to  speak  of  counterfeits,  which  were 
in  general  circulation.2  This  ragged  currency  broke 
down  under  the  political  shock  of  secession  and  rebellion. 
It  was  contended  by  some  authorities,  especially  in  the 
West,  that  all  issues  of  state  banks  had  been  in  violation 

1  Rhodes,  vol.  iv,  423,  424. 

3  Hepburn,  Coinage  and  Currency  t  p.  177. 


356    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

o£  the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  This  general 
financial  condition  of  the  country  greatly  aggravated 
the  difficulties  of  the  Treasury  and  the  administration. 
Secretary  Chase  also  pushed  his  dislike  and  distrust  of 
state  banks  to  the  extreme,  and  would  not  use  them  as 
temporary  depositories  in  handling  his  loans.  Standing 
by  the  Sub-Treasury,  with  every  technical  limit,  he 
obliged  lenders  to  furnish  loans  in  specie  directly  to  his 
agents.  He  enforced  medieval  finance  with  all  the  in 
creased  power  of  modern  resource.  This  course,  when 
there  was  such  insufficient  means  for  transacting  public 
and  private  business,  was  a  severe  hardship  ;  and  it  pre 
cipitated  a  partial  panic  for  specie,  December  16, 1861. 
The  market  was  much  excited  then  by  the  possibility 
of  war  with  England,  caused  by  the  Mason-Slidell  inci 
dent. 

In  1862-63,  the  administration,  as  well  as  Congress 
and  the  people,  became  conscious  that  the  burden  of 
subduing  the  rebellion  would  require  the  largest  finan 
cial  measures  to  carry  the  task  to  a  successful  issue. 
Every  kind  of  nice  particularism  must  yield  in  finance, 
as  it  had  yielded  in  the  fancied  inviolability  of  states 
and  persons,  in  the  desperate  necessities  of  the  Union. 
Early  in  1863,  the  House  of  Representatives  was  in 
formed  that  a  billion  of  dollars  must  be  borrowed  in 
eighteen  months ; l  that  the  national  expenses  were 
then  two  and  one  half  millions  per  day,  Sundays  not 
excepted.  The  income  was  six  hundred  thousand ;  so 
nineteen  hundred  thousand  must  be  borrowed  daily. 

1  Beyond  the  national  outlay  the  individual  States  had  spent  freely. 
The  writer's  father  was  Chairman  of  the  Commitee  on  Finance  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  General  Assembly  of  Rhode  Island.  He 


GOVERNMENT  357 

Legal-tender  notes,  fractional  paper  currency,  treasury 
notes  were  being  issued  in  alarming  aggregates.1 

Probably  a  mistake  was  made  by  Secretary  Chase  in 
changing  the  rate  of  interest  on  bonds  redeemable  at 
option  in  five  to  twenty  years,  —  popularly  known  as 
5-20s,  —  from  six  per  cent,  to  a  lower  rate  at  five  per 
cent,  with  a  longer  term  at  option,  after  ten  years  to 
forty  years.  The  national  banks  were  forced  into  taking 
the  lower-rate  bond  to  get  a  basis  for  business,  and  the 
10-40s  might  have  been  limited  to  them.  But  the  rate 
of  six  per  cent.,  then  being  accepted,  was  low  enough. 
Enthusiasm  for  contributing  financial  aid  was  chilled, 
and  the  popular  supply  of  money  lessened.  The  penny- 
wise  saving  in  interest  was  lost  hundreds  of  times  by 
increased  premiums  on  gold  and  the  consequent  advance 
in  prices  paid  by  the  nation.  Meanwhile  the  latter  end 
of  the  5-20s  loan  was  placed  by  the  secretary  through 
popular  subscription.  This  was  fostered  by  energetic 
agents  and  commissions,  by  advertising  and  all  the 
ingenious  methods  of  modern  finance.  It  was  another 
move  toward  concentrating  the  resources  of  the  people 
by  large  national  methods,  and  so  deserves  mention  here. 

As  noted,  the  main  difficulty  was  in  the  lack  of  stable 
currency  and  of  large  financial  machinery ;  to  meet  it 
Secretary  Chase  had  proposed  in  his  report  in  Decem 
ber,  1861,  to  establish  the  system  of  national  banks. 

drew  the  bill  which  was  to  put  the  little  State  into  debt  for  one  million, 
an  unknown  extravagance  in  those  days.  The  act  passed  with  little  com 
ment.  After  adjournment,  Orray  Taft,  a  wealthy,  prudent,  and  provident 
capitalist,  came  toward  my  father.  He  said,  "  My  heart  sank  in  prospect 
of  the  interview."  But  the  cheery  citizen  accosted  him,  "  Weeden,  that  is 
right  !  We  shall  need  more  yet." 

1  Spaulding,  Paper  Money,  pp.  174-176. 


358     WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

Herein  he  was  opposed  and  hindered  by  petty  particu 
larism  and  state  prejudice.  It  was  not  until  February, 
1863,  that  this  obstacle  to  a  larger  national  government 
was  overcome,  and  the  act  creating  the  national  banks 
passed. 

It  was  a  principle  considered  broadly,  like  the  draft 
ing  of  the  people  into  the  service  of  the  Union.  It 
brought  the  financial  force  of  industrial  enterprise  and 
the  fecundity  of  exchange  into  a  larger  moneyed  system, 
which  could  be  and  which  was  used  to  support  the  gov 
ernment.  Had  this  powerful  system  been  created  in  the 
beginning,  it  would  have  averted  probably  the  passage 
of  the  Legal-tender  Act,  and  it  certainly  would  have 
lessened  the  depreciation  and  the  consequent  evils  of 
the  United  States  notes,  or  "  greenbacks."  The  cost  of 
the  war  was  enormously  increased  by  the  depreciation 
of  paper  money  and  the  advance  of  the  premium  on 
gold  to  185.  A  large  fraction  of  this  cost,  aggravated 
by  depreciated  public  credit,  would  have  been  saved, 
had  the  States,  through  their  representatives  in  Con 
gress,  been  wise  enough  to  follow  Secretary  Chase  in 
his  enterprising  and  sagacious  recommendations  in  the 
beginning. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   UNION   VINDICATED    AND    DEVELOPED 

IN  the  administration  of  affairs  at  the  crisis  of  rebel 
lion,  in  the  management  of  vast  resources  put  forth 
to  subdue  revolt,  the  central  power  of  the  United  States 
necessarily  took  on  new  responsibility  and  exercised  new 
powers.  The  far-sighted  Hamilton  outlined  these  possi 
bilities  even  better  than  he  knew.  "  The  wants  of  the 
Union  are  to  be  supplied  in  one  way  or  another :  if  by 
the  authority  of  the  federal  government,  then  it  will  not 
remain  to  be  done  by  that  of  the  state  governments." 
National  unity,  the  product  of  "  Union  the  bond  of  all 
things  and  of  man,"  came  into  renewed  life  in  the  western 
world.  In  the  travail  of  battle  and  the  sacrifices  of  war 
the  conception  of  government  was  broadened ;  it  was 
even  created  anew,  in  order  that  the  enlarged  energies 
of  the  American  people  might  be  employed. 

The  war  was  not  completed  until  nearly  two  years 
after  Gettysburg ;  but  the  issues  were  initiated  and  the 
consequences  shadowed  forth  by  that  victory,  as  Lincoln 
clearly  perceived.  He  was  bitterly  disappointed  in  the 
immediate  and  material  result.  In  the  intimate  revela 
tions  recorded  by  Hay,  he  said :  "  I  regret  that  I  did 
not  myself  go  to  the  army  and  personally  issue  the  order 
for  an  attack." 1  In  his  patient  resentment  he  was  just, 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  278. 


360  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 


for  he  said  later :  "  Still,  I  am  very  grateful  to  Meade  for 
the  great  service  he  did  at  Gettysburg."  1 

In  his  masterly  utterance  at  the  dedication  of  the 
cemetery  on  the  ground,  about  four  months  later,  —  an 
utterance  heard  in  this  country,  but  immediately  felt 
and  comprehended  throughout  the  civilized  world,  as 
words  have  hardly  ever  been  understood,  —  he  said  :  — 

Fourscore  and  seven  years  ago  our  fathers  brought  forth 
on  this  continent  a  new  nation,  conceived  in  liberty  and  dedi 
cated  to  the  proposition  that  all  men  are  created  equal.  .  .  . 
In  a  larger  sense  we  cannot  dedicate.  ...  It  is  rather  for  us 
to  be  here  dedicated  to  the  great  task  remaining  before  us  ... 
that  this  nation  under  God  shall  have  a  new  birth  of  freedom ; 
and  that  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  for  the 
people,  shall  not  perish  from  the  earth.2 

The  heroes  had  spent  their  lives,  leaving  a  battle 
field  not  to  be  fed  by  soft  dedication,  but  for  an  endur 
ing  memorial  in  the  hearts  of  their  fellows ;  a  treasury 
of  deeds,  whence  more  and  greater  deeds  should  build 
up  the  future  of  the  common  country. 

In  the  words  of  this  stalwart  apostle  of  national 
unity,  a  new  birth  of  freedom  came  out  of  the  throes  of 
revolution  and  was  assured  permanent  life  in  the  epoch 
established  at  Gettysburg.  In  his  second  inaugural  ad 
dress,  delivered  more  than  a  year  later,  he  only  enlarged 
and  extended  the  momentous  thought  inspired  by  that 
great  triumph.  He  said  that  in  the  beginning  "  both  par 
ties  deprecated  war ;  but  one  of  them  would  make  war 
rather  than  let  the  nation  survive ;  and  the  other  would 
accept  war  rather  than  let  it  perish.  And  the  war  came. 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  vol.  vii,  278. 

2  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  vol.  ii,  439. 


THE  UNION  VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    361 

.  .  .  Neither  party  expected  for  the  war  the  magnitude 
or  the  duration  which  it  has  already  attained.  Neither 
anticipated  that  the  cause  of  the  conflict  might  cease 
with,  or  even  before,  the  conflict  itself  should  cease. 
6  Woe  unto  the  world  because  of  offenses.'  .  .  .  With 
malice  toward  none;  with  charity  for  all;  with  firmness 
in  the  right,  as  God  gives  us  to  see  the  right,  let  us  strive 
on  to  finish  the  work  we  are  in."  l 

Government  by  the  people  had  incurred  a  new  re 
sponsibility  and  was  to  take  on  new  powers  through 
the  enlarged  and  perfected  Union  of  the  States. 

Mr.  Lincoln  refers  briefly  to  the  facts  we  have  treated 
at  length,  stating  that  the  administration  as  well  as  the 
rebels  did  not  comprehend  the  innate  magnitude  and 
force  of  the  revolt,  nor  the  latent  might  of  the  Northern 
purpose  to  subdue  it.  Neither  party  foresaw  the  con 
sequences,  impending  and  inevitable  in  emancipation 
and  the  destruction  of  slavery ;  for  as  far  as  possible 
slavery  had  been  avoided  in  the  organization  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  in  the  uprising  of  the  Northern  people 
to  overcome  the  revolt.  The  ascendency  of  government 
exclusively,  the  defeat  of  the  rebellion,  and  the  restora 
tion  of  order  inspired  the  Northern  people  and  impelled 
their  representative  armies  in  1861-62. 

The  partial  defection  from  the  cause  of  the  Union  of 
the  Peace  Democracy  late  in  1862  and  in  1863  was  at 
tributed  to  the  reentrance  of  the  demon  of  slavery,  and 
to  the  struggle  for  emancipation.  But  in  the  final 
result,  the  strength  of  public  order  in  the  North,  the 
deep-laid  foundations  of  Union  were  more  completely 
revealed  in  consequence  of  the  thorough  revolution. 

1  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  vol.  ii,  657. 


362    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

As  the  President  indicated  above,  had  the  revolt  been 
subdued  at  the  beginning,  emancipation  would  not  have 
been  compulsory.  Probably  there  would  have  been 
some  form  of  graduated  and  compensated  emancipation. 
In  that  case,  the  tremendous  power  of  the  Union  —  in 
the  States  and  through  the  States  —  would  not  have 
been  revealed  and  put  forth,  as  the  people  were  com 
pelled  to  put  it  forth  in  the  year  1863. 

Like  an  immense  turbine  wheel,  running  in  a  fall  of 
water  from  above  and  dragging  through  a  backward 
flow  of  water  below,  the  government  of  the  Union, 
becoming  national  as  it  spent  "  blood  and  iron,"  went 
its  course,  overcame  the  backward  currents,  and  estab 
lished  the  irresistible  will  of  the  people.  These  were 
the  issues  of  a  tremendous  historic  problem.  Fascinat 
ing  as  the  military  exposition  of  campaigns  and  of 
battle  is  and  will  be  always,  the  incidents  of  local  state 
and  central  national  evolution  are  much  more  impor 
tant.  The  germs  of  government  are  in  these  events 
which  the  loyal  peoples,  the  war  governors,  and  Abra 
ham  Lincoln  finally  marshaled  to  the  ascendency  of  the 
American  Union. 

In  his  famous  letter  of  August  26,  1863,  the  Presi 
dent  showed  his  appreciation  of  the  gains  at  Vicksb'urg 
and  Gettysburg,  and  his  confidence  in  the  renewed 
Union  dedicated  to  freedom.  "  Peace  does  not  appear 
so  distant  as  it  did.  I  hope  it  will  come  soon,  and  come 
to  stay ;  and  so  come  as  to  be  worth  the  keeping  in  all 
future  time.  It  will  then  have  been  proved  that,  among 
free  men,  there  can  be  no  successful  appeal  from  the 
ballot  to  the  bullet."  1 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  iii,  734. 


THE  UNION  VINDICATED  AND  DEVELOPED    363 

As  we  leave  the  immediate  personality  of  the  President 
we  may  consider  the  kingly  power  which  he  used  so 
sparingly  and  so  well. 

I  have  referred  at  times  to  the  survival  and  occasional 
operation  of  the  kingly  power  in  our  method  of  execu 
tive  government.  It  cannot  be  considered  too  carefully, 
as  we  approach  the  end  of  these  studies.  Serious  ob 
servers  of  our  time  are  coming  to  attach  more  and  more 
importance  to  the  rarely  existing  survivals  of  the  ancient 
kingly  power  in  the  executive.  It  is  the  true  Jovian 
principle,  the  divinity  that  doth  hedge  a  king.  It  can 
not  be  formulated  in  statute  nor  embodied  in  a  techni 
cal  privilege,  for  it  is  too  ethereal  for  the  ponderous 
mace  of  established  authority.  It  is  the  power  of  the 
people,  directly  represented  by  their  own  chosen  leader 
and  ruler.  It  is  one  of  the  few  romantic  and  sentimen 
tal  franchises  left  to  the  common  citizen,  the  every-day 
man,  whether  of  a  republic  or  a  kingdom.  As  its  true 
historic  significance  is  beyond  the  comprehension  of  the 
petty  politician,  so  he  hates  it,  tries  to  ignore  its  exist 
ence  or  to  repudiate  its  legitimate  exercise.  These  self- 
considering  patriots  could  not  comprehend  Lincoln  in 
times  of  war  ;  they  equally  misconstrue  Roosevelt  in  the 
few  occasions  when  the  conditions  of  peace  have  opened 
the  way  for  this  godlike  faculty.1 

It  works  so  naturally  in  the  American  system  that, 

1  Facts  suddenly  reveal  deep  principles,  hardly  surmised  in  the  super 
ficial  indications  antecedent  to  the  deed.  Who  accomplished  the  late 
solution  of  peace,  —  not  only  in  Asia,  but  possibly  in  Europe  and  the 
world,  —  a  solution  considered  impossible  until  it  was  undertaken  ?  Not 
the  war-lord  of  Germany,  not  the  constitutional  king  of  England,  nor  the 
paradoxical  president  of  France,  but  the  chosen  representative  of  the 
American  people. 


364  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

like  the  functions  of  a  healthy  animal  organization, 
it  is  generally  not  recognized.  When  it  does  not  exist 
by  heredity,  the  vacuum  is  sufficiently  apparent  and 
calls  for  something  beyond  the  common  idols  of  popu 
lar  representation.  Mr.  Froude 1  said :  "  If  I  were  a  New 
Zealander,  I  should  desire  an  elective  president  like  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  uncontrolled  except  in 
taxation  by  a  popular  chamber."  And  the  same  clear 
expositor  believed  that  Canada  and  the  Australias  left 
to  themselves  would  have  preferred  American  methods. 
"  In  the  President  rests  the  supreme  executive  authority. 
He  chooses  his  own  ministers ;  he  is  responsible  to  the 
nation  and  not  to  Congress." 

Whether  it  would  have  been  a  better  stroke  in  civili 
zation  to  have  suppressed  rebellion  speedily,  and  to 
have  reestablished  Union  in  1861-62  with  a  limited 
and  regulated  system  of  slavery  instead  of  enforced 
emancipation,  is  beyond  the  ken  of  human  kind.  The 
problem  is  speculation  pure  and  simple.  Never  was  a 
great  emergency  in  history  more  fully  developed  and 
precipitated  by  the  inexorable  logic  of  events.  Out  of 
the  agony  of  a  nation  divided  against  itself,  out  of  the 
fiercest  throes  of  battle,  came  the  freedom  of  the  slave ; 
for  no  one  man  decided  the  issue. 

It  is  true  that  we  are  disposed  to  treat  the  whole 
problem  of  our  relations  with  the  negro  much  more  mod 
estly  now  than  was  the  custom  in  the  third  quarter  of 
the  last  century.  New  issues  of  state-rights  have  arisen 
which  cannot  be  treated  here.  Yet  we  are  to  remember 
that  as  slavery  was  accidental  in  the  union  of  the  States, 
so  the  race  problem  is  incidental  now.  The  great  issuse 

1  Oceana,  Tauchnitz  ed.,  pp.  203,  236. 


THE  UNION   VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    365 

of  the  government  of  the  Union  must  be  developed  and 
worked  out  on  their  own  merits,  and  over  and  above  the 
incidental  contact  of  race  with  race.  The  blundering 
exclusion  of  Chinese  and  Japanese  is  only  a  little  worse 
than  our  management  of  the  negro  race. 

The  whole  matter  of  personal  contact  between  peoples, 
civilized  and  partly  civilized,  must  vex  the  twentieth 
century  almost  to  desperation.  Scientifically  instructed 
men,  bred  under  industrial  systems,  are  meeting  tribal 
organizations  in  their  primitive  ways  all  over  the  world.1 
Even  Christianity,  the  greatest  of  civilized  systems,  can 
afford  no  immediate  and  specific  solution  of  the  diffi 
culty.  After  the  Renaissance  and  Reformation,  it  was 
fondly  imagined  that  the  Christian  faith  had  but  to  pro 
claim  itself  and  all  would  be  well ;  that  the  world,  reno 
vated  and  repaired  thereby,  would  adapt  itself  to  ideal 
living. 

Fully  as  we  trust  the  essential  power  of  the  faith,  we 
begin  to  doubt  its  practical  administration  in  a  world 
not  adapted  to  it.  The  Mohammedan  faith  is  as  vigorous 
and  thrifty  as  the  Christian.  Its  mahdis  and  delusive 
prophets  very  well  offset  the  Mormon  Joe  Smiths,  West 
ern  Dowies,  and  Yankee  Mother  Eddys,  in  exploiting 

1  The  war  gave  an  interesting  physical  illustration  of  the  difference 
between  savagery  and  civilization  on  this  continent.  Sherman  marched 
through  the  hostile  Confederacy  with  a  column  of  60,000  men;  the  then 
unit  of  warlike  force,  powerful  enough  for  defense,  not  large  enough  to 
be  unwieldy.  Lewis  and  Clark  in  1806  "  found  the  natives  extremely  nu 
merous  and  generally  friendly,  though  we  have  on  several  occasions  owed 
our  lives  and  the  fate  of  the  expedition  to  our  number,  which  consisted  of 
31  men."  —  Century  Mag.,  vol.  Ixviii,  875. 

Yet  we  put  a  rifle  and  an  alphabet  in  the  hands  of  a  savage,  and  expect 
him  to  keep  step  with  civilization  developed  away  from  him  for  thousands 
of  years. 


366  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

popular  credulity.  Miraculous  pigs  no  longer  run  about 
in  Judea,  but  Lourdes  musters  thousands  of  Christian 
pilgrims  in  enlightened  France.  Japan,  nourished  by  a 
religion l  instituted  long  before  the  birth  of  Christ,  can 
organize  a  state  wonderfully,  can  send  forth  citizens  of 
all  grades  of  intelligence,  animated  by  a  spirit  of  patri 
otic  sacrifice  surpassing  the  devotion  of  all  the  Crusades. 
China,  possessing  the  oldest  and  in  many  respects  the 
most  permanent  system  of  civilization,  wants  our  West 
ern  science,  but  repudiates  our  religion.  When  we  re 
member  and  mortify  ourselves  over  the  greedy  rapacity 
and  semi-barbarous  action  of  some  of  the  highest  cul 
tured  Christian  nations  in  the  Boxer  times,  we  blush 
and  hardly  wonder  at  Chinese  skepticism. 

To  get  at  the  true  significance  and  force  of  Lincoln's 
masterly  phrase,  embodying  popular  government,  it 
may  help  us  to  consider  other  uses  of  the  term,  and 
some  potential  issues  of  government  which  have  been 
sloughed  off  as  civilization  advanced ;  or  at  least  have 
been  developed  into  new  organs,  holding  due  place  and 
a  defined  work  in  the  body  politic.  The  world  was 
shocked  by  a  brutal  massacre,  which  the  government  of 
Russia  thought  proper  to  inflict  on  its  people  in  Jan 
uary,  1905.  The  issue  would  have  been  a  simple  matter 
of  government  to  a  western  trained  mind  —  a  function 
in  the  right  of  petition.  Not  so  in  Russia  where  East 
and  West  meet  and  produce  many  curious  political 
manifestations.  Every  one  knows  that  the  Tsar  is  or 
was  the  "  little  father  "  of  his  people.  In  the  church 
this  function  of  government  has  one  signification,  in  the 

1  "  The  ancient  Japanese  term  for  government,  matsuri-goto,  signifies 
liberally  matters  of  worship."  —  Hearn,  Japan,  an  Interpretation,  p.  38. 


THE  UNION  VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    367 

daily  walk  of  life  it  has  or  has  had  others.  Few  of  us 
supposed  that  this  phrase,  figurative  to  a  western  mind, 
would  become  a  modern  economic  function,  a  practical 
governing  essence  of  imperative  force.  The  orthodox 
Russian  workman  had  believed  that  the  fountain  of  jus 
tice,  the  "little  father,"  could  solve  troubles  in  labor 
and  wages,  just  as  implicitly  as  the  believer  trusted  that 
the  autocrat  could  smooth  his  way  to  heaven.  So  in 
western  countries  an  industrial  community  believes  or 
pretends  that  their  fetish,  the  trade  union,  can  bring 
about  political  development,  imponderable  and  impos 
sible.  Or  perhaps  the  confidence  prevailing  in  the  at 
mosphere  of  Russia  was  more  like  the  faith  of  a  North 
American  Indian  in  the  miracle  of  his  "  medicine-man." 
The  practical  result  under  Russian  administration  was 
not  a  mere  failure  of  the  right  of  petition,  but  bloody 
butchery  of  the  suppliants,  with  their  wives,  children, 
and  neighbors.  According  to  governing  Russia,  all  this 
was  a  necessary  incident  of  industrial  development  con 
founded  with  mistaken  political  aspiration. 

In  highly  developed  Great  Britain,  the  term  gov 
ernment  is  used  to  indicate  in  a  definite  way  the  cab 
inet  or  working  ministry,  apart  from  the  sovereign. 
Cabinet  is  a  limited  term.  Burgess  shows  that  the  com 
mon  ideas  of  publicists  are  hazy  and  confusing,  as  they 
set  forth  the  terms  state  and  government.1 

In  America,  the  circumstances  of  our  history  have 
prescribed  and  controlled  the  development  of  govern 
ment.  It  was  not  easy  for  us,  as  it  is  now  difficult  for 
Russia,  to  assign  and  ordain  the  functions  of  govern 
ment.  Blood  was  shed  freely  in  the  revolution  against 

1  Burgess,  Political  and  Constitutional  Law,  vol.  i,  57. 


368  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

George  III  to  assign  the  limitations  of  royal  preroga 
tive.  Greater  yet  was  the  sacrifice  in  the  massive  rebel 
lion  of  state-rights  and  slavery,  when,  as  Lincoln  boldly 
predicted  at  Gettysburg,  the  last  appeal  was  made  from 
the  ballot  to  the  bullet.  Never  was  more  momentous 
issue  brought  into  civilization,  and  it  was  worked  out 
"  with  malice  toward  none,  with  charity  for  all." 

As  Mr.  Burgess  defines,  America  has  embodied  in  her 
experience  a  clear  and  salient  separation  of  the  partial 
functions  of  government  from  the  great  powers  of  the 
state  as  it  exists  in  its  entirety.  In  our  polity  govern 
ment  is  not  the  sovereign  organization  of  the  state. 
"  Back  of  the  government  lies  the  constitution,  and 
back  of  the  constitution  the  original  sovereign  state 
which  ordains  the  constitution  both  of  government  and 
of  liberty."  l 

The  state  is  the  whole,  the  massive  result  of  civiliza 
tion.  "  Divine  right,"  whatever  that  was,  could  only 
produce  practical  government.  Even  a  king  or  emperor 
—  royal  and  peremptory  —  was  and  is  only  a  function 
of  the  state.  Before  this  principle  was  stated  formally, 
Lincoln  perceived  and  grasped  it  actually.  He  saw  that 
this  principle  was  the  corner-stone  of  the  United  States, 
and  he  formulated  it  in  the  term  Union.  In  the  crisis 
of  affairs,  July  3,  1861,  he  said  to  the  members  of  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  who  were  "fellow- 
citizens,"  the  "  States  have  their  status  in  the  Union, 
and  they  have  no  other  status.  The  Union  and  not 
themselves  separately  procured  their  independence  and 
their  liberty." 2 

1  Burgess,  Political  and  Constitutional  Law,  vol.  i,  57. 

2  O.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  i,  317. 


THE  UNION  VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED     369 

The  supreme  executive  in  modern  organization  —  be 
it  president,  king,  or  kaiser  —  is  one  with  the  people, 
the  expression  of  the  whole,  through  its  legitimate  head. 
Lexicographers,  seeking  positive  definition,  say  of  the 
state :  "  The  whole  people  of  one  body  politic,  the 
commonwealth ;  usually  with  the  definite  article ;  in  a 
particular  sense,  a  civil  and  self-going  community ;  a 
commonwealth."  Our  American  colonies,  after  snapping 
the  umbilical  connection  with  the  Crown  of  Great  Brit 
ain,  assumed  much  in  taking  the  name  of  States.  They 
could  not  have  taken  these  names,  had  they  not  been 
virtually  parts  of  the  United  States.  Independent  as 
these  communities  were  in  the  development  of  personal 
liberty,  they  were  even  more  dependent  on  their  com 
mon  union,  in  their  autonomy  as  States.  The  incipient 
troubles  of  the  first  confederation  proved  this  absolutely. 
It  was  not  until  the  genius  of  Hamilton  —  cautiously 
followed  by  the  skillful  Madison  —  welded  into  one  sub 
stance  the  differing  faculties  of  would-be  independent 
communities  that  a  genuine  state  was  formed  in  the 
body  politic  of  the  American  Union.  It  was  impossible 
that  the  whole  grandeur  of  a  state,  which  is  the  "  organ 
of  our  collective  best  self,  of  our  national  right  reason," 
could  be  comprised  in  a  local  community  and  exercised 
within  the  limits  of  particularism.  The  conformation  of 
the  free  individual,  the  modern  political  man,  might  be 
in  local  society ;  his  habitat  must  extend  over  the  na 
tion,  must  possess  the  greatest  opportunities  of  empire, 
as  it  exists  potentially  in  the  Union  of  the  States. 

This  fusing  and  welding  of  local  communities  into 

1  No  one  excelled  Matthew  Arnold  in  phrasing  the  popular  conscious 
ness  of  the  nineteenth  century. 


370    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

one  state,  potential  and  imperial,  has  been  justly  appre 
ciated  and  admired  by  disinterested  observers  in  Europe. 
Mr.  Froude  says  1  that  England  must  regard  our  ex 
perience,  more  or  less,  in  her  inevitable  combination 
of  "  self -governed  communities  into  a  single  common 
wealth."  He  considered  that  the  original  bond  of  the 
American  Union  under  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
was  even  looser  than  the  ties  now  binding  Canada 
and  Australia  to  the  Crown,  though  time  and  custom 
strengthened  that  bond.  It  was  resisted  by  the  sword, 
was  sustained,  and  now  the  "American  Republic  is,  and 
is  to  continue,  so  far  as  reasonable  foresight  can  antici 
pate,  one  and  henceforth  indissoluble." 2 

The  partial  blindness  which  could  recognize  the 
state  only  in  particular  and  local  States  affected  Sey 
mour,3  Vallandigham,  and  Dodd,  as  well  as  Davis  and 
the  apostles  of  Calhoun.  With  their  inadequate  political 
vision,  they  could  not  perceive  that  a  state  half  sover 
eign  in  a  shorn  and  plundered  Union  could  not  equal  a 
state  which  should  be  an  integral  part  of  a  larger  and 
more  commanding  Union.4  The  greater  the  whole,  the 

1  "  No  monarchy  or  privileged  order  could  have  dared  to  take  the  mea 
sures  necessary  to  maintain  the  American  Union.  They  would  have  infal 
libly  wrecked  themselves  in  the  effort."  —  Froude,  Oceana,  Tauchnitz  ed., 
p.  346. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  313. 

8  In  the  draft  Seymour  declared  he  would  put  down  all  resistance  to 
state  laws.  He  would  not  promise  to  enforce  a  federal  law.  —  Cf .  ante,  p. 
301. 

4  Even  patriotic  New  England,  ingrained  in  particularism,  felt  and 
appreciated  the  change  wrought  by  the  war  in  federal  and  state  relations. 
Governor  Andrew,  in  addressing  the  29th  Massachusetts  in  1863,  said: 
"  The  pride  in  the  fact  that  they  were  Massachusetts  men  could  have  no 
proportion  to  the  fact  that  they  were  United  States  soldiers."  —  Schouler, 
Mass,  in  the  Civil  War,  p.  418. 


THE   UNION  VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    371 

greater  would  be  the  participating  parts.  This  principle 
was  so  little  understood,  in  fact  so  ignored  by  the  Cop 
perheads  in  the  war,  that  it  ought  to  be  explained  now 
and  enforced  beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt  for  all 
time. 

The  marvelous  growth  of  our  country  from  1789  to 
1861  was  the  outcome  of  its  unified  strength.  The 
body  politic  vibrated  in  its  remotest  part,  as  in  the 
human  body  the  heart-beat  sends  currents  of  life  through 
all  the  members.  Secession  tried  to  break  the  Union, 
but  it  only  induced  further  expansion  of  power,  through 
temporary  subversion.  As  Mr.  Lincoln  stated  after  eman 
cipation,  we  were  forced  "to  think  anew  and  to  act 
anew."  The  enlarged  government  of  the  Union  after 
1865  embodied  more  power  in  its  various  functions.  It 
was  larger  in  effect  through  the  discipline  and  subordi 
nation  of  its  parts.  At  first  the  "  stateish  spirit "  of 
Indiana,1  patriotic  as  it  was,  could  only  care  for  its  own 
people  in  charitable  work,  but  in  the  broad  currents 
of  a  Western  Sanitary  Commission  this  feeling  found 
larger  life  and  was  organized  into  a  larger  state. 

In  federal  and  state  functions,  Mr.  Lincoln's  process 
of  new  thinking  and  acting  was  at  work  throughout  the 
Civil  War,  and  necessarily  changed  the  administration 
of  the  Union.  We  gave  many  details  in  the  case  of 
New  York.  The  opinion  of  Attorney-General  Bates  — 
already  cited  in  annulling  the  deposition  of  a  regimen 
tal  colonel  by  the  governor  of  Kansas  —  dealt  with  the 
large  question  of  federal  or  state  control  of  volun 
teers.  He  was  obliged  to  repel  "  the  loose  idea  that  the 
governors  of  the  States  have  the  right  to  control  the 

1  Ante,  p.  131. 


372    WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

organization  of  the  troops  from  their  respective  States, 
even  after  they  are  received  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States." 1  This  principle  of  unification  of  the 
functions  of  the  federal  government  was  working 
throughout  all  the  departments  of  state  during  the 
Civil  War.  Such  process  does  not  make  theories,  it  is 
the  crucial  practice  of  constitutional  law. 

The  States  did  not  lose  by  abnegating  their  partial 
sovereignty  in  certain  cases,  as  was  feared  by  Seymour 
and  Vallandigham.  They  became  greater  in  themselves 
as  they  renounced  a  separating  individuality  and  merged 
themselves  in  the  imperial  greatness  of  an  inclusive 
Union. 

Enormous  and  preponderating  issues,  proceeding  from 
emancipation,  were  embodied  in  the  changes  made  in 
the  Constitution.  The  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  amend 
ments  were  enacted  in  1865  and  1866 ;  and  it  would  be 
a  very  faulty  survey  of  the  Union,  as  affected  by  the 
rebellion,  which  should  overlook  and  neglect  the  scope 
and  consequences  of  these  changes.  The  amendments 
were  capable  of  an  interpretation  which  would  subject 
all  state  legislation  to  a  federal  control.  Without  doubt 
the  original  intention  of  the  legislature  was  to  protect 
the  negro  in  his  new  relations  to  the  republic,  without 
going  farther  and  without  disturbing  the  judicial  rights 
of  the  white  race.2  Like  many  plans  laid  out  for  Sambo 
alone,  the  accomplishment  went  beyond  the  project  and 
took  in  humanity  at  large,  with  all  its  restless  wants  and 
capabilities.  As  in  the  military  outgrowth  of  the  nation 
black  troops  brought  new  national  powers  to  accord 
with  the  new  national  opportunity,  so  in  the  peaceful 

1  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  ii,  150.  2  Freund,  Police  Power,  p.  65. 


THE  UNION   VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    373 

outcome  of  law  the  new  citizen  carried  new  development 
and  consequence  into  the  procedure  of  the  courts.  In 
the  time  of  the  famous  Slaughter-House  Cases,  it  was 
expected  that  the  mighty  arm  of  Columbia,  stretched 
over  the  black  man,  would  stop  in  its  course  and  would 
not  affect  old  judicial  rights,  relations  established  by 
more  than  a  century  of  American  law.  Not  so  the  re 
sult  ;  in  railroad  litigation  the  Supreme  Court  took  new 
departure  from  the  fourteenth  amendment,  and  con 
trolled  the  police  power  of  particular  States.1 
The  poet  said  truly,  - 

"  The  individual  withers,  and  the  world  is  more  and  more." 

The  individual  citizen's  grasp  and  reservation  of  his 
own  chosen  opinion,  after  he  had  surrendered  his  life 
to  his  country,  wras  suggestive  at  times.  Some  Massa 
chusetts  volunteers  early  claimed  the  right  to  "  refuse 
to  serve  except  under  officers  of  their  own  election." 
Governor  Andrew  subjected  particularism  to  patriotism 
in  the  beginning.  He  told  them  promptly  that  such 
course  "  would  subject  the  guilty  to  consequences  from 
which  I  could  not  save  them." 2 

Yet  there  are  strong  cross-currents  in  favor  of  the 
individual  citizen,  as  the  massive  development  of  insti 
tutions  goes  on.  The  individual,  instead  of  losing  scope 
in  the  tremendous  centralization  of  power  attained  by 
the  Union  at  Washington,  gained  greater  liberty.  Par 
ticularism  in  the  States  suffered,  but  the  liberty  of  the 
individual  man  gained  new  capacities.3  Equality,  which 

1  Freund,  Police  Power,  p.  65.    Also  cf.  Baldwin,  Two  Centuries  of 
American  Law,  p.  35. 

2  Mass.  Exec.  Files,  vol.  15,  p.  1L 

3  The  fourteenth  amendment  "  protects  individual  rights,  as  in  no  land 


374  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

was  a  glittering  generality  in  France,  has  become  a 
working  element  more  and  more  in  American  political 
progress.  It  checks  governmental  powers,  and  the  "  con 
trolling  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  invoked 
with  increasing  frequency  to  give  it  effect." l  Pregnant 
as  the  principle  is,  it  has  not  yet  been  defined  fully  in 
a  legal  sense.  It  counter-checks  and  even  reverses  the 
"  crystallization  "  of  feudal  times.2 

We  may  rest  assured  that  the  individual  man  in 
America  will  take  care  of  himself,  in  the  long  run, 
corporations,  trusts,  and  occasional  institutions  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding.  The  world  has  long  accus 
tomed  itself  to  the  idea  of  a  state  embodied  in  the  per 
son  of  one  man,  king  or  tsar.  The  "  state  is  I "  seemed 
to  be  a  natural  dogma,  when  taking  it  by  the  head.  It 
was  the  mission  of  America  to  change,  even  to  reverse 
the  process.  Democracy  is  defective  in  some  respects, 
but  it  extends  and  magnifies  in  the  lowest  order  of  its 
integral  citizens  that  sense  of  "  reasonable  responsibil 
ity"  desiderated  by  all  statesmen.  Whitman,  the  demo 
cratic  poet,  had  many  shortcomings,  but  he  touched  the 
heart  of  the  people  with  a  sure  hand. 

"  Copious  as  you  are  I  absorb  you  all  in  myself,  and  become  the  master 

myself, 

America  isolated  yet  embodying  all,  what  is  it  finally  except  myself; 
These  states,  what  are  they  except  myself  ?  " 

The  pendulum  did  not  swing  too  far,  actually,  in 
determining  these  planetary  motions  of  the  federal  sys- 

were  they  ever  in  any  age  protected  before.  But  this  is  only  by  the  sacri 
fice  of  other  rights  of  Individualism;  only  by  the  exclusion  of  the  sover 
eignty  of  the  Union  at  the  cost  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State."  — 
Baldwin,  Modern  Political  Institutions,  p. 

1  Freund,  Police  Power,  p.  631. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  626. 


THE   UNION   VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    375 

tern.  Though  it  was  feared  at  first  that  these  momen 
tous  changes  might  "  reset  the  very  foundations  of  our 
political  system,"  1  the  calm  atmosphere  of  the  courts 
soon  brought  the  oscillating  bodies  into  a  proper  bal 
ance  of  power.  Corporations  and  persons  were  separated 
in  the  final  outcome  of  judicial  action.2  Moreover,  the 
Supreme  Court  expressly  abnegated  the  functions  which 
might  undo  proper  state  legislation.3  The  great  agen 
cies  of  local  self-government  proved  to  be  more  vital 
and  enduring  than  the  momentary  action  of  race  re 
lations,  and  these  profound  influences  assumed  their 
proper  place  in  political  development. 

The  Union  was  thoroughly  established  by  the  Civil 
War,  and  its  binding  power  was  immensely  increased 
thereby.  Possibly  by  no  peaceful  experience  could  the 
essential  force  of  a  democracy,  working  through  Whit 
man's  units,  —  masters  in  their  own  circles,  —  could  the 
democratic  force  have  carried  that  mastering  power 
through  state  and  federal  relations,  into  the  larger  ar 
ticulation  of  the  developed  Union.  War  brought  out 
all  the  latent  powers  of  individuals  in  communities ; 
these  powers  becoming  active,  first  impelled  States  and 
finally  swept  the  Union  itself  into  larger  and  wider 
operation.  But  the  nature  and  character  of  the  Union 
was  no  sudden  or  abnormal  creation. 

1  Baldwin,  Two  Centuries  of  American  Law,  p.  36. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  295. 

8  The  Supreme  Court  decreed:  "  If  the  laws  enacted  by  a  State  be  within 
the  legitimate  sphere  of  legislative  activity,  and  their  enforcement  be 
attended  with  observance  of  those  general  rules  which  our  system  of 
jurisprudence  presents  for  the  security  of  private  rights,  the  harshness, 
injustice,  and  oppressive  character  of  such  laws  will  not  invalidate  them 
as  affecting  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process  of  law."  —  Wil- 
Ioughby,w4mmcan  Constitutional  System,  p.  189. 


376  WAR  GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND  STATE 

It  has  been  an  efficient  motive  of  these  pages  to  show 
that  the  spirit  of  the  Union,  this  sublime  inceptive  and 
coalescing  principle,  came  early  into  being.  The  "  flag 
of  the  Union"  —  not  of  Massachusetts  or  Great  Britain 
—  was  hoisted  by  Pepperell  over  the  fortress  of  Louis- 
burg  and  over  the  prostrate  power  of  France.  The 
spirit  of  the  Union  was  fostered  by  Franklin  and  his 
coworkers  long  before  sugar-duties  and  tea-taxes,  stamp- 
acts  and  port-bills  harassed  the  grumbling  colonies,  thus 
imposing  an  encroaching  prerogative  of  the  Crown,  as 
the  colonists  conceived  it.  The  political  philosophers  of 
Europe  saw  clearly,  when  they  recognized  in  the  Ameri 
can  Revolution  a  new  principle  of  government,  a  new 
directing  force  in  the  large  affairs  of  man.  It  was  not 
merely  that  Samuel  Adams  and  Patrick  Henry  disagreed 
with  George  III  and  Lord  North.  The  largest  govern 
ing  force  possible,  the  representation  of  the  common 
people,  —  a  representation  groped  after  by  France  in 
bloody  conflict,  a  force  not  empowered  and  utilized  by 
England  until  after  1830,  —  this  political  renaissance 
was  achieved  in  America  when  independence  was  pro 
claimed  and  sustained. 

Such  pregnant  ideas,  such  dominating  germs  of  gov 
ernment  were  more  or  less  inchoate  in  the  first  periods  of 
Union  life.  They  subsisted,  though  latent  and  inactive, 
in  all  the  communities  of  the  United  States.  Calhoun 
and  his  school  found  these  undeveloped  functions  of 
government  ready  to  hand.  It  suited  the  aspirations  of 
slavery  to  exalt  itself  through  the  unsubjected  func 
tions  of  particular  States.  As  individuals  and  as  com 
munities,  the  propagandists  revolted  and  rebelled.  Mr. 
Lincoln  proclaimed  a  mighty  hope  when  he  ventured 


THE  UNION  VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    377 

the  forecast  that  the  war  would  be  the  last  appeal  from 
ballot  to  bullet.1  As  he  viewed  it,  government  by  the 
people  was  being  established  on  firm  foundations.  In 
their  wayward  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  the 
Southern  rebels  dragged  many  Northern  politicians  into 
sympathy  with  them  and  into  support  of  their  hazard 
ous  creed.  Seymour  of  New  York,  Abbott  and  Loring 
of  Massachusetts,  the  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle 
would  not  sustain  the  Union  positively  against  a  par 
ticular  State.2 

It  is  difficult  to  comprehend  the  problem  now  as  it 
stood  in  1864,  as  the  course  of  events  has  so  changed 
the  perspective.  But  the  Democratic  presidential  con 
vention  of  1864  said  directly  that  there  was  "  failure 
of  the  Union  by  the  experiment  of  war,"  then  advised 
a  convention  of  States  to  "  restore  peace  on  the  basis  of 
the  federal  union  of  the  States."  Here  would  appear 
to  be  a  difference  between  restoration  of  the  Union 
simple  and  a  federal  union  of  the  States  brought  into 
being  by  a  peace. 

This  great  constitutional  problem  has  been  worked 
out  in  the  conflict  of  war,  and  through  the  consequent 
legislative  and  judicial  action.  The  contrary  or  state- 
rights  doctrine,  supported  by  the  antique  social  and  the 
modern  unsocial  institution  of  slavery,  was  overcome 
by  the  Union,  which  prevailed  over  the  functions  of 
particular  States.  The  whole  state  —  the  Union  —  in- 

1  August  26,1863.  A  peace  "  worth  the  keeping  in  all  future  time.  It  will 
then  have  been  proved,  among  free  men,  that  there  can  be  no  success 
ful  appeal  from  the  ballot  to  the  bullet;  and  they  who  take  such  appeal 
are  sure  to  lose  their  case,  and  pay  the  cost."  —  0.  R.,  Series  III,  vol.  in, 
734. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  307. 


378    WAR   GOVERNMENT,  FEDERAL  AND   STATE 

herited  all  the  powers  of  civilization  descended  from 
centuries  of  tribal  hordes,  kingdoms,  and  empires,  from 
cities  and  republics.  This  historic  evolution,  including 
and  embodying  our  Civil  War,  cannot  be  studied  too 
much  or  pondered  too  thoroughly.  The  past  involves 
the  future  of  a  powerful  commonwealth.  I  have  shown  1 
that  it  is  a  practical  question  in  that  politicians  and  pub 
licists  even  now  ignore  the  true  causes  and  effects  which 
wrought  the  changes  in  our  Constitution  and  yet  more 
produced  our  modern  constitutional  atmosphere.  The 
renovated  and  extended  Union  has  become  so  natural 
and  normal  that  these  censors  have  forgotten  the  signifi 
cant  throes  of  the  body  politic  in  producing  its  second 
birth. 

The  State  of  Texas,  one  of  these  particular  commu 
nities,  will  have  soon  —  as  time  goes  in  the  experience 
of  nations — a  population  larger  than  that  of  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  when  it  attacked  the  basic  principles 
of  the  United  States.  Every  individual  person,  in  this 
future  aggregation  of  American  citizens,  ought  to  study 
and  comprehend  the  principles  of  this  contest  —  federal 
and  state  —  which  shook  the  whole  world  in  the  first 
two  years  of  its  course.  But  Texas  is  singular  only  in 
its  size.  Little  Rhode  Island  —  small  in  bulk,  great  in 

'    O 

achievement  and  historic  inheritance  —  is  founded  on 
the  same  principles.  New  York  in  its  cosmopolitan  aspi 
ration,  Massachusetts  in  its  critical  and  criticising  excel 
lence,  the  Northwest  in  its  imperial  yearning,  each  and 
all  of  these  particular  communities  may  well  study  the 
history  of  this  great  struggle  at  arms,  and  the  greater 
problems  of  civic  evolution  involved  therein.  The  par- 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  4. 


THE  UNION   VINDICATED  AND   DEVELOPED    379 

ticular  States  at  last  found  their  true  distinction,  not 
in  independent  governmental  action,  but  in  their  be 
coming  the  majestic  parts  of  that  magnificent  whole  — 
the  American  Union. 


INDEX 


ABBOTT,  J.  B.,  on  Constitutional  Demo 
cracy,  307  n. 

Abolitionists,  moral  issue,  12,  15  n. ;  and 
the  Civil  War,  148 ;  service,  336. 

Adams,  C.  F.,  on  Crittenden  Compromise, 
25  n. ;  and  Andrew,  149. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  on  party  obligation,  11. 

Administration.  See  Draft,  Volunteering, 
and  administrators  by  name. 

Agnew,  C.  E.,  Sanitary  Commission,  174. 

Albany,  draft  resistance,  287. 

Altoona  conference,  228-232,  326-328. 

Amendments,  effect  of  fourteenth,  372- 
375. 

Anderson,  Robert,  at  Sumter,  56-58. 

Andrew,  J.  A.,  early  touch  with  Wash 
ington,  67-71 ;  executive  genius,  74,  207 ; 
and  troops  for  North  Carolina  expedi 
tion,  75-77, 198, 199 ;  and  treason,  93 ;  on 
Bull  Eun,  95,  96 ;  and  Stanton,  104 ;  on 
emancipation  and  recruiting,  117,  168, 
325, 326 ;  on  incapacity  of  the  administra 
tion,  123  n. ;  as  an  anti-slavery  type,  147, 
148;  counselors,  149,  155;  preparation 
for  war,  150 ;  Democratic  indorsement, 
151 ;  on  welfare  of  volunteers,  151 ;  and 
Cushing.  152 ;  and  Butler  in  Maryland, 
153 ;  and  complaints  of  women,  154 ;  on 
his  critics,  154  n.,  164 ;  and  federal  red 
tape,  155,  213 ;  urges  more  troops,  161 ; 
energy,  164 ;  response  to  call  of  May, 
1862, 168 ;  character,  191-193 ;  character 
of  appointments,  192 ;  official  self-con 
sciousness,  193;  and  independent  re 
cruiting,  197;  recruiting  controversy 
with  Butler,  199-208 ;  and  federal  inter 
ference,  213 ;  and  control  over  organized 
volunteers,  216-218 ;  and  the  draft  (1862), 
218,219;  (1863),  284;  as  a  war  minister, 
222 ;  and  Altoona  conference,  229,  326- 
328;  on  Emancipation  Proclamation, 
231,  327 ;  and  election  of  1864, 254, 255  n. ; 
and  Seymour,  302;  and  arbitrary  ar 
rests,  351  n. ;  on  federal  loyalty,  370  n. 

Arbitrary  arrests,  Lincoln  on,  84 ;  cessa 
tion,  236 ;  action  of  Congress,  242  n.,  352 ; 
not  a  cause,  338;  Vallandigham  case, 
242,  243;  Copperhead  action  as  cause, 
344 ;  military  trial  of  Copperheads,  344 ; 
a  necessity,  347, 351-354. 


Arras,  Morton's  complaint,  162, 163;  state 
and  federal  importation,  clash,  164. 

Army.  See  Draft,  Sanitary  Commission, 
Volunteering. 

Bache,  A.  D.,  Sanitary  Commission,  127. 

Baker,  Conrad,  on  enrollment  in  Indiana, 
284 ;  on  draft  resistance,  308 ;  on  secret 
organizations,  311. 

Baltimore  riot,  63. 

Bancroft,  George,  on  war  and  slavery, 
323  n. 

Banks,  state,  currency  (1861),  355;  and 
Chase,  356;  national,  and  centraliza 
tion,  357,  358. 

Bates,  Edward,  on  control  of  volunteers, 
216. 

Beecher,  H.  W.,  and  secession,  27. 

Bell,  John,  and  secession,  20  n. 

Bellows,  H.  W.,  Sanitary  Commission, 
126-129,  174. 

Belmont,  August,  and  Copperheads,  239 ; 
on  the  peace  party  (1863),  354. 

Bingham,  J.  J.,  urges  Copperhead  organi 
zation,  341. 

Bird,  F.  W.,  on  Andrew,  192. 

Black,  J.  S.,  as  a  Union-saver,  24. 

Baine,  J.  G.,  on  the  draft  (1864),  314. 

Blair,  F.  P.,  on  approaching  emancipa 
tion,  230. 

Blatchford,  E.  M.,  Union  Defense  Com 
mittee,  156. 

Block,  Maurice,  on  nationality,  272. 

Border  States,  and  secession,  20  u. ;  troops 
from,  159;  Morton's  influence  in  Ken 
tucky,  163 ;  trade  with,  178, 179. 

Boston  draft  riot,  284. 

Boutwell,  G.  S.,  as  Andrew's  Washington 
agent,  70 ;  on  Chase  as  a  financier,  100  ; 
on  the  Vallandigham  case,  243  n. 

Bowditch,  H.  I.,  Sanitary  Commission, 
129. 

Brady,  J.  T.,  Union  Defense  Committee, 
152 ;  on  Seymour  and  the  rioters,  288  n. 

Bright,  J.  D.,  on  Northern  parties,  339. 

Buchanan,  James,  and  the  Union,  x,2, 23 ; 
disastrous  feebleness,  351. 

Bull  Eun,  causes  of  defeat,  94, 95 ;  effect 
in  Europe,  95 ;  in  the  North,  96. 

Bullard,  E.  F.,  on  the  draft,  290. 


382 


INDEX 


Burgess,  J.  W.,  on  reserved  powers  of 
the  President,  66  n.;  on  the  state  in 
America,  368. 

Burke,  Edmund,  on  party  politics,  9. 

Butler,  B.  F.,  on  slaves  as  contraband,  94 ; 
and  the  Maryland  slave  insurrection, 
153;  character,  193-195;  as  a  military 
man,  195-197, 207 ;  authorized  to  recruit, 
197 ;  controversy  with  Andrew,  199-208. 

Cabinet,  function  of  American,  328 ;  Lin 
coln  and  his,  332. 

Calhoun,  J.  C.,  and  the  Union,  7  n. ;  on 
party  obligations,  11 ;  on  society  and 
government,  125. 

Cameron,  Simon,  House  censures,  85 ; 
checks  volunteering,  87,  112,  160,  166; 
and  Curtin,  88 ;  incapacity,  102,  158  n. ; 
and  Sanitary  Commission,  127 ;  checks 
state  support,  165;  investigated,  169; 
interference  with  state  recruiting,  180, 
183, 189,  190, 191  n.,  197 ;  and  Sickles's 
brigade,  183 ;  and  appointment  of  gen 
eral  volunteer  officers,  184, 185 ;  and  But 
ler's  recruiting,  197,  199, 200,  206 ;  and 
Seward's  War  Department  meddling, 
209,  210 ;  and  regimental  commissions, 
210. 

Campbell,  Robert,  and  appointment  of 
volunteer  officers,  186. 

Carrington,  H.  B.,  and  the  Copperhead 
rising,  343. 

Chamberlain,  D.  A.,  on  the  Union,  4,  5. 

Chandler,  Zachariah,  on  the  Peace  Con 
vention,  27. 

Chase,  S.  P.,  statesmanship,  54 ;  solution 
before  Sumter,  65 ;  financial  policy,  99- 
101 ;  and  sub-treasury  system,  101,  356 ; 
and  Fremont's  proclamation,  107 ;  and 
Hunter's  order,  117,  324 ;  and  Lincoln's 
renomination,  251,  254;  as  a  cabinet 
officer,  329-333. 

China  and  Christianity,  366. 

Christian  Commission,  work,  131. 

Christianity,  prospects  as  a  world  faith, 
365. 

Cisco,  J.  J.,  Union  Defense  Committee, 
152. 

Civil  War,  underlying  reasons,  28 ;  deemed 
inevitable,  52,  58 ;  onus  of  aggression, 
57,  81;  prolonged  through  administra 
tive  defects,  113,  123,  124;  and  recru 
descence  of  state  sovereignty,  241. 

Clay,  C.  C.,  Jr.,  and  the  Copperhead  ris 
ing,  343. 

Clay,  Henry,  and  the  Union,  7. 

Clifford,  W.  K.,  on  secession  and  Jacob- 
ism,  33  n. 


Clubs,  Union,  133  n. 

Coercion,  question  (1860),  21 ;  popular  de 
mand,  72-74. 

Colfax,  Schuyler,  interference  in  recruit 
ing,  190 ;  and  the  enrollment,  283. 

Commerce,  Yates  regulates,  at  Cairo,  178; 
with  enemy  forbidden,  178 ;  illicit,  178; 
with  Border  States,  178, 179. 

Compromises,  and  slavery  issue  (1850), 
13;  spirit  and  plans  (1861),  20,  24-28; 
forces  opposing,  28-31. 

Confederate  States,  factors  of  failure, 
xxiii ;  and  slavery,  37,  58 ;  patriotism, 
59 ;  conscription,  316. 

Congress,  sustains  the  administration 
(1861),  85 ;  and  emancipation,  116 ;  and 
executive  war  powers,  116 ;  red-tape  in 
vestigation,  169;  reconstruction  veto, 
253 ;  enrollment  act,  279  n. ;  and  arbi 
trary  arrests,  352. 

Connecticut  as  a  Puritan  community,  136. 

Constitutional  Democracy,  307,  340. 

Copperheads,  historical  judgment  on, 
xxiii-xxv,  306,  307;  segregation  (1861), 
22-24;  organization  in  Indiana  (1862), 
224;  in  campaign  of  1862,  226;  propa 
ganda,  234 ;  and  perversion  of  patriotic 
enthusiasm,  237 ;  corrupting  principle, 
238;  and  Democratic  opposition,  239; 
Vallandigham  case,  242, 243 ;  movement 
in  Pennsylvania,  245;  and  Morgan's 
invasion,  246 ;  Lincoln  on,  248 ;  issue  in 
1864,  261;  and  arbitrary  arrests,  338; 
Morton  on  newspapers,  339;  treason 
able  opposition,  339,  341;  attitude  to 
ward,  of  radical  Re  publicans,  341 ;  secret 
organizations,  342-344;  plan  for  a  ris 
ing,  343 ;  leaders  condemned,  344 ;  blind 
ness  to  true  sovereignty  in  the  Union, 
370. 

Couch,  D.  N.,  and  the  draft  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  309. 

Crittenden  Compromise,  24-26. 

Cummings,  Alexander,  and  Cameron,  85. 

Curtin,  A.  G.,  executive  force,  74;  char 
acter,  88;  and  Cameron,  88;  and  ad 
ministrative  check  to  volunteering. 
87-92 ;  patriotic  energy,  158 ;  and  state 
finances,  158;  and  Stanton,  170;  and 
control  of  state  recruiting,  191  n. ;  as  a 
war  minister,  222 ;  and  Altoona  confer 
ence,  229,  326 ;  on  the  draft  (1862),  280, 
281  n. ;  and  drafted  ministers,  313 ;  and 
arbitrary  arrests,  352. 

Curtis,  B.  R.,  on  executive  usurpations, 
233. 

Gushing,  Caleb,  offers  services,  152 ;  oppo 
sition  to,  153  n. 


INDEX 


383 


Dana,  C.  A.,  on  Lincoln's  education,  40  n., 
42  n. ;  on  Lincoln  and  bis  cabinet.  332  n. 

Dana,  R.  H.,  on  emancipation  issue,  118 ; 
on  Lincoln,  250. 

Davis,  H.  Winter,  manifesto  against  Lin 
coln,  253,  254. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  as  President,  xxiii; 
Southern  defense  (1860),  15 ;  on  North 
ern  aggression,  28 ;  on  right  of  seces 
sion,  33  n. ;  inaugural  and  slavery,  38. 

Debt,  public,  increase  in  1863,  356 ;  state 
loans,  356  n. 

Democracy,  security  in  America,  268, 
373-375. 

Democratic  party,  and  the  administra 
tion  (1861),  182 ;  recrudescence,  227 ;  re 
sult  on  the  war,  241;  Constitutional 
Democracy,  307,  340;  opinions  incom 
patible  with  Union  (1862),  340;  and 
slavery  (1862),  340 ;  attitude  (1863),  354. 
See  also  Copperheads,  Elections,  Sey 
mour. 

Dickinson,  D.  S.,  opposition  to  Lincoln, 
254. 

Dix,  Dorothea,  services,  132. 

Dix,  J.  A.,  Union  Defense  Committee. 
156;  commission,  184,  185;  on  Copper 
heads,  238 ;  on  Seymour  and  state  pro 
tection  of  the  draft,  290,  300-302. 

Dodd,  H.  H.,  on  the  war  and  State-Eights, 
341 ;  trial,  344. 

Doolittle,  J.  R.,  on  the  draft  (1864),  314. 

Douglas,  S.  A.,  and  slavery  issue,  13, 14 ; 
plea  for  peace,  26  n. ;  and  public  opinion, 
30 ;  on  Lincoln  as  a  debater,  42 ;  and 
popular  sovereignty,  49;  on  Lincoln's 
inaugural,  52 ;  patriotism,  60  n.,  83. 

Draft,  Andrew  deplores  threatened,  218 ; 
urged  (1862),  263,  265 ;  and  the  "  people," 
264,265;  call  for  (1862),  279;  enrollment 
act,  279  n. ;  applications  for  postpone 
ment,  280 ;  close  scrutiny  of  quotas, 
280-282;  violence  and  progress  of  en 
rollment,  281-285 ;  Boston  riot,  284 ;  Sey 
mour's  attitude,  284-287 ;  resistance  in 
New  York  State,  287 ;  New  York  City 
riots,  288 ;  result  of  draft,  289 ;  Jay  on 
riots,  289;  postponement  urged,  290; 
Seymour  and  the  riots,  291-293 ;  not  a 
partisan  measure,  292 ;  popular  support, 
292,  297-299,  313-315 ;  Seymour's  appeal 
for  suspension,  293-296 ;  and  submission 
to  adjudication,  295, 296 ;  Lincoln's  reply 
to  Seymour,  296-298 ;  Seymour  and  state 
protection  of,  300-302 ;  resistance  in  In 
diana,  308;  in  Pennsylvania,  309,  310; 
drafted  men  as  soldiers,  310;  in  1864, 
311 ;  drafted  ministers,  313 ;  stimulating 


effect,  315 ;  and  support  of  the  adminis 
tration,  315;  number  liable,  316;  in 
South,  316 ;  as  an  act  of  administration, 
316-318. 

Eggleston,  Edward, on  "yellow" Indian 
apolis,  142. 

Elections,  (i860)  issue,  14-16;  vote,  16; 
Lincoln's  minority  election  considered 
36 ;  (1862)  issues  and  effect,  225,  226 ; 
renewal  of  party  allegiance,  Copper 
heads,  226-228,-  conference  of  govern 
ors,  228-232;  emancipation  as  issue, 
232 ;  in  New  York,  232 ;  military  despot 
ism  as  issue,  233 ;  in  Indiana,  233 ;  (1863) 
Ohio,  244;  Lincoln's  letter,  246-249; 
(1864)  opposition  to  Lincoln's  nomina 
tion,  251, 252, 261 ;  Johnson's  nomination, 
252;  Wade-Davis  manifesto,  253;  new 
convention  movement,  254;  Lincoln's 
popular  strength,  255 ;  Democratic  plat 
form  and  candidates,  256,  257, 261, 377 ; 
side  issues,  257 ;  results,  258,  259. 

Ellis,  G.  E.,  on  Puritans  and  the  Bible, 
136  n. 

Emancipation,  under  war  powers,  xvii, 
116,  321,  324;  Fremont's  proclamation, 
106;  its  effect,  107;  development  of 
issue,  115-118 ;  Hunter's  order  and  Lin 
coln's  annulment,  117,  322-325;  not 
probable  through  act  of  Congress,  116 ; 
Lincoln's  policy,  118-120, 122 ;  Greeley's 
letter,  119;  Proclamation,  120;  neces 
sary,  120,  364 ;  military  result,  121,  334 ; 
effect  abroad,  121,  334  n. ;  and  election 
of  1862,  225,  232 ;  and  Altoona  confer 
ence,  230-232, 327;  Lincoln's  confidence 
in,  247,  249,  335;  abolition  secured, 
259 ;  Lincoln  and  compensated,  323, 335 ; 
Chase's  idea  of  the  power,  324 ;  popular 
progress  concerning,  325, 326 ;  Lincoln's 
self-reliance,  333 ;  and  the  abolitionists, 
336 ;  effect  on  the  Union,  361 ;  and  the 
sacrifice,  364. 

Erhardt,  J.  B.,  on  Seymour  and  the  draft, 
300  n. 

Erie  Canal,  social  effect,  134. 

Evarts,  W.  M.,  Union  Defense  Commit 
tee,  152. 

Everett,  Edward,  and  the  war,  150. 

Fessenden,  W.  P.,  on  utilizing  the  patri 
otic  outburst,  72. 

Finances,  difficulties  (1861),  98, 99 ;  Chase's 
mistakes,  99-101,  356;  effect  of  sub- 
treasury  system,  101,  356;  support  of 
the  government  (April,  1861),  150,156; 
Pennsylvania,  158;  Indiana,  337,  338; 


384 


INDEX 


State  currency  (1861),  355 ;  loans  (1863), 
356 ;  effect  of  reduced  rate  of  interest, 
357;  popular  subscriptions  and  in 
creased  federal  power,  357;  national 
banks,  357,  358;  possible  avoidance  of 
legal-tender  act,  358. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  Union  Defense  Commit 
tee,  152. 

Floyd,  J.  B.,  as  a  Union-saver,  23. 

Forbes,  J.  M.,  patriotic  work,  69;  and 
Andrew,  149, 154 ;  and  voluntary  offer 
ings,  152. 

Foreign  affairs,  Lincoln  on  (1861),  84,  93 ; 
British  attitude,  94 ;  effect  of  Bull  Run, 
95 ;  and  of  emancipation,  121,  334  n. 

Franklin,  W.  B.,  and  Sickles's  brigade, 
183;  and  Union  Defense  Committee's 
regiments,  184. 

Fremont,  J.  C.,  character,  105, 106 ;  procla 
mation,  106, 107. 

French,  J.  H.,  command,  200. 

Froude,  J.  A.,  on  American  government, 
364, 370. 

Fry,  J.  B.,  Provost-Marshal-General,  281 ; 
on  Seymour  and  the  draft  riots,  291- 
293. 

Garrison,  W.  L.,  and  the  Union,  12, 15  n. ; 
as  a  product  of  Massachusetts,  139. 

Gaulden,  W.  B.,  on  slavery,  15  n. 

Gettysburg,  result,  244, 359. 

Gibbs,  Wolcott,  Sanitary  Commission, 
174. 

Giddings,  J.  R.,  and  beginning  of  slavery 
issue,  13. 

Gordon,  J.  B.,  on  cause  of  the  Civil  War, 
64  n. 

Government,  stage  in  Russsia,  366;  in 
Great  Britain,  367 ;  in  America,  367.  See 
also  Lincoln,  People,  Union. 

Governors,  war  functions,  xi,  xii,  xv,  222 ; 
and  federal  red  tape,  156 ;  conference, 
228-232, 326-328 ;  Lincoln's  attitude,  333. 
See  also  governors  by  name. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  Vicksburg,  243;  lieutenant- 
general,  251 ;  Sherman  on  his  Wilder 
ness  assaults,  353. 

Gray,  Asa,  on  Lincoln,  249. 

Great  Britain,  and  the  Civil  War,  94; 
and  emancipation,  121 ;  stage  of  govern 
ment,  367. 

Greeley,  Horace,  demand  for  emancipa 
tion,  119 ;  political  folly,  241 ;  and  Lin 
coln's  ree'lection,  251,  254,  255. 

Green,  T.  H.,  on  the  Civil  War,  258  n. 

Grimes,  J.  W.,  on  election  of  1862, 232. 

Grow,  G.  A.,  on  utilizing  the  patriotic 
outburst,  71. 


Habeas  Corpus.    See  Arbitrary  arrests. 
Hallet,  B.  F.,  indorses  Andrew,  151. 
Hamilton,  Alexander,  on  possibilities  of 

federal  power,  359,  369. 
Harlow,  A.  H.,  on  enlisting,  153. 
Harris,  Elisha,  Sanitary  Commission,  126- 

128. 

Hay,  John,  on  Lincoln's  greatness,  47. 
Heintzelmau,  S.  P.,  and  secret  organiza 
tions,  313. 

Helie,  F.  A.,  on  term  nation,  270. 
Hendricks,  T.  A.,  on  the  Civil  War,  235 ; 

sentence  of  history  on,  306 ;  and  Morton 

compared,  345. 

Henshaw,  Daniel,  and  Andrew,  327. 
Herndon,  W.  H.,  on  Lincoln's  qualities, 

45. 

Hoar,  E.  R.,  on  Stanton,  105. 
Hoar,  Joanna,  as  a  type,  137. 
Holcombe,  J.  P.,  and  Copperhead  rising, 

343. 

Holt,  Joseph,  on  Sons  of  Liberty,  312. 
Hooker,  Thomas, .polity,  136. 
Howe,  S.  G.,  on  voluntary  contributions, 

152  n. 

Hughes,  John,  and  the  draft,  310. 
Hunter,  David,  emancipation  order,  117, 

322-325. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad,  patriotism,  157. 

Indiana,  Sanitary  Commission,  131;  so 
cial  structure,  139-143 ;  patriotism  after 
Sumter,  145 ;  first  troops,  146 ;  military 
condition,  147;  attitude  toward  slav 
ery,  147 ;  Democratic  success  (1862),  233 ; 
and  election  of  1864,  258  n.,  259 ;  draft 
resistance,  282, 283,  308.  See  also  Mor 
ton. 

Indianapolis,  "  yellow,"  142. 

Iowa,  movement  against  volunteering, 
220 ;  election  and  emancipation  (1862), 
232. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  and  the  Union,  7. 

Japan,  advance,  366. 

Jay,  John,  on  Seymour  and   the  draft 

riots,  289. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  nomination,  252. 
Johnston,  J.  E.,  and  McClellan  (1861), 

110,  111. 
Julian,  G.  W.,  Ohio  election  of  1863,  244; 

and  Copperheads,  341 ;  on  Morton,  347. 

Kasson,  J.  A.,  on  the  draft  (1864),  314. 
Kentucky,  question  of  loyal  trade.  178  n. ; 

Morton's  influence,  163.   • 
Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle.   See  Secret 

organizations. 


INDEX 


385 


Law  and  necessity,  243,  245. 

Leavitt,  Joshua,  on  the  administration, 
72. 

Lee,  Henry,  and  Andrew,  150. 

Lee,  R.  E.,  as  a  general,  xxiii;  on  re 
served  rights  of  States,  286  n. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  as  dictator,  x,  xvi,  66, 
67,  80,  189,  254 ;  inadequate  conception 
of  task  and  use  of  powers,  xiii,  xviii,  67- 
69,  86,  92,  100,  146,  159, 175, 176 ;  revolt 
against,  xvii ;  as  emancipator,  xvii ;  war 
powers,  xviii,  116 ;  character,  xix,  xxii ; 
and  territorial  slavery,  15, 31-33 ;  elec 
tion,  16;  and  compromise,  25,  82;  pre- 
presidential  influence,  29;  and  public 
opinion,  30,  31,  53,  56,  82 ;  and  slavery  in 
States,  32 ;  on  secession,  33  n.,  52,  159 ; 
minority  election  considered,  36 ;  train 
ing,  38, 39 ;  depression,  39  n. ;  education, 
40,41 ;  Parker's  influence,  40 ;  object  les 
sons  and  "  motive,"  42 ;  humor,  42 ;  con 
duct,  42  n. ;  and  fellowmen,  43 ;  double 
nature,  44-46 ;  greatness,  46 ;  grasp  of 
slavery  question,  46-49;  and  popular 
sovereignty,  50 ;  prescience,  51 ;  and 
Seward's  scheme  of  policy,  54 ;  and  Sum- 
ter,  56,  57,  81 ;  call  for  troops,  61,  83 ; 
and  relief  of  Washington,  63 ;  executive 
defects,  68,  75-77,  124;  petty  interfer 
ences,  68,  74,  75,  188  n.,  190, 191;  inade 
quate  appreciation  of  popular  rising,  70, 
92 ;  urged  to  utilize  it,  71,  72 ;  factor  of 
his  personality,  77 ;  effect  of  poor  polit 
ical  manner,  78,  79 ;  first  message,  81 ; 
on  loyalty  of  forces,  83 ;  on  suspending 
habeas  corpus,  84;  on  foreign  affairs, 
84 ;  on  extra-legal  actions,  85 ;  silence  on 
slavery,  86 ;  checks  volunteering,  87, 
113  ;  popular  support  after  Bull  Run, 
96 ;  and  Stanton,  103 ;  and  Fremont's 
proclamation,  106 ;  and  McClellan,  110 ; 
effect  of  Order  No.  3,  111  n. ;  and  Hunt 
er's  order,  117,  322,  323;  emancipation 
policy,  118-120,  122,  321-323,  333-335; 
and  Greeley's  letter,  119;  and  effect 
of  emancipation,  121,  334,  335 ;  and  mil 
itary  affairs,  123 ;  and  Sanitary  Commis 
sion,  127;  boyhood  surroundings,  141, 
142;  contrasted  with  Morton,  143,  144; 
lack  of  creative  spirit,  144;  benumbs 
state  support,  159;  and  reSnlistment  of 
three-months'  men,  162 ;  and  Union  De 
fense  Committee,  169 ;  and  the  call  for 
300,000  troops  (1862),  171,  211 ;  and  pa 
triotic  Democrats,  182;  and  appoint 
ment  of  general  volunteer  officers,  188 : 
and  independent  recruiting,  198;  and 
Andrew-Butler  controversy,  204,  206; 


censures  delay,  218 ;  evolution  of  larger 
powers,  219,  221-223, 320 ;  interest  in 
progress  of  volunteering,  220 ;  and  elec 
tion  of  1862,  225  ;  and  Vallandigham, 
240,  242,  243  n. ;  and  Gettysburg  crisis, 
244,  359;  Illinois  letter  (1863),  246-249, 
262, 309 ;  contemporary  portraits  (1864), 
249, 250 ;  and  Grant,  250  ;  opposition  to 
renomination,  251,  252,  261 ;  and  party 
policy,  253 ;  and  Wade-Davis  manifesto, 
253 ;  reconstruction  veto,  253 ;  appoint 
ments,  253  n. ;  popular  strength,  255- 
322 ;  reelected,  258,  259;  on  popular  de 
mand  for  a  draft,  292 ;  on  constitu 
tionality  of  the  draft,  294 ;  reply  to  Sey 
mour's  draft  appeal,  296-298 ;  advances 
to  Seymour,  302, 303  n. ;  draft  of  1864, 
311 ;  caution  in  policy  and  control  (1861), 
319 ,  exercise  of  power  in  Emancipation 
Proclamation,  321;  reserves  power  to 
himself,  322,  323;  mastery  of  large  af 
fairs,  323 ;  attitude  toward  his  cabinet, 
328,  332,  333;  and  Seward,  329;  and 
Chase,  329-331;  self-reliance,  333,  335; 
no  despot,  348,  351;  necessity  of  arbi 
trary  action,  351 ;  Gettysburg  speech, 
360 ;  second  inaugural,  360,  361 ;  idea  of 
the  "  state,"  368. 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  on  nature  of  the  Union,  3, 4. 

Loring,  G.  B.,  on  Constitutional  Demo 
cracy,  307  n. 

Lowell,  J.  R.,  on  Southern  aggression,  28 ; 
on  Lincoln,  56,  249 ;  on  progress  of  pub 
lic  opinion  (1863),  355. 

McCall,  G.  A.,  question  of  command,  91. 

McClellan,  G.  B.,  on  commanders  for 
volunteers,  96;  as  an  organizer,  109; 
and  Scott,  109 ;  defects  as  .  commander, 
109-111 ;  effects  of  delay,  111 ;  governors 
urge  his  removal,  231,  327 ;  candidacy, 
256. 

McDougal,  J.  A.,  and  the  draft,  292. 

Madison,  James,  on  the  Union,  4  n. 

Magoffln,  Beriah,  and  Morton,  163. 

Malet,  Sir  Edward,  on  Lincoln,  46. 

Marshall,  John,  and  the  Union,  34  n. 

Marshall,  John,  of  Quincy,  as  a  type, 
138. 

Martindale,  J.  H.,  on  utilizing  the  patri 
otic  outburst,  71. 

Martineau,  James,  on  the  Civil  War  and 
emancipation,  334. 

Massachusetts,  social  structure,  135, 155 ; 
liberal  fraction,  136;  classes,  137-139; 
anti-slavery  attitude,  147, 148 ;  and  out 
break  of  war,  150-155 ;  arming  of 
recruits,  165;  enrollment  and  draft, 


386 


INDEX 


284 ;  Constitutional  Democrats,  307.  See 
also  Andrew. 

Mauch  Chunk,  Copperheadism,  310. 

Meade,  G.  G.,  Gettysburg  and  after,  244, 
359. 

Meigs,  M.  C.,  as  Quartermaster-General, 
97 ;  on  red  tape,  97 ;  on  financial  diffi 
culties,  98,  99 ;  and  Sanitary  Commis 
sion,  129,  130 ;  on  military  force  of  ne 
groes,  121. 

Methodist  Church  and  the  Civil  War, 
133  n. 

Military  trials,  Vallandigham,  242;  of 
Copperheads,  344.  See  also  Arbitrary 
arrests. 

Militia,  recent  reforms,  318. 

Ministers  drafted,  313. 

Morgan,  E.  D.,  on  effect  of  Bull  Bun,  96 ; 
on  New  York's  financial  aid,  156;  re 
cruiting,  157,  161 ;  and  red  tape  157  n. ; 
and  the  check  on  purchasing  arms,  165 ; 
urges  more  troops,  165 ;  on  volunteers 
and  regulars,  166 ;  and  hurry  call  of 
May,  1862,  168;  and  Union  Defense 
Committee,  181, 183 ;  and  appointment  of 
generals,  184-189 ;  and  Cameron  on  Sew- 
ard's  mediation,  209,  210;  on  commis 
sioning  regiments,  210,  211 ;  and  call  for 
300,000, 212 ;  executive  ability,  221 ;  and 
State-Eights,  228 ;  and  Altoona  confer 
ence,  231,  232. 

Morgan,  J.  H.,  raid,  246. 

Morton,  O.  P.,  executive  force,  74,  347; 
and  Stantou,  104, 214, 215 ;  training  and 
character,  143-145 ;  preparation  for  war, 
145-147;  adequate  conception  of  the 
task,  146;  embodiment  of  state  sup 
port,  146 ;  and  federal  red  tape,  155 ;  re 
sponse  to  first  call,  162 ;  and  delay  in 
arms,  162 ;  influence  in  Kentucky,  163 , 
response  to  call  of  May,  1862, 168 ;  pro 
tests  check  on  recruiting  (June,  1862), 
171 ;  wants  a  commission,  171  ;  and 
trade  with  the  Border  States,  178 ;  and 
control  of  state  recruiting,  190;  and 
appointment  of  officers,  191  n. ;  as  a 
war  minister,  222;  and  Copperheads, 
224,  234,  339,342-344;  government  by 
prerogative,  234,  236,  237,  260,  337 ;  on 
State-Eights,  240  n. ;  on  a  third  party  in 
war,  246;  character  of  appointments, 
252  ;  on  the  draft  (1862),  280 ;  (1864),  311 ; 
and  enrollment  resistance,  284;  and 
Democratic  legislature,  308;  and  Al 
toona  conference,  326  ;  financiering 
338 ;  reelection,  342  n. ;  and  Hendricks 
compared,  344 ;  political  development, 
345-347;  paralyzed,  346  ,•  in  the  Senate, 


346;  religion,  346;   necessity  of  arbi 
trary  action,  353. 
Motley,  J.  L.,  on  Lincoln,  249. 

Nationality,  meaning  of  term,  270 ;  polit 
ical  cause  of  America,  271;  and  race, 
271 ;  a  hindrance  to  progress,  273.  See 
also  People,  Union. 

Navy  as  a  factor  in  the  war,  109. 

Negroes,  as  contraband,  94 ;  in  the  war, 
121,  247.  See  also  Emancipation,  Slav 
ery. 

Neutrality,  Lincoln  on  state,  82. 

New  England,  colonial  communal  feel 
ing,  5. 

New  York,  social  influence,  134 ;  financial 
support  of  the  war,  156 ;  first-call  troops, 
157,  160,  161;  election  Of  1862,  232;  Of 
1864,  259.  See  also  Morgan,  Seymour. 

New  York  City,  draft  riots,  288,  289; 
secret  organization,  312. 

"New  York  Herald"  and  the  patriotic 
outburst,  60. 

North  Carolina  expedition,  Massachu 
setts  troops  for,  75-77,  198,  199. 

Nugent,  Eobert,  conducts  the  draft,  292 ; 
on  Seymour's  attitude,  300  n. 

Officers,  control  of  commissions,  90 ;  char 
acter  of,  at  Bull  Eun,  95 ;  regular,  as 
commanders  of  volunteers,  96 ;  appoint 
ment  of  volunteer  general,  184-189, 
191  n. 

Ohio,  reenlistment  of  three-months'  men, 
162 ;  election  of  1863,  244. 

Olmsted,  F.  L.,  Sanitary  Commission, 
128,  174. 

Opdyke,  George,  Union  Defense  Commit 
tee,  156. 

Ostrogorski,  M.,  on  Lincoln  and  politics, 
253. 

Owen,  E.  D.,  and  war  in  Kentucky,  171. 

Parker,  Joel,  and  Andrew,  327;  on  Lin 
coln's  despotism,  348, 351. 

Parker,  Theodore,  influence  on  Lincoln, 
40. 

Party  organization,  defined,  9 ;  inevitable, 
9;  function,  9;  influence  of  creed  obli 
gations  on,  10 ;  development,  11 ;  conserv 
ing  force,  11 ;  control  of  nominations, 
12 ;  hold,  12,227 ;  development  of  slavery- 
issue,  12-14 ;  issues  and  results  of  1860. 
14-17;  superficial  calm,  224,  354;  and 
war  management,  252 ;  review  of  pro 
gress  (1862-64),  259-262 ;  war  parties,  339. 
See  also  Democratic  party. 

Patriotic  outburst,   after  Sumter,  64-66, 


INDEX 


387 


73, 145, 150, 160 ;  after  Bull  Run,  96.  See 
also  Volunteering. 

Patterson,  Robert,  requisition  for  troops, 
89. 

Peace  Convention,  26. 

Pendleton,  G.  H.,  candidacy,  256. 

Peninsular  Campaign,  work  of  Sanitary 
Commission,  129, 130. 

Pennsylvania,  war  feeling,  87;  social 
character,  134;  financial  condition 
(1861),  158  ;  Copperhead  movement,  245 ; 
election  of  1864,  258  n.,  259 ;  enrollment 
resistance,  282 ;  draft  in,  309,  310.  See 
also  Curtin. 

Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  Cameron's 
action  concerning,  90, 91. 

People,  historical  evolution  of  the  term, 
266 ;  social  sense  of  the  term,  267 ;  politi 
cal  sense,  268, 273 ;  factor  of  personality 
in  America,  269 ;  and  nationality,  270- 
273;  amalgam  of  American,  273,  274; 
and  race  admixture,  275 ;  character  and 
intellect  as  factors,  275;  transfer  of 
racial  tendencies  to  America,  276 ;  their 
fusion  into  one  people,  277-279 ;  rise  of 
sovereignty  of,  through  federal  action, 
349 ;  through  war,  362 ;  and  Lincoln,  351 ; 
and  kingly  power  of  the  executive,  363, 
369. 

Phillips,  Wendell,  and  the  Civil  War,  148. 

Pierrepont,  Edwards.Union  Defense  Com 
mittee,  152. 

Police  power  and  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment,  373. 

Politics.  See  Copperheads,  Democratic 
Elections,  Party  organization. 

Popular  sovereignty,  and  slavery  issue, 
13 ;  fascination,  49 ;  Lincoln  probes,  50. 

Presbyterian  Church  in  the  Civil  War, 
133  n. 

President,  kingly  power,  and  the  people, 

363,  369.  See  also  Lincoln. 

Pryor,  R.  A.,  and  attack  on  Sumter,  57. 
"  Punch  "  on  British  sentiment,  94. 

Quartermaster  Department,  Meigs's  suc 
cess,  97;  red  tape,  97;  foreign  and 
home  purchases,  108. 

Race  problem,  evolution,  275 ;  considered, 

364,  365. 

Raymond,  H.  J.,  and  Lincoln's  reelection, 
255. 

Reconstruction,  Lincoln's  veto,  253. 

Recruiting.   See  Draft,  Volunteering. 

Red  tape,  federal,  and  the  loyal  govern 
ors,  95,  155,  213. 

Renan,  J.  E.,  on  race  and  nation,  271. 


Resources,  at  Lincoln's  command,  66,  73, 
80 ;  failure  to  utilize,  67-69,  74 ;  neces 
sity  of  using,  fully  urged,  71,  72;  con 
sidered  ample  (1861),  113;  war  pro 
longed  by  neglecting,  175, 176.  See  also 
Draft,  Finances,  Volunteering. 

Rhode  Island,  war  loans,  356  n. 

Rhodes,  J.  R,  on  the  Vallandigham  case, 
243  n. ;  on  Seymour  and  the  draft  riots, 
289  n. 

Richardson,  J.  P.,  on  the  draft,  288. 

Richardson,  W.  A.,  and  the  draft,  292. 

Riley,  W.  H.,  on  the  draft,  314. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  factor  of  personal 
ity,  269;  on  backwoodsmen,  273;  on 
good  Americanism,  279  n. ;  use  of  kingly 
power,  363. 

Russell,  W.  H.,  on  State-Rights,  1  n. ;  on 
the  South  and  slavery,  8  n. 

Russia,  stage  of  government,  366. 

Sanitary  Commission,  origin,  126-128; 
services,  128, 129, 132, 174 ;  Meigs  on,  129, 
130 ;  motives,  130 ;  western  branch,  131 ; 
advice  on  recruiting,  171-174 ;  attitude 
of  administration,  174. 

Scott,  Winfleld,  inadequacy,  70;  confi 
dence  in,  93 ;  and  McClellan,  109. 

Secession,  factors  of  failure,  xxiii ;  South 
Carolina,  preparation,  17 ;  slavery  basis, 
18, 37,  58 ;  not  a  conspiracy,  18 ;  sincer 
ity,  19,  59 ;  right,  33  n. ;  and  Lincoln's 
minority  election,  36 ;  Lincoln's  inaugu- 
gural  on,  52 ;  develops  power  of  the 
Union,  371.  See  also  Union. 

Secret  organizations,  Copperhead,  in 
1864,  311,  342 ;  in  New  York  City,  312 ; 
in  Northwest,  312 ;  plans  for  a  rising, 
343 ;  Morton's  knowledge  of,  343 ;  con 
vention  of  Sons  of  Liberty,  343;  and 
state  sovereignty,  344;  condemnation 
of  leaders,  344. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  and  threats  of  secession, 
15 ;  and  compromise,  27 ;  and  irrepres 
sible  conflict,  48 ;  vanity  of  leadership, 
52,  55,  56,  76,  77,  208 ;  scheme  of  policy, 
54,  55, 65 ;  inadequate  conception  of  the 
task,  71 ;  and  Lincoln's  mastership,  84, 
329;  and  the  call  for  300,000,  171,  212; 
question  of  premiership,  209 ;  Cameron 
resents  interference  of,  209, 210 ;  on  the 
political  calm,  224 ;  on  the  draft  (1864), 
314 ;  necessity  of  arbitrary  action,  353. 

Seymour,  Horatio,  campaign  cry,  225; 
and  state  sovereignty,  228, 233, 240,  260, 
261 ;  political  character,  239,  303-305 ; 
and  election  of  1864, 256, 257 ;  and  Stan- 
ton's  invitation,  282 ;  recruiting  system, 


388 


INDEX 


282 ;  on  the  draft  and  State-Eights,  284- 
287;  and  the  draft  riots,  288  n.,  289-293; 
appeal  for  suspension  of  the  draft,  293- 
296;  Lincoln's  reply,  296-298;  failure 
to  grasp  the  situation,  297-299;  and 
state  protection  of  the  draft,  300-302 ; 
and  Lincoln,  302,  303  n. ;  and  Andrew, 
302 ;  coerced  to  his  duty,  305 ;  historical 
judgment  on,  306. 

Sherman,  John,  on  arbitrary  arrests,  353 ; 
on  popularity  of  the  war,  355. 

Sherman,  T.  W.,  Massachusetts  troops 
for,  75-77,  198, 199. 

Sherman,  W.  T.,  on  duration  of  the  war, 
114;  on  Grant's  Wilderness  assaults, 
353. 

Sickles,  D.  E.,  political  attitude  (1860), 
21 ;  volunteers,  182 ;  controversy  over 
brigade,  182. 

Simpson,  Matthew,  in  the  Civil  War, 
133  n. 

Slavery,  and  State-Eights,  l,  18 ;  develop 
ment  of  issue,  12-14 ;  issue  in  1860, 14, 
15;  as  a  blessing,  15  n. ;  Lincoln  and 
territorial,  25, 31-33 ;  Lincoln  and  state, 
32 ;  as  corner-stone  of  Confederacy,  58 ; 
attitude  of  Indiana  and  Massachusetts, 
147-149;  Lincoln's  reconstruction  veto, 
253;  Democratic  attitude  (1862),  340. 
.  See  also  Emancipation,  Negroes. 

Smith,  Goldwin,  on  the  Union,  3, 4  n. 

Smith,  E.  K.,  as  Curtin's  agent,  158. 

Society,  force,  125,  132 ;  use  in  the  Civil 
War,  126, 132, 176 ;  women  in  the  Civil 
War,  126, 131, 154,  174 ;  Christian  Com 
mission,  131;  Union  Clubs,  133  n.  See 
also  People,  Sanitary  Commission. 

Sons  of  Liberty.  See  Secret  organiza 
tions. 

South  Carolina,  preparation  for  seces 
sion,  17. 

Sovereignty.    See  People,  State. 

Stanton,  E.  M.,  and  the  Union-savers,  23, 
24 ;  appointment,  101 ;  character,  102, 
170 ;  and  Lincoln,  103 ;  as  Secretary  of 
War,  103-105;  and  the  governors,  104, 
170, 213-215 ;  Puritan  spirit,  104 ;  stops 
recruiting,  114 ;  on  military  force  of  the 
negroes,  121 ;  on  the  Sanitary  Commis 
sion,  130;  and  Jackson's  raid,  167, 169; 
on  necessity  of  red  tape,  213 ;  influence 
on  centralizing  tendencies,  223 ;  on  re 
sistance  to  enrollment  (1862),  281  n.; 
and  Seymour,  282 ;  and  adjudication  of 
draft  law,  295  n. ;  on  efficiency  of  the 
draft,  310,  315;  and  Indiana  finances, 
338;  on  rumor  of  his  resignation,  345; 
necessity  of  arbitrary  action,  353. 


State  sovereignty,  and  slavery,  1, 18 ;  re 
crudescence,  240 ;  effect  on  the  war, 

„  241 ;  reserved  right,  286  n ;  Sons  of  Lib 
erty  on,  344;  impotent  without  Union, 
370,  372 ;  dogma  overthrown  by  the 
Civil  War,  377.  See  also  Union. 

States,  war  functions,  x-xii;  disuse  as 
recruiting  agencies,  xiii,  xv ;  opposition 
to  federal  measures,  xiv;  clash  with 
national  authority,  177 ;  early  independ 
ent  action,  177 ;  opposition  to  national 
banks,  358 ;  term  possible  only  in  the 
Union,  369.  See  also  State  sovereignty, 
Union,  Volunteering,  and  states  and 
governors  by  name. 

Stephens,  A.  H.,  "  corner-stone  "  speech, 
58 ;  on  Altoona  conference,  232. 

Stevens,  J.  A.,  and  recruiting,  221. 

Stevens,  Thaddeus,  agitator,  225;  and 
Lincoln's  renomination,  251. 

Stone,  W.  M.,  on  Copperheads,  341  n. 

Strong,  G.  C.,  and  Andrew-Butler  contro 
versy,  204. 

Strong,  G.  F.,  Sanitary  Commission,  174. 

Sumner,  Charles,  and  Fremont's  procla 
mation,  107 ;  and  the  war  powers,  116 ; 
social  taboo,  193;  on  Democrats  (1863), 
354. 

Sumter,  Fort,  necessity  of  action,  56 ;  at 
tempt  to  supply,  57  ;  attack,  57 ;  moral 
effect,  59 ;  patriotic  effect,  64-66,  73, 145, 
150 ;  Lincoln,  on  81. 

Tappan,  Lewis,  remonstrance  to  An 
drew,  153. 

Territories,  slavery  issue,  13 ;  Lincoln  on 
slavery  in,  25,  31-33. 

Thayer,  J.  S.,  political  attitude  (1861), 
21. 

Thompson,  Jacob,  and  Copperhead  ris 
ing,  343. 

Townsend,  Frederick,  on  draft  resist 
ance,  287,  293. 

Trade  union  as  a  fetish,  367. 

Treason,  and  Copperheadism,  xxiv,  238, 
339,  341 ;  subsidence  of  hatred  of,  92, 
93. 

Union,  idea  (I860) ,  x,  1-3 ;  legal  basis,  2  n. ; 
no  compact,  3,  4;  colonial  sentiment 
for,  5,  376 ;  continental  force,  6 ;  inevit- 
ableness,  6;  Marshall  formulates  idea, 
6 ;  sentiment  to  1850,  7, 12 ;  and  compro 
mises,  13,  20,  24-28,  30 ;  education  per 
verted  by  slavery,  17-20;  Northern 
types  of  savers  (I860),  20-24 ;  latent 
forces  during  slavery  control,  34-36; 
Lincoln's  statement,  159 ;  and  volunteer- 


INDEX 


389 


ing,  219,  221;  and  the  draft  as  an  act 
of  administration,  315-318 ;  Democratic 
opinion  (.1862),  340;  and  sovereignty 
of  the  people,  349 ;  influence  of  popular 
loans,  357;  of  national  banks,  358; 
development  of  power  through  war, 
359-3G2,  371,  375,  377;  effect  of  emanci 
pation  issue,  361 ;  and  the  "  state,"  368- 
370;  necessary  to  the  welfare  of  the 
States,  370,  372,  378 ;  effect  of  the  war 
amendments,  372-375;  and  Democratic 
platform  (1864),  377.  See  also  Copper 
heads,  Lincoln,  Secession,  State  sover 
eignty,  States. 

Union  Defense  Committee  of  New  York, 
committee  of  correspondence,  152 ; 
extra-legal  activity,  161  n.,  179,  180; 
Lincoln  upholds,  170 ;  and  call  for 
300,000, 171 ;  conflict  with  state  author 
ities,  180,  183 ;  and  Sickles's  brigade, 
183. 

Upfold,  George,  crudeness,  142. 

Utica,  draft  resistance,  288. 

Vallandigham,  C.  L.,  arrest  and  banish 
ment,  240, 242 ;  candidacy  for  governor, 
244;  return,  256;  .and  the  enrollment, 
283 ;  sentence  of  history,  306 ;  and  Sons 
of  Liberty,  344. 

Van  Buren,  W.  H.,  Sanitary  Commission, 
126,  127, 174. 

Volunteering,  national  mismanagement, 
xiii :  disuse  of  state  agencies,  xiii,  xv ; 
ninety-days  call,  61 ;  three-years  call,  62 , 
eager  response,  71-74, 150,  157, 160 ;  re 
peatedly  checked  by  administration, 
87-92,  114,  159,  166,  169,  171 ;  States  urge 
acceptance  of  more  troops,  90, 146, 161, 
165 ;  spirit  after  Bull  Run,  96 ;  and  eman 
cipation,  117,  121,  168,325,  326;  effect  of 
administration  discouraging,  122-124; 
welfare  of  the  soldiers,  151;  reenlist- 
ment  of  three-months'  men,  162 ;  hurry 
call  (May,  1862),  167;  response,  168 ;  call 
for  300,000  (1862),  171,  211-213,  221  n.; 
Sanitary  Commission  on  recruiting, 
171-174 ;  necessity  of  steady  activity, 
173,174;  federal  interference  in  state 
recruiting,  180-184,  189-191, 197-200,  206, 
221 ;  control  of  appointment  of  general 
officers,  184-189;  Andrew-Butler  re 
cruiting  controversy,  199-208;  state 
right  to  commission,  210, 211 ;  and  fed 
eral  red  tape,  213, 214 ;  national  control 
of  troops  after  organization,  215-218 ; 
and  growing  central  control,  219,  221 ; 
Lincoln's  personal  interest,  220 ;  clash 


in  recruiting  new  and  old  regiments, 
220,  221;  movement  to  prevent,  220; 
balance  sheet  (1863),  281. 

Wade,  B.  F.,  manifesto  against  Lincoln, 
253, 254. 

Wadsworth,  J.  S.,  question  of  appoint 
ment,  184,  185. 

War  and  a  third  party,  246,  247. 

War  powers,  Lincoln's  use,xviii,  116,219, 
221-223,  320;  necessity,  243,  245,  348; 
kingly  function,  363.  See  also  Arbitrary 
arrests,  Emancipation. 

Washington,  George,  and  the  Union,  6. 

Washington,  relief  (1861),  62,  63 ;  scares, 
92,  111,  167. 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  source  of  the  Consti 
tution,  In.,  4;  and  the  Union,  7;  and 
doctrine  of  nationality,  34  n. 

Webster,  Fletcher,  regiment,  150, 162. 

Webster,  Noah,  on  direct  action  of  the 
federal  government,  350. 

Webster,  Peletiah,  on  direct  action  of  the 
federal  government,  350. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  compromise  plan,  27 ;  on 
Lincoln  after  election,  29 ;  and  call  for 
300,000,  212 ;  on  volunteering  spirit 
(1862), 221  n.;  and  Lincoln's  reelection, 
255. 

Weer,  William,  removal,  216. 

Whittier,  J.  G.,  on  abolitionists  and 
emancipation,  336. 

Willis,  N.  P.,  on  Lincoln,  44. 

Wilmot  Proviso,  13. 

Wilson,  Henry,  and  Lincoln's  renomina- 
tion,  251. 

Wilson,  J.  F.,  reports  Copperhead  -move 
ment,  220. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  on  secession,  14  n. ;  on 
the  Union,  34  n. ;  on  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation,  335  n. 

Winthrop,  R.  C.,  and  election  of  1864, 257. 

Women  in  the  Civil  War,  126, 131, 154, 174. 

Wood,  Fernando,  and  the  draft,  293,  299. 

Woods,  E,  C.,  and  the  Sanitary  Commis 
sion,  127. 

Woodburn,  J.  A.,  on  war  parties,  340. 

Wool,  J.  E.,  on  relief  of  Washington, 62  n. ; 
and  Union  Defense  Committee,  180; 
and  enrollment  resistance,  281  n. 

Wright,  J.  A.,  and  recruiting,  90,  91. 

Wyman,  Jeffries,  Sanitary  Commission, 


Yates,  Richard,  regulates  commerce  pass 
ing  Cairo,  178. 
Young,  J.  R.,  on  Altoona  conference,  228. 


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Weeden,  W.B. 

War  government, 
federal  and  state, 


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221028 


